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Propositions 
1. Nay were ye to know with certainty of mind (ye be ware). 
Al-Quran 
2. For farmers, control over irrigation water is like control over their own lives - as water is 
life. 
This thesis 
3. It is better to clean your own watercourse than to borrow an irrigation water turn. 
This thesis: A farmer from watercourse FD 84-L 
4. Nowadays, no one accepts authority from others, everyone wants to be an elder of the 
village. We lack unity therefore we can not organise collective action anymore. 
This thesis: A farmer from watercourse FD 84-L 
5. Although some of the actions by farmers can be called reactive management, in general 
farmers do plan their irrigation management activities and they have learned through 
experience to manage their irrigation system. Their management can not be classified as 
'contingent management' and is rather performance oriented. 
This Thesis 
6. The assumption that watercourses are managed collectively because of the fact that 
farmers are grouped together is an over-simplification of the realities in which water 
management takes place in a watercourse command area. 
This Thesis 
7. I am a queen and you are a queen as well, which of us shall carry the water? 
A Pukhtoon Proverb 
8. The radical of one century is the conservative of the next. The radical invents the views. 
When he has worn them out, the conservative adopts them. 
Mark Twain 
9. Time present and time past are both perhaps present in time future, and time future 
continues in time past. 
T. S. Elliot 
10. Washing one's hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to 
side with the powerful, not to be neutral. 
Paulo Freire 
ABSTRACT 
The irrigation systems of Punjab, Pakistan are not functioning effectively in relation to design 
criteria or farmers' needs. This under-performance is attributed to among others, scarcity of 
irrigation water, changes in cropping intensity and mis-allocation of available resources. 
Presently irrigation system management in Pakistan is undergoing institutional reforms- to 
introduce Participatory Irrigation Management with involvement of new Farmers 
Organisations in water management- that is expected to result in improved water distribution 
performance and financial sustainability of the system. This study was conducted to 
investigate the impact, value and capability of farmers' local water management actions in a 
large-scale canal irrigation system, to contribute in the wider debates about Participatory 
Irrigation Management and sustainability of groundwater use in such schemes in Pakistan. 
An interdisciplinary, socio-technical approach was used as the main methodological approach 
for this study. A comparative study method was used to analyse farmers' actions for water 
management. The research was undertaken in the Fordwah Irrigation System, which serves a 
command area of 232,000 hectares. Six watercourses along the two distributaries (at the tail 
of the system) were selected for in-depth study. Fieldwork was conducted between November 
1996 to April 1998. Water delivery performance was measured at the outlets of these 
watercourses. Collective and individual water management actions were studied to 
understand their dynamics and their impact on improving water delivery to the farm. 
The study suggests that there is neither a standard set of water management activities nor they 
are strictly planned, in the study area. Farmers' actions are mostly subject to their desires to 
match water demand with supply, however one can still see some of the water management 
activities that are inevitable to operate the system. The actions taken and the way and time 
these activities are organised and performed is difficult to predict in advance. Collective 
action is undertaken more at the watercourse or higher level in the irrigation system, whereas 
individual actions are mainly undertaken at the farm level. 
The four main findings of the study are: 1) that fanners are knowledgeable and capable actors 
who take actions that improve water supply and compensate for dysfunctional delivery; 2) 
farmers actions are not only technically and economically sound but also have motives other 
than just economic benefit; 3) farmers' management cannot be classified as 'contingent 
management' and is rather performance-oriented; and 4) current performance indicators, 
which are not able to show realities of social relations shaping water availability, could be 
improved by including criteria to assess performance of irrigation system from the 
perspectives of different actors. By incorporating the way farmers intervene with the system 
and thus appropriate the water delivery, such new performance studies could portray local 
water dynamics of a system and support recommendations based on reality to improve the 
functioning of the irrigation system. 
The patterns of conjunctive water use at the farm level suggest that in future groundwater 
must continue to provide significant amount of water for crop production. Farmers already 
organise management actions in the irrigation system: new Farmers' Organisation may 
improve the accountability of these to other farmers. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The large irrigation systems in Pakistan were constructed to protect the region from the threat 
of famine and to open up new areas for settlement to generate income to the then colonial 
British Government by the sale of crown waste lands (Michel, 1967; Bandaragoda and 
Badruddin, 1992; Gilmartin 1994). With the objective of maximizing the production per unit 
of surface water available, the water was spread thinly over as large an area as possible to 
achieve maximum social benefits from the distribution of available surface water resources. 
This concept of irrigation is referred to as Protective Irrigation1. The irrigation systems 
constructed, based on the protective irrigation concept, are characterized as supply based 
systems - which do not respond to changes in demand - with low design cropping intensities 
and high water 'duties'2 (Jurriens et al, 1996). Canal water provided was sufficient to irrigate 
only one third of the command area3. Infrastructure was needed that could distribute water 
proportionally and equitably. Because of the high silt content in the river waters, 
infrastructure was also required to distribute silt proportionally to the secondary channels and 
tertiary outlets in order to avoid siltation (or sedimentation) in the main and secondary canals 
and therefore reduce the maintenance requirements. To limit human interference in the 
operation of the system, regulation points were minimised and the watercourses were 
provided with ungated tertiary outlets. In the recent past, research on the performance of 
these irrigation systems at primary and secondary sub-system levels by the International 
Water Management Institute (IWMI) (Vander Velde, 1991; Kuper and Kijne, 1992; Bhutta 
and Vander Velde, 1992; Habib and Kuper, 1996; and Kuper 1998) showed that the 
distribution of canal water is neither proportional nor equitable anymore. 
The poor functioning of the irrigation system in Pakistan has been a source of concern since 
the 1960's, and since then it has been the subject of considerable external assistance and 
internal policy reforms. This under performance is mainly attributed to the scarcity of surface 
water. The previously planned scarcity now manifests itself in inadequacy, unreliability and 
inequity in the distribution of surface water for farmers at watercourse level. The surface 
water scarcity is not only a reflection of changes in the cropping patterns and cropping 
intensities, but also shortcomings in agency management. Deteriorating infrastructure due to 
poor maintenance of the canals is resulting in unreliable and inequitable canal water 
distribution. Poor cost-recovery is considered one of the main reasons for lack of funds 
available for the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure (Strosser, 1997). These 
discrepancies in the distribution of surface water also lead to other problems like water-
logging and salinity, and over exploitation of groundwater4 at farm level (Badruddin, 1993 
and World Bank, 1994). To address these problems in the management of irrigation systems, 
the World Bank (1994) proposed a number of institutional changes for irrigation management 
turnover. 
Jurriens et al, (1996) has described the concept of protective irrigation in depth. 
2
 Water duty is the area to be irrigated by a unit discharge. It is expressed as number of acres/ft3/s. 
3
 In fact canal water was provided to protect the crop from failure, which is reflected from the fact that a fanner 
is supposed to pay full water tax, provided his crop reaches maturity, even if he receives only one irrigation turn 
during the whole season (Kuper, 1997). 
4
 Groundwater is currently contributing about 30 to 40 % of the total irrigation water at the farm-level (this 
study; Vander Velde and Johnson, 1992; Nespak/SGI, 1991). 
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The policy of Irrigation Management Turnover (IMT) to the farmers was considered as an 
option to resolve some of these management problems of irrigation system in Pakistan. 
However, after several rounds of discussions between the different stakeholders in Pakistan 
and the World Bank an agreement was reached to decentralise, instead of privatise, the 
irrigation system management and to promote farmers' participation (Strosser, 1997). The 
Government of Pakistan announced a policy decision in September 1995 to introduce 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) in the primary irrigation system level, and to 
transform Provincial Irrigation Department(s) (ID) into Provincial Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority (ies) (PIDA). As a result the Provincial Assembly of Punjab Province has also 
approved a bill in 1997 to form the PIDA and the Area Water Boards (AWBs)5. The 
Government of Punjab is now preparing to test these AWBs as pilot projects in the province. 
New local level water management organisation has already been initiated at watercourse and 
distributary on pilot basis. 
One of the anticipated impacts of PIM is the better functioning of irrigation systems, in both 
water supply and administration. Its objectives are not only to improve the performance of 
the irrigation system through better operation and maintenance, but also to enhance 
accountability of the managers of the system to the water users. However, the success of PIM 
in other countries is taken as a guarantee of successful transfer of the irrigation system in 
Pakistan too. Nevertheless, the impact of the PIM is not yet fully evaluated even in those 
countries where it was presented as a success story. Therefore, before the implementation of 
this Act, it is very important to know the existing level of management as achieved by the 
water users of the irrigation system in relation to the water supply conditions. Not only that, 
the implementation of this Act should also be based on an understanding of what farmers can 
do, and on the interactions between farmers and Irrigation Department in shaping water 
delivery. Very little is known about how various water management actions on a daily basis 
by farmers are shaped by the poor functioning of the irrigation system at primary and 
secondary sub-system levels. In reality, no one has studied systematically how farmers' water 
management activities can amend water distribution to improve outcomes of the irrigation 
system at watercourse and farm level. The objectives of this study are thus to improve 
understanding of the impact, value and capability of farmers' local water management actions 
in large-scale canal systems, to contribute in the wider debates about PIM and sustainability 
of groundwater use in such schemes in Pakistan. 
The study of water delivery problems and their resolution has given rise to a field of study on 
design-management dimensions, which has also diverged in themes of study. A practical 
interest in problem diagnosis has triggered a range of water management assessment 
methodologies, one of which is Performance Assessment Methodologies. Vincent (2001) 
notes how these have been developed by IWMI in particular since 1985, both to show types 
of delivery problems, and to be used for comparative studies that can evaluate effects of 
investment or reform programs. Since 1994 they have also been developed beyond water 
supply analysis to attempt to evaluate the whole 'design-management environment' of an 
irrigated fanning area (Murray-Rust and Snellen, 1993). However, Vincent also notes that 
5
 PIDA will act at the provincial level, whereas AWB will be formed at each canal command to distribute canal 
water among the distributaries. Each major canal command within a province will have an Area Water Board 
(AWB). These AWBs will have representatives of water users and the Government. The Farmers' Organizations 
(FOs) will be formed on each distributary (i.e., at secondary sub-system level). The FO consists of 
representatives of the water users from all the watercourses in that distributary. Water Users Associations 
(WUAs) will be the lowest unit of organization in which all the water users of a watercourse command area will 
be represented. 
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these studies are often not 'user focused' in terms of understanding what people can or cannot 
do locally with the technology for delivery of water, or organising collective action for 
management needs like the maintenance or fee payment. Thus since the 1970's there has 
been another field of study of design-management interaction, to debate what can work and 
how for the delivery of water. 
In the past, performance assessment has been done mainly on the performance of irrigation 
systems at the primary and secondary sub-system levels (Bishop and Long, 1984; Clemmens 
and Dedrick, 1984; Sharma et al, 1991; and Bird and Gillot, 1992). However, while these 
studies are very helpful in making the performance of the irrigation system visible, they only 
show the performance of one (or sometimes two) elements of the irrigation system and do not 
consider the links between the different elements of the irrigation system in detail. Besides, 
these studies deal with the performance of water delivery system at main or secondary level 
and do not take into account of what happens inside the watercourse. Moreover these studies 
also did not capture the part played by farmers intervention in achieving these performance 
levels. Perry (1995) has already stated that the performance evaluation of an irrigation system 
at primary and secondary sub-system levels in isolation from the performance evaluation of 
an irrigation system at watercourse and farm level would not provide full understanding of 
the system. However, little work has been done on the performance of the surface water 
supply system at watercourse level. 
The alternative line of study of design-system management relations has a focus on users and 
their interaction with their technology to ensure water supply. Rather than supply technical 
arrangements for ideal conditions and prescriptions for better main system management, they 
look to learn from interactions between technology and people, people and people, and 
central and local domains of management to see what might be workable options in 
developing or transforming irrigation. Recently studies have begun which use flow criteria, 
which are also called performance criteria, as a means to show the wider water conditions and 
what local actions make water delivery 'actualised' (Lankford and Gowing, 1996; Vos, 
2001). Such studies use flow criteria now called 'performance indicators', but as a means to 
show the wider water conditions in which actions take place for better water supply, and also 
the effects of these interactions. These studies (Mollinga, 1998; Pradhan, 1996; Van der 
Zaag, 1992. Horst, 1998) of farmer-system interactions have debated which kind of 
technologies work better in different agrarian and water supply contexts, and are still quite 
rare for large irrigation systems. 
Mollinga's study (1998) of the Tungabadra provides an insight of the social relations 
emerging in a water-scarce system with gated pipe outlets. There is limited work to date 
studying social relations and water management activities in large-scale systems with fixed 
division structures and with extensive groundwater development. How do farmers in such 
conditions make estimates, choices and preferences over actions to improve their water 
supply? Groundwater is often treated as just a black box response to dysfunctional canal 
supply whereas a farmer focus can help understand better the strategies that shape 
conjunctive use and its sustainable use. The present study was conducted to study the impact 
of farmers' water management actions in a conjunctive water use environment of Fordwah 
Irrigation System. 
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1.2 STUDY SITE 
Research was undertaken in the two distributaries of the Fordwah Irrigation System, Punjab, 
where the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) had a wider research program in 
which the researcher could undertake further work in sample watercourses. This gave the 
researcher access to additional data for analysis. The following paragraphs present 
information about the research site i.e. Fordwah Irrigation System and the selection of 
distributaries for carrying out in-depth research. 
Fordwah Irrigation System 
The Fordwah system irrigates about 232,000 hectares (ha) of Culturable Command Area6 
(CCA) out of a Gross Command Area (GCA) of 301,000 ha and is classified under the 
cotton-wheat agro-ecological zone with cotton and forage as main kharif (summer) crop and 
wheat and forage as main rabi (winter) crops. The annual precipitation of 200 mm7, which 
mostly falls in the monsoon season (July to September) is much less than the evaporation of 
2400 mm (Kuper, 1997) hence irrigation is essential for the cultivation in this area. 
The Fordwah canal offtakes from Suleimanke headwork8 that was constructed from 1921 — 
1926 (and opened in April 1926) under the Sutlej Valley Project (Sutlej Valley Project, 
1933). This project was initiated to make use of the surplus water of the Beas River, a 
tributary of the River Sutlej (Sutlej Valley Project, 1920). Initially the source of irrigation 
water was the River Sutlej (and Beas), but India was awarded the rights to water from Sutlej 
(and Beas) as a result of Indus Basin Treaty between Pakistan and India in 1960. Afterwards 
link canals were constructed to convey water from the Balloki headwork to the Suleimanke 
headwork (the layout of the irrigation network in Pakistan is shown in Appendix I). This 
irrigation system has two different sources of water, in the flood season (mainly kharif) it gets 
water from river Chenab and rest of the year it gets water from Mangla dam9 that is built on 
river Jhehlum. A schematic diagram of the Fordwah irrigation system is presented in the 
Figure 1.1. 
The main canal is relatively short (about 13 kms.) and bifurcates into two branches, 
McLeodganj branch and Fordwah branch, at RD10 44. Fordwah Branch is a non-perennial 
canal that receives water, from Suleimanke headwork, only in kharif season (April 16 to 
October 15). However, 6 distributaries along this canal are perennial among which 5 lie in the 
Chishtian Sub-Division. The reasons for keeping other distributaries non-perennial were 
limited availability of surface water, historical water rights1' and negotiations between the 
then Bahawalpur State (of which the study area is a part of) and the colonial Government of 
British India (which initiated the project) (Sutlej Valley Project, 1933). A feeder canal, called 
6
 Culturable Command Area is the irrigable area for which water is allocated. 
7
 This value is quoted in Kuper 1997. He averaged the 30 years of rainfall data of the Bahawalnagar and 
Bahawalpur meteorological stations. However rainfall data collected for this study showed a high rainfall during 
the study period. Farmers also confirmed more than average rainfall during that year of 1997. 
8
 Three canals off-take from Suleimanke headwork: Eastern Sadiqia and Fordwah canals from the Left Bank and 
Pakpattan canal from the Right Bank of the headwork. 
9
 The route of water in the flood season is the Qadirabad-Balloki link canal and Balloki-Suleimanke link canal. 
In the dry season when water comes from the Mangla dam it is conveyed through Rasool-Qadirabad link canals, 
Qadarabad-Balloki link canals and then Balloki-Suleimanke link canals. 
10
 RD is Reduced Distance from the head of the Canal. 1 RD = 1000 ft. = 304.8 m. 
' ' There were already some inundation irrigation canals, which were used for the irrigation especially during the 
flood season. Farmers who were using these canals were assumed to have right on the water from the Sutlej 
River and therefore provided with the perennial canal water supply. 
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Sadiqia-Ford Feeder, caries water for these perennial distributaries from the Eastern Sadiqia 
canal, which also offtakes at the Suleimanke headwork, to the Fordwah branch canal. All the 
perennial distributaries except one lie in one sub-division of the Fordwah Irrigation system, 
which is Chishtian sub-division. The feeder canal comes under the rotation of Eastern Sadiqia 
irrigation system; therefore its management also influences the Fordwah irrigation system. In 
addition to carrying water for the perennial distributaries of Fordwah canal in winter, the 
feeder canal also supplies water to two distributaries of which one is perennial and the other 
is non-perennial. 
Fordwah Canal 
Fordwah Branch Canal 
Daulat Distributary 
Mohar Distributary 
Phogan Distributary 
Khem Gar Distributary 
Jagir Distributary 
Shahar Farid Distributary • 
Masood Distributary 
Soda Distributary 
Azim Distributary 
Eastern Sadiqia Canal 
Sadiqia-Ford Feeder Canal 
• 3L Distributary 
• 4L Distributary 
5L Distributary 
Fordwah Distributary 
Mahmood Distributary 
Figure 1.1: Location of the two selected distributaries, Mahmood distributary and 
Fordwah distributary (in the Chishtian Sub-division) along the Fordwah 
Branch Canal 
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Recent studies (Hart, 1996; Habib and Kuper, 1996; Habib and Kuper, 1998; Kuper, 1997; 
Visser et al, 1998) on canal operations of Fordwah Canal Irrigation system have shown that 
the system is neither equitable nor proportional. These studies have also demonstrated a large 
fluctuation in the daily discharges of the distributaries along the canal, which are amplified as 
water moves downstream. This results in considerable discharge fluctuation at the tertiary 
outlet and therefore at the farm-gate. These fluctuations at the farm-gate cause serious 
problems for farmers12, as they effect the number of bunded units that could be irrigated in 
one canal water turn (Sarwar et al., 1997). 
The Punjab Irrigation Department (PID) is currently responsible for the management of the 
main system that is from the headwork to the tertiary or watercourse outlet. The watercourse 
outlet is locally called mogha. Below the mogha a group of farmers are supposed to distribute 
the canal water and maintain the watercourse, however the guidelines for water distribution 
are provided in form of fixed roster (warabandi) schedule (section 2.5.2 explains different 
kind of warabandi schedules). 
1.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
The core concern of this thesis is to see how farmers take actions to improve their water 
supply, to acquire canal or groundwater, in the given conditions of water availability in a 
system that is known to face serious water inadequacies. The study was also concerned to 
undertake an interdisciplinary approach that could provide a focus on users actions and inter-
relations, rather than an approach where system-level characteristics were the main object of 
study and comparison. 
The method used in this study was a comparative study of irrigators' actions in six selected 
watercourses from two selected distributaries. Water availability, from canal water and 
groundwater was taken as a key factor in the selection of distributaries and watercourses. 
However, some other practical considerations also influenced the choice of the distributaries. 
These were: 1) IWMI-Pakistan already had a good basic data base of the area and the 
distributaries; and 2) It was convenient to work in these two distributaries in terms of 
mobility. Since IWMI-Pakistan had a field office in Hasilpur, a town very close to these 
distributaries, it was relatively easy for the field staff to commute this distance. Some of the 
research staff still had to cover a distance of 42 kilometers daily. The two selected 
distributaries, Fordwah distributary and Mahmood distributary, are perennial distributaries at 
the tail end of Fordwah branch canal13. 
Two variables were considered in selecting sample watercourses. The first was average water 
canal water availability in kharif\994 to all the watercourses along the chosen distributaries. 
This volume of water was estimated by a hydraulic model, Simulation of Irrigation Canals 
(SIC)14. The second variable that influenced the selection of sample watercourses was 
12
 Keller (1986) Freeman (1990) and Lowdermilk (1990) have written about the variability of water supply and 
its effect on the organisation of water distribution elsewhere. 
13
 There are three distributaries at the tail of the Fordwah branch canal: Azim distributary, Fordwah distributary 
and Mahmood distributary (see figure 1.1). Azim is a non-perennial distributary that off-takes from the left bank 
of the canal, whereas both Fordwah and Mahmood are perennial distributaries and off-take from right and 
middle of the Fordwah branch canal respectively. 
14
 Simulation of Hydraulic Canals (SIC) is a hydraulic simulation model developed by the Irrigation Division of 
Research Center for Agricultural and Environmental Engineering (CEMAGREF) Montpellier, France. This 
model is based on one-dimensional hydraulic analysis for transitional and steady state flow. 
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documented tubewell density per 100 ha in the watercourses of the two distributaries. Using 
these two variables, four clusters of watercourses were identified along the Fordwah 
distributary and two along Mahmood distributary. Along the Fordwah distributary, the first 
cluster comprised of the watercourses with above average canal water supply and above 
average tubewell density. The second cluster has watercourses with above average canal 
water supply and below average density of tubewells. Watercourses with below average canal 
water supply and above average tubewell density are in third cluster. The fourth cluster 
comprises of watercourses with below average canal water supply and below average 
tubewell density. Along the Mahmood distributary watercourses with above average tubewell 
density were kept in one group and watercourses with below average tubewell density were 
kept in another group. One watercourse from each cluster was chosen along the two 
distributaries. Random selection methods were used partly at the choice of the researcher to 
gain appreciation of the diversity of conditions in the system, but also at the choice of the 
researcher and the of the host institute so that certain statistical tests could be performed in 
analysing data, both for this study and in the wider programme. Alongside this study, some 
special analysis has been made of events in other distributaries and watercourses, which were 
relevant to the scope of this study. While the watercourses were first selected randomly, the 
selection was developed so that the watercourses were spread along the distributary, to take 
into account water supply to the upper and lower halves of the distributary. After the 
selection of the watercourses it was found that one of the watercourse along the Fordwah 
distributary was very small with only two cultivators (3 owners). However, after a reflection 
it was kept to compare its difference of water management activities undertaken with a 
watercourse with a higher number of cultivators. Further it was assumed that it would be 
easier to get in-depth information about the water management activities in case of a 
watercourse with fewer cultivators. 
The watercourses selected for in-depth study were 1030-R and 11860-TC along the 
Mahmood distributary and 38830-L, 67670-L, 84140-L, and 96692-R along the Fordwah 
distributary15. They belong to group 1 and 2 of Mahmood distributary and clusters 2, 1, 3 and 
4 of Fordwah distributary respectively. Location of the selected watercourses along the 
distributaries is presented in the Figure 1.2. These watercourses are referred to as MD 1-R, 
MD 11-TC, FD 38-L, FD 67-L, FD 84-L and FD 96-R in the rest of the thesis. More details 
of these watercourses, the irrigators using them and their water supply are given in chapter 3. 
Then followed a period of initial monitoring and studies of actions which helped to define 
measurement points of focus in this study, as outlined in chapter 2. Fieldwork was undertaken 
from November 1996 to April 1998. Data was collected for three crop seasons: rabi 1996-97, 
kharif 1997, and rabi 1997-9816. Facilities to successfully undertake the fieldwork were 
provided by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). This study had the 
privilege to get short-term assistance from a Dutch student/researcher, and a national student 
from the Water Management Department of the NWFP Agricultural University, Peshawar. 
Long-term assistance was provided by three IWMI field-assistants. The students joined the 
team for six months each. The Dutch student/researcher supported the research by getting 
information regarding some social aspects of the water management activities especially 
related with tenancy conditions. The national student assisted in collecting some physical 
data e.g. conveyance losses. Major data collection was provided by the IWMI field assistants, 
15
 The number of the watercourses refer to their location along a distributary (that are expressed in RD) and the 
side (Right - R or Left - L) from which they off-take. 
16
 rabi is the winter crop and kharif is summer crop. 
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who collected daily data regarding water distribution and other activities throughout the 
period of data collection. 
I I Selected Watercoirees 
/ \ / FwdwSiDistftaiav 
/ \ J Mtauod Distributary 
From Right to Left 
Mahmood 
Mahmood 
Fordwah 
Fordwah 
Fordwah 
Fordwah 
1030-R 
11860-TC 
38830-L 
67160-L 
84140-L 
96692-R 
(MD 1-R) 
(MD11-TC) 
(FD 38-L) 
(FD 67-L) 
(FD 84-L) 
(FD 96-R) 
Figure 1.2: Location of sample watercourses along the two selected distributaries, 
Fordwah and Mahmood, of the Fordwah Irrigation System 
Two major events happened during the course of data collection, one was the unexpected 
canal water scarcity because of some infrastructural problems and the other was visit of the 
Prime Minister to the study area. At the end of May 1997, a weir of one of the two link 
canals17 was washed away, therefore the total inflow to the Suleimanke headwork was 
decreased to about half. This incidence caused unusual water scarcity during June 1997 . 
The Mahmood distributary still received some water during this period, however Fordwah 
distributary did not receive any water in that month and farmers had to rely mostly on the 
pumped groundwater for irrigation. The effect of this water scarcity on the gap between 
demand and supply and on the farmers' actions for water management is described in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
17
 There are two (link) canals, Balloki-Suleimanke link canal 1 (BS 1) and Balloki-Suleimanke link canal 2 (BS 
2), which carry water from Balloki headwork to Suleimanke headwork. 
18
 The distributaries along the Eastern Sadiqia canal were given priority for water supply since those channels 
also carry water for drinking and other domestic use: in that area canal water is used for drinking as well. The 
groundwater quality along in the Eastern Sadiqia irrigation system is so bad that it can not be used for drinking. 
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Another unusual incidence that happened during the fieldwork was the visit of the Prime 
Minister to the study area. It is very common in the area, especially in the Azim distributary 
that the big landowners cut the distributary and steal water. Hence fanners at the tail of the 
distributary hardly receive any canal water19. In the past farmers from the tail of the 
distributary had been complaining about the situation to the Irrigation Department staff and to 
the politicians of the area but the situation did not improve. In July 1997, farmers with the 
help of a Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) and a Member of the National 
Assembly (MNA) filed a complaint to the Secretary for Irrigation Punjab and they invited the 
Prime Minister (PM) to visit the site. When the PM visited the site, he witnessed a cut in the 
distributary by a big landowner. The PM ordered to suspend the whole Irrigation Department 
staff of the area20 and to improve the water distribution in the area. This had an implication 
on the water supply of the selected distributaries as well; the water supply to the Fordwah 
distributary improved, which made farmers, at the tail section of the distributary, very happy. 
However the fanners of the Mahmood distributary became extremely unhappy because water 
supply to their distributary was reduced and brought back to its design discharge. The 
responses of the farmers, from the selected watercourses of the Mahmood distributary, to this 
reduction in canal water supply are discussed in the chapter 3. 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
An interdisciplinary, socio-technical approach was used as the main methodological approach 
for this study of farmers' actions for water management and their influence on the water 
availability at the farm-gate in a supply-based large-scale irrigation system. The socio-
technical approach enables to study both of the artefacts and water supply, and the social 
relations in detail. Mollinga (1998) states that a comprehensive understanding of irrigation 
requires addressing of both (social and technical) dimensions simultaneously, and not 
consecutively and separately, as is usually done. 
However, this research focus more on assessment of the delivery of water, and the functional 
actions of people in different locations, and much less in documentation of the power 
relations of people or events and societal factors that bring collective action into being. Still, 
several attempts are made to discuss this for particular events studied in this thesis. 
Furthermore, where ever possible additional information was also gathered on such locations 
by working with other colleagues in IWMI during the course of this study (Terpstra, 1998; 
De Klein and Wahaj, 1998). The following paragraphs give the layout of the book. 
Chapter 1 has introduced the subject of the research, and the research site. It has also 
presented the methodology, the scope, and the layout of the thesis. In Chapter 2 a conceptual 
framework is presented and the main research question is formulated. This chapter also 
summarises the information gathered in the field during the 18 months of fieldwork. 
Chapter 3 summarises the general water supply situation and the agrarian conditions of the 
study area. The water delivery environments in the selected watercourses and distributaries 
are described and some conventional irrigation system performance indicators, like Delivery 
Performance Ratio, and Relative Water Supply are presented. These indicators are used to 
show on the one hand the water supply situation and the gap between the demand and supply 
Tail fanners receive canal water usually when it is not needed, either after heavy rainfall or during the period 
of harvesting of a crop - when it is surplus form the upstream. 
20
 Only one officer, Executive Engineer, was not suspended because he was just being transferred to the area. 
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over time of the watercourses and the distributaries. On the other hand, these indicators are 
used to show the difference in the water availability of the selected distributaries and the 
watercourses. This chapter also introduces different social and agrarian characteristics of the 
studied watercourses, and thus explains the context in which irrigation is taking place. The 
conditions in the villages and the watercourses presented in this chapter helps in explaining 
some of the factors influencing collective and individual actions in the following chapters. 
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the collective and individual actions taken by the farmers to 
improve irrigation water availability at the farm-gate. Collective action is referred to when 
most of the farmers from a watercourse command area are involved in an activity. This 
happens mainly at the watercourse level and above. Individual action, on the other hand, is 
taken more at the farm level. The timing of the actions taken and the benefits to different 
farmers and groups of farmers are also discussed. Hence the outcome of the operational 
management of the irrigation water in watercourse command areas is described. These 
chapters explain why some activities occur more in some watercourses than others and also 
show the improvements that farmers are able to make in their water deliveries. Farmers are 
found to be effective decision-makers. Chapter 4 deals with the collective action of the 
farmers and explains the way these activities are organised - the main activities studied were 
water acquisition and watercourse maintenance. It also describes the rules, roles, and 
responsibilities of different farmers within a watercourse command area who are undertaking 
collective action for these activities. The processes involved in organising these activities are 
also discussed. Finally the factors influencing (both in positive and negative ways) collective 
action in the sample watercourses were identified. The efforts made by individual water users 
to manage irrigation water within the watercourse command area are explained in Chapter 5. 
Different water management strategies of the farmers to try and get more control over irrigation 
water at the farm-gate, and the way these activities are performed by the farmers, are explained. 
The financial rewards of these physical and institutional interventions by the farmers are 
discussed at the end of the chapter, which show the motivation of farmers for undertaking these 
actions for water management. 
In chapter 6 the outcome of most commonly practised individual and collective actions for 
water management are presented in terms of water availability at the farm-gate. The 
responses of farmers at the time of canal water scarcity and canal water abundance are 
quantified in this chapter. The indicators used to show the impact of most of the activities are 
the Relative Water Supply (RWS) and Relative Irrigation Supply (RIS). At the end of the 
chapter some farmers are selected for in-depth study: their demand and supply situation over 
time is presented and the actions they undertake are explained to present the management of 
individual farmers to match demand with supply. 
Chapter 7 gives the summary and conclusions of the thesis. It presents the key findings of the 
study, reflects on the usefulness of the approaches used in the study and the limitations of 
some of the study tools. The strengths and weaknesses of the research as a whole are 
discussed and recommendations for policy implementation and follow up research are 
suggested. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The irrigation systems of Punjab are not functioning effectively in relation to design criteria 
or farmers' needs. This under-performance is attributed to among others, scarcity of irrigation 
water, changes in cropping intensity and mis-allocation of available resources. Much of the 
contemporary debate about water management is concerned with interventions designed to 
improve water management to resolve this 'underperformance'. However, there are choices in 
both what to study and how to study a system to understand possible changes to it. This 
review looks first at approaches to the study of irrigation water management and its 
'performance'. It then looks at frameworks to study water management and farmers actions to 
improve their water supply. The chapter then presents the principles of the 'design-
management environment' in irrigation systems in Pakistan, and its problems in reality. From 
this review it then sets out the key research questions and the framework for the research and 
data collection, to show how farmers actions improve water delivery at watercourse level. 
Vincent (2001) notes how there has been a divergence of studies to understand water 
management to assist interventions. One line of work has emerged on 'methodologies for 
irrigation management' (Lenton, 1986), in which performance monitoring has become a 
specific focus of work. Most of this research has focused on the specific design of 
performance indicators to assess system performance1, first for diagnostic analysis of 
problems causing poor water delivery (see Bos et al., 1994; and Molden and Gates, 1990), 
but also to compare different types of irrigation systems (Abernethy, 1991; Perry, 1996; 
Kloezen and Garces-Restrepo, 1998; Molden et al., 1998) and in some cases to design a 
framework for business management of an irrigation enterprise (Murrey-Rust and Snellen, 
1993; Snellen, 1998)2. The main criteria used for performance evaluation are Adequacy, 
Reliability and Equity of the irrigation water delivery. Table 2.1 summarises commonly used 
water delivery performance parameters, their definition and indicators. 
1
 The most widely used definition for performance of an irrigation system is the one given by Abernethy (1989), 
"The performance of a system is represented by its measured levels of achievements in terms of one, or several, 
parameters that are chosen as indicators of the system's goal". This definition of performance suggests that there 
is a pre set of indicators that are used to show the achievements of the irrigation system in relation to its goals 
and objectives. This definition fits well with the irrigation system that have clear objectives and targets but in 
case of big multilevel irrigation system with no clear objective or targets the indicators are difficult to define, 
and so are the performance criteria. 
2
 More recently, remote sensing has also been used as a tool to measure performance in terms of crop-
evapotranspiration, and productivity of land and water (see Bastiaanssen and Bos, 1999; and Bastiaanssen et al. 
1999) 
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Practically all these frameworks and indicators are related to the performance of main and 
secondary system level3, and mostly developed either from a researcher or agency point of 
view. The performance of an irrigation system can be evaluated at different levels of an 
irrigation4 system, and very often even defined differently from the perspective of different 
stakeholders. The Irrigation Department in Punjab Pakistan has their internal indicators for 
monitoring and evaluation of the system.They are more concerned about delivering water at 
the tail of the system and more proportional and equitable water distribution, in short 
reliability and equity is their major criteria for canal water supply. Whereas farmers are more 
concerned about their production and their input supply also including irrigation water. 
Nevertheless water users do assess the services of surface irrigation supply by the Irrigation 
Department through the availability of water at the farm-gate. For them, the system is 
performing well if they receive adequate water for their crops at the time the crops need it. 
They are not really concerned about equity, they are more concerned about the adequacy and 
reliability of the canal water supply. 
Very often the views on performance of irrigation services of the water users, and the 
contribution in achieving these objectives of performance is neglected. Nevertheless there are 
a few attempts made to study farmers' perspectives on the indicators of surface water supply 
and groundwater quality (see Hoeberichts, 1996; Kielen 1996, Gowing et al, 1996). 
A different line of research has evolved to understand why and how different conditions of 
water delivery come into being through peoples' actions. These studies also involve 
measurements of water delivery, but these are often used to open up a broader inter-
disciplinary understanding of why patterns of water use emerge. Levine (1982) first used the 
criteria of Relative Water Supply (RWS) both to look at the deficiencies in water delivery, 
and also to show how water supply could be a substitute for labour in irrigated production. 
Keller (1986) discussed how RWS could be used to explore social tensions, asserting that a 
low RWS is likely to cause higher social tension. Uphoff et al. (1990) developed an inverted 
U-shaped curve (n-shaped) of Relative Water Scarcity to describe the scope of farmers' 
actions in the management of irrigation water. In the case of both 'absolute' scarcity and 
excess of irrigation water farmers' participation in the management activities will be 
negligible. Under extreme scarcity, strong authority is needed to ensure access to water and 
steer any negotiation. However, in case of 'relative' water scarcity, there is scope for 
collective action that can negotiate and facilitate improvements in water supply. The 
importance of availability of water in shaping farmers actions is clearly demonstrated by 
many authors, so that it became the key factor in the selection of the six sample watercourses, 
as outlined in Chapter 1. 
Criteria like RWS are now called 'performance indicators' but can also be used for a very 
different exploration of the world of farmers' actions and the inter-disciplinary study of 
irrigation systems. This approach is used in this thesis. 
3
 Though, a few like Kuper and Kijne (1992); and Strosser and Garces (1992) looked at the tertiary outlet 
(mogha) they did not go beyond it. 
4
 Punjab Irrigation Department (PID) and farmers in the case of Punjab Pakistan. 
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2.2 INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES: WHAT MAKES IRRIGATION 
SYSTEMS WORK, HOW IRRIGATION SYSTEMS WORK 
To grasp the complexity of an irrigation system, an interdisciplinary approach is needed that 
keeps the technology in use as a central point while studying relations around it. Authors, 
such as Mollinga (1998), Pradhan (1996), Perry (1995), Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993), 
Jurriens and de Jong (1989), and Eggink and Ubels (1984), have all stressed the 
compartmentalisation of much irrigation research, which fails to show the inter-linkages 
actually present. An interdisciplinary or socio-technical approach to study irrigation systems, 
and what is called in this thesis their 'Water Delivery Environment' is proposed in this study 
(see Mollinga 1998, Pradhan 1996, Vincent 1997). In general, three clear frameworks for 
analysis of irrigation system management can be identified: one is provided by Murray-Rust 
and Snellen (1993), a second by Perry (1995), and a third by Mollinga (1998). 
Mollinga (1998) developed a typology of water control to promote an interdisciplinary 'socio-
technical' approach. He first argued that the different possibilities for irrigation activities -
their different contexts - can be related to the agro-ecological system, the agrarian structure, 
and state and institutions of civil society, which in turn shape the inter-relations of water, 
technology and forms of organisation. This context is referred to in this study as the 'Water 
Delivery Environment' and discussed in detail for the research area in chapter 3. Mollinga 
made this schematic model dynamic by examining the practice of irrigation - in human 
agency through knowledge and capability, people's use of strategies and resources, their 
arenas and domains of interaction and their rules and routines - and looking at these through 
the concept of water control and its critical dimensions: the technical or physical dimension, 
organisational dimension and socio-economic and political dimension. Technical water 
control refers to physical control of water flow. In its organisational form, water control is the 
managerial control of water in which a group of people co-operate with each other in order to 
achieve effective management of irrigation water and are able to negotiate with other entities 
over the delivery of water to their group (see also Hunt 1990). Socio-economic and political 
control of water addresses the conditions of possibility of technical and managerial water 
control (Mollinga 1998: 28). Mollinga argues that a socio-technical approach rather than the 
performance-oriented approach is more relevant to study the dynamics of the irrigation 
system and water supply at any level. Only by understanding existing water management 
practices and the context in which they happen realistic interventions can be made. He also 
argues for an understanding of the everyday politics that shape outcomes in water supply. 
Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993) developed the term 'design-management environment' to 
describe the combination of (i) the design of the physical infrastructure of the system (ii) the 
principles of water allocation (iii) organisational and institutional environment. Their 
conceptual model however, is designed specifically to contribute to the performance debate 
in giving a framework that could be used by irrigation managers. While influenced by the 
Small and Svendsen (1992) model of nested hierarchical systems to explore the social 
environment in which irrigation system operates, they conceptualise a view of irrigation 
system management as separate from the agricultural system and with a division between the 
roles of irrigation agencies and farmers. They viewed performance as having two dimensions: 
the attainment of a specific set of relevant objectives, and doing so with efficient resource 
use. They distinguished between operational performance and strategic performance. The 
former is related to the water delivery and the latter with the efficient decision making with 
the available physical, financial and human resources. 
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This three-fold framework is used to present the management structure of irrigation systems 
in the Punjab in the section 2.5, but it has limitations for studying the realities of local water 
management which are also reviewed at the end of that section. 
Perry (1995) also used more or less the same conceptual framework to discuss successful 
irrigation system management: looking at infrastructure, water rights5, and responsibilities in 
water supply. He differentiated between the 'functional' and 'dysfunctional' irrigation system 
and argues that performance assessment of dysfunctional systems could be misleading. His 
work provides a sort of framework but does not really refer to 'rules in use' and practice. He 
sees any deviations from rules and the politics as part of'dysfunctionality' of the system. 
2.3 TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 
Technology has great implications on the availability of water at different points within an 
irrigation system as is emphasised by many researchers including Horst (1996), Lankford and 
Gowing (1996) and Levine (1980). A number of typologies exist to describe irrigation 
infrastructure and systems of water control to deliver water according to different water 
supply principles and objectives (Plusquellec et al. 1994; Horst, 1996; Horst, 1998; Lankford 
and Gowing, 1996 and 1997); and Renault and Godaliyadda, 1999). While Horst (1996 and 
1998), and Lankford and Gowing (1996 and 1997) write about the relationship between the 
system infrastructure and water delivery priorities, Levine (1980) emphasises the relationship 
between the design, operation and management of the systems through water and crops. The 
objective of the system, like equitable water distribution, or supply of adequate water for the 
pre-defined cropping pattern, defines the choice of the technology to distribute water. For 
instance if equity is the objective of the system, fixed proportional structures are likely to be 
used for water distribution. In the systems studied, fixed proportional structures are used for 
water distribution within a distributary, which implies that discharge at the distributary head 
is an important factor in the water availability at the watercourse level, if the dimensions of 
the tertiary outlets remain as designed. 
Horst (1998) describes different irrigation water delivery systems and their implications on 
the water delivery. His book focuses on water division structures and how their operation can 
lead to dysfunctionality. He regards irrigation structures as 'technical artefacts' and calls for 
'transparent' technology whose operation and significance can be understood. He states that 
division of water is not only a technical matter it also has a human dimension. The way 
farmers perceive these 'technical artefacts' may cause conflicts between the farmers if they 
are not satisfied with the quantity and timing of flow. 
These conflicts may result in the farmers' intervention by damaging the structures and in the 
operation of the system. Horst's recommendations for transparent technology that should 
include a) general consensus by the farmers and agency on the allocation and distribution of 
water; and b) a system of canal and structures which enables farmers to understand the flows 
of water by their own perception (ibid: 74). 
Beccar et al. (2001) also argue along the same lines and says that the complexity of the water rights influences 
the operation of the irrigation system. Moreover, water rights constitute the fundamentals of the water 
distribution system. They define water rights as property rights which show links between the people and the 
source (water in this case); people and technology (infrastructure in this case) and people and people. 
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These interdisciplinary approaches also differ in the way technology is examined in relation 
to system management. Mollinga (1998) discusses the social dimensions of the socio-
technical approach to study irrigation. He states that it can be studied in three ways: social 
requirements for use; social construction and social effects (ibid: 14). Different technologies 
require particular social conditions to use (ibid 14). He considers technology development 
and design as social processes, that include interaction between different actors and interests 
of these stakeholders to shape the technologies, therefore technologies are socially 
constructed (ibid 15). A third dimension is the social effect of technology; technologies 
influence people's livelihood through its effect on crop production, people's health and other 
things (ibid 15). 
Lankford and Gowing (1997) differentiated systems in terms of water provision, water 
distribution and water partition which arise from management and engineering choices 
regarding design of system infrastructure, and configuration and operational procedures. In 
the 'water provision' systems, discharge is controlled mainly at the headwork and water flow 
measurement is usually absent in these systems. The 'water distribution' systems are further 
sub-divided into two: one, which has water control through the water level (cm, m) and the 
other with discharge control (1/sec/ha.). A wide range of technologies, from intensive manual 
methods to automatic control, is found in this type of irrigation system. In the 'water 
partition' systems, water supply is matched with the system demand. In this kind of system, 
water is considered highly scarce and a strict control of ratio of water supply to the area 
(1/sec/ha) is emphasised. Two modes of management, 'normal' and 'actualising' have been 
identified for these different kinds of irrigation systems. In the 'normal' mode, management 
is passive and is not done to improve long-term performance: the system is operated with 
routine daily activity. Actualising is an active mode of management to make a system work 
as it should and can be referred to the set of skills required to improve system management to 
enhance long-term performance. The practical actions of the managers, in such type of 
management, are based on the diagnostic analysis of the system. For example, the 'normal 
management' accepts the design of the system as it is whereas actualising questions the 
design and then takes practical actions by introducing trials and new designs, layouts, 
methods etc. 
Renault and Godaliyadda (1999) proposed the typology of the gravity irrigation systems, 
particularly for the analysis of system operations, which could be applied to the whole 
irrigation system or sub-systems. They argue that the operation of a canal, regardless of the 
level of irrigation sub-system, is comparable to an industrial process in which inputs are 
transformed by machines6 into outputs. The processes of canal operations include: internal 
and external constraints, characteristics of canal reaches, impact of quality of irrigation 
services on the system, and resources (inputs and efforts) needed to achieve a required level 
of performance given internal and external constraints. Based on these four processes a canal 
operational typology is developed, which has four levels of analysis: system and structures, 
networks, water, and consumer levels. 
The first level, system and structures7, addresses the technology of the irrigation system. This 
level is further subdivided into two categories, system sub-level and structures sub-level. The 
first describing the overall physical characteristics of the system and the second describing 
the local characteristics of the structures. Water control can be achieved by controlling water 
level or volumes through upstream or downstream water control mechanisms. Upstream 
6
 Which are canals and structures in case of an irrigation system 
7
 System and structures are considered to be analogous to the 'factory and machines' from the industrial process. 
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water control is common in the gravity irrigation schemes, in which the water level is 
maintained upstream of a structure (cross regulator) to prevent backwater effect in the 
upstream reach. Irrigation systems are considered to have two types of components: canal 
reaches - which are used for conveyance and storage of water - and structures - which are 
used to control water depth and deliveries. The actual physical condition of the structures and 
the properties of a canal reach influence the degree of control of the water and the speed with 
which the system responds to the incoming, scheduled or unscheduled, fluctuations. Three 
properties of a canal reach are considered important: 1) its topography - double bank canals, 
single bank canals and canal reaches with intermediate reservoirs respond differently to these 
water fluctuations; 2) control of water depth - a canal reach can operate in three situations: 
within backwater effect, has normal depth, and free flow or super-critical flow; and 3) 
seepage losses - lined canals have less seepage losses and low friction as compared to the 
unlined canals. 
The second level of the typology, that is the networks, deals with the boundary condition of 
the irrigation system. The hydraulic network identifies the interfaces between the different 
networks including irrigation, drainage, runoff, natural streams, and rivers. Different sources 
of water - groundwater and surface water - are recognised at this level. The layout of the 
hydraulic network is used to differentiate between the systems, with and without drainage 
facilities. 
Water, the third level of typology, is based on the hydrological context of the scheme. Water 
availability is considered to have large implications on the operation of the irrigation scheme. 
Three conditions of water availability are considered in this typology, which are water 
abundance, water scarcity, and seasonal variability of water. The sediment that enters the 
system with the surface water has a significant impact on the maintenance of the system. The 
surface water can be reused for irrigation by recycling of the water either through 
groundwater pumping or from the storage of drainage effluent. Conjunctive use of surface 
and groundwater provides better flexibility and additional availability of water for irrigation. 
However, the use of (marginal quality) irrigation water may have adverse environmental 
effects through increase of soil salinity and water-logging. 
The fourth, and final level of typology is the level of the Consumer: the service provided to 
the users is analysed at this level. This level addresses the issues of multiple uses of water, 
policy and performance of the distribution system, and sociological and institutional aspects 
of the irrigation schemes. Here an irrigation system is again compared with an industry: the 
lower- value water, in the rivers and reservoirs, is transformed to higher-value, at the point of 
delivery to the user, through the operations of the irrigation systems. Therefore, like an 
industry, the operation of irrigation systems provides added value to the water by processing 
it through the irrigation system. 
Murray-Rust and Snellen have evaluated fixed versus gated systems in terms of their 
potential achievement of Equity, Adequacy and Reliability objectives and the kinds of 
operational requirement they have. 
In the terminology of Horst (1998), Fordwah is a system with proportional water distribution, 
with little 'transparency' and small 'operational flexibility' . According to Lankford and 
8
 Horst (1998) argues that the transparency of the irrigation systems in Punjab is low because most of the 
modular offtakes are of the undershot type. Therefore the degree of opening is not visible to the passerby. And 
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Gowing (1997) it has potential to perform well if management is fully actualised, but can face 
problems when badly managed. In the terminology of Murray-Rust and Snellen, the Fordwah 
system is a system with upstream control and is a fixed division system that has operational 
and maintenance requirements to work well. 
According to the typology developed by Renault and Godaliyadda (1997) for the analysis of 
system operations, the important factors that should be considered to study any canal reach of 
the Fordwah canal are: its structures, physical characteristics, water availability, different 
sources of water and their impact on the environment, and the social and institutional aspects 
of the water delivery system. These factors are similar in scope to the irrigation context of 
Mollinga, and are described as the 'Water Delivery Environment' of this study in chapter 3. 
2.4 WATER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES AND ACTIONS TO MEET 
SCARCITY AND SURPLUS 
Management of irrigation water requires some essential activities that need to be undertaken: 
water has to be controlled, channelled and managed in order to irrigate the crops in the 
farmers' fields, which is the main purpose of all the irrigation systems. Researchers have 
proposed a kind of classification of the activities needed to manage water. Examples are Hunt 
(1989), Kelly (1983) and Coward (1979). In this study activities are referred to the range of 
things to be done (what) and actions are referred to the actual deeds (how and when). To 
explore the attempts at collective action (some successful and some not) chapter 4 looks at 
collective efforts of farmers. 
Uphoff (1986) offered a more comprehensive set of water management activities that could 
be identified in any irrigation system. His cubic matrix shows linkages between the different 
management activities concerning technology, management, and organisation (see Appendix 
II). He proposes three groups of activities namely control structure activities, water use 
activities and organisational activities. Control structure activities include design, 
construction, operation and maintenance. Water use activities include water acquisition, 
allocation, distribution and drainage. To organise these activities, processes of conflict 
management, communication, resource mobilisation and decision making are needed. 
However some researchers (see Vincent 1995) warn that expectations or design of a preset of 
water management activities may result in the standardisation of the water management 
activities that may not represent the actual situation in the field. Different kinds of stresses in 
a system lead to different emphases in the field. Vincent suggests to differentiate the tasks 
needed to make a system function as per design, and the actions of farmers to make a system 
operate as they wish especially if it is dysfunctional. The broader focus on actions in this 
study is taken to encompass these different kinds of management. Manzungu (1999) and Van 
der Zaag (1992) also criticise standardisation of irrigation management tasks and instead talk 
about 'contingency' management9. 'Contingency' management implies that there is more 
than one way to organise and manage a system and its management depends on the specific 
set of conditions at the scheme or system level (Manzungu 1999). This study also considers 
Uphoff s cubic matrix as starting point but adapts it to the situation in the study area, 
focusing on the water management activities. Uphoff shows the 'legal' tasks needed in a 
the operational flexibility is small because the flow within the tertiary unit is divided on the basis of a time 
roster (warabandi). 
9
 However, Manzungu (1999) used Uphoff s cubic matrix as starting point. 
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functioning system. In dysfunctional systems a range of additional actions may emerge as 
farmers seek to control their water supply through different actions. Farmers actions in water 
management may be different from needs to keep system working. Therefore this study also 
looks at the 'water acquisition' and refusal of excess water, and then more broadly at 
'farmers' actions. 
These water management activities, which are considered to be needed for operation and 
management of an irrigation system, are mainly based on Uphoff s cubic matrix. However he 
considers maintenance as a control structure activity. Though maintenance is a control 
structure activity at the higher level of the irrigation system, at watercourse level it is done to 
ensure better use of irrigation water. Since the main focus of this research is to study impact 
of water management activities at the tertiary level, watercourse maintenance is considered as 
a water use activity. The main water management activities that exist at tertiary level in a 
water scarce system (like in Punjab, Pakistan) are described in the following paragraphs. 
Water Allocation 
Water allocation defines the water available to each farm in terms of time, thus if this time is 
different for farms of the same size, the allocation is not equitable. However in the warabandi 
system water allocation is not done by farmers, and is based on time allocated to the parcel of 
land rather than volume of water allocated to farmers. Hence the allocation is only on the 
name of landowners. (Re)allocation of this time is necessary in order to be able to 
accommodate tenants; this (re)allocation is done by farmers. 
Water Distribution 
Water distribution is based on a fixed (7 days) roster and any trade and exchange of canal 
water is illegal. The way (canal and tubewell) water is distributed within a tertiary unit 
considerably influences the performance (of water distribution). The trading (including 
exchange of canal water as well as buying and selling of tubewell water) of the irrigation 
water most likely improves the performance in terms of adequacy. Whereas, at the same time, 
it may also indicate the unreliability of the canal water. 
Watercourse Maintenance 
Watercourse maintenance is needed for better water conveyance. The maintenance, more 
specifically cleaning/desilting, of the watercourse will most likely improve (the performance 
of) water distribution (by reducing conveyance losses) in terms of more equitable water 
distribution to different farms, because it avoids surplus at one point and shortage at the other 
points. 
Water Acquisition 
In supply-based agency-managed irrigation systems, water acquisition is not considered an 
activity performed by the users of water. Fanners still try to acquire additional irrigation 
water (surface as well as groundwater). These activities reflect the unreliability of the surface 
water supply and the unsatisfactory irrigation supply available to the farmers. On one hand 
this will improve the water situation for the farmers who are able to undertake these kinds of 
activities, whereas on other hand it worsens the water situation of the farmers downstream in 
the system. 
Drainage or Refusal to Surplus Water Supply 
Drainage, though a very important activity in irrigation systems, exists in a different form in 
the irrigation systems that do not have drainage infrastructure. It is more a response to the 
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surplus water supply at the time it is not needed by the crop. Farmers either close their outlet 
or take some other measures to get rid of this surplus water. 
Most water management actions and activities are the result of a continuous process of 
communication and negotiation, but also collective action. 
Organisation of different water management tasks also requires communication, negotiation 
and decision making at collective as well as at individual level. In case of groundwater supply 
schemes, Long (1989) found that farmers on commands with large discharge public tubewells 
tend to overirrigate much more than farmers with no control over irrigation supplies, and 
farmers who purchase private tubewell water or have their own private tubewell. Because of 
the unreliable water supply from these public tubewells due to electricity failure and cutbacks 
of the operation, farmers over-irrigated when supplies were available. 
Farmers' actions for water availability 
Coward (1991) notes that patterns of social interaction govern the use of irrigation facilities 
whenever an irrigation scheme1 serves more than one person and these social arrangements 
may be formal or informal, and individualistic or collective, in nature. He also observes that 
institutions11 and organisations are needed to perform irrigation tasks. Coward (1991) 
proposes three concepts - roles, rules, and social groups - to study institutional and 
organisational elements of irrigation tasks. There are rules12 for performing tasks in an 
irrigation system, roles for those performing the tasks, and social groups that influence the 
rules and the performance of the tasks. The roles can have two dimensions: role expectations 
and role performance. The roles performed may or may not be the same as expected or 
'ideal' roles13. The expected roles are associated with given functions, for example the role of 
a gauge reader or the role of a water user, whereas the role actually performed includes the 
human dimension: the actor who is playing the role has personal motives which influences 
the performance of the role he is playing. Giddens (1979) argues that it is not roles but 
practices, which constitute social systems: people produce and reproduce the social and 
material environment around them through regularised acts, which are referred to as 
practices. Long (1989) views people as knowledgeable and capable14 actors who may act 
differently in varying situations. He says that 'in order to understand the complexities of 
intervention and actor strategies in the area of research we need to penetrate the life-worlds 
of different social groups and individuals who make up the complex mosaic of changing 
agrarian and social relations in the region'' (Long, 1989: 254). 
This study is exploring farmers' actions as a dimension of human agency through the world 
of key actors and their interaction. Human Agency refers to the people's behaviour and their 
motivations to take actions (Giddens, 1984). Farmers have informal rules to organise group 
10
 An irrigation scheme could be a canal irrigation scheme, a well irrigation scheme or any other type. 
" Coward (1991) uses the word 'institution' to refer to ideal behavior and role expectations and as a generic 
concept for the variety of rules that help pattern social behavior: norms, folk ways, customs, conventions, 
etiquette and law. 
12
 These rules may be formal and informal and may and may not be followed in the execution of the irrigation 
tasks. 
13
 Coward (1991) explains that role expectations is the institutional aspect of the role and role performance is 
the social-organisational aspect of the role. 
14
 Mollinga (1998) argues that knowledgeability and capability of actors does not imply that they can always do 
what they want to do. But their practices are constrained because of their positioning in the context they are 
operating. Hence the relationships in which an actor finds him/herself constrain and enable his/her possibilities 
of actions. 
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or collective actions for water management, which may and may not be followed in practice. 
Collective action refers to the actions undertaken by consent of most of the farmers. Not 
every farmer has to take part in the activity, however most of them agree to the plan of action 
and benefit from it. This study adopts Long's (1989) approach and studies the rules and the 
practices to organise farmers actions for water availability and the principal actors who are 
playing different roles in organising these actions, and hence influencing the water 
availability at mogha and at farm-gate. 
Individual and Collective Action for water management 
Irrigation systems by their very nature of scale and topography influence collective action for 
water management. Managing large irrigation systems may require more co-ordination and 
co-operation among the farmers as compared to small irrigation schemes (Uphoff 1986). 
Martin and Yoder (1988) suggest that a difficult topography may become a reason for 
farmers to take collective action since it would be difficult for individuals to acquire and 
manage irrigation water in that situation. 
Farmers, in case of relative water scarcity with a room for improvement in the water supply, 
are more likely to opt for collective action for water management as compared to the absolute 
water scarcity or water abundance (Uphoff et al. 1990). Wade (1979, 1988, and 1990) also 
regards water scarcity or need of irrigation water as the main factor for emergence of 
collective action for water management. He defines water scarcity as a function of distance 
from the source - he writes reliability worsens and hoarding behaviour increases as a 
function of distance form the source. De Klein and Wahaj (1998) argue that the need for 
irrigation water is the major incentive for farmers to organise collective action. 
Farmers who undertake this collective action also have their own motivations and vested 
interests in organising and participating in collective action. Ostrom (1993) suggests that 
farmers undertake collective action when they foresee their efforts for individual actions 
outweighing the efforts involve in organising and undertaking collective action. Their 
decisions to be involved in the collective action seem to be based on rational analysis of 
benefit/cost (Olson, 1971). However benefit or cost could not only be seen in the economic 
sense. It could also be in the sense of social gains of earning respect (known as 'Izzat') and 
social loss by losing one's face value (Merrey 1986a). Another social factor that can 
overshadow the economic benefit is 'Zid' (that means being stubborn): farmers do not 
undertake collective action because other farmers want them to do so (De Klein and Wahaj, 
1998). These situations may result in conflicts between (individual and groups of) farmers 
that have to be resolved effectively in order to let materialise the collective action. Malik et 
al. (1996) proposed that effective conflict resolution would help in organising collective 
action. Some of the farmers will try to gain the benefit of collective action without 
participating. However there are mechanisms to control free riding. Uphoff et al. (1990) 
suggest that people who try to ride free and take benefit of other people's collective action 
will eventually find no role in the decision making process. Enforcement of sanctions for not 
participating in the collective action can also result in willingness of farmers to participate in 
collective action (Malik et al., 1996; De Klein and Wahaj, 1998). 
Some researchers, like Van Leeuwen (1998), opine that another way to look at the collective 
action is simply to accept that people also consider collective interests of the group and try to 
get collective profit. Koelen (1984, in van Leeuwen 1998) suggests that it is easier to 
organise collective action for preservation of a common resource (that means: 'taking less') 
than for producing a collective good (that means: 'giving'). He considers the quick results of 
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the collective action as a good incentive for farmers to participate in collective action. Van 
Leeuwen (1998) studied collective and individual actions in the domains of water 
management though he took a village as the starting point instead of watercourse command 
area. He looked at the water management as domains of interactions that have institutions, 
which are described by networks. He also adapted Verschoor's (1997) thesis of translation 
into water management activities, and argues that individual actions do not mean that there is 
no agreement about the need to act collectively. The agreement on the need to perform an 
activity may exist but translation of the need to networks of solution may not be agreed upon 
by the farmers and therefore individual action is taken. 
The reason why farmers opt for individual or collective action might not be influenced by the 
individual decisions for obtaining individual or collective benefit, but the result of the 
behaviour that forms them as group-members (Van Leeuwen, 1998). The choice for 
individual or collective action can be shaped by other factors besides relative benefit 
including reinforcement of identity and networks, and other collective objectives of a group 
(Mollinga, 1998). 
Researchers have identified several factors and characteristics of a farmer group that promote 
collective action for water management. Mirza and Merrey (1979)15 found that location of 
farms of powerful or influential farmers at the tail of a watercourse and a large percentage of 
farmers with land holding size between 2.5 to 10 ha. has a positive effect on collective action. 
They also found that it is easier to organise collective action in the watercourses with small 
number of farmers, and/or have farmers with relatively equal distribution of power. Mirza 
(1975), Malik et al. (1996) and Van Leeuwen (1998), on the contrary16, found that it is easier 
for a group of farmers to organise collective action if they have a clear leadership. Mirza 
(1975) opines that decision making for collective action taken by the whole Panchayat11 
instead of influenced by an individual would support collective action. In that case farmers 
feel more obliged to participate in the collective action. Another factor that is considered by 
Mirza (1975), and Mirza and Merrey (1979), to have implications on the happening of 
collective action is the caste or biradari18. They found that majority of farmers from one 
biradari are more likely to have fewer problems in organising collective action. Malik et al. 
(1996) also found the presence of tenants in the area as affecting collective action. They 
suggest that a small number of tenants in a watercourse command area is most likely to 
facilitate collective action. Since tenants are not landowners and therefore may not cultivate 
the land for a long time, they are less interested in long term benefits of collective action. De 
Klien and Wahaj (1998) suggest that it is difficult to organise collective action if most of the 
farmers are involved in off-farm employment simply because of relatively less time 
availability. Their findings are based on field research on collective action for watercourse 
maintenance in 12 watercourses19 in the Punjab, Pakistan. 
15
 Their results were based on a study of 10 rehabilitated watercourses in the Punjab. 
16
 However, Van Leeuwen research site was socially very different than the research site of Mirza and Merrey 
(1979). 
17
 Panchayat is the traditional system of conflict resolution in which elders and respected people of a village 
take decisions 
18
 Biradari is a kinship group based on the patrilineal descent and marriage. 
19
 Six out of the twelve watercourses belong to this current Ph.D. study. The other six watercourses lie along 6-
R distributary of Hakra branch canal that offtakes from Eastern Sadiqia canal. 
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2.5 OPERATIONS IN THEORY: THE 'DESIGN-MANAGEMENT 
ENVIRONMENT* IN THE IRRIGATION SYSTEM(S) OF PAKISTAN 
This section outlines the design criteria, operational requirements and management of the 
irrigation system at different level of irrigation systems in Pakistan, following the three fields 
of influence proposed by Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993). It then shows the limitations of 
this approach as a prelude to the design of the research framework to look at farmers' actions 
to improve water supply at watercourse level. This section also describes the water rights of 
the farmers and the administrative set-up of the Irrigation Department'2''. 
2.5.1 Physical Infrastructure: Design Assumptions and Its Implication on Operation 
of the System. 
The main features of the hydraulic design of the irrigation system in Punjab, Pakistan as 
described by Mahbub and Gulhathi, (1951) are: 
• Irrigation channels were designed with Lacey's equation for non-silting and non-
scouring, which was based on the Regime theory developed by British engineers (Ali, 
1993) 
• The flexibility factor for the secondary channels is 1 (or close to 1), which means that the 
fluctuation in the flow at the parent canal will be felt equally by all the outlets. However, 
one of the requirements for this condition is that the parent channel runs within a certain 
limits of the full supply level (FSL) (in most cases 75 % of the FSL). If this requirement 
is not fulfilled then the flexibility factor goes below one and the fluctuation is mainly felt 
by the outlets at the tail end of a distributary or a minor. 
• Structures in the main system (i.e., primary and secondary canals21) are gated, whereas 
outlets at the tertiary level are designed as overflow structures22 (Open Flume) and orifice 
(mainly Open Flume with Roof Block and Adjustable Proportional Module). This means 
that the structures at the distributary level are more sensitive to the water levels in the 
canal: large fluctuations in flow is created by small water level differences in the parent 
canal. While the structures in the main canals (including distributary gates) need careful 
operation and management. The head-discharge relationship for an overflow structure is 
described with discharge proportional to H15 whereas for an for an undershot or orifice 
structures the discharge is proportional to H°5. The main assumption behind these design 
criteria was that the outlets would draw their share of water proportional to the area to be 
irrigated by adjusting the width of the weir or diameter of the pipe. 
• Outlets are supposed to draw their share of sediment 3, because they are installed close to 
the bed of the distributary - the undershot outlets are installed at the 0.9 D of Full Supply 
20
 Which, later in the thesis, will help in understanding the interaction between the farmers and the Irrigation 
Department Staff. 
21
 In Pakistan a primary canal is called a main canal (or a branch canal) and a secondary canal is called a 
distributary. 
22
 Some of the distributaries have a combination of Open Flume (OF) outlets (and/or Adjustable Proportional 
Module (APM)) and Pipe Outlets (PO) which have totally different hydraulic requirements. The Open Flume 
outlets are mostly towards the tail of the distributary, whereas, the pipe outlets are towards the head of the 
distributary. The reason for such a combination is that in case of fluctuations in the parent channel, the outlets at 
the tail still draw water proportionally, but can also carry excess flows more readily. 
23
 However, this does not happen in reality, Sedimentation in the canals is one of the main problems faced by 
the Irrigation Department for achieving equitable water distribution. Sedimentation reduces the capacity of the 
canals, thus decreasing the water availability at the tail of the distributaries. Vander Velde and Murray-Rust 
(1992) and Vander Velde (1991) found that the desilting of the distributaries considerably improves water 
delivery to the watercourses along the tail end of the distributary. 
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Depth of a distributary and open flumes are installed at the bed of a distributary. This will 
prevent sedimentation in the parent channels thus reducing the maintenance requirement 
for the main system and help in maintaining the hydraulic integrity needed for the 
efficient running of the system. 
• The system is designed to minimise the operation of the hydraulic structures with little or 
no cross-regulation. 
The criteria for the hydraulic design have considerable implications on the management of 
the system. The rules to operate and manage an irrigation system are clearly stated in Manual 
of Irrigation Practice24 (Govt, of West Pakistan, 1961). Among others, a few main features of 
the management and the operation of the irrigation system are: 
• Distributaries are supposed to be operated at a certain supply level to achieve equity in 
water distribution and to prevent siltation. If the flow in the river is low, a 8 day rotation 
among the distributaries (and canals) is introduced. A rotational schedule among the 
distributaries is made according to a priority list . The canal on first priority gets the full 
design discharge, the next priority canal gets water if there is enough water available in 
the parent canal to operate this distributary at 75 % of its design discharge. Similarly, the 
canal at the third priority is operated if the discharge in the parent canal is enough to 
operate it at the design level (see Malhotra, 1982; and Berkhoff, 1987). 
• The Irrigation Department only sets targets for the water supply at the head of the 
distributary, since the outlets are supposed to draw their allocated share of water. 
• Gates of the main and the secondary canals have to be operated according to the schedule 
made by the Irrigation Department. The gate also needs to be adjusted in case of 
unexpected discharge fluctuation in the parent canal. This requires a communication 
network between the different staff members of the Irrigation Department, like the 
Executive Engineer (XEN), Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Sub-Engineer and the gauge 
readers (gatekeepers). 
• One of the implications of the design criteria was maintenance of the irrigation 
infrastructure. To keep the system functioning properly and achieve the design equity in 
water distribution, maintenance of the system is very important. 
• Maintenance at the higher level of the irrigation system (main system level) is the 
responsibility of the Irrigation Department. 
• To make management and operation easier for the Irrigation Department, responsibility to 
manage water (distribution and maintenance of the watercourse) below the outlet was 
given to the group of farmers within the watercourse command area. However, the basic 
rules (water allocation rules or water rights) for the distribution were already defined by 
the Irrigation Department. 
• Time sharing (warabandi) system of water allocation and distribution was introduced to 
facilitate water distribution and to equitably divide the scarcity of water among all the 
water users of a command area. 
24
 The Manual of Irrigation Practice is mainly based on the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 (Nasir, 1993), which 
details the rules, responsibilities and powers of the Irrigation Department. 
25
 Each canal in a group gets first priority in one cycle. For example, if there are three canals, canal A, canal B 
and canal C, one rotation cycle will be of 24 days: Canal A will get first priority for first 8 days, 2nd priority in 
the next 8 days (from day 9 to 16), and 3rd priority in the last 8 days of the cycle (from day 17 to 24). After 24 
days it will again be at first priority. Similarly water supply to the Canal B and C will also be prioritized in the 
same way. 
25 
FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGA TION PERFORMANCE BELOW THE MOGHA 
2.5.2 Principles of Water Allocation: Water Rights and Warabandi 
In Pakistan water rights are related to the land holding in the command area, and are practised 
in a distribution cycle called warabandi. This means that the time allocation in the warabandi 
is basically the right of a farmer to use water. People with no agricultural land cannot have 
any water right. However, people can still get access to irrigation water through a tenancy 
agreement and through the rights of other relatives. However, the water rights available to 
tenants depend highly on the type of tenancy agreements, and the social relations between the 
owner and the tenants. The landowners, when leasing out their land to the tenants, distribute 
their allotted water among tenants, which depends upon the social relationship between the 
landowner and each tenant (the lease agreement is much more flexible if the tenant is a close 
relative). Hence, in this way the inequity in water allocation is already permitted, which is 
contradictory to the objective of the warabandi system. Principally the water rights should 
also be transferred with the land on sale or death. Observations show that sometimes, when a 
father distributes land among his children for operational purposes, or when children inherit 
the right after the death of their father, they do not officially divide the warabandi turn. 
However, in practice they distribute the water turn among themselves without legalising it25. 
This makes the analysis of the entire situation more complex as this distribution is not very 
strict. 
The British in Northwest India and Pakistan introduced Warabandi, a well-known water 
distribution system (see Malhotra, 1982, for evolution of the warabandi system). It is the 
only written form of farmers' water rights, which is also the water allocation principles, and it 
defines rules for the water distribution among a group of farmers. This type of water 
distributions system is based on the continuous water supply at the mogha. It enforces 
equitable distribution of scarce water over all the water users. Warabandi by definition is the 
method of allocating water or irrigation time proportional to land size (Bandaragoda and 
Rehman, 1995; Bandaragoda, 1998). Thus, in this case, the warabandi provides the rules to 
be followed during the actual distribution of water. 
Under a warabandi, the rotation starts from the head of the watercourse and proceeds towards 
the tail of the watercourse. A farmer has a right to use all the water flowing in the 
watercourse during his turn. In Pakistan, two types of warabandis are recognised, 'pakka 
warabandi1 (official warabandi) and 'katcha warabandi' (unofficial warabandi). In katcha 
warabandi, all the shareholders have to agree upon the turns and their schedule, and the 
Irrigation Department does not intervene unless they receive complaints from the farmers. 
Under pakka warabandi, once the rotation is started, it continues even if the distributary is 
closed during the irrigation turn, which means that there is no compensation for a farmer who 
loses his turn because of no water being in the distributary (Malhotra, 1982). Whereas, the 
katcha warabandi takes care of the unplanned canal closure. The irrigator on whose turn the 
canal was closed starts his turn again when the water starts flowing in the canal. The katcha 
warabandi is based on the agreement between the farmers whereas the pakka warabandi 
roster is prepared by the Irrigation Department. However, the basis to allocate time for canal 
water turn is the same. Total time in a week is divided over the total command area to 
calculate the allocation - time per unit area. The main difference in the two forms of 
warabandis is the time to complete one full cycle of roster. In the pakka warabandi one full 
roster is completed in a week, so if a canal water is stopped for certain period of time in that 
week, farmers having their warabandi turn in that time will lose their turns. They will get 
One reason for not legalising the water turn is that they can not do it until they legalise the distribution of 
land. And to do that they need to spend money to fulfil official requirements for registering the land in their 
names. 
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their warabandi turns again in the next week provided that there is water flowing in the 
watercourse. In the case of katcha warabandi the roster starts again with the same farmer in 
whose turn water was stopped. Therefore one full roster of katcha warabandi may be longer 
than 7 days. This sometimes makes it difficult for farmers to keep track, of their warabandi 
turns and time. One of the main characteristics of the pakka warabandi is that, by enforcing 
the water scarcity equally among farmers, it reduces the conflicts between the water users 
within one watercourse command area. However, at the same time, it may result in the 
inefficient use of irrigation water since the supply is more or less fixed and does not match 
the crop water requirement (Huppert, 1987 and Bhatti and Kijne, 1990). The reasons for the 
shift from katcha to pakka warabandi vary from one chalc to another (it may be the inequity 
created by the big landowners). The warabandi schedule is revised during the annual canal 
closure each year and the roster is changed by twelve hours (Bandaragoda and Rehman 
1995), so that the farmers who had their water turn during the night the previous year can 
irrigate during the day time. 
2.5.3 Organisational and Institutional Environment: Administrative Set-Up of the 
Punjab Irrigation Department 
In Punjab, Pakistan the whole irrigation system is sub-divided into 
management/administrative units. A Chief-Engineer, who is responsible for one zone28, is the 
highest officer (after the Secretary Irrigation of the Provincial government) of the Irrigation 
Department. The next officer in the hierarchy of the administration is a Superintendent 
Engineer, who is responsible for the Circle29 office. An Executive Engineer (XEN) is in 
charge of a zone, which is the highest administrative unit of a canal, and the basic hydraulic 
unit of the Indus Basin Irrigation system. The XEN is mainly responsible for the operation 
and maintenance of the irrigation system. Each canal is then further subdivided into Sub-
Divisions and the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) is in-charge of a canal sub-division. He is 
assisted by Sub-Engineers in technical matters and by revenue staff for the assessment and 
collection of the water tax (abiana)30. An important actor in the operation of the system is the 
gauge-reader (or gatekeeper), who is responsible for moving the gates of a distributary 
(secondary canal) under the supervision of the Sub-Engineer. The Patwari who has the 
lowest rank in the revenue staff also has close contact with the farmers, as he is responsible 
for assessing cropped area and the cropping pattern of the farmers and for making a 
warabandi for a watercourse. 
2.5.4 Irrigation Management at the Watercourse Level 
Water is supplied to the individual fields through the tertiary outlets (locally called moghd) 
and watercourses. It is the responsibility of the Irrigation Department to supply the designed 
quantity of water to each tertiary unit (chak) at the outlet. A mogha is, therefore, the contact 
point of the Irrigation Department and the farmers since the Irrigation Department is 
responsible to manage water up to this point and below this point a group of farmers takes 
care of the water distribution. Though they are not responsible to manage this water below 
the outlet, they are empowered under the Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 (Nasir, 1993) to 
take action in case this canal water is wasted. The Executive Engineer of the Irrigation 
Department can stop the water supply to a watercourse that is not properly maintained, 
(therefore resulting in wastage of canal water), or can penalise a person through whose 
27
 Area irrigated from one tertiary outlet (moghd) is called a 'chak' 
28
 Whole Punjab Province is sub-divided into 7 zones 
29
 A circle is comprised of 5 canal zones 
30
 Abiana is the water tax that is based on the area and the crop irrigated. It is higher for the cash corps like rice 
and sugarcane as compared to the grain crops like wheat and maize. 
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neglect canal water is wasted. The actual management of water at this level remains farmers' 
responsibility, however. 
2.5.5 The Reality Gap 
In Pakistan the design assumptions and their implications on the management of the irrigation 
system at the different levels have an impact on the operation of the system. For example, 
water was provided for one third of the Cultural Command Area (CCA) and increased 
cropping intensity was not foreseen. Poor operation of the irrigation system led to problems 
like siltation in the canals, which result in increased bed level elevation, consequently 
changing the whole idea of proportional water distribution at the ungated secondary level. 
However, the attempts at rehabilitation of the systems by providing additional outlets to some 
areas changed the concept of the proportional water distribution (these outlets did not always 
have the same hydraulic requirement (Head-Discharge relationship) for operation). Even in 
the newly built systems the outlets are found not constructed and installed according to their 
design drawings, which has resulted in an in-built inequity in the water distribution (Murray-
Rust and Van Halsema, 1998). These problems have been reported in terms of poor 
performance of the irrigation system by several researchers (among others Vander Velde and 
Murray-Rust (1992), Vander Velde (1991), Bhutta and Vander Velde (1992), Kuper and 
Kijne (1992) Strosser and Garces (1992)). 
While the framework developed by Murray-Rust and Snellen (1993) is useful to describe the 
main system management of the Irrigation System of Pakistan, it is not practical to study 
irrigation system performance at the watercourse level. Since the Irrigation Department has 
no role in operation and management of canal water at tertiary level, they do not have any 
objective or target at this level. Hence, it is difficult to define performance at the tertiary level 
of the irrigation system in the absence of clear objectives and targets for the canal water 
supply. Moreover in the context of the irrigation system in Punjab, where groundwater is 
frequently used and provides about 40 % of the total irrigation water, one cannot separate the 
contribution of pumped groundwater in the crop production. Therefore a performance criteria 
is needed that includes groundwater use in performance evaluation. Moreover, their criteria to 
show the design and management inter-relationships are not very helpful to interpret at the 
watercourse level. These criteria do not show what farmers do, and only give results 
reflecting the situation after their negotiations. 
Researchers like Lowdermilk (1990) look at the farmers' actions as 'anarchy' because they 
break rules. However, they often 'break rules' in an orderly way and the underlying 
assumption are that these actions improve the performance of the irrigation systems. Freeman 
(1990) and Keller (1990) write about the gap between the need required and the delivery of 
the irrigation water (which Keller called relative water supply). However, the model proposed 
by Keller is a schematic model and does not provide an analytical framework. Different 
actors (water users and agency staff) in an irrigation system adapt different strategies to 
achieve their objectives by mobilising resources (Mollinga 1998). Agency staff in their daily 
irrigation management activities encounter several difficulties that they have to cope with at 
short notice, for example demand for more irrigation water supply from farmers and breach 
of the irrigation channels. Farmers on the other hand try to adapt long term (planning) and 
short-term (operational) strategies31 to improve water control. For instance a farmer acquires 
additional water for irrigation by installing a tubewell and hence goes for a long-term solution 
31
 Short term strategies adapted by people to deal with the difficult circumstances in the daily irrigation-related 
activities are called coping strategies (Johnson 1992 quoted in Manzungu 1999). 
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to cope with the unpredictable canal water supply, while another farmer buys groundwater to 
cope temporarily with insufficient canal water. 
Agency staff and water users, interact with each other to improve canal water availability, 
hence both play important roles in the dynamics of irrigation water management and 
appropriating water for a group of farmers. This interaction between farmers and agency staff 
is beneficial for both the agency staff and the farmers: the agency staff, through their rent 
seeking practices, get some economic benefit and farmers get better water supply. This study 
sets out to show the strategies adapted by the water users to manage irrigation water and their 
effectiveness, and explains interactions between farmers and agency officials. 
2.6 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The main research question of the study is: 
How and why do farmers intervene in irrigation water supply, what conditions shape 
their actions and what is the impact of their action on water delivery in a large scale 
irrigation system of Punjab, Pakistan? 
To operationalise the main question following sub-questions are posed: 
• How do conditions of water supply and infrastructure shape water availability and room 
to manoeuvre? 
• How do different farmers take different actions for water management and why? 
• What criteria can be used to study and demonstrate impact of farmers' actions on water 
delivery? 
• How effective are farmers' actions in improving water availability at the farm-gate? 
2.7 OPERATIONALISING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
This section summarises and operationalises the research framework to study water 
management at the watercourse level. The research framework is outlined and the data 
collection set-up is described. The previous sections have shown the following issues to be 
significant in understanding outcomes of interaction between technology, people and water 
availability: 
• technology and water availability: the physical characteristics of the terrain and irrigation 
infrastructure as well as their capacity to convey water 
• the influence of the 'delivery environment' in shaping water management activities 
• fanners responses to the water availability 
• criteria to describe and assess outcomes of farmers actions in water management. 
The study framework has developed a set of technical dimensions, farmers actions and water 
management studies that could be studied and compared across the sample watercourses, 
reflecting this review of conceptual literature, and also initial field study in the research area. 
Figure 2.1 shows the inter-relatedness of issues below the mogha and provides the research 
framework to study how farmers' actions at watercourse level reshape performance at the 
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watercourse level. The different components presented in the diagram are discussed briefly in 
the following paragraphs. 
Technology and water availability 
In shaping a study of water availability below the mogha, discharge at the mogha is 
considered the primary entrance point of the study and part of the delivery environment 
(resource), as it shapes the uncertainty in water availability and the farmers' responses. 
Discharge at the mogha directly influences the total water available at the farm-gate, 
invariably affecting the adequacy and reliability of the canal water delivery. 
The physical conditions3 that are considered to play an important role in water management 
at tertiary level are: (i) design water allowance, (ii) shape and size of the mogha, (iii) length 
and slope of the watercourse, (iv) location of farm along the watercourse (v) presence of 
(private) tubewells, and (vi) quality of groundwater. 
• Design water allowance: The design water allowance, expressed in discharge per unit 
area, determines the design discharge and hence provides basis for water allocation. 
• Shape and size of the mogha: This influences the discharge through the mogha, which in 
turn influences the water availability at the farm-gate. 
• Length of the watercourse: It influences the water losses in conveying water to the tail 
of the watercourse. The conveyance losses in the lined watercourse will be much less than 
the conveyance losses in the unlined watercourse. 
• Slope of the watercourse: The slope of the watercourse (together with the discharge 
available at the mogha), along with the channel cross section determines the velocity of 
the flow in the watercourse. This in turn, also influences the water available at the farm-
gate. 
• Location of the farm along the watercourse: Canal water availability to the farm 
located at the head of the watercourse is more likely to be higher than the canal water 
available to a farm at the tail of the watercourse because of more conveyance distance and 
therefore higher conveyance losses. 
• Presence of (private) tubewells: The presence of (private) tubewells in the watercourse 
command area influences farmers' control over irrigation water in terms of adequacy and 
reliability. The location of the tubewell determines which farmers can possibly attain 
benefit from this water. If a farmer's farm cannot be irrigated from tubewell water (e.g., 
all the tubewells are downstream of his land), he either has to rely on canal water or 
install his own tubewell. 
• Quality of groundwater: The quality of groundwater influences its use. Marginal quality 
groundwater can not be used very often, moreover, it has to be mixed with the canal 
water, and therefore its use is limited. However, it still increases the reliability and the 
adequacy of total irrigation water but to a limited degree. 
!
 Some of these factors were also used in the selection of the sample watercourses. 
30 
w 
<: 
D 
H 
OH 
W 
U 
< 
Z 
o 
U 
<; 
on 
< 
Q 
Z 
< 
w 
o 
z 
<; 
o 
W 
a. 
Z 
o 
p 
H 
z 
w 2 
u 
O 
< 
z 
< 
W 
< 
2 • 
£ a 
*i s 
« ¥ s 
u •& s 
- y c 
»1 U 1. 
t . — IU 
£ ® "S 
fa • • 
5S 
s 
en 
c 
c 
o 
c 
w 
> 
• mm 
"a* 
u 
5 S 
t» U 4) O 
g Z Q U 
(J 
0) 
s= 
s 
v> 
<D 
c « 
il 
2 S 
£ s s 
53 
IP 
.a 
<^- - = 
O 
e= 
G. 
a 
•5 
c 
; ', 
-J 
00 
c 
3 
O 
o 
(1) 
O 
c 4) S .—. O 
oo a> ' 
>-^  J 3 *»J D 2 Q __i —» X -E* C. 
S S S j ' S - J n H ^ O ' o l ) 
^ is 
« g 3 g 
•a 
o 
J * 
U 
e 
E 
u 
on 
fa 
FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGA TION PERFORMANCE BELOW THE MOGHA 
Water management activities 
The main water management activities that are needed to be undertaken at tertiary level in a 
water scarce system (like in Punjab, Pakistan) are water acquisition, water allocation, water 
distribution, watercourse maintenance, and drainage of excess water (these activities have 
already been defined in section 2.4). 
Farmers actions in the response to water availability 
In Pakistan the Irrigation Department and farmers are involved in the management of 
different levels of an irrigation system in Pakistan. Farmers are the main actors33 in the 
management of irrigation below the mogha, they continuously try to acquire more canal 
water at the mogha and manage available water as well. However, the arena of action is at 
different levels, some actions are taken collectively, others individually. Some activities are 
undertaken internally (inside the watercourse command) and others externally (above the 
watercourse). Subsequent chapters show what activities were undertaken collectively or 
individually, and what activities were negotiated internally in a watercourse and which 
required 'external' negotiation with staff of ID. 
Criteria to describe and assess the outcomes of farmers actions 
In a supply-driven big canal irrigation system like in Fordwah, tasks, responsibilities and 
targets of the irrigation managers at the main system level are related to the operation and 
maintenance of the main system34. Performance evaluation is mainly studied in terms of 
monitoring and evaluation (see Vander Velde (1991); Bhutta and Vander Velde (1992). The 
Irrigation Department has no role in operation and management of canal water at tertiary 
level therefore they do not have any objective or target at this level35. Hence, it is difficult to 
define performance at the tertiary level of the irrigation system in the absence of clear 
objectives and the targets for the canal water supply. However, it is the level where the results 
of poor performance at the main system level are obvious. The quantification of performance 
at this level will also help in comparing the management of the irrigation managers 
(engineers) at the main system level with the managers (farmers) at the tertiary level of the 
irrigation system. 
Since the focus of this study is on the actions farmers take for water management the analysis 
is mainly based on the water delivery performance as shaped by the actual users of irrigation 
water. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the continuous process of performance evaluation, farmers' 
actions (or interventions) and improved performance. A farmer continuously monitors and 
evaluates water delivery to his farm based on which he takes individual or collective action to 
improve water delivery and to save the cost of operating tubewells for additional irrigation 
water. 
33
 Though the supply of water at the watercourse level is also influenced by the ID staff, and day to day 
operation of the delivery system at higher level. Another very important actor for water availability at the farm-
gate is the patwari. 
4
 Here main system is referred to the main and secondary (distributaries) irrigation canals. 
35
 The ID observes discharges at the main canal and the distributaries. They do not monitor discharge of the 
tertiary outlets (moghas), they are supposed to keep a record and check the efficiency of these outlets. If the 
actual data of the outlets matches the design then the outlets should draw their fair share of water supply and the 
sediment. 
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: farm-gate Water delivery performance 
(Before intervention) 
• RWS/RIS 
Type of activity 
& 
Organisational 
level 
Improved water delivery 
performance 
• RWS/RIS 
• Savings (in terms of 
water and money) 
Figure 2.2: Water delivery performance as shaped by farmers' interventions 
The literature on performance indicators is very rich (see Rao 1993 for review) however most 
of the performance indicators reveal the achievements of the irrigation system at the higher 
level of management and seem to overlook the role played by the farmers in these 
achievements. Hoeberichts (1996) studied performance indicators from farmers' perspectives, 
and gave qualitative indicators used by the farmers to assess surface water supply. Gowing et 
al. (1996) used fuzzy set theory to look at the performance at farm level from farmers' 
perspective. However none of them have quantified the impact of water management 
activities that farmers undertake which is the main thrust of the current study. Indicators are 
needed that could demonstrate the impact of water management activities on water delivery 
performance at the tertiary level sub-system. 
To study operational management at the tertiary level it is important to understand that 
farmers do not compartmentalise the water delivery into performance indicators as such like 
the system studies do. They rather have a wholistic view of the water delivery; their main 
criterion is the amount of water delivered to them at their farm-gate - something that can 
aggregate the result of many interventions. Also, farmers themselves never measure the 
amount of water: rather they use their own indicators, like the area irrigated during one water 
turn as a proxy of water available at the farm-gate. These local indicators are analysed further 
during the study. 
Since a primary concern of farmers is to match the total irrigation water available with the 
demand of the crop, discharge at the farm-gate and the Relative Water Supply or Relative 
Irrigation Supply seem good indicators to evaluate irrigation water delivery at the 
watercourse level. Both RWS and RIS is the ratio between the supply and demand with a 
difference that RWS considers rainfall as a part of supply while in RIS rainfall is deducted 
from the demand to get irrigation water requirement. The formulae to calculate RWS and RIS 
RWS = Total Water Supply 
Crop Demand 
RIS Irrigation Supply 
Irrigation Demand 
Total Water Supply = 
Crop Demand = 
Irrigation Supply = 
Irrigation Demand = 
Net surface diversions, groundwater pumpage, and rainfall 
Potential crop water requirement 
Net surface diversions and groundwater pumpage 
Potential crop water requirement less effective rainfall 
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The variability of the discharge at the mogha is demonstrated by either plotting the actual 
daily discharges over time or by calculating the Delivery Performance Ratio (DPR) over 
time. Delivery Performance Ratio is the ratio of actual discharge to the target discharge (Bos 
et al, 1994). As financial savings is also one of the concerns of farmers it has also been 
included in this analysis. The productivity in terms of yield (tons per ha.) is also calculated 
however since RWS can be used a proxy for productivity it is not shown in Figure 2.2. 
Besides productivity depends on other inputs (like fertiliser etc.) as well. 
2.8 SETTING UP DATA COLLECTION 
This research collected quantitative and qualitative data in order to understand farmers' 
intervention in the irrigation system and their influence on irrigation system performance. 
Most of the data is collected from primary sources (i.e., from the field either by 
measurements or from interviewing farmers). However, some of the data was also gathered 
from secondary sources, i.e., Punjab Irrigation Department (PID). On-going processes were 
monitored in the field and documented. Much information was obtained by informal 
interaction of the field staff. It was not difficult for the field staff to discuss about anything 
that was happening in the watercourses because of the good rapport they built with the 
farmers. The way collective action was organised was also part of the monitoring activity of 
the field staff. Whenever possible Panchayat meetings were attended by the researchers to 
observe the negotiation process and the outcome of the discussions among farmers. The 
following paragraphs give the data collected at tertiary level for each activity, the method of 
getting that information and the source. 
Technology and water availability 
Distributary level data (see table 2.2) was collected to show the variability of discharge two 
different the two distributaries. 
Table 2.2: 
Data 
Canal water 
Method 
Gate Operations Gauging 
Tail gauges Gauging 
'Whenever the gate was moved 
availability data collected at distributary level 
Frequency 
Regular1 
Daily 
Sample 
Two distributaries 
Two Distributaries 
Source 
Field Monitoring 
Field Monitoring 
The data collected to estimate water availability at the watercourse and farm-level is 
presented in table 2.3. This data helped in calculating daily discharges to the sample outlet 
and to individual farms. In addition, it also helped in showing how much water is more or 
less saved by desilting a watercourse or a portion of the watercourse, and thus could help in 
understanding the importance of the activity. The data also showed the daily variability of 
canal water supply to the tertiary units and to the selected farms, which indicated the equity 
of surface water among the watercourses and among farmers. 
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Table 2.3: Outlet type and canal water 
Data 
Outlet type 
Discharge measurement for 
rating curve of the outlets 
Water level and actual 
discharge 
Conveyance losses 
Canal dimensions: slope of 
the channel 
Discharge measurements at 
farm-gate 
Method 
Observation 
Current meter, cut 
throat flume 
Gauging 
Inflow outflow 
Topographic survey 
Current meter, Cut 
throat flume 
supply data at watercourse and farm level 
Frequency 
Once 
Start of the 
research' 
Daily 
Once every 3 
months 
Once 
Regular (for 
one season)3 
Sample 
6 outlets 
6 outlets 
6 outlets 
6 watercourses 
6 watercourses 
15 farms2 
Source 
Observation and 
Outlet register 
Field measurement 
Monitoring in the 
field 
Field measurement 
Field measurement 
Field measurement 
This was done once at the start of the research to calibrate the outlets of all the watercourses, and was 
repeated for the outlets, which were changed or tampered with during the research period. 
2
 In three watercourses, MD 1-R, FD 84-L and FD 96-R, three farms, one in head, middle, and one in tail were 
selected. Whereas, in other three sample watercourses two farms, one in the upper half portion and one in the 
lower half portion of the watercourse, were selected. 
3It was done for every warabandi turn of these farms for one cropping season 
Groundwater pumpage 
A summary of the data collection on groundwater is shown in table 2.4. In the study area 
groundwater is an important factor for farmers to plan and cultivate crops since it gives more 
flexibility in water application more certainty in terms of irrigation. 
Table 2.4: Data collected about groundwater pumpage and use 
Data 
Discharge 
Groundwater table 
Groundwater pumpage 
Groundwater usage 
Groundwater quality 
Method 
Trajectory method1, 
cut throat flume 
Observation well 
Monitoring of water 
distribution/Farmers 
interviews 
Monitoring of water 
distribution/Farmers 
interviews 
Chemical analysis 
Frequency 
Regular (twice in an 
agricultural 
Regular 
(every two 
Daily 
Daily 
Once 
season) 
weeks) 
Sample 
882 
18 
88 Tubewells2 
88 Tubewells2 
20 Tubewells3 
Source 
Field measurement 
Field monitoring 
Farmers and 
Observation 
Farmers and 
Observation 
Soil Fertility, 
Pakistan 
Appendix III presents the Trajectory method to estimate discharge of the tubewells. 
2Include all the tubewells in 6 sample watercourses. 
3Chemical analysis of the tubewells that according to farmers had saline water was done by Soil and Water 
Laboratory, Bahawalpur. This laboratory is under Directorate of Soil Fertility, Pakistan 
Irrigation water availability from other sources 
A very small percentage of farmers, in the study area, used water for irrigation from a 
different source, like sewage water, and did not use canal water for irrigation . The quantity 
of the water used by these farmers was not measured. However, information was gathered 
about their water management activities. 
Water management actions and agency-farmer interactions 
The data collected to study the different water management activities and agency-farmer 
interactions is summarised in table 2.5. Most of the data related to water management 
1
 They sold their canal water turn 
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activities was collected by regular monitoring of the actual occurrence of the activity. Also 
actual processes of organising and performance of water management activities were 
observed. Data related to the agency-farmer interactions was needed to study the linkages 
between the farmers and PID Staff and the strategies they adopt to manage water. 
Table 2.5: Information collected about water management actions and agency-
farmer interactions 
Data 
Pakka warabandi 
Agreed upon warabandi 
Water distribution 
Desilting of the watercourse 
Organisation of water 
management activities 
Any interaction between 
farmers and PID1 
Farmers and PID1 Staff 
Involved in these 
interactions 
1 „ • • . • .• ^ 
Method 
Secondary data 
Farmers interview 
Monitoring 
Monitoring and 
Farmers' interviews 
Monitoring and 
Farmers' interviews 
Monitoring/ 
Observations and 
Farmers' interviews 
Monitoring/ 
Observations and 
interviews with 
farmers and PID' 
staff 
Frequency 
Once 
At the start of 
every season 
Daily 
Regular 
Regular 
Regular/every 
time it 
happened 
Regular 
Sample 
6 tertiary units 
6 tertiary units 
6 tertiary units 
6 tertiary units 
6 tertiary units 
6 tertiary units 
6 tertiary units 
Source 
PID' 
Framers, Observation 
Farmers 
Farmers, Observation 
Farmers, Observation 
Farmers, Observation 
Farmers, PID1 Staff 
Observation 
Punjab Irrigation Department 
Agrarian conditions 
Data related to agrarian condition is presented in table 2.6. 
Table 2.6: Information collected about 
Data 
Landholding size of 
owners 
Operational Landholding 
size of cultivators 
Tenancy Status 
Method 
Farmers interview and 
Secondary data1 
Farmers interview 
Farmers interview 
agrarian conditions 
Frequency 
Once 
Once at the start of the 
research and afterwards 
every time it changed2 
Start of every season and 
afterwards every time it 
changed2 
Sample 
6 tertiary 
units 
6 tertiary 
units 
6 tertiary 
units 
Source 
Farmers and 
PID 
Framers 
Farmers 
This is from pakka warabandi which is prepared by the irrigation department 
2
 The basic data set were updated every time operational landholding size of a cultivator changed. This usually 
happens because of change in tenancy arrangements 
Data related to water use, and production 
Other data that was needed for the analysis of the water management activities is summarised 
in table 2.7. Meteorological data and other crop related data was needed to calculate demand 
of irrigation water, and to see the gap between demand and supply of irrigation water. 
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Table 2.7: Data related to water use and 
Data 
Rainfall 
Other 
meteorological data 
Cropping pattern 
Yield 
Crop input data 
Method 
Rain gauge 
Secondary 
Walk through 
Survey 
Fanners' 
Interview 
Framers' 
interviews 
' For all the farmers in six tertiary units 
Frequency 
productivity 
Whenever happened 
Monthly 
Seasonal 
Seasonal 
Sample 
6 tertiary units 
Bahawalnagar 
area 
6 tertiary units' 
250 farmers in 6 
tertiary units 
52 Farms2 
2
 This data was collected from 10 selected farmers from each watercourse except one 
cultivators 
Source 
Field observation 
Field observation 
Farmers 
Farmers 
that has only two 
2.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is not only infrastructure and water supply that determine irrigation performance below the 
mogha. The prevailing institutions and ultimately the users of this irrigation water also shape 
the irrigation that takes place. Irrigation systems are not only physical systems, different 
actors who interact with each other are also part of the irrigation system as they influence and 
are being influenced by the physical aspect of irrigation (Chambers, 1988). Farmers, being 
active recipients of the technology, evaluate and react to the irrigation services provided to 
them. Thus they take an active role in shaping the performance of the irrigation system. 
These different issues are inter-linked with each other and cannot be studied in isolation, as 
shown in the following chapters. These succeeding chapters will also demonstrate how 
farmers' actions make a difference in the Water Delivery Environment. 
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THE WATER DELIVERY ENVIRONMENT OF THE STUDY 
AREA: WATER DELIVERY, AGRARIAN CONDITIONS, AND 
PRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the 'Water Delivery Environment' of the study area. As described in 
chapter 2 this is the context in which irrigation is taking place in the study area, drawing on 
the framework of Mollinga (1998) and Renault and Godaliyadda (1999): it shows the context 
of people, technology, and water supply in which farmers undertake actions for water 
management. To show how the system was performing at the time of study, some 
conventional performance indicators like Delivery Performance Ratio, and Relative Water 
Supply are also presented, but at the level of the watercourse and the distributary. 
3.1 WATER SUPPLY CONDITIONS AT THE DISTRIBUTARY LEVEL 
The two distributaries, Fordwah and Mahmood, selected for this study are quite different in 
their Water Delivery Environment: this was one of the reasons to opt for these two 
distributaries. These two distributaries are the last perennial distributaries at the tail of 
Chishtian Sub-Division, and therefore are considerably affected by any water shortage within 
the system (see Figure 1.1 for the location of the distributaries along the Fordwah Branch 
canals). Moreover, in the case of surplus water supply from upstream, these distributaries also 
have to carry higher discharges. Both these distributaries are perennial. The 3rd tail end 
distributary, Azim, is non-perennial and is not discussed further in this study. Differences in 
the water delivery of the two distributaries are summarised as following: 
3.1.1 Size of the Distributaries 
Fordwah is overall a bigger distributary as compared to Mahmood. It is longer, has a much 
bigger command area and thus much higher design discharge as compared to the Mahmood 
distributary. Table 3.1 gives the physical features of the two distributaries. 
Table 3.1: Main features of two sample distributaries 
Distributary Length of the Design Discharge 
Distributary (m3/s) 
(km) 
Fordwah 42.6 4.47 
Mahmood 3.6 0.23 
1
 This allowance is based on the design 
Culturable 
Command Area 
(CCA) (ha) 
14940 
825 
discharge less the design seepage 
No. of 
Outlets 
88 
7 
Water 
Allowance' 
(1/s/ha) 
0.25 
0.25 
losses of the distributaries 
3.1.2 Discharge of the Distributaries 
Fordwah has a much higher design discharge than Mahmood as it serves a much larger area. 
However, Mahmood distributary nearly always receives much more than its design discharge, 
as compared with a much more variable level of supply to the Fordwah distributary. Figure 
3.1a and 3.1b present actual and design discharges of both the distributaries during the study 
period. Discharge variation in both the distributaries is very high; however, Mahmood gets 
almost double its design discharge. During the study period, the average discharge of the 
Mahmood distributary was 14 ft3/s (i.e. 396 1/s which is about 170 % of its design discharge). 
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For only 8 % of time (in days) in one year Mahmood did not receive any water, whereas for 
about 94 % of the time its actual discharge was higher than its design discharge. For about 34 
% of the time it received 18 ft3/s (509 1/s) or more canal water, which is double than it's 
design discharge. Whereas, Fordwah was closed for 16% of time and received equal to or 
higher than its design discharge for 50 % of the days. The average discharge of the Fordwah 
was 133 ft3/s (3764 1/s), which is about 84 % of its design discharge. The highest discharge of 
the Fordwah distributary during the study period is 209 ft3/s (i.e., 5914 1/s). The reasons for 
the higher discharge of the Mahmood distributary are firstly, that this distributary is very 
small therefore it hardly comes under rotation. When a very strict rotation was followed in 
kharif 1997, it was closed for one week and open for 3 weeks with full supply. The other tail 
end distributaries, Fordwah and Azim (the other non-perennial distributary at the tail of the 
Fordwah branch canal) had rotations with priorities - one week one distributary was operated 
with full supply and next week the other distributary would get full supply. Secondly farmers 
from Mahmood distributary have good relations with some of the Irrigation staff and most of 
the time they manage to get higher discharge in the distributary whenever it is needed. The 
reasons for the large improvements in flow in Fordwah distributary are discussed further in 
section 3.4. 
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Figure 3.1b: Water supply to Mahmood distributary during the study period (March 
1996- April 1998) 
3.1.3 Water Situation at the Tail of the Distributaries 
The water supply at the tail of the distributary indicates the functionality of the channel. The 
presence of one foot of water depth at the tail of the distributary is one of the internal 
indicators by which the Irrigation Department assesses the water delivery performance of the 
system. A dry tail of a distributary could either mean a low discharge at the head of the 
distributary or a reduced capacity of the channel to carry the design discharge. It could also 
mean that the outlets in the head and the middle reaches of the distributary are drawing more 
water than their designed share. In other words the proportionality of the system has been 
disturbed. 
The water situation at the tails of the selected distributaries is very different. The tail of the 
Fordwah distributary hardly gets any water, whereas Mahmood's tail is always overflowing1. 
Figure 3.2 shows the water situation at the tail of both the distributaries. For the duration of 
the study period, the depth at the tail of the Mahmood distributary was greater than one foot 
for more than 70% of the time, whereas the tail of the Fordwah distributary was dry for most 
of the time. During the twelve months between April 1997 to April 1998 the tail of the 
Fordwah distributary was dry for about 52% of days. However for 77 % of the time it 
received more than 70% of its design discharge at the head. Which reveals that, even 
according to the Irrigation Department criteria, this channel is dysfunctional as the tail of the 
distributary is not receiving water for most of the time in a year. On contrary, the tail of 
Mahmood distributary was dry for only 19 % of the time in days and for 89 % of the time it 
received more than 70 % of its design discharge. 
1
 In fact the tail of the Mahmood distributary also overflows because the Irrigation Department has increased the 
height of crest of the tail clusters of the moghas (there are 3 moghas at the tail of the distributary) while they did 
not increase the height of the walls of the open flume outlet. 
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Figure 3.2: Water situation at the tails of two selected distributaries over time (April 
1997-April 1998) 
3.1.4 Desilting of the Distributaries 
Mahmood distributary is desilted twice in one year, once during the canal closure (January) 
and once during summer (June/July). Farmers from the three tail watercourses organise and 
undertake the desilting activity of the whole distributary2. 
The last time Fordwah distributary was fully desilted by the Irrigation Department was almost 
10 years before this study period. However, in 1992-93, it was desilted by farmers on a self-
help basis. The then Government of Punjab, in a campaign, mobilised farmers throughout the 
province for desilting of almost all the distributaries. In the year 1997 part of the tail portion 
of the Fordwah distributary was desilted. Irrigation Department contracted this work to a 
consultancy firm in Pakistan. According to the Irrigation Department, lack of funding is the 
main reason for infrequent desilting of the distributaries. 
3.1.5 Groundwater Use 
The presence of a tubewell in an area is an indication of inadequate3 and unreliable canal 
water supply. In the study area, the density of tubewells per 100 ha for the Fordwah 
distributary is 8.7 and for Mahmood it is 3. Moreover, the number of operational hours of the 
tubewells in Fordwah is much higher than in Mahmood. During the study period tubewells 
were operated for 10 % and 90 % in Mahmood and Fordwah sample watercourse 
respectively: that shows the relative importance of groundwater use for irrigation in the 
distributaries. Nevertheless, the quantity of pumped water depends on the discharge capacity 
of the tubewell. The ratios percentage of usage of total water pumped during the study period 
for Fordwah and Mahmood distributaries was 67: 33 that is also reflected in the total water 
use (see section 3.3.5). 
2
 The Irrigation Department is officially responsible for the maintenance of the distributaries 
3
 This inadequacy may also be the result of increased cropping intensities. 
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3.2 THE SAMPLE WATERCOURSES: WATER RIGHTS AND AGRARIAN 
CONDITIONS 
The selected tertiary units are different in physical condition, but have more or less the same 
set of rules to perform water management activities. Before a description of the selected 
tertiary units it is important to describe different features of a typical tertiary unit in Punjab. 
Figure 3.3 presents a tertiary unit with different features and local names. The land 
demarcation in a tertiary unit or 'chak' is based on the 'grid' system introduced by the British 
in early nineteenth century4. Under the grid system land was surveyed and divided into 
squares or 'murabah' and Blocks. A Block is consisted of 16 squares and is numbered. A 
Square is also numbered consecutively starting from the Northwest portion of a revenue 
village5 imauza\ It is further subdivided in 25 'killa' - one killa is approximately equal to 
one acre - that are also numbered. Permanent concrete posts are used to mark the corners of 
the Squares. These posts are often used as a benchmark by farmers to find out the exact 
location of their killas. 
A tertiary outlet a 'mogha', connects a watercourse to a distributary channel. A watercourse6 
is a channel that conveys water from a distributary to the farmers' land holdings (Malhotra, 
1982). It is generally an earthen channel and has several branches. A watercourse is usually 
constructed between the boundaries of the holdings (and boundary of a killa) to avoid 
conflicts among the farmers. The main official watercourse is called 'sarkari khal': sarkari is 
referred to something owned by the Government and khal is a local word for watercourse or 
channel. The sarkari khal is designed by the ID Engineers and is constructed by the farmers. 
Farmers make their own farm and field channels to transport irrigation water within their 
farms. A watercourse provides at least one delivery point or a farm inlet to each land holding 
(or a farmer). A farm inlet, called a 'nakka' could be earthem or a concrete structure. An 
earthen or 'katcha7 nakka' is basically a hole in the watercourse that could be closed by clay 
and bushes. Concrete structures with circular holes that can be closed with concrete lids are 
called pakka8 nakkas. Every Square is officially provided with one nakka. 
Farmers of a watercourse command area (a tertiary unit) are often referred to as 
'shareholders'9, ('pattidar' in local language) by farmers themselves and Irrigation 
Department Staff 
4
 Land demarcation according to such pattern was made compulsory to receive the canal water. It was easy to 
introduce this system in the new settlement schemes. However, farmers from the old settlement schemes were 
also forced to conform to this requirement (Hailey, 1907). 
5
 A revenue village is a unit for collecting abiana (water tax) from a group of farmers. A Numberdar in a 
revenue village is made responsible to collect abiana from the farmers. 
6
 Pakistan has about 88,000 watercourses that serve a CCA from 60 to 250 hectares. 
7
 Katcha means earthern, weak, unofficial. 
8
 Pakka means concrete, strong, official. 
9
 They are sharing water from the same mogha. 
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Figure 3.3: Layout of a tertiary unit (chak) 
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Main Features of the selected watercourses 
The main attributes of the sample watercourses are summarised in table 3.2. Three kinds of 
outlets (mogha) are present in the sample watercourses. Three have an Adjustable 
Proportional Module10 (APM), two have an Open Flume with Roof Block (OFRB) and one 
has Open Flume (OF). The implications of these outlet types and their dimensions on the 
discharge are discussed in section 3.3. The lengths of the selected watercourses range from 
1.3 km to 3 km. These watercourses are also different in their physical conditions: the longest 
watercourse, FD 67-L is almost fully lined and has pakka nakkas, whereas the Mahmood 
watercourses are lined up to the first 390 meters. They have a few pakka nakkas. The other 
three selected watercourses are completely unlined with katcha nakkas. 
Table 3.2: Main attributes of six selected watercourses 
Distributary 
Outlet 
Outlet Type 
Design width of the 
outlet (b) (ft) 
Design height of the 
outlet (y) (ft) 
Actual width of the 
outlet (b) (ft) 
Actual height of the 
outlet (y) (ft) 
GCA (acres) 
CCA (acres) 
Water Allowance 
(ft3/s/1000acres) 
Design Q (ft3/s) 
Watercourse length (m) 
number of TW 
Warabandi type 
No. of Owners1 
No. of Cultivators2 
No. of Tenants3 
Allocated Irrigation 
time4(min/acre) 
Range of the Officially 
allocated water turn5 
(min/acre) 
Mahmood 
1030-R 
OFRB 
0.42 
0.74 
0.42 
0.74 
355 
350 
3.6 
1.26 
1625 
10 
pakka 
77 
71 
19 
29 
28-34 
Mahmood 
11860-TC 
OF 
0.49 
0.49 
435 
412 
3.6 
1.48 
2798 
5 
pakka 
78 
74 
16 
25 
23-28 
Fordwah 
38830-L 
OFRB 
0.16 
0.70 
0.16 
0.66 
169 
105 
3.6 
0.38 
1300 
2 
pakka 
3 
2 
1 
59 
Fordwah 
67160-L 
APM 
0.20 
0.72 
0.21 
0.72 
401 
385 
3.6 
1.38 
3000 
17 
pakka 
44 
57 
23 
26 
26-28 
Fordwah 
84140-L 
APM 
0.20 
0.59 
0.21 
0.59 
317 
264 
3.6 
0.95 
2145 
24 
pakka 
86 
48 
29 
38 
35-44 
Fordwah 
96692-R 
APM 
0.20 
0.38 
0.22 
0.42 
174 
170 
3.6 
0.64 
2015 
10 
pakka 
48 
29 
25 
56 
56-58 
'Owner: who owns agricultural land 
2Cultivator: who actually cultivates the land (includes owner and tenant) 
3Tenant: a farmer who does not own land but cultivates it. He may sharecrop the land or rent it. 
4Time calculated by patwari for the unit area in a watercourse command area. 
5The range is not given for the watercourse FD 38-L because there are only two landowners 
There is a link between the number of tube wells in the watercourse command area and the 
number of owners in the water scarce Fordwah distributary. Every farmer wants to be 
independent and flexible in use of irrigation water. In the Mahmood distributary more 
10
 In fact a modified version, which is an Adjustable Orifice Semi-Module (AOSM), of APM is in use. However, 
since it is still referred to as APM in the record of Irrigation Department, the same name is used here. 
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tubewells are found in the head watercourses because of the choice for rice cultivation, that 
has a higher crop water requirement. However, the number of tubewells in Mahmood is still 
much less than in the Fordwah distributary, because of the availability of ample amounts of 
water. The quality of groundwater is also much better in the watercourses along the 
Mahmood distributary than in the watercourses along the Fordwah distributary since it is 
closer to an old riverbed. 
The time to irrigate a unit land (allocated irrigation time for the unit area) is different for all 
the watercourses because it depends on the CCA and the design discharge of a watercourse, 
although the rotation cycle (warabandi) in all the cases completes in seven days. In theory, all 
farmers in one watercourse command area should get the same allocation for a unit area, that 
is minutes per acre. However, some small discrepancies were found when minutes per acre 
for all the landowners were calculated from the pakka warabandi. Some farmers are getting 
slightly more than the official allocation, while others are getting slightly less. The officially 
allocated warabandi turn is calculated by dividing the total irrigation turn time in minutes by 
the total command area of the watercourse written in the pakka warabandi. The allocation of 
each individual farmer is calculated by dividing his full water turn by his total area. The range 
of the allocated water turn of fanners within a watercourse is relatively big in the Mahmood 
watercourses and FD 84-L. Some of the reasons for these ranges are discussed in chapter 5 
(section 5.4). Nevertheless these extreme values of allocated time per unit of area are few and 
the average time calculated using pakka warabandi schedule is very close to the official 
allocation presented in the table. 
3.2.1 Settlement Patterns of the Watercourses 
The study area, originally an arid region, was opened up to immigrants1' for settlement and 
agriculture by the Sutlej Valley Project in the 1930's. People from different parts of Eastern 
Punjab (and also some people from other parts of the state, these people are locally known as 
'Riasati,n) shifted to this area. Today, the settlement pattern is composed of towns, villages 
and individual farmhouses. The first land allotment took place in 1930's after the 
construction of the project. A second land allotment was done at the time of Partition of 
United India, when many Muslims from Central India and East Punjab migrated to Pakistan 
(and Hindus & Sikhs moved out of the area). However, often people from one place of origin 
belonging to one caste, tried to stick together. Therefore in most of the settlement villages the 
population of farmers from one caste or one area of origin are found. Nevertheless, such 
patterns are not absolute since in the post independence period farmers also moved out and 
new farmers came in. 
The main towns of the study area are Chishtian and Hasilpur. These towns provide 
employment opportunities, have processing factories, and provide market outlets to the 
agricultural produce of the area. Both the towns have populations of approximately 400,000. 
Chishtian town is a big market for cotton produce and other agricultural products of the area; 
it also has a sugar mill. Two of the sample watercourses, MD 1-R and MD 11-TC, are close 
to Chishtian and two, FD 84-L and FD 96-R, are very close to Hasilpur town. Fodder and 
vegetables grown in the watercourses FD 84-L and FD 96-R are sold at Hasilpur market. 
Fodder is also sold to the farmers having livestock farms. The milk from the cattle of these 
" However, part of the area was cultivated, even before the Project started, especially during the flood season 
because of the inundation canal of the River Sutlej. People were living along the river as well. 
12
 The State is called 'Riasat' in the local language, therefore people from the state are 'riasati' 
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dairy farms is sold to the milkmen, who sell it in the town. Farmers also sell cattle at the 
cattle market, which is organised from time to time on a regular basis. The watercourse FD 
38-L is relatively more close to Chishtian than Hasilpur whereas FD 67-L is more close to 
Hasilpur. 
In two of the sample watercourses, FD 84-L and MD 11 -TC, cultivators live in villages13 
(which are also local administrative centres with schools). The cultivators in other 
watercourses live in individual farmhouses known as 'deras', which are usually constructed 
within their landholdings. These deras (houses) are spread over the whole watercourse 
command area. In the watercourse FD 67-L some houses are concentrated in one or two 
places in the watercourse command area. 
Most of the farmers in the selected watercourses are settlers, and more than one caste is 
present in one village. There is only one watercourse, FD 67-L, with one dominant caste - 77 
% of farmers from one caste - and another watercourse, FD 84-L, with two dominant castes -
one with 52 % of farmers and other with 32 % of farmers14. The rest of the watercourses 
have farmers from many different castes, although, one or two castes are in the majority. In 
these cases, most of the farmers in one village have migrated from the same area even if the 
caste is different. It appeared in the study that caste seems to have an influence in the 
execution of some water management task in certain watercourses. For instance, in case of 
MD 1-R, work distribution to desilt a watercourse is done according to the castes. However, 
this research was not focused on caste to understand the relation between the caste 
composition of the village and water management activities. More research could be done on 
this issue. Other researchers studying irrigation in the Punjab, like Merrey (1983, 1986a, 
1986b), noted that the roles and norms through which water management activities (which he 
refers to as irrigation tasks) materialise are imbedded in the larger social structure - especially 
the kinship-based biradari system. He analysed the effect of biradarism and kinship on the 
execution of water management tasks. In the villages he worked in, the conflicts between and 
within different biradaris were the main hindrance in the process of effective rehabilitation of 
the watercourse(s). 
3.2.2 Agrarian Conditions 
Land tenure pattern 
The individual landholding size in the selected watercourses is reduced as a result of 
inheritance of the land from father to children. As the population has increased the 
landholding size has become smaller. Some of the landowners increase their operational land 
holding size by renting in more land. In this study the operational land holding size is taken as 
the land actually operated or cultivated by a farmer. Table 3.3 presents the average, minimum 
and maximum landholding sizes of the owners and the cultivators of the selected 
watercourses. 
The watercourse FD 38-L has only three owners and two cultivators. Two of the owners are 
relatives, they are father and son and have leased out their land to one farmer. Hence the 
operational landholding size of the two cultivators is more or less the same. The presence of 
13
 Farmers of the watercourse FD 84-L are in fact living in two villages 
14
 Farmers from these two castes are related to each other by marriage. 
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one big landowner15 in the watercourse FD 67-L has increased the average landholding size 
by 38 %. If that landowner is excluded the average landholding size becomes 2.1 ha. The 
watercourse FD 84-L has the smallest average landholding size of owners: this watercourse 
also has highest number of tenants. 
The operational land holding size of the cultivators in sample watercourses, presented in 
Table 3.3, reveal that the watercourse FD 84-L has the smallest gap between the minimum 
and maximum land holding within the watercourse command area16. This may explain the 
fact that this watercourse has the most diverse tenancy arrangements, and also has the highest 
percentage of farmers having off farm employment. This suggests that the farm size is too 
small for livelihood of a family, therefore owners bring in tenants and seek off-farm 
employment themselves. 
Table 3.3: Operational landholding sizes of the cultivators in six selected 
watercourses 
Watercourse 
MD 1-R 
MD 11 -TC 
FD 38-L* 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Landholding size of the landowners 
Average 
1.7 
2.0 
12.8 
3.4 
1.2 
1.4 
Maximum 
14.2 
11.1 
19.4 
60.3 
8.8 
5.5 
Minimum 
0.1 
0.2 
9.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.05 
Operational Landholding Size in ha. 
Average 
1.96 
2.11 
19.23 
3.57 
2.15 
2.38 
Maximum Minimum 
14.17 0.10 
11.13 0.20 
19.43 19.03 
20.04 0.10 
7.70 0.20 
12.60 0.10 
* This watercourse only has two cultivators with almost same operational land holding size therefore all the 
values are almost same. 
Tenancy classes present in the selected watercourses are 'Owner-Cultivators'17, 
'Sharecropping'; and 'Renting'. 'Owner-cultivator' refers to the farmers who cultivate their 
own land. 
Two main arrangements sharecropping exist: one is the sharecropping for 50 percent, in 
which both owner and tenant are equally responsible for the expenditures and get equal 
harvest of the crops. Each pays 50 % of the total expenditure and has a right to 50 % of the 
yield of all the crops cultivated. In the other arrangement of sharecropping owners get 75 % 
of the yield but provide all the inputs except labour, which is provided by the tenant. The 
tenant, who in this case, provides all the labour18, does not pay for the inputs and gets 25 % of 
the total produce. In the third kind of tenancy arrangement, that is renting, an owner leases out 
land to a tenant for a fixed amount of money. A tenant, in this case, gets 'temporary' rights on 
land. He can cultivate the land, as he wants. The landowner cannot interfere with his 
cultivation practices. Appendix TV presents terms and conditions of different tenancy 
agreements. These contracts are usually made for one or two years, including two crop 
seasons kharif and rabi . 
15
 This landowner is also an influential person in the watercourse command area. 
16
 Although in all the watercourses except FD 67-L and FD 38-L, the operational landholding size of majority of 
the farmers is less than 5 acres (2.02 ha.) (Wahaj et ah, 2000). 
17
 In this research, Landowners who are cultivating their lands themselves are considered a tenancy class in order 
to be able to compare them with the other tenancy classes present in a watercourse command area. 
18
 The tenant is like a permanent labourer in this arrangement. 
19
 This contract may be renewed after one or two years. In case of renting contracts, owners prefer not to lease 
out their land for more than 5 years, firstly because they want to increase the rent; and secondly because of the 
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In the selected watercourses, two watercourses, FD 84-L and FD 96-R, have more diverse 
tenancy arrangements. The reason might be that these two Fordwah watercourses are closer to 
the city where there are better opportunities for off-farm employment. Certainly off farm 
employment is also greater than in the other watercourses (see table 3.4). It has also been 
found that in some cases one cultivator is owner-cum cultivator on one parcel of land, is a 
sharecropper on another parcel of land and is a lessee on the third parcel of land. However, he 
must have enough manpower to cultivate all these parcels. Sometimes, a farmer owns small 
parcels of land in more than one watercourse, whose boundaries are not adjacent. In that case 
the farmer may only cultivate one parcel and rent in more land in the same watercourse 
(preferably adjacent to his own land) and lease out the parcel of land in the other watercourse. 
Or he may also lease out both the parcels and rents in land in a completely different 
watercourse (as in the case of one of the cultivators in the watercourse FD 38-L). However 
this strategy to consolidate area cultivated is not very common. The selected watercourses 
along the Mahmood distributary (MD 1-R and MD 11-TC) have a relatively high number of 
owner cultivators. 
Table 3.4: 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Off farm employment in six selected watercourse command areas 
Number of cultivators having off 
farm employment 
1 
7 
1 
6 
22 
12 
% of cultivators having off farm 
employment 
1.3 
8.8 
50.0 
13.9 
45.8 
41.3 
More than 40 % of the cultivators in the watercourses FD 84-L and FD 96-R have other 
sources of income besides agriculture. Very often persons with a college education or 
university degree prefer to find a job in the Government sector instead of cultivation. Apart 
from higher income, these jobs also give some respect and influence within the community. 
In the case of the watercourse MD 1-R, there is only one cultivator with an off-farm job: he is 
Gauge Reader in the Irrigation Department. He leased in land because it is adjacent to his 
place of duty therefore he could easily keep an eye on the water level in the Branch and act 
accordingly. At the same time he earns some extra money from cultivation. 
3.2.3 Social Relations and Leadership in Water Management 
In almost all the watercourses one or more influential farmers are present who have more 
wealth and power than the rest of the farmers, and therefore are considered leaders or 
influential persons in the watercourse command. Prestige and power is not related only with 
land: nor do responsibilities of collective action always lie with the wealthiest farmers. In 
irrigation communities one can gain the authority by repeatedly initiating a task or organising 
a water management activity20. More details of the relation of responsibilities and roles in 
fear of losing their land. In some cases renters tried to occupy this land legally by transferring it to their names 
(Terpstra 1998). 
20
 Hunt (1989) identified the authority of a local water management organisation in an irrigation community. He 
recognises the size of an organisation and its influence, the source of legitimacy of authority, performance of the 
tasks of the organisation, the fulfilment of roles and the evaluation of their performance, and its financial 
viability and economic sustainability to be important and describe the authority of the organisation. 
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collective action are given in chapter 4 (section 4.5). Generally speaking one or more farmers 
are responsible for resource mobilisation within the watercourse command area or village, 
depending on the nature of the task. Similarly one or more farmers are considered helpful or 
unofficially responsible for the work needed to be done outside the watercourse, for example, 
negotiation with the Irrigation Department. These farmers are considered 'knowledgeable' 
and having more exposure to 'outside' world by the fellow farmers. Thus 'knowledge' and 
'exposure' are also source of authority. 
The influential and smaller farmers sometimes have a kind of dependency relationship. 
Influential farmers help others and in return get some labour input if needed or votes in case 
they are politicians. Or, small farmers get things, like fuel, on credit from the influential 
farmer and therefore do not object inequitable water distribution. These influential farmers 
could also use their influence in a negative way in order to show their power and to impress 
their opponent. Influential farmers are not always big landowners in the watercourse 
command area, they may also own a small piece of land in a watercourse command area. Or 
they may be tenants, who have rented in land or are sharecropping land in the watercourse 
command areas. In these situations, these tenants and small landowners usually have 
considerable amount of land in other, neighbouring watercourses. Thus, these tenants can 
have a higher socio-economic status as compared to some of the landowners of the 
watercourse. 
Irrigation water management is mainly men's task and responsibility in the study area. 
Although women own land (through inheritance), often their male family members (father, 
husband or brother) cultivate the land. Or it is given on lease. Some women are involved in 
agricultural activities however they neither irrigate fields nor they are involved in 
organisation or performance of water management activities. Therefore, in this thesis a farmer 
is referred to as 'he'. 
The forum that farmers use to discuss water related issues is the 'Panchayat'21: although it 
does not have a legal status, it is a traditional method and is accepted by the water users. 
Farmers use the word Panchayat for any meeting to discuss issues and take decisions. While 
a formal Panchayat is not present anymore (at least not in the study area) it still works and 
elders of the village (or watercourse) and sometimes the numberdar is present to discuss the 
issues. These elders of the village posses certain respect23 because of their age or social status 
and may also be representing their biradaris and thus have higher social status within their 
biradaris. Similarly, in general any farmer can call for a Panchayat for any issue or dispute -
for instance a dispute about the land between two farmers could be discussed in the 
Panchayat. If the dispute among the farmers involved could not be solved in the Panchayat, 
or one party is not satisfied with the decision, only then the concerned parties go to court, 
since it takes a lot of time before any decision is taken by the court. Besides it is expensive to 
21
 In some parts of India formal Panchayats are present at village level and have legal status. These Panchayats 
also have a head (or a chairman) and other members. 
22
 (or lambardar) the person responsible to collect abiana from the water users and give it to the Revenue 
Department. As compensation he gets some land for and he also doe not has to pay abiana. 
23
 Religious leaders or Imam (person who leads prayers in the Mosque) are also respected by others because of 
their religious knowledge and religious tasks they perform. However, in the study area they are usually not 
involved in conflict resolution but they are involved in decision making related to water management if own or 
cultivate land in a watercourse command area. 
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go to the court. However the decision taken in the Panchayat could be used as evidence in the 
court (Terpstra 1998). 
3.2.4 Interaction Between the Farmers and the Irrigation Department Staff: Location 
of Irrigation Staff and Means to Access Them 
The main office of the Irrigation Department (ID) for the study area is in Chishtian town, 
where the Sub-divisional officer (SDO) sits with his administrative, maintenance and revenue 
staff24. The Executive Engineer (XEN) of Fordwah canal, who is responsible for the whole 
canal sits in Bahawalnagar - a bigger city, which is about 90 kms from Chishtian. The ID also 
has an office at the Sub-Engineer level in the Hasilpur town. The Gauge Reader, who is 
responsible to operate gates of Mahmood, Fordwah and Azim distributaries, is required to be 
present very close to the structure all the time. Therefore, a Gauge Reader lives next to this 
regulation point25. Patwaris do not have a permanent office, since they are required to be in 
the field for most of the time. Some of the maintenance field staff of the ID, the Mate and the 
Baildar, are also in the field for most of the time. They are responsible for small repairs and 
earthwork. 
Farmers very often know where to find these ID staff. However, the most contacted ED staff 
are the Sub-Engineer for mogha remodelling, and the Patwari for a change in the warabandi 
or to save the abiana (water tax). Patwaris are the ones who assess the cropped area and 
therefore abiana for each farmer26. Farmers from the Mahmood distributary also contact the 
Gauge Reader very often to move the gates of the distributary. It is easier for them to contact 
the Gauge Reader and the SDO because of less distance as compared to the farmers of the 
Fordwah distributary. Appendix V presents main tasks and responsibilities of the ID staff 
contacted most by the farmers. 
Some of the farmers who have also served Irrigation Department as a patwari or other lower 
level staff recognise the difficulties which ID staff faces in their day to day encounters with 
the farmers and the political leaders of the area, based on their own experience. But they also 
know the right persons to contact in the ID to get their work done. These farmers, who have 
worked for ED, accuse politicians for the bad functioning of the main irrigation system. Box 
3.1 presents views of an ex-patwari who is cultivating his land now. 
24
 Chishtian Sub-division is considered a difficult area for irrigation managers because of the high level of 
political interference. Therefore SDOs try to minimise their tenure -5 SDOs have been transferred in and out in 
3 years (from 1993 to 1996) - whereas their normal tenure is 2 -3 years (Kuper, 1997). 
25
 To earn some extra living, he has rented in land along the Mahmood distributary. 
26
 However, they do not collect this abiana. It is collected by the Numberdar of the village. The abiana is based 
on the irrigated area and crop. It is highest for the cash crop like sugarcane vegetables and rice and cotton, since 
these are the crops, which need irrigation water most and are very profitable. Abiana for the main crops grown in 
the sample watercourses is: 
Crop 
Sugarcane 
Vegetable 
Cotton 
Rice 
Wheat 
Fodder 
Abiana per acre 
RsAJSS 
141/3.5 
79/1.97 
77/1.93 
73/1.8 
49/1.2 
31/0.8 
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Box 3.1: Views of an ex-patwari cum farmer on the problems faced by the ID staff 
and on the involvement of politicians in the management of the irrigation 
system 
Farmer OH)1 49, who owns 7 acres of land in one of the sample watercourses, was an ex-
patwari with the Irrigation Department for 17 years from 1948 to 1965. At the beginning of 
his job he was happy and satisfied with his work, however with the passage of time he felt 
more difficulties in fulfilling his job as he felt that he had to keep both fanners and his bosses 
happy. According to him patwaris used to feel happy and contented even if someone (a 
farmer) would reward them with a small amount of money (Rs. 10) in good old days. He took 
early retirement after he felt that he could no longer perform his duties properly because of 
the political interference. 
He feels that the management of the irrigation system has deteriorated since 1965, since when 
political interference of the big landlords has been increased. He is aware of the fact that ID 
officials get threats of transfers and sometimes even get suspended, if they do not co-operate 
with the big landlords and their tenants. In the worst cases ID officials have received life 
threats in case of non co-operation with these people. The whole system has entered into a 
vicious circle - small farmers steal water because they see big landowners doing and get 
away with it without paying any penalty. If these small farmers are caught while stealing 
water, by the ID staff, they seek help from either big landlords or the political leaders of the 
area. Political leaders of the area help these farmers because they are their vote banks. The 
effect of stealing of canal water appears in the form of water scarcity at the tail of the system 
where other farmers suffer. Every one blames everyone else for bad functioning of the 
system. The ID has a potential to manage this system very well only if political interference is 
minimised. 
3.3 SAMPLE WATERCOURSES: OUTLET TYPES AND WATER SUPPLY 
DURING THE STUDY PERIOD 
3.3.1 Outlet Type in the Selected Watercourses 
The type and the design of an outlet has greatest impact on the water distribution, therefore it 
is of prime importance to the canal engineers and the irrigators (Mahbub and Gulhati 1951). It 
influences the equitable water distribution within a distributary and determines the discharge 
formulae to be used. The selected watercourses have three types of outlets27 (See Appendix 
VI for sketches and other details): 
• Adjustable proportional Flume (APM) or Adjustable Orifice Semi-Module (AOSM) 
• Open Flume (OF) 
• Open Flume with Roof Block (OFRB) 
27
 Although there is one more type of outlet, pipe outlet, found in the selected distributaries. About 10 pipe 
outlets are installed along the Fordwah distributary, these pipe outlets are installed where the working head was 
not enough for the functioning of the semi-module (Hart, 1996). Along Fordwah distributary OFRB are present 
in the first half of the distributary (RD 0 to Rd 65) and APM/AOSM along the second half of the distributary 
(from RD 65 to 139). The tail of the Fordwah distributary has OFRD. Whereas along the Mahmood distributary 
first two outlets off-taking from the right side are pipe outlets and first two left outlets are OFRB. Three tail 
outlets (tail cluster) are open flumes. 
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The outlets were calibrated to obtain daily discharges of the watercourses. The Open Flume 
outlet however, was not calibrated with its formulae because it was always drowned under 
water, therefore the discharge formulae for an open flume could not be used for calibration, as 
the area of the flume through which water is flowing could not be determined. Instead, a 
section of a lined portion of the watercourse 50 meters downstream of the outlet was gauged, 
and this measurement was used as a calibration after consulting irrigation and hydraulic 
engineers. Only one outlet, that is the OFRB of the watercourse FD 38-L, needed to be 
calibrated for two flow conditions because of the higher elevation of the watercourse 
downstream of the outlet. The sediment deposition in the first hundred meters increases the 
bed elevation and therefore changes the flow condition from modular to submerged (or non-
modular). The outlet of the watercourse MD 11-TC (outlet type OF) could also not be 
caliberated with its standard discharge formulae because it was drowned in water28, for most 
of the time that resulted in continuous change in the actual area through which water was 
flowing. After discussions with some of the irrigation and hydraulic engineers it was decided 
to calibrate the lined section of the watercourse at the head by using empirical formulae. The 
discharge formulae used for calibration of the outlets for different flow conditions29 are as 
follows: 
Outlet Type(s) Discharge Equation(s) Sample outlet 
Orifice (OFRB and APM) with MD 1 -R 
semi-modular flow condition Q = CBYJ2gHs FD 38-L 
Orifice (OFRB and APM) with 
non-modular flow condition 
Open Flume 1 non-submerged) 
Section of the watercourse 
Where: 
Q 
c B 
Y 
Hs 
Hu 
Hd 
K 
D 
n _ 
Discharge 
Discharge Coefficient 
Breadth of the outlet 
Height of the outlet 
H u - Y 
Q = CBYA/2g(Hu-Hd) 
Q = CBHu3'2 
Q = KDn 
Upstream water level above the crest 
Downstream water level above the crest 
Discharge Coefficient 
Depth of the water in the channel 
Exponent 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 38-L 
MD11-TC 
28
 The explanation given by the farmers and the irrigation department officials is that when the distributary was 
remodelled the height of the crest of the outlet was increased while the height of the side walls was not increased 
and therefore the outlet is most of the time drowned even with its design discharge. This was also found true but 
higher water supply was the main reason for this overflow. 
29
 See Visser (1996) for different types of flow conditions for weir and orifice flow. 
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3.3.2 The Influence of Outlet Dimensions on Water Supply in Selected Watercourses 
The size of an outlet determines potential discharge to a watercourse. Therefore it is critical in 
the supply of irrigation water for the farmers, and is a point where farmers intervene with the 
system and get benefit for the whole group within a watercourse command area. Sometimes 
farmers tamper with the outlet in order to acquire additional canal irrigation water. 
At the start of the research, five out of six selected watercourses had almost the same 
dimensions as designed. However, one of the outlets was 21.6 % bigger than its design 
dimensions, hence the water it draws is 20 % more on average30. 
Later during the research farmers intervened and tampered with31 another outlet, MD 1-R, a 
few times. First the farmers broke the outlet. When the Irrigation Department (ID) interfered 
and fixed it32, farmers tampered with it again. Nevertheless it was fixed again by the ID 
within few days, but a compromise was made by increasing the Y (the elevation of the roof 
block above the crest) of the outlet by about 3 %. However this increase in the Y did not 
increase the discharge, in the sense that the discharge to the distributary was decreased. 
The dimensions of another outlet FD 67-L were also changed by the Irrigation Department in 
rabi 1997-98; its width B was increased by almost 10 % and height Y was decreased by about 
3 % that resulted in a total increase of 8 % in the discharge. The impact of these changes in 
mogha dimensions is discussed in detail in the chapters 4 and 6. 
3.3.3 Water Supply During the Study Period 
The study period that lasted for three agricultural seasons was special in terms of water 
supply. The first season that is rabi 1996-97, was normal but at the start of the kharif season 
one of the link canals that carry water from Balloki headwork to the Suleimanke headwork 
got damaged. Therefore the water, which according to farmers was already scarce, became 
even scarcer. This scarcity of water, in combination with the water theft33 upstream in the 
system by big landowners, made the water situation even worse for the fanners at the tail end 
of the system. Water theft upstream is a factor that always influences water distribution in the 
Chishtian Sub-Division (personal communication with Irrigation Department staff). However, 
at the end of kharif season the link canal was repaired and canal water supply improved. 
Another big incident that had influence on canal water supply of the study area was the visit 
of the Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan to the area in July 1997. During the visit the PM 
witnessed cuts in one of the distributaries in the area by the bigger farmers. He suspended 
most of the Irrigation Department staff of the irrigation circle and also promised to take 
appropriate actions against the farmers who were indulged in water theft. Though such forms 
of water theft by the farmers were not occurring in the distributaries studied, the whole 
emphasis on equitable water distribution by the PM influenced water supply to the selected 
watercourses during the remainder of the study period. 
30
 This 20 % is the average of one year (April 1997-April 1998) daily discharges. 
31
 They made holes in the walls of the outlets and also damaged the roof. 
32
 The Irrigation Department interfered because of high awareness due to the visit of the Prime Minister. This is 
discussed more in section 4.1 
33
 Here water theft also includes the use of power or influence to get a higher discharge than authorised. 
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The Delivery Performance Ratio (DPR) which is the ratio of actual supply to the design 
supply was calculated for all the sample watercourses. The DPR of the selected watercourses, 
presented in figure 3.4, shows that the water supply to the watercourses along Fordwah 
distributary was highest in rabi 1997-98 and lowest in kharif 1997. Average DPR during the 
study period was highest for the watercourse at the head of the distributary, followed by the 
one at the tail reach of the distributary; this is mainly because of the increased mogha size. 
Although the mogha of FD 38-L has the correct design dimension, it is still drawing more 
water than its design share. In theory, it should draw its design discharge. The only 
explanation of this is that, since the capacity of the Fordwah distributary to carry water has 
been reduced because of sedimentation, hence the water levels of the distributary are higher 
than the design water level for same discharge at the head of the distributary. Hence higher 
working head results in the increased discharge of the mogha. The water supply situation was 
improved considerably in rabi 1997-98 because i) one of the damaged link canal was fixed ii) 
distribution among the distributaries became more equitable after the PM's visit. However, 
the average DPR for the whole study period still remained well below 1 for the two 
watercourses, FD 67-L and FD 84-L, along the middle reach of the Fordwah distributary. 
Figure 3.4: 
When DPR = 1 
I Rabi 1996-97 D Kharif 1997 ^Rabi 1997-98 * Overall Average 
Delivery Performance Ratio (DPR) of the six selected watercourses along 
Fordwah and Mahmood distributaries during the study period (January 
1997 to April 1998) 
The watercourses along the Mahmood distributary show a different situation since the 
discharge of the distributary is usually much greater than its design share of water. Therefore 
both the selected watercourses (one at the head and the other at the tail of the distributary) 
have a DPR of more than 1 throughout the study period. The head mogha was receiving about 
175 % of the design during rabi 1996-97: that reduced to about 150 % in kharif 1997 and to 
137 % in rabi 1997-98. This change in the discharge of the mogha was due to the overall 
reduction in the discharge of the distributary after the PM's visited the area. According to 
these farmers the water supply has deteriorated. The privilege which the farmers of these 
watercourses have been getting in terms of higher water supply had become a right in their 
eyes: when it was taken back they felt deprived of their right. Some farmers even blamed the 
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researchers (IWMI-Pakistan) for the reduced water supply: they said that since researchers 
had started measuring discharge, water supply had deteriorated. Nevertheless, one of the 
farmers who first blamed the researchers for poor water supply said that he realised that this 
reduction in the discharge of mogha was due to the fact that canal water is reduced, making 
the situation very difficult for them. In the words of a farmer: 
"We are like fish that live in water and in past we never had any water shortage, we got 
water whenever we needed it but now when the water is taken away from us we are suffering 
like fish would suffer without water. We know that it was not our right but we are used to get 
more water and now we have problems in surviving. " 
In the selected tail watercourse of the Mahmood distributary the water situation remained 
more or less the same. One would expect a decrease in discharge and thus in DPR of this 
mogha as a result of the decrease in water supply to the distributary. But since the Irrigation 
Department downsized some of the upstream moghas to their design dimensions the 
discharge at the tail did not change. It remained more than 1 for all seasons. 
The seasonal DPR shows the difference between the design and the actual discharge of the 
watercourses in a season. However it does not show the fluctuation in daily discharges, of 
these watercourses. Thus, the Coefficient of Variation (CV) - standard deviation/mean - of 
daily discharges of all the sample outlets are calculated, for the whole study period (18 
months 4), to show variability in canal water supply. The CV of daily discharges are 0.62, 
0.64, 0.71, 0.64, 0.60, and 0.59 for the watercourses MD 1-R, MD 11-TC, FD 38-L, FD 67-L, 
FD 84-L, and FD 96-R respectively. These values, showing a high variation in daily 
discharges, cannot be used to show the general picture, since the canal water supply to the 
system was unusually disturbed due to some infrastructural problems in one of the link canals 
for one full month (in June 1997). Therefore the CV of daily discharge was calculated for the 
whole study period minus the month of June 1997. While this decreased the variability 
coefficient, it nevertheless was quite high. The new values of CV for the watercourses MD 1-
R, MD 11-TC, FD 38-L, FD 67-L, FD 84-L, and FD 96-R are 0.55, 0.57, 0.63, 0.55, 0.51, and 
0.49 respectively. These values show a high degree of fluctuation, and therefore unreliability 
in the canal water supplies to the watercourses. In the case of MD 1-R, this CV of discharge 
also includes the impact of farmers' action to refuse the surplus canal water supply by 
blocking the mogha35 - the actual discharge during the days the mogha is blocked becomes 
zero. A CV of discharge for MD 1-R without considering the days when discharge was nil 
because of farmers interventions is even less, which is 0.5. An interesting observation is that 
the fluctuations in the last two sample watercourses along the Fordwah distributary are of 
more or less the same magnitude. The reason might be that they are physically very close to 
each other (the distance between these watercourses is about 3.8 kms). The highest 
fluctuations are felt in the watercourse FD 38-L, which can be explained by the depth at 
which the OFRB is installed in the distributary cross section. Since it is installed quite high in 
34
 The period (4 to 5 weeks) when canals are closed for routine maintenance was not included in the analysis, 
because it is considered a part of the planning: for this period of time no water delivery was planned for the 
watercourses. 
35
 Although it also happened in the sample watercourses along the Fordwah distributary, that farmers blocked the 
mogha when they did not need canal water, but for fewer days. Hence it did not influence the CV of the 
discharge. In case of MD 11-TC, farmers do not block the mogha to manage excess canal water supply, they 
rather drain it in the water-logged area. Therefore this activity does not effect the discharge at the mogha. 
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the distributary, a small reduction in the water level has a big impact on the discharge through 
this mogha . 
3.3.4 Water Allowance Versus Supply 
The water allowance defines the size of an outlet, and therefore provides the basis for design 
of a distributary channel (Mahbub and Gulhati, 1951; Govt, of West Pakistan, 1961). 
Generally, water allowance is expressed in cusecs (ft3/s) per 1000 acres of Culturable 
Command Area (CCA). The water allowance for the selected distributaries' command areas 
and therefore of the selected watercourses command areas is 3.6 ft3/s per 1000 acres. 
However, actual water supply (in ft3/s/1000 acres) to the watercourses may be different from 
the water allowance (3.6 ft3/s/1000 acres). 
Principally the water supply to the official command areas of the watercourses should be 
equal to (or close to if not equal) their water allowance. In practice it is not the same, as 
shown here by the high discharge fluctuation. Another reason is that farmers, very often, do 
not cultivate one hundred percent of their command area but leave some land fallow37. In 
which case their actual supply should be greater than their water allowance. Table 3.5 shows 
the water supply (that is water delivered in ft3/s/1000 acres) as calculated based on the 
designed Culturable Command Area (CCA), and the Actual Cropped Area (ACA). Water 
supply based on both the areas - CCA and ACA - was calculated using the following 
formulae: 
Water delivered in ft3/s /1000 acres of CCA = (discharge/CCA) * 1000 
Water delivered in ft3/s /1000 acres of ACA = (discharge/AC A) * 1000 
Where discharge38 is in ft3/s, and CCA and ACA in acres 
The table also shows the ratio between the water supply (in ft3/s/1000 acres) based on both 
the areas (CCA and ACA) and water allowance - that is 3.6 ft3/s/1000 acres. Theoretically 
this value should be 1 for CCA, however it is not so. For the first two seasons, rabi 1996-97 
and kharif 1997, the ratio of actual water delivered based on CCA to the allowance was less 
than 1 for all the selected Fordwah watercourses and greater than 1 for the selected Mahmood 
watercourses. This shows the extent of water scarcity according to the design criteria. The 
ratio between actual water supply based on CCA and water allowance is below 1 even in case 
of the watercourse FD 96-R whose mogha was remodelled and enlarged. While the water 
supply remained higher than 1 for selected Mahmood watercourses in rabi 1997-98, the water 
supply of the two selected watercourses along the Fordwah distributary - FD 38-L and FD 
84-L - also exceeded the theoretical value of 1. 
In all the selected watercourses the water supply based on ACA is higher than the water 
supply based on CCA because the actual cropped area is less than the CCA. However the 
situation is more or less same when different watercourses are compared. The water supply 
based on ACA is very good in the selected watercourses along the Mahmood distributary: the 
36
 Earlier studies (Visser, 1996; Wahaj, 1995) also show that the water distribution to the head outlets is more 
correlated to the distributary discharges than the tail outlets. 
37
 This land is left fallow for several reasons including scarcity of canal water. In fact the system is designed with 
much less design cropping intensity (see section 3.4.2 for details). Note that water allowance is based on full 
CCA whereas design cropping intensity is the percentage of CCA. 
38
 Note that the average discharge of the whole season was used in the calculations. 
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ratio between the water supply based on ACA is much higher than 1 showing no signs of 
water scarcity according to the design criteria. The situation is different in the selected 
Fordwah watercourses. Water supply based on ACA of two of the selected Fordwah 
watercourses - FD 38-L and FD 96-R - is greater than 1 in all the seasons. The watercourse 
FD 67-L received less than their water allowance in the first two seasons but the water supply 
improved - ratio of water delivered based on ACA and water allowance exceeded 1 - in the 
last season of the study period, i.e., rabi 1997-98. Water supply to one of the selected 
watercourses, FD 84-L, remained below 1 throughout the study period. 
Overall, water supply situation to all the selected Fordwah watercourses became better after 
the water supply situation improved in late kharif 1997. Nevertheless the ratio between the 
water supply based on CCA and water allowance remained below 1 for two watercourses, FD 
67-L and FD 84-L. The following chapters will show how do they manage this water scarcity. 
Table 3.5: Actual water supply (ft3/s/1000acres) versus water allowance (i.e., 3.6 
ft/s/1000 acres) of six selected watercourses during the study period 
(January 1997 to April 1998) 
Rabi 1996-97 
(ftVs/1000acres) 
Kharif1997 
(ft3/s/1000acres) 
Rabi 1997-98 
(ftVs/lOOOacres) 
Based on CCA' (acres) 
Based on ACA2 (acres) 
Supply based on 
CCA/allowance 
Supply based on ACA/ 
allowance 
Based on CCA1 (acres) 
Based on ACA2 (acres) 
Supply based on 
CCA/allowance 
Supply based on ACA/ 
allowance 
Based on CCA1 (acres) 
Based on ACA2 (acres) 
Supply based on 
CCA/allowance 
Supply based on ACA/ 
allowance 
Watercourse 
MD1-R MD11-
6.45 
7.66 
1.79 
2.13 
5.55 
7.11 
1.54 
1.98 
3.99 
4.60 
1.11 
1.28 
TC 
5.32 
6.53 
1.48 
1.81 
5.15 
6.74 
1.43 
1.87 
5.69 
6.75 
1.58 
1.88 
FD 38-L FD 67-L FD 84-L FD 96-R 
3.34 
4.74 
0.93 
1.32 
2.95 
4.43 
0.82 
1.23 
5.07 
8.20 
1.41 
2.28 
2.11 
2.49 
0.59 
0.69 
1.74 
2.42 
0.48 
0.67 
3.23 
3.95 
0.90 
1.10 
1.59 
1.74 
0.44 
0.48 
1.88 
2.11 
0.52 
0.59 
3.00 
3.33 
0.83 
0.93 
3.22 
3.60 
0.89 
1.00 
2.64 
3.68 
0.73 
1.02 
4.25 
4.72 
1.18 
1.31 
'CCA is Culturable Command Area 
2ACA is Actual Cropped Area 
3.3.5 Conjunctive Water Use 
Farmers in the study area frequently use groundwater to irrigate their crops. Figure 3.5 gives 
an overview of the percentage of volume of groundwater, canal water and rainfall during the 
study period. Groundwater provided approximately 22 % of the total volume of water 
available in the selected watercourses during January 1997 to April 1998. Particularly in the 
month of June when canal water was scarce, most of the water was provided by rain and 
groundwater pumpage. Note that in kharif 1997, the link canal conveying water to Fordwah 
58 
THE WATER DELIVERY ENVIRONMENT OF THE STUDY AREA: WATER DELIVERY, AGRARIAN 
CONDITIONS, AND PRODUCTION 
irrigation system was damaged, therefore groundwater pumpage was relatively higher than 
previous kharif seasons39. 
Groundwater use in the watercourses along Fordwah distributary (that has a relatively lower 
canal water supply) is much higher than the watercourses along Mahmood distributary that 
has better canal water supply. However, within the Mahmood distributary groundwater is 
used more in the head watercourses because of more rice cultivation there. Similarly along 
the Fordwah distributary groundwater pumpage is greater in the watercourses with lower 
canal water supply. 
100% 
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70% 
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30% -
20% 
10% -\ 
0% 
•~W 
a.* 
MD1-R MD11-TC FD 38-L FD 67-L FD 84-L 
13Canal water S G r o u n d water • Rainfall 
FD 96-R 
Figure 3.5: Percentage of canal and groundwater used in six selected watercourses 
during study period (January 1997 to April 1998) 
The use of groundwater is an indicator of adequacy and of reliability of the canal water 
supply. A higher amount of groundwater use indicates that the canal water is not sufficient for 
the crops grown in the area, whereas a higher frequency of groundwater pumpage would 
mean that the canal water supply is not reliable. 
Groundwater exploitation was seen as the source for additional irrigation water as farmers 
were pressurised by the increased need of irrigation water resulting from increased cropping 
intensity. In the study area tubewell installation started in 1960, though a clear trend of 
increased groundwater exploitation set in during the 1980s (see Figure 3.6a). Almost all the 
farmers are using groundwater for irrigation in the study area: however, the frequency and 
amount is higher in the Fordwah distributary than in the Mahmood distributary. 
39
 Data from the previous kharif seasons was not available. This statement is based on the discussions with the 
Irrigation Department staff and farmers. 
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Figure 3.6a: Tubewell installation patterns in the six selected watercourses along the 
two distributaries 
Observation wells were used to observe groundwater table depth in every selected 
watercourse during the study period. Three observation wells at head, middle and tail of every 
watercourse were installed and readings were taken every fifteen days. Figure 3.6b shows the 
fluctuations in groundwater table over time. The groundwater depth values presented in the 
graph are the average of the values obtained from three observation wells. Overall average 
groundwater table depth increases as one moves downstream in the distributaries. Average 
groundwater depth for the selected watercourses in meters is 1.56, 1.88, 2,06, 3.06, 4.31, 4.89 
in MD 1-R, MD 11-TC, FD 38-L, FD 67-L, FD 84-L and FD 96-R respectively. The depth to 
groundwater table increases as the distance of the watercourses from the distributary head 
increases. Over time, the fluctuations in the groundwater table depth are more obvious in the 
watercourses along the Mahmood distributary because of relatively higher groundwater 
pumpage in kharif 1997. However, in almost all the watercourses, the groundwater table fell 
in kharif'but rose again in rabi because of less groundwater pumpage and better canal water 
supply. That may be keeping the balance of groundwater table in the area. January is another 
time of the year when groundwater table depth decreases, when the canal water supply is 
stopped for regular maintenance of channels. Farmers rely only on groundwater in that month 
hence groundwater levels fall, but again the groundwater table restored once the canal water 
supply is resumed. Unfortunately groundwater level data was only available after June 1997 
hence water balance for one year could not be done. 
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Figure 3.6b: Average groundwater table in the six selected watercourses over time 
(April 1997 to April 1998) 
3.4 CROP PRODUCTION, IRRIGATION WATER REQUIREMENTS, AND 
WATER DELIVERY 
3.4.1 Cropping Pattern 
The cropping pattern differs between the two distributaries in relation to available water 
supply. In the Fordwah distributary the main crops are wheat, cotton, sugarcane and fodder. 
Whereas, the main crops cultivated in the Mahmood distributaries are wheat, sugarcane, rice 
and fodder. Vegetables are also grown specifically at the head of both the distributaries. In the 
Mahmood distributary farmers cannot really grow cotton because of the higher groundwater 
table. The percentage of cultivated area under major crops in the sample watercourses is 
presented in table 3.6 (a and b). One of the reasons for the high percentage of sugarcane 
cultivation in three of the selected watercourses is that these watercourses are close to the 
sugar mill making it easier for farmers to sell their produce. 
In the watercourses along Mahmood distributary the percentage of area under sugarcane is 
even higher than the percentage of area cultivated under wheat that is considered the main 
rabi crop of this climatic zone. Moreover in kharif nee is the second biggest crop along the 
head watercourse of Mahmood distributary. This is a clear indication that water availability is 
not a limiting factor for the farmers having land along this distributary. Whereas, looking at 
the watercourses along Fordwah distributary, the percentage of area cultivated under 
sugarcane decreases along the distributary. Wheat, on the other hand covers more than fifty 
percent of total cultivated area in all the selected watercourses along the Fordwah distributary. 
In kharif, cotton is the main crop whereas there is hardly any rice along this distributary. Rice, 
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in the selected watercourses of Fordwah distributary, is grown mostly for domestic 
consumption. 
Table 3.6a: Cultivated area under major crops in six selected watercourses in rabi 
1996-97 and rabi 1997-98. Rabi 96 and Rabi 98 refer to the seasons rabi 
1996-97 and rabi 1997-98 respectively 
Watercourse 
MD 1-R 
MD 11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Wheat 
Area (ha.) 
Rabi Rabi 
96 98 
42 41 
54 55 
16 12 
92 94 
65 68 
30 35 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
Rabi Rabi 
96 98 
35 33 
40 41 
52 46 
70 74 
67 74 
49 57 
Sugar 
Area 
(ha) 
Rabi 
96 
43 
58 
9 
15 
7 
0.5 
Cane 
Rabi 
98 
52 
48 
13 
6 
2 
0.1 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
Rabi Rabi 
96 98 
36 42 
43 36 
30 48 
11 5 
7 2 
0.8 0.2 
Fodder 
Area 
(ha) 
Rabi 
96 
29 
22 
3 
13 
15 
17 
Rabi 
98 
27 
29 
2 
12 
13 
15 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
Rabi Rabi 
96 98 
24 21 
16 22 
10 6 
10 10 
15 14 
28 24 
Table 3.6b: Cultivated area under major crops six selected watercourses in kharif 
1997 
Watercourse 
MD 1-R 
MD 11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Cotton 
Area 
(ha) 
4 
22 
9 
72 
65 
28 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
3 
17 
32 
64 
68 
56 
Sugar Cane 
Area 
(ha) 
49 
72 
16 
15 
7 
0.5 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
44 
57 
56 
13 
7 
1 
Rice 
Area 
(ha) 
43 
11 
0 
5 
0.2 
0 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
39 
4 
0 
4 
0.2 
0 
Fodder 
Area 
(ha) 
14 
27 
2 
11 
16 
15 
% of total 
cultivated 
area 
13 
21 
8 
10 
17 
31 
3.4.2 Cropping Intensities 
The system was designed for 80% annual cropping intensity - (Cropped area/Cultuturable 
Command Area )*100 - with 32 % in rabi and 48 % in kharif. Design engineers envisaged 
lower cropping intensity in rabi as compared to kharif, which is not the case at present. The 
cropping intensities have increased tremendously mainly because of need for more food and 
income due to an increase in the population and more commercial activity. Only 4 % of the 
total population of farmers in the selected watercourses cultivate one crop in a year leaving 
the farm completely fallow for one full season. The cropping intensities of the watercourses 
studied are presented in table 3.7. Besides considerable increase in the annual land cultivated 
as compared to design cultivated area (60 to 90 % of CCA rather than 32 % in rabi and 48 % 
in kharif), farmers generally cultivate more area in rabi than in kharif mainly because of the 
lower water requirement in rabi40. The lowest cropping intensity is in the smallest 
watercourse (in terms of area and number of farmers both) FD 38-L. Some of the land for 
which water was allocated cannot be used for cultivation because of the high degree of salt in 
the soil. In the remaining watercourses, annual cropping intensities are twice the design 
cropping intensities. 
40
 Though in non-perennial distributaries the cropping intensity in kharif is still higher than the cropping intensity 
in rabi since they only get canal water supply in kharif. 
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Table 3.7: Cropping Intensities of the sample watercourses during the study period 
(rabi 1997, kharif 1991 and rabi 1997-98) 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Cropped Area (hectares) 
Rabi Kharif Rabi 
1996-97 
121 
136 
30 
132 
97 
61 
1997 
111 
127 
28 
112 
95 
49 
1997-98 
125 
133 
26 
127 
91 
62 
Cropping Intensity (%) 
Rabi 
1996-97 
85 
82 
70 
85 
91 
89 
Kharif 
1997 
78 
76 
67 
71 
89 
72 
Rabi 
1997-98 
88 
80 
62 
82 
85 
90 
3.4.3 Irrigation Water Demand and Water Supply in the Selected Watercourses: 
Matching Supply with the Demand 
The annual potential evapotranspiration of the selected watercourses was 1787 mm for the 
year April 1997 to April 1998 (two agricultural seasons, kharif 1997 and rabi 1997-98), 
whereas rainfall in this period was 302 mm41. This shows the great need for irrigation in the 
area. Irrigation water requirements was calculated using software CROPWAT 4.0 for 
windows. Figure 3.8 a and 3.8 b present irrigation water requirements and conjunctive water 
use at the farm-gate in selected watercourses of the study area. On the supply side conveyance 
losses for every watercourse were deducted from the total canal water supply. Rainfall is 
deducted from the demand. The canal water supply situation was very bad in kharif 1991 that 
is also shown by high amount of groundwater use, yet the gap between the supply and 
demand is still enormous. MD 11-TC has highest deficit, 312 mm, whereas FD 84-L has the 
least deficit, 97 mm, because of high groundwater use and lower water demand. In this 
watercourse farmers are managing demand very well by keeping it low: they are growing 
crops with relatively less water requirement. The gap between demand and supply is less in 
rabi 1997-98 for all the selected watercourses. 
The Relative Irrigation Supply (RIS), which is the ratio between the irrigation water supply 
and irrigation water demand (Perry, 1996) of canal water and conjunctive water use, is 
separately estimated for all the selected watercourses. The values presented in table 3.7 reveal 
that the demand for canal water for irrigation was much higher however, the gap between 
demand and supply was decreased tremendously with the use of groundwater in kharif '1997. 
For example RIS improved from 0.24 to 0.86 in case of FD 84-L. In Rabi 1997-98 RIS is 
much better even with use of only canal water, it is more than 0.5 for all the watercourses. 
This also suggests that the groundwater was the major contributor in achieving reasonable 
levels of RIS in all the watercourses. In FD 38-L and MD 11-TC RIS is even greater than 1. 
RIS with conjunctive water use is higher than 1 for all the selected watercourses in rabi 1997-
98. These patterns are analysed further in chapter 6. 
41
 Data used to calculate evapotranspiration was obtained from Meteorological stations located in Bahawalpur 
(about 90 kilometers West from the field area) and Bahawalnagar (about 40 kms East of study area). Rainfall 
was measured with rain gauges in all six selected watercourses and then the average of each month is taken and 
summed up for a year. This year rain in the area was much higher than the normal rainfall. Fanners and 
researchers both observed that in the year 1997 it rained more than the usual. 
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Table 3.8: 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Relative Irrigation Supply (RIS) of six selected watercourses in kharif 
1997 and rabi 1997-98. RIS 
and total irrigation (canal + 
RISin/t/iann997 
Canal water Conju 
0.51 
0.57 
0.41 
0.29 
0.24 
0.36 
is calculated for both canal water supply only 
ground) water 
nctive use 
0.92 
0.68 
0.71 
0.72 
0.86 
0.86 
RIS in rabi 1997-98 
Canal water Conjunctive use 
0.88 1.05 
1.22 1.29 
1.37 1.37 
0.75 1.06 
0.50 1.04 
0.72 1.16 
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Figure 3.7a: Irrigation water requirement and conjunctive use of canal and 
groundwater for kharif1997 in the six selected watercourses 
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Figure 3.7b: Irrigation water requirement and conjunctive use of canal and 
groundwater for rabi 1997-98 in the six selected watercourses 
3.4.4 Yield 
The crop yield for every farmer in the selected watercourse has been obtained through 
interviews at the end of every season studied (see table 3.9). Average yields of wheat and 
sugarcane in the selected watercourses are in line with the average yield for Punjab, published 
by Government of Pakistan (1999). The average yield of cotton in the selected watercourses is 
significantly lower than the average yield of Punjab. This may be the impact of bad canal 
water supply during kharif\997. The yield of rice is higher in the selected watercourses than 
for Punjab, which may be taken as the indication of better irrigation services - however use of 
groundwater played a vital role in achieving these yields. Wheat as a major rabi crop in the 
area was very good mainly because of the adequate canal water supply. In rabi 1997-98, canal 
water supply to all the watercourses was quite good (DPR ranged from 0.82 for FD 84-L to 
1.47 for MD 11-TC). During kharif\991 it was best for MD 1-R, which has the highest yield 
for rice. 
Table 3.9: Yield of major crops in six selected watercourses 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Average 
Punjab 
Average watercourse yield in tons/ha. 
Wheat 
2.3 
2.0 
2.4 
2.0 
2.5 
2.6 
2.3 
2.3 
Sugarcane 
45 
34 
55 
44.6 
40 
Cotton 
1.1 
0.9 
1.0 
1.1 
0.8 
0.8 
0.95 
1.5 
Rice 
3.0 
2.7 
2.2 
2.6 
1.4 
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3.4.5 Soil and Water Quality 
The soils in the selected watercourses are moderately coarse and coarse in texture. The 
watercourses along the Mahmood distributary (MD 1-R and MD 11-TC) have more of 
moderately coarse soils. Whereas, coarse soils are found more in the watercourses FD 67-L 
and FD 96-R. According to Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) a variety of crops (including 
wheat, cotton, rice, sugarcane, potatoes, water melon, etc) could be cultivated on these kind 
of soils. However, the level of salinity and sodicity can significantly effect the yield of these 
crops. Cotton is tolerant, while sugarcane, wheat and potatoes are moderately tolerant to soil 
salinity (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979). 
Kuper (1997) has described a gradual decrease in moderately and severely salinity affected 
areas in the Chishtian sub-division4 through appropriate measures taken by farmers. Strosser 
(1997) gave the salinity affected area as 10 % of the CCA (Strosser, 1997). The sodification 
of the soils resulting from the increased use of marginal quality groundwater may completely 
damage the soils so much so that they cannot be reclaimed any more (Strosser, 1997). 
However in the selected watercourse FD 38-L farmers have lost about 10 % of the total CCA 
because of soil degradation resulting from salinity and sodicity problems. However in other 
watercourses these problems have not yet cost any valuable agricultural land. Farmers take a 
range of water management and other actions as salinity and sodicity control measures 
(Kielen, 1996; Kuper, 1997). Some of these water management actions include maximum use 
of canal water for irrigation, blending tubewell and canal water, and a large pre-irrigation 
(rouni) for leaching. The use of gypsum is also very common for salinity control. 
The quality of groundwater in the study area is highly variable - it is often saline with 
relatively high concentrations of sodium and bicarbonates (Kuper, 1997) . The selected 
watercourses along the Mahmood distributary generally have better quality groundwater, with 
the average EC of 1.1 dS/m, since this was the old riverbed of the River Sutlej. The average 
EC of groundwater in the selected watercourses along the Fordwah distributary is a bit higher, 
which is 1.6 dS/m44. Recent studies (Kuper 1997, Kielen 1996, Hoeberichts 1996) have 
shown that farmers of the study area are well aware of the problems caused by the use of 
marginal quality groundwater and have their own indicators and criteria to judge the quality 
of groundwater45. Some farmers in the selected watercourses of Fordwah distributary 
complained about the poor groundwater quality. Water from a few tubewells in the Fordwah 
selected watercourses was found unfit for irrigation (see section 5.2). 
42
 The selected watercourses of the current study are part of the Chishtian Sub-division. This statement of Kuper 
(1997) is based on the results of series of surveys conducted by some Government agencies (including Water 
and Power Development Authority, WAPDA). The salinity was determined through visual observations. The 
total non-saline area found in the survey conducted in 1978 was increased to about 80 % from 55 % non-saline 
area found in the survey conducted in 1960. 
43
 Kuper (1997) studied the irrigation management strategies for improved salinity and sodicity control. Sample 
from 500 tubewells of the Chishtian sub-division were analysed under the study. The water was tested for three 
indicators - electrical conductivity (EC); sodium adsorption ratio (SAR); and residual sodium carbonates (RSC). 
The average EC of the of the pumped water was 1.1 dS/m, average SAR was 3.8 (mmol/1)05, and average RSC 
was 0.4 meq/1. 
44
 The highest average EC was found for the watercourses FD 96-R, with an average value of 1.9 dS/m. 
According to the water quality criteria used by WAPDA it is of marginal quality. 
45
 Kuper (1997) has even shown that the criteria used by the farmers (based on their perception) to judge 
tubewell water quality is stricter than the classification of WAPDA (based on laboratory measurements). 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the 'Water Delivery Environment' of the selected watercourses 
looking at their water supply, water technology, agrarian conditions and irrigation outcomes. 
Some basic performance indicators were also calculated to show the level of functionality of 
the system. The monitoring of tail gauges of the Fordwah distributary showed that it is 
dysfunctional even from the Irrigation Department's criteria of monitoring of water supply, 
whereas Mahmood distributary is privileged with good water supply. While for more than 
half of the time, during the study period, the tail of the Fordwah distributary did not receive 
any canal water. The water level at the tail of the Mahmood distributary was more than 
double its design water level. 
Discharge to the watercourses is highly variable and not matching the respective design 
discharges: the overall average DPR of the Mahmood watercourses during the study period 
was greater than 1, whereas it was less than 1 for the sample watercourses along the Fordwah 
distributary. 
The cropping intensities of the watercourses are more than double the design cropping 
intensities, that is a major cause for acquiring additional irrigation water. This additional 
water has to come either from exploiting the groundwater resources or by higher discharge in 
the whole distributary. The former is a more common way of water acquisition in the 
Fordwah distributary and the latter is more common in the Mahmood distributary. High water 
demanding crops, rice and sugarcane, are grown in three of the selected watercourses, two 
watercourses along the Mahmood distributary and one, FD 38-L, along the Fordwah 
distributary. 
The research site is transforming through population growth, and urban employment. Off-
farm activities and markets shape production and market choices as well as water supply. 
However despite these changes some social institutions like Panchayat abide. 
It was also shown that even in a dysfunctional system, farmers manage to get reasonable 
yields of the major crops. However, the yield of the high water demanding crops, sugarcane 
and rice, was better for the watercourses with relatively better canal water supply. The 
following chapters will explore in detail the way farmers manage water scarcity and water 
abundance to achieve this production and yields. 
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COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE WATER 
DELIVERY 
Premeditated water scarcity of protective irrigation supply in the large irrigation systems of 
Pakistan, together with the increased cropping intensity and unreliable irrigation water supply 
has resulted in efforts by farmers to acquire more water for irrigation and hence increase 
control over irrigation water. Farmers on the one hand make individual efforts like installing 
tubewells to improve adequacy and timely availability of water and on the other hand make 
collective efforts to maintain watercourse and to increase amount of surface water for 
irrigation. This chapter deals with the water management activities that are organised and 
performed collectively at watercourse level. These activities are identified and their 
organisational arrangements are discussed. Factors influencing collective action for water 
management in the selected watercourses are identified and discussed in the conclusions. The 
relative impact of these actions on water availability is presented in chapter 6. 
At the start of the research no distinction was made in terms of activities undertaken at 
different levels of organisation. However, with the time spent in the study area it was learnt 
that two water management activities, water acquisition and watercourse maintenance are the 
most important as far as collective action is concerned. The actions1 undertaken under these 
activities are: 
• Water acquisition: acquiring more water for all shareholders in the watercourse 
command area by: (i) lobbying for increase in discharge, (ii) physical interventions, and 
(iii) institutional arbitration 
• Watercourse maintenance: keeping the geometry of the watercourse in good shape by 
desilting of the main watercourse and other maintenance work. 
• Other actions to improve water availability and to reduce 'hassle' in irrigation, like (i) 
relocating infrastructure, (ii) lining of the main watercourse. 
In this research these activities are assumed to be effective and having an influence on the 
water delivery environment of the watercourse command area. 
4.1 WATER ACQUISITION: ACQUIRING MORE WATER FOR ALL SHARE 
HOLDERS IN THE WATERCOURSE COMMAND AREA 
Additional water for irrigation could be acquired from two sources, ground or canal water. 
Groundwater is mainly an individual strategy to increase flexibility in amount and timing of 
water use. Canal water is more difficult for an individual farmer to acquire hence collective 
action is preferred. Farmers either intervene with the system physically for short- term benefit 
or try to institutionalise their physical interventions for relatively long-term gains. 
Mollinga (1998) also found similar kind of actions regarding water acquisition in Tungabadra canal irrigation 
system in South India. 
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4.1.1 Lobbying for an Increase in Discharge 
Farmers try to contact Irrigation Department (ID) staff of different levels (including XEN, 
SDO and Gauge Reader) collectively to complain about the shortage of surface irrigation 
water and to request an increase in the discharge of their distributary. Since the outlets are 
ungated, farmers can only request for an increase in discharge of the distributary. The staff 
visited depends on the nature of the complaint or request to be made. For example, requests 
regarding the increase of discharge or mogha dimensions are made to the SDO or Sub-
Engineer and requests regarding the increase of discharge in the distributary are made very 
often to the Gauge Reader. However generally the efforts made to get higher discharge in the 
distributary are from farmers having land along a smaller distributary. Most often influential 
farmers or farmers with better negotiating abilities would go on these so-called 'missions'. 
These negotiators may also be influential persons, who are involved in the local politics and 
have contacts with the Members of Provincial Assembly (MPA). 
Sometimes farmers seek the help of MPA(s) of their area to lobby for increased water supply 
to their distributary. To arrange additional water, an MPA usually talks to the senior staff of 
the ID (XEN or SDO level). Sometimes he (MPA) also tries to order junior staff in the ID 
(Gauge Reader, Sub-Engineer). Junior irrigation staff obey the orders of an MPA to save their 
own jobs or to please him to get some benefits later on. However doing so can also put their 
jobs at stake sometimes (see Box 4.1). 
4.1.2 Physical Interventions 
Usually physical interventions are illicit practices and include a certain risk factor in 
undertaking them: that may also be one reason why farmers perform this activity collectively. 
Actions taken to intervene physically with the system are also based on the urgency of the 
matter. For instance, collective action is organised quickly in response to sudden decrease in 
water supply as a result of change in strategies of operational management of the ID. Box 4.1 
also outlines the actions taken by the farmers of the Mahmood distributary during July 1997 
and August 1997 to collectively acquire their perceived right of water. This could also be 
regarded as successful collective action that is possible in the case of a smaller distributary. 
However, this successful collective action still means less supply of surface water to some of 
the watercourses in other distributaries and problems for some of the ID staff in fulfilling 
their duties. Farmers physically intervene with the system at two levels, distributary level and 
watercourse level. At the distributary level physical action is pursued through the Gauge 
Reader by putting pressure on him to increase the discharge in the distributary and thus the 
watercourse. Whereas at watercourse level it is more direct physical intervention by 
tampering with the mogha. 
70 
COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE WATER DELIVERY 
Box 4.1: Collective action for water acquisition in response to the decreased surface 
water supply in the Mahmood distributary 
Farmers at the tail of the Azim distributary, one of three tail distributaries of the Fordwah branch 
canal, have not received any water since a long time, because big landowners take all the canal 
water by force. These farmers have been trying to get some canal water. Finally they decided to talk 
to the Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) this time. The MPA complained about this water 
scarce situation to the Prime Minister (PM) who visited the area in the third week of July 1997. The 
Prime Minister, some ID officials and the Provincial minister of Agriculture witnessed a cut in the 
distributary. The PM ordered to arrest the culprit and suspended the whole Irrigation staff of the 
circle, except an Executive Engineer (XEN) recently transferred to this area. In response to the 
Prime Minister's visit the ID's staff became very careful and took some measures to deliver water to 
the tail of the distributaries. One of the actions they took was to downsize the moghas to their design 
dimensions. Another measure was to decrease the discharge of the Mahmood distributary, since it 
was much higher than its design share. Farmers along the Mahmood distributary, who were used to 
receive abundant water, got extremely angry with the ID and threatened to kill the Sub-Engineer 
who they thought was responsible for the decrease in discharge. Shareholders from the different 
watercourses reacted differently as discussed below. 
Watercourse MP 1-R 
Direct physical intervention: Tampering with the mogha 
Sharecroppers of watercourse MD 1-R were used to get on average 60 % higher discharge than its 
design share before the visit of the Prime Minister in kharif1997. This privilege of plentiful water 
was considered a right by these farmers, who had received this for many years. After the visit of the 
Prime Minister, who also clearly instructed the ID staff to provide water to the tail end farmers in 
the system, the ID staff tried to keep the discharges of the distributaries to their design share. As a 
result discharge to the Mahmood distributary was reduced. Water users of the watercourse MD 1-R 
got angry at this intervention of ID and tampered with the mogha, by breaking bricks thus creating a 
hole in the wall of mogha on one side, in the third week of August 1997. The ID repaired this 
within a few days, but the new mogha was now downsized, which was not acceptable to farmers 
since the water supply was not enough to irrigate rice and sugarcane. Therefore the farmers again 
broke the wall. This time the ID made a compromise and the dimensions of the mogha were 
increased as compared to the one in the normal conditions. The height of the opening was increased 
by 2.7 %; the width was not increased though. However, the discharge of the mogha still decreased 
by 30 % because of the total reduction in the discharge of the distributary. The mogha would have 
drawn 2 % less than the present discharge if the height of the mogha (Y) had not been increased. 
Tail clusters of Mahmood distributary 
Lobbying for increased water supply 
Shareholders from the tail cluster of watercourses went to the Gauge Reader first to get more water 
into the distributary since tampering with the mogha would not have solved their problem (their 
moghas are at the ultimate tail of the distributary). The Gauge Reader was instructed not to leave 
more water than the design in Mahmood distributary hence he refused to increase the discharge and 
explained the situation to the fanners. The farmers got angry with him and went to the MPA of the 
area and complained about the Gauge Reader's refusal. The MPA summoned the Gauge Reader and 
asked him to entertain the request of farmers, he also gave his visiting card to the Gauge Reader and 
said he would talk to the officers himself. The Gauge Reader came back and increased the discharge 
to Mahmood distributary. The XEN of the zone visited the site and found that the discharge to the 
Mahmood distributary was much higher than its design. He got angry with the Gauge Reader and 
suspended him. The Gauge Reader was still suspended by the end of this research period. 
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4.1.3 Tampering with the Mogha 
Farmers tamper with the mogha by making a hole in the sidewall of the mogha to increase the 
discharge for the whole watercourse command area. This is mainly done in the kharif season 
when demand for irrigation water is at its peak. The mogha may have been tampered with by 
only one or a number of farmers but the plan of action is discussed and agreed upon by all the 
farmers. Once a mogha is tampered with by farmers(s) it is usually not repaired before the 
canal closure. Therefore if farmers undertake this action during the start of the year (after 
January) or at the start of kharif season (after April), they can use the large flow for the rest of 
the year until beginning of January. The farmers do have to pay2 the fine for damaging the 
mogha but when divided among the shareholders this is minimal as compared to the benefit 
they get with the additional water. Sometimes this action is even taken in consultation with 
the ID officials (SDO according to many farmers). In addition to this penalty, farmers also 
have to pay some money to the officer consulted3. But in this case the penalty is not high 
since the amount of penalty depends on the officer4. 
During the whole study period only one mogha {mogha type OFRB) of the watercourse MD 
1-R was tampered with by the farmers (see box 4.1 for details). Another mogha (mogha type: 
APM) was tampered with and replaced just before the data collection was started5. 
Shareholders of the Watercourse FD 67-L are very well organised in undertaking this action 
for acquiring additional canal water. They have been doing it time and time again in the past 
and do not hesitate to undertake it. 
4.1.4 Institutional Arbitration 
Remodelling the outlet: Change in mogha dimension 
A more sustainable way to acquire additional canal water is to get the dimensions of the 
mogha enlarged. This can only be done with the help of the ID officials. Therefore farmers 
have to first discuss the situation among themselves, then negotiate with the ID and then 
collect some funds to pay for the so-called service provided by the Department. The ID staff 
contacted for this reason depends on the ease with which the farmers could approach them. 
For instance if a farmer has a relative or a friend who is a higher level officer (SDO or XEN) 
he would rather directly talk to him. Nevertheless most often a Sub-Engineer is the contact 
person for these kinds of arrangements since he is responsible for checking the dimensions of 
the outlet and construction work in the field. One of the duties of a Sub-Engineer is to 
2
 According to the Canal and Drainage Act the Divisional Canal officer is, after holding an inquiry, responsible 
for levying charges according to the rules. Section 33 of Canal and Drainage Act 1873 (Nasir, 1993) substituted 
by the Punjab (Amendment) Act XXXII of 1975, '.....provided that where the water so used has been supplied 
through a watercourse, the charges shall be levied: from the person by whose act or neglect such use has taken 
place, or if such person cannot be identified, from the person on whose land the water has flowed and such land 
has derived benefit therefrom; or if such person cannot be identified or the land on which the water has derived 
no benefit therefrom, from all persons chargeable in respect of the water supplied through such watercourse'. 
3
 Farmers usually consult the Sub-Engineer or the SDO. 
4
 The penalty could be from three to six times of the water tax (abiana) of the crops irrigated from the stolen 
water. In the case of involvement of all the farmers in tampering with the mogha, total abiana for the 
watercourse is considered since all the farmers have benefited from this intervention and all the crops are 
irrigated with this additional water (Canal and Drainage Act, 1873). 
5
 According to the Check Outlet Statement of Hasilpur section for the year 1997-98, 29 out of 88 outlets (about 
33 %) along the Fordwah distributary differ significantly from their design dimensions: 
• Out of these 29 outlets 15 are APM, 10 are OFRB and 4 are pipe outlets. 
• 10 of these outlets lie in the head reach, 10 in the middle reach and 9 in the tail reach of the distributary. 
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periodically check6 and record the outlet dimensions and the working head of the outlet in a 
register called the 'H-Register'. Particularly when a Sub-Engineer is transferred to an area, he 
has to check all the outlets in the distributary (or a section of a distributary) for which he is 
responsible and prepare a statement called 'check outlet statement'. Moghas are downsized 
and brought back to their original design dimensions if they deviate from design data. This 
makes farmers always suspicious about the motives of new Sub-Engineers transferred to the 
area for checking the mogha dimensions. They fear that the Sub-Engineer wants to get some 
money and that they check the outlets for personal gains and not because of their duty7. 
In the selected watercourses one of the moghas had enlarged dimensions at the start of the 
research, while the dimensions of the rest of the moghas were approximately according to 
their design. The watercourses along the Mahmood distributary and watercourse FD 38-L 
were not enlarged because of good canal water supply. Watercourse FD 67-L was downsized 
and repaired just before the research started. Watercourse FD 84-L was not enlarged because 
of lack of consensus among the shareholders over collecting funds. Nevertheless towards the 
end of the data collection, the dimensions of FD 67-L and MD 1-R were also changed. MD 1-
R has already been dealt with in section 4.1.1 whereas FD 67-L is discussed later in this 
section. 
The mogha of the watercourse FD 96-R was enlarged about one year before the start of the 
current study. Farmers decided to have this change and discussed it with the Sub-Engineer of 
the area who was willing to help them but also charged money for the service he provided. 
Farmers paid Rs 16000/USS 400 in total. The width of the outlet, B, was increased by 10% 
and the height of the opening, Y was increased by 10.5 % with an overall increase in area of 
21.6 %. This intervention resulted in an increase of average daily water supply to the 
watercourse of 20 %. Figure 4.1 shows the difference between the discharges calculated using 
the design8 dimensions and actual dimensions of the outlet FD 96-R. Although the variability 
in the water supply would have remained the same, the total amount of water delivered to this 
watercourse has substantially increased because of the increased mogha dimensions. A rough 
estimate reveals that farmers would have to spend Rs. 48000 (US$1200)9 in order to pump 
the same amount of water for one year (from December 1997 to December 1998). This 
estimate was made using a tubewell with a discharge of approximately 19.5 1/s and the price 
to pump water for one hour as Rs 40 (about USS 1) that is commonly used in this 
watercourse. Therefore farmers together saved about Rs 32000 (USS 800) in one year10. 
6
 Although, in practice this duty is not performed periodically, only when a Sub-Engineer is transferred in does 
he prepares a check statement. 
7
 In fact, to some extent farmers are justified to doubt the motives of the Sub-Engineer (see footnote 28). 
8
 The discharge is calculated using the design dimensions but actual water level in the distributary, to get an idea 
of the discharge in case the mogha was not enlarged. 
9
 The conversion rate of US dollar to Pakistani Rupee was 40 Rs. to a dollar in January 1997, which dropped to 
44 Rs to a US dollar in January 1998. The conversion rate used in this thesis is 40 Rs to a Dollar to keep the 
comparison simple. 
10
 Since the mogha was not downsized to its design dimensions for more than two years, the benefit is even 
higher. 
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Actual Q *• Q with design dimensions 
Figure 4.1: Daily discharges (Q) of FD 96-R with design dimensions and actual 
dimensions of the outlet (November 1996 to November 1998) 
Water users in the watercourse FD 67-L were receiving only 50 % of the design discharge and 
were not happy with the situation. They were talking about tampering with the mogha and 
getting the size of the mogha enlarged. However, after the Prime Minister's visit when the 
new Sub-Engineer was transferred to the area, he checked all the outlets and downsized those 
with bigger dimensions than their design, and upgraded the ones that were smaller than the 
design. According to farmers, one day the Sub-Engineer changed their mogha as well. They 
thought it was downsized and therefore became very angry. They also asked about this change 
to the Sub-Engineer who told them to wait and see. The Sub-Engineer said that the change 
was for the good and that it would have positive impact on water delivery. The area of the 
orifice was increased by about 5 % with 9.5 % increase in the width, B, and 4.1 % decrease in 
height, Y, of the mogha. This increased the discharge by about 8 % provided that there was 
water in the distributary. Figure 4.2 shows the actual discharge and the discharge if the mogha 
had not been enlarged. Farmers were not satisfied with this increase of the discharge and were 
talking about getting the mogha enlarged for next year if canal water supply does not 
improve. 
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Figure 4.2: Daily discharges (Q) of the watercourse FD 67-L for both new and old 
APM outlet (October 1997-April 1998) 
Inclusion of more command area to increase the discharge 
If the watercourse command area is increased by 10% of its existing command area the outlet 
has to be enlarged in order to supply the water allowance. The delivery time in minutes per 
acre is reduced however. Assume a watercourse with a CCA of 300 acres (121.5 ha.) that has 
50 fanners and a design discharge of 1.08 ft3/s (30.6 1/s). The irrigation time per acre will 
roughly be 33 minutes per acre. If the CCA of such a watercourse is increased by 10 % and 
becomes 330 acres, the design discharge will be increased to 1.19 ft3/s (33.7 1/s) but the time 
to irrigate one acre will decrease to about 30 minutes per acre. However, with a stable 
discharge the depth of water supply over a given period will remain the same. According to 
farmers, in the past when the water supply was still reasonably reliable the strategy to increase 
the command area of the watercourse in order to increase discharge capacity of the mogha 
was adopted. However now farmers do not go for this option. Box 4.2 shows lack of 
agreement on increasing the watercourse command area since some of the shareholders 
perceived it as loss of water as a result of less time available for irrigation. This also shows 
the distrust of the farmers with regard to the services provided by the ID. Collective decision 
was not taken as the proposed change may have negative impact for some farmers 
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Box 4.2: Resistance to the acquisition of water by increasing the command area of the 
watercourse 
An ex Patwari, ODD 43, has land in two adjacent watercourses FD 67-L and FD 68-L. It is difficult 
for him to irrigate his land in the tail section of watercourse FD 68-L because of some physical 
constraints: slope of the watercourse at the tail section was minimal. Therefore he wanted to include 
that part (36 acres or approximately 15 ha) in the command area of the watercourse FD 67-L from 
where his land is accessible for irrigation. To shift some area from one watercourse to the other he 
had to take shareholders of the potential increased watercourse command area into confidence so 
that they do not object when asked by the ID. Officially he has to make a request for the change in 
the source of the canal water supply to the ID official, who will visit the area and inquire among 
other farmers about their views on inclusion of the new area. Hence the ex Patwari had to discuss 
this issue with other shareholders. He asked for a Panchayat a few times and tried to convince 
fellow shareholders that this inclusion of 10 % more area would also result in an increase of the 
discharge capacity of the outlet by 10 %. According to rules if 10 % of the total command area is 
increased the outlet has to be remodelled and discharge is increased. The numberdar of their village 
who is living a bit farther along another distributary and is considered a respectable person also 
joined the meetings once and gave arguments in favour of the ex Patwari but it did not work. The 
argument against this change put forward by a number of shareholders was the reduction in 
irrigation time in terms of minutes per acre. Some of the farmers said that they had already lost 3 
minutes per acre as result of increase in the command area at different times in past: this time 6 
more minutes had to be deducted, which was not acceptable. The canal water supply is fluctuating 
and the discharge is not guaranteed, which could result in a smaller volume of canal water per unit 
area. The Patwari told the farmers that he would get this change made one way or the other because 
he has good contacts with the ID people. However, by the time fieldwork for this research was 
completed nothing had happened; some farmers were still opposing the increase in command area 
while some others were convinced that the change would not reduce total quantity of water per unit 
of area. 
4.2 WATERCOURSE MAINTENANCE: KEEPING GEOMETRY OF THE 
WATERCOURSE IN GOOD SHAPE TO REDUCE LOSSES 
The watercourse is of vital importance to the farmers since it carries water from the source -
that is the mogha in this case - to the individual field. If it is in bad shape conveyance losses 
are higher and precious water is lost. Conveyance losses are much greater in the unlined 
watercourse as compared to the lined watercourse, between 30 to 40 % of water entering the 
unlined watercourse is lost in conveyance (Trout, 1979). Thus maintaining watercourse in 
good shape is as good as acquiring additional water for irrigation. 
Farmers are responsible to maintain watercourses. The Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 
(Nasir, 1993) states "The Government is not responsible for the maintenance of the 
watercourse, but that is the responsibility of those who use it, whether on existing 
Government, or private land." The ID can only interfere and take action if they consider that 
farmers are not keeping the watercourse in good shape, such that it is causing water loss. In 
this case the ID can stop water supply to the watercourse until the watercourse is improved. 
However, it had never happened in the sample watercourses. 
76 
COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE WATER DELIVERY 
Watercourse maintenance includes desilting or cleaning of the watercourse, repair of the 
watercourse banks, repair and installation of nakkas and construction and repair of culverts. 
Desilting is done periodically and the rest is done once in a while. Farmers consider desilting 
as one of the most important water management activities since it requires resource 
mobilisation in the form of labour - and it is hard work. Cleaning or desilting includes 
removal of weeds and sediment from the bed and the banks of the watercourse and 
strengthening of the watercourse banks. In the lined watercourses with a good slope, less 
sediment is deposited and thus these tasks become relatively easier (De Klein and Wahaj, 
1998). Sometimes when farmers start irrigation, and patrol along the watercourse, they 
remove some hindrances. That is also a kind of watercourse cleaning, but farmers do not 
really regard it as such. Moreover it is not done in planned or organised way and to keep track 
of this kind of activity is also difficult: therefore it is not dealt with in depth in this thesis. In 
some cases farmers also desilt the distributary. Box 4.3 describes some of the processes of 
collective action for desilting of the distributary. 
4.2.1 Farmers Perception on Frequency of Desilting of the Watercourses 
Farmers have an idea of the number of times that a watercourse should be desilted during a 
year - which they do not always follow. In the current research, farmers were asked about 
their perception of required frequency of the desilting activities in each of the selected 
watercourses. Later, the number of actual desiltings was monitored and thus 'deferred 
maintenance' was calculated as the difference between the ideal and the actual number of 
desiltings. Table 4.1 presents the desilting events that happened during the study period in the 
selected watercourses. The timing and the number of the actual desiltings were different for 
all the watercourses. The need to maintain - or more precisely to desilt - the main watercourse 
seem to be better met in the watercourses along the Fordwah distributary as compared to the 
Mahmood distributary (see table 4.2). Farmers of the Fordwah watercourses seem to be more 
practical in assessing the need to desilt the watercourse1'. Several reasons were explored for 
the differences. The first is the better water supply in terms of DPR. The second was the 
number of water users. The water supply to the watercourses along the Mahmood distributary 
was better than to the watercourses along the Fordwah distributary; therefore the need to 
desilt the watercourse to improve water availability at the middle and tail reaches was less 
strong than for the Fordwah watercourses. Moreover, these sample watercourses (along the 
Mahmood distributary) were desilted at the time of peak water requirement. A relationship 
between the deferred maintenance and canal water delivery and deferred maintenance and 
number of shareholders in a watercourse command area was tested. The correlation between 
the deferred maintenance and the number of shareholders in a watercourse was stronger (R2 = 
0.71) than between the deferred maintenance and DPR (R2 = 0.59). Figure 4.3 shows the 
relationship between the number of shareholders and the deferred maintenance. De Klein and 
Wahaj (1998) found that the number of shareholders was less than 30 in the watercourses 
with little or no maintenance gap. Their results were based on in-depth study of twelve 
watercourses in Southeastern Punjab12. 
1
' Perhaps because farmers of the Mahmood distributary cultivate crops with high water requirement, they 
perceive a greater need for cleaning their watercourses than they actually perform. 
12
 Six of these twelve watercourses are part of this Ph.D. study. 
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Box 4.3: Successful collective action for desilting of the Mahmood distributary 
Desilting of the distributaries is a responsibility of the ID. Generally speaking most of the 
distributaries in Punjab are in bad shape in terms of maintenance. In the late 1980s farmers started 
desilting the distributaries in a campaign of "self help" initiated by the then Provincial Government, 
but it did not last long. The parts of the distributaries that need reinforcement are temporarily 
strengthened in case of a breach. 
In the studied distributaries, the ID last carried out desilting more than ten years ago, because of the 
lack of funds provided by the Provincial Government. In the year 1997 part of the tail reach of 
Fordwah distributary was desilted. Nevertheless the Mahmood distributary is desilted by the farmers 
from tail clusters twice a year. This happens once in January/February during the canal closure, and 
a second time in June or July when a lot of sediment comes with the water and evapotranspiration is 
at its peak. Sometimes it gives problems to farmers upstream when done in June/July. During the 
canal closure there is no problem in desilting the distributary. 
Farmers from three watercourses at the tail of the distributary organise for desiltings. Three persons, 
one shareholder from each watercourse, are responsible for organising the activity. When organised 
during the canal closure, date and time is first discussed among a few farmers, mostly among the 
numberdar of MD 11-TC and three other influential farmers (one from each watercourse of the tail 
cluster) and then communicated to other farmers. When it has to be done during the supply period 
(in June/July) permission to close the distributary for a day or two has to be asked from the SDO of 
the ID since it is not possible to desilt the distributary when it has water flowing in it. One of the 
leaders writes an application and gets it signed (or takes a thumb impression) by at least 15 farmers 
and the Sub-Engineer of the area and submits it to the SDO for approval. Afterwards the time and 
the date for desilting are announced in the Mosques by loudspeakers to inform all the farmers. 
Sometimes farmers from upstream try to stop this desilting activity since the distributary has to be 
closed and they are not affected by the sedimentation. A few times they tried their best to get the 
approval to close the distributary cancelled but they did not succeed. Once they even requested the 
MPA of the area to interfere. The leaders who organised the activity suggested to the SDO to go to 
the head office, which is in another city, on the day this activity had to be performed. This way he 
does not have to deal with the MPA - since if an MPA asks an SDO for cancellation of the order to 
close the distributary he will have problems in resisting the request. The SDO took the advice and 
did not come to his office that day and the activity was performed successfully. 
The distributary is divided in three equal parts to be cleaned by the farmers of three watercourses. 
One farmer from each watercourse then distributes the work according to the land holding size of 
the farmers. During the desilting activity farmers try to maintain a smooth slope in the distributary 
bed and keep distributary width as in design, which they learned form the Sub-Engineer of the area, 
although they do not measure it with a measuring tape. 
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Table 4.1: Desilting events that took place in the 
study period (November 1996 to April 
Month 
Nov-96 
Dec-96 
Jan-97 
Feb-97 
Mar-97 
l-14Apr-97 
15-31 Apr-97 
May97 
Jun-97 
Jul-97 
Aug-97 
Sep-97 
Oct-97 
Nov-97 
Dec-97 
Jan-98 
Feb-98 
Mar-98 
l-14Apr-98 
15-31 Apr-98 
Total 
Per Year 
15 April 97 to 15 April 98 
MD1-R MD11-
TC 
FD 38-L 
6 
4 
six sample watercourses during the 
1998) 
FD 67-L 
4 
3 
8 
7 
1 
1 
FD 84-L FD 96-R 
1st half 
FD 96-R 
2nd half 
4 
3 
6 
5 
6 
4 
Table 4.2: Gap between the watercourse desilting required 
year (two crop seasons: kharif 1997 and rabi 1997 
Watercourse 
MD 1-R (partially lined) 
MD 11-TC (partially lined) 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L (almost fully lined) 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R (average of the two 
halves) 
Required number 
of desilting 
9 
9 
9 
O3 
4 
6 
Actual number 
of Desilting1 
4 
3 
7 
1 
3 
5 
and actual during one-
-98) 
Deferred maintenance 
(%) 
55.5 
66.6 
22.2 
25.0 
16.6 
1
 The Annual number of desilting events taken between 15 April 1997 to 15 April 1998. 
2
 Deferred maintenance = ((required number of desilting-actual number of desilting)/ 
required number of desilting ))*100 
3
 This watercourse was lined two years back and since then farmers have not desilted it. 
Therefore farmers thought that it did not need to be desilted at all. However, later they 
realised that the desilting was required. 
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Figure 4.3: Number of shareholders and deferred maintenance in five (out of six) 
sample watercourses. FD 67-L was not considered for the analysis, as, 
after lining of the watercourse, farmers did not expect any need to desilt 
the watercourse 
4.2.2 Why Desilt a Watercourse? 
As a researcher we know that desilting of the watercourse is needed for better conveyance of 
irrigation water, to increase flow velocity by removing any hindrance - or technically 
speaking by decreasing the friction. Farmers, while they do not use technical terminology, 
still mentioned more or less the same reasons for watercourse desilting when asked -the 
improved availability of irrigation water in terms of less water loss. 
Removal of weeds and silt from the watercourse results in increased velocity, smooth water 
flow, less water loss during conveyance (less conveyance losses) and increase in area irrigated 
per unit of time. Cleaning of watercourse bed and sides increases the velocity of the water by 
reducing friction, which saves water from overtopping and also reduces the risk of breach of 
nakkas or watercourse bunds. Hindrances at the tail of the watercourse tend to cause a breach 
in the nakkas at the head of the watercourse. Blockage of the rodent holes and bank 
strengthening also prevents the risk of a breach in a watercourse, and seepage through these 
holes, and thus saves water. It also reduces the risk of any legal conflicts with other 
shareholders of the watercourse. In case of a breach, the affected cultivator could go to the 
court against the farmer who had a water turn at the time of the damage caused13. Therefore to 
avoid such individual problems farmers collectively clean the watercourse. 
The foremost impact of desilting is the increase in the area irrigated in a unit time, especially 
for the farmers at the tail of the watercourse. For the farmers having their land along the head 
of the watercourse the main reason to participate in the activity is to prevent a breach in the 
watercourse that happens when water is blocked. 
13
 This however does not happen since apologies are made and help is extended in fixing the breach in the 
watercourse. 
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4.2.3 Indicators Used by Farmers in Organising the Desilting Activity 
In some cases - as in FD 38-L - sedimentation in the watercourse causes a backwater effect 
and thus influences the discharge at the mogha by changing the flow condition from free flow 
to submerged flow. It is then necessary to clean the first 100 meters or so (depending on the 
slope of the watercourse) more often than the rest of the watercourse, in order to maintain free 
flow condition at the outlet. In the watercourse 67-L this situation existed before lining the 
watercourse. Here farmers had to clean the first 200 meters of the watercourse very frequently 
to maintain a free flow condition at the mogha. 
The factors as mentioned by the farmers that are considered in deciding about the desilting of 
the watercourse are: 
Obstruction in the flow of water 
Growth of grass in the bed and the sides of the watercourse and sediment deposition obstructs 
water and reduces its velocity. 
Overtopping 
If the beds and the banks of a watercourse are not desilted water starts overtopping the banks 
and is lost. 
Breach 
A breach in the watercourse is an indication that the watercourse can not carry water properly 
anymore and that the watercourse has to be desilted and the banks of the watercourse have to 
be strengthened to prevent water loss. 
Unit irrigated area during water turn 
If the area irrigated during one water ti 
indicator is a proxy for most of the indicators listed above. 
urn declines, it is time to clean the watercourse . This 
Timing of the desilting activity 
The main reason for organising the activity is the need of water; it needs to be saved at the 
time it is needed most. However, for convenience of undertaking the activity, other agrarian, 
physical and social factors are taken into consideration as well. The following are the 
practical considerations that farmers have in deciding about the timing of the desilting 
activity: 
• It is more convenient to desilt a watercourse on the day water is used at the head of the 
main watercourse, since the whole watercourse is cleaned at the same time, therefore it 
should be empty. In case of desilting of a watercourse branch, it is done when water is 
flowing in the other branch. 
• A watercourse could also be easily desilted when the parent canal is closed because of 
the rotation among the distributaries. Since the watercourse is empty and silt is already 
dried it is easier to remove it. 
• A watercourse is often desilted just before the end of the canal closure since it is easier 
to desilt a dry watercourse. Besides a watercourse is used intensively immediately after 
the canal closure period. 
14
 Some farmers mentioned almost 100 % increase in area irrigated at the tail of the watercourse after the 
desilting of the watercourse. 
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• It is also convenient to desilt a watercourse when there are no crops in the field, for 
example after harvesting of wheat or cotton, since silt could be easily dumped in these 
empty fields. 
• Desilting is postponed - or is not organised - at the time of weddings or death 
ceremonies since few farmers will be present. 
4.3 CONVEYANCE LOSSES 
The Engineers of the Colorado State University and several agencies in Pakistan conducted 
an intensive study of watercourse conveyance losses in 1973. The results of their study 
revealed that about 40% of water is lost in conveyance after entering the watercourse (Trout, 
1979; Ashraf et. al, 1978; Clyma et. al., 1975). Conveyance losses of almost all the branches 
of all the selected watercourses were measured several times during the study period. 
Conveyance losses are influenced by, among other things the slope of the watercourse and the 
discharge at the mogha. Table 4.4 summarises the average conveyance losses in the branches 
of the selected watercourses and the slope. It is also one of the factors considered by farmers 
in deciding the desilting activity: however, they use different indicators to estimate the 
magnitude of the conveyance losses. Farmers use overtopping of the watercourse, rodents' 
holes and vegetation in the bed of the watercourse as main indicators to estimate the 
conveyance losses. One interesting observation is that the conveyance losses in the main 
branches of all the watercourses are very much in line with the deferred maintenance. 
Desilting is deferred most in the watercourse having least conveyance losses, MD 11-TC. The 
reason obviously is the better transport of irrigation water and hence no need to desilt it. The 
gap between the actual and required desilting is least in FD 84-L main watercourse, which has 
the highest conveyance losses. 
The slope of the watercourse also has an influence on the conveyance losses since a steeper 
slope increases the velocity of water and therefore reduces the water loss. The design slope of 
the watercourses is 0.2 m to 0.25 m per 1000m for Punjab (Government of West Pakistan, 
1961). The R2 for the unlined watercourses including all the branches (in total 10) is 0.77. 
This indicates a relationship between the slope and the conveyance losses. Farmers have a 
very clear idea of the problems with the slope of watercourse. Figure 4.4 reproduces a study 
from the Hakra 6-R distributary along the Hakra Branch of the Eeastern Saidiqia canal by 
another IIMI researcher, that shows the slope of a watercourse and the areas that were 
considered problematic by the farmers. The match is amazingly in line; farmers knew exactly 
where the problem lay in term of slope even though they did not have any technical training 
in surveying. The spots identified by the farmers (boxes in the figure) as having problems 
with the slope are the same as those shown by the slope survey of the watercourse done by the 
trained field staff. 
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Table 4.3: Conveyance losses in the six sample watercourses 
Watercourse, Branch 
MD 1-R, main1 
MD 1-R, right 
MD 1-R, left1 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L2 
FD 84-L, main 
FD 84-L, right 
FD 84-L, left 
FD 96-R 
Average 
Conveyance losses Conveyance losses 
(%) (%/1000m) 
36 22 
51 33 
48 39 
28 15 
23 26 
20 92 
6.53 11 
37 21 
45 32 
38 21 
33.7 23 
Slope 
(m/lOOOm) 
0.60 
0.58 
0.35 
0.86 
0.48 
0.70 
0.54 
0.71 
0.23 
0.90 
0.60 
Partially lined watercourse 
2
 Almost fully lined watercourse 
This is a very small reach, only 585 meters, therefore losses are very small. Moreover 
losses were measured soon after the desilting. 
Pakka 
-**-
Kacha 
-»-«-
Pakka Kacha 
**•-
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Distance (m) 
-Left field -^- Left bank -Bed -Right bank - Right field 
Figure 4.4: Problem areas in watercourse 101-R of the Hakra 6-R distributary, 
according to the farmers' and researchers' opinion 
Source: De Klein and Wahaj, 1998 
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4.4 OTHER WATER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
Apart from regular water management activities like watercourse maintenance, some other 
water management activities, like change in the location of the mogha and watercourse lining, 
are also undertaken by farmers collectively. These two activities are explained in the 
following paragraphs through examples from the study area. 
4.4.1 Relocating Infrastructure 
The channel of the watercourse FD 84-L has many bends in the first few hundred meters that 
considerably reduces the velocity of water entering the watercourse. Farmers have informally 
discussed this issue and came up with the solution to change the location of the mogha. If the 
mogha is shifted 130 meters downstream then the watercourse will become straight (see 
Figure 4.5). A few farmers including an ex patwari (of the ID) went to the ID to discuss the 
issue and were told by the officer concerned that it will cost them Rs. 50,000 (US$ 1250) to 
shift the mogha from its existing position to 130 meters downstream. These farmers 
informally discussed this issue with other shareholders. All but one agreed with the solution, 
although not all farmers were ready to pay a high amount of money for this change. One 
landowner Mr. X, having land along the first hundred meters of the watercourse, did not agree 
with this proposal since this change of location will not improve water supply to his farm. A 
shift in mogha location downstream will increase the conveyance time of water for this 
landowner. One of the farmers discussed this issue with Mr. X and promised to construct a 
good quality watercourse up to his land. Mr. X agreed to think about this issue. In the 
meantime other landowners decided to collect money, which according to some farmers is 
also not an easy task in this watercourse. However, money was not collected and no 
agreement was reached between Mr. X and rest of the farmers by the end of this research. 
Fordwah distributary 
present location of the mogha 
foposed loeSfion of the mogha 
Command area FD 84-L 
Figure 4.5: Present and proposed location of the mogha of the watercourse FD 84-L 
Source: Terpstra 1998 
4.4.2 Lining of the Main Watercourse 
Watercourse desilting in an unlined watercourse is a very laborious task, but if not done 
causes loss of irrigation water which is a precious and scarce resource. Farmers prefer to get 
at least part of the watercourse lined to decrease the water loss and reduce hassle to desilt it. 
In a program initiated by the Punjab government called On Farm Water Management 
(OFWM) over 25000 watercourses have been renovated (www.ofwm.aop.pak/activities/htm. 
2001) in the whole province . Under this program farmers had to organise themselves in a 
15
 A number of these improved watercourses were lined, mostly up to 10 % of the total length of a watercourse. 
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farmer organisation and had to provide 25 % of the total expenditure16 of the lining and 
labour for construction. Since the benefit obtained from this activity is long term only owners 
were expected to pay for it, nevertheless the actual cultivators of the land (who could be an 
owner or a tenant) provided the labour. The OFWM programme provided technical help and 
materials such as bricks, sand and cement. Two out of the six selected watercourses are partly 
lined, and one is almost fully lined. MD 1-R main branch and MD 11-TC are lined up to 390 
meters whereas FD 67-L is lined up to 2535 meters. This lining considerably reduced the 
number of desiltings in a year. Watercourse FD 67-L was desilted only once in three years 
after its lining. Frequency of desiltings of the lined main branches of the Mahmood 
watercourses is also less than the other watercourses. 
Farmers CID 14, and CID 25 with some other farmers, initiated the lining of part of the 
watercourse in MD 11-TC. The head reach of the watercourse was lined up to 390 meters 
with the help of the Directorate of OFWM in 1988-89. Farmers provided labour and 25 % of 
the actual cost and OFWM provided technical support and material for construction. 
Landowners paid the money for the lining. The total contribution of a farmer is divided over a 
fixed period, in this case 3 years, which is paid with the abiana. Cultivators - including 
tenants - provided labour. A similar method was used to organise watercourse desilting as 
was used to organise the digging for the lined watercourse. All the cultivators were supposed 
to take part in it, so everyone had to come himself, send another family member, or hire a 
labourer to do his work. The lining has reduced the hassle to clean at least the first couple of 
hundred meters at the head of the watercourse, and thus saves a lot of water. 
In the watercourse FD 67-L, farmer OID 41 is the biggest landowner (149 acres or 60.3 ha.). 
He has land at the tail of the watercourse therefore he was affected by the conveyance losses 
in the unlined watercourse. He took the initiative to get the watercourse lined and after 
discussing it with the fellow shareholders, he contacted the OFWM Directorate. They worked 
together and the watercourse was lined in 1995-96. However, the material used in the 
construction of the watercourse is not of very good quality, which sometimes results in 
seepage through the walls of the watercourse. Still according to the farmers the loss of water 
through conveyance is reduced considerably due to the higher velocity due to an increased 
slope. In the past it was difficult to irrigate fields at the tail of the watercourse but now it is no 
problem. This is also one of the reasons why one of the farmers, who worked in ID as a 
Patwari, wants to include some of his land that is presently in the command area of an 
adjacent watercourse, in the command area of the watercourse FD 67-L. Moreover, the 
frequency for desilting the watercourse has also been reduced significantly. Before lining the 
watercourse had to be cleaned once every two months but now once a year is enough. In 
addition the problem of change in the flow condition at the mogha is also solved. Earlier the 
sedimentation at the head of the watercourse caused a change in flow condition of the mogha 
from free flow to submerged flow, which decreased the discharge. Now because of the higher 
slope and much less sedimentation the condition always remains as free flow and the 
discharge is also not reduced. 
16
 The percentage of the cost provided by the farmers was different in different projects. In the OFWM project 
(from 1976-77 to 1980-81) funded by the USAID, no cost was recovered by the farmers. Farmers had to pay 10 
% of the material cost in two years of grace period in 10 instalments (1981- 1985) in the OFWM I, which was 
World Bank assisted project. In the OFWM -II Project (1986 to 1990), that was also funded by the World Bank, 
farmers had to contribute 25 % of the total cost in three years. The money was recovered in 6 instalments (2 
instalments in one year) with the abiana. 
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Farmers in FD 84-L have talked about lining the watercourse. In a Panchayat meeting held in 
the first quarter of 1997 all the farmers agreed to line the watercourse. However, not all the 
farmers agreed on the payment and therefore the lining still had not been started by the end of 
the research. 
4.4.3 Installation of Pakka Nakkas 
A Pakka Nakka17 is a concrete structure with circular holes that can be closed with concrete 
lids. Farmers prefer pakka nakkas over katcha nakkas because of several reasons. Pakka 
nakkas are easier to operate: it is much easier for a farmer to remove the concrete lid when he 
wants to irrigate as compared to remove wet mud with bushes in it. Similarly, it is easier to 
close the pakka nakka by putting the lid back than to fill the katcha nakka, that is a hole in the 
watercourse by mud. Generally there is less leakage through pakka nakkas as compared to 
the katcha nakkas, and usually they do not breach. A lined watercourse always has pakka 
nakkas, however they can also be installed in an unlined watercourse. In the selected 
watercourse pakka nakkas are installed in the watercourse FD 67-L and in the lined portion of 
the watercourses MD 1-R and MD 11-TC. 
4.5 INSTITUTIONALISING THE COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES: RULES, ROLES, 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Different forums are used for different kinds of activities within a watercourse command 
area, and different activities have different kinds of organisational requirements. For instance, 
watercourse desilting needs resource mobilisation in terms of labour, whereas water 
acquisition mainly needs resource mobilisation in terms of money. Different farmers are 
considered responsible for different kinds of actions undertaken. For instance in almost every 
watercourse someone is considered more vocal and assertive than the others and therefore 
very often takes the lead in negotiating interests of his group with the ID. Someone who is 
respected by the farmers is very often responsible for the resource mobilisation in terms of 
labour or money. Nevertheless the decision about performing these activities is taken 
collectively involving all the shareholders of the watercourse command area and only then a 
plan of action is chalked out. 
In the selected watercourses collective action for watercourse maintenance and water 
acquisition activities was monitored in detail to get more insight in how farmers are organised 
to change the Water Delivery Environment within the watercourse command area. The rules, 
roles and responsibilities of different actors for these two activities are discussed in this 
section. 
4.5.1 Desilting of the Watercourse 
The rules and roles to desilt watercourses are more or less the same in all the selected 
watercourses. There is always someone responsible, either officially (by the people in the 
watercourse command area) or by always taking the initiative himself. The main watercourse 
is cleaned in the water turn of the head farmer or when there is no water in the distributary. 
Sometimes farmers have to close the mogha, which is illegal, to desilt the upper reach (first 
Pakka nakkas were developed and introduced by the On Farm Water Management Project Punjab in the 1970s 
by the researchers from Mona Reclamation Experimental Project (MREP), Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA), and the Colorado State University (CSU). 
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few meters) of the watercourse. Different processes that are involved in organising this 
activity are outlined in the following paragraphs. De Klein and Wahaj (1998) explain these 
processes in more depth. 
Initiative taking and responsibility 
The person who is responsible to organise an activity may or may not initiate it. An initiator is 
the one who feels a need to organise the activity. However the activity is still organised by the 
person who is responsible. The person who is responsible for organising the watercourse 
cleaning very often has land at the tail of the watercourse command area. He often also takes 
the initiative for organising the activity, although there are other farmers as well who take 
initiative. Anyone who feels that desilting should be done can request the responsible person 
to organise the activity. Then the person responsible arranges the date and time to perform the 
activity and communicates it to other shareholders. 
In the selected watercourses, however always the same farmers were found to take the 
initiative. At least two cultivators in every branch of all the selected watercourses are 
considered as initiative takers for watercourse desilting activity by the fellow shareholders, 
although officially only one person is responsible to organise it. These initiative takers are 
mostly from the tail reach of the branch but can also be from the head or middle reach. These 
farmers usually do not get any reward for organising the activity apart from better conveyance 
of the water in the watercourse to their farm. In some cases they do not clean their share of 
the section although their presence is necessary since they divide tasks among the 
shareholders as well. Table 4.4 presents the cultivators responsible for organising the activity, 
taking initiative and location of their farm along the watercourse. Some of these farmers, who 
are responsible for the watercourse maintenance, are also considered overall leaders of the 
watercourse. Farmers CID 1-R and CID 14 in MD 1-R main branch; farmer CID 49 in MD 
11-TC; farmer CID 8 in FD 84-L main and right branch; and farmer CID 18 in FD 96-R are 
considered as leaders in their respective watercourses. In all the cases the person responsible 
to organise the activity is an owner-cum-cultivator, whereas in most of the cases an initiative 
taker is also an owner except in both FD 84-L right and FD 84-L left where a lessee also takes 
initiative to organise the activity. 
While responsibility for organising desilting is delegated to one person in some watercourses, 
in others a farmer becomes the person responsible to organise the activity by always taking 
initiative and organising the activity. In most of the selected watercourses farmers have 
become responsible by just taking the initiative. In the watercourse MD 11-TC farmer CID 54 
took over this responsibility from his father who was also responsible for organising desilting 
in this watercourse. In MD 11-TC and FD 84-L18 the persons responsible for organising the 
activity also divide the work and do not have to clean the watercourse, whereas in the rest of 
the sample watercourses there is no reward for organising the activity. 
Communication 
The person responsible for organising the activity is responsible to communicate the time and 
the date of the planned activity. The loudspeaker of the Mosque is usually used to announce 
the time and the date. This is done one day before the activity has to be performed. The outlet 
(or moghd) number or the name of the chak is announced with the date and the time at which 
18
 The farmer responsible for desilting activity in this watercourse is an owner who has given his land on share 
cropping to another farmer. Hence he would not have cleaned the watercourse even if he was not responsible for 
organising the activity. His tenant desilts the watercourse 
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the activity has to take place and the shareholders are requested to come. In some cases, a 
sanction (or fine) in case of absenteeism is also announced. In cases where some farmers live 
away from the village or watercourse command area, the Chowkidar (watchman) of the 
village is sent to inform them, or other farmers inform them personally. In a small 
watercourse, organiser personally informs other shareholders. In some cases all the methods 
are used to ensure everyone is informed. 
Table 4.4: Status of the persons who take initiative or organises desilting activity in 
the watercourse branches of six selected watercourses; their tenancy 
status and location of their farms along the watercourse 
Watercourse Cultivator/Owner Identification 
Branch Code (CID/OID)' 
Tenancy Status Location of farm 
MDl-Rmain 
MD1-R right 
MDl-Rleft 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84- L Main 
FD 84-L right 
FD 84-L left 
FD 96-R 
First half 
FD 96-R 
Second half 
l ^ m . ... . 
Responsible/ 
Organiser 
CID49 
CID263 
CXD433 
CTD93 
CID54 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
OID495 
OID496 
CID 5 
CID8 
CID 18 
Initiator 
CID 1 
CID 49 
CID 22 
CID 26 
CID 43 
CID 9 
CID 54 
CID 14 
on^6 
CID 53 
OID496 
CID 53 
CID 15 
CID 14 
CID 5 
CID 6 
CID 8 
CID 18 
OC/L 
OC 
OC 
OC 
OC 
OC 
OC 
OC 
Owner 
OC/T 
Owner 
OC 
L/T 
L 
OC 
OC/L/T 
OC 
OC 
Head/Tail 
Head 
Middle 
Middle 
Tail 
Tail 
Tail 
Head/Tail 
Tail (right branch) 
Head (right branch) 
Tail 
Head 
Middle 
Tail/Head 
Middle 
Head/Middle 
Head 
Tail 
CID is cultivator's identification code and OID if the owner's identification code (from this study) 
OC is Owner cum Cultivator, L is Lessee, and T is Sharecropper. 
They are not made in charge, however by taking initiative and organising the activity they have 
become responsible for organising the activity. 
This is a small watercourse with only two cultivators. 
5This watercourse is not desilted since it has been lined. 
He is owner and sharecrops land with his tenant, therefore does not have a Cultivator's 
identification code. His owner identification code is given. 
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Resource mobilisation 
Every shareholder is supposed to take part in the desilting activity. If the cultivator himself 
does not want to come, he may hire a labourer to do his part of work or he may send someone 
else, for instance his son, brother, or a servant. Tenants usually clean the watercourse for the 
landowners in case of share cropping. 
The work is divided in such a way that the fanners from the tail of the watercourse have to 
spend more time and thus do more work as compared to the farmers at the head of the 
watercourse. Where the nakkas of some head end farmers are very close to the outlet they do 
not even participate in the activity, which is acceptable to the other shareholders. Since tail 
enders get most benefit from this cleaning, it is considered justified by all shareholders area 
that they also do most of the laborious work. 
No funds are collected or maintained for emergency maintenance. Whenever maintenance 
requiring money is needed, it is collected. Every time funds have to be collected, for example 
for the lining of the watercourse or for installing pakka nakkas19, it is collected according to 
the landholding size of each farmer. In cases where fines are recovered from absentees, the 
money is used to pay the labourer who did the work of the absentee. Farmers in some 
watercourses use this money to have tea and sweets afterwards. In case of a breach in a 
watercourse, a farmer who has his turn at that time is responsible to fix it. If he is not able to 
fix the problem other farmers, for instance the one whose crop is threatened by this breach 
and the one who has the next water turn, help in fixing it. 
Distribution of work 
All the farmers (or their substitutes) get together on the set date and time and desilt the main 
branch of the watercourse. In the case of a branch of a watercourse, farmers using that branch 
get together and clean it on the pre-set date and time. Usually one of the farmers, often the 
one who is responsible for organising the desilting activity, distributes the length of the 
watercourse over all the farmers present for desilting. The portion of the watercourse one 
cultivator has to clean depends on the amount of land he has in the watercourse command 
area. 
Every farmer takes part in the desilting of the part or stretch of the watercourse that is used to 
convey water to his fields20. Therefore he starts from the outlet and continues until his last 
official nakka. The location of the stretch is divided according to the warabandi turns. The 
stretch of the watercourse from the head to the point (or nakka) where the first farmer takes 
his water turn is divided among all the farmers. Then the farmers taking water only from this 
nakka will drop out and the rest of the farmers will continue cleaning until the next nakka. 
This cycle is repeated until the last nakka of the watercourse is reached. Though the method 
of allocating work is the same, the units of measurements for deciding the stretch of the 
watercourse per person is different. For instance in some watercourses work division is 1 
karam ' per hour of water turn and in others farmers use 1 kanah22 per square (approximately 
325 meters) of land. 
19
 Such maintenance requirements did not emerge during the study period. 
20
 Farmers use spades or shovels to remove the silt and the weeds. 
' One karam is 5.5 feet = 1.67 meters 
22
 Kanah is a stick to measure the length of the stretch and could be of any size. However the one mentioned by 
the farmers was 22 feet (6.7 meters) 
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In the selected watercourses all the shareholders are expected to desilt the watercourse at the 
same time (except in one branch of FD 84-L and the main watercourse of MD 1-R). In MD 1-
R, work is distributed according to the biradari and then within the biradari cultivators 
redistribute the work according to area. Each biradari has to clean one third of the branch 
since three different biradaris have land irrigated by this branch. In the left branch of FD 84-
L work is already allocated to the cultivators who are expected to do it at a convenient time. 
Nevertheless these farmers are supposed to desilt the entire watercourse within a week. This 
watercourse has a large number of cultivators and a mix of owners and tenants. 
The principles for division of labour for desilting are more or less the same in all the 
watercourses. Table 4.5 summarises the rules for work allocation. The task is divided 
according to the land holding size and every farmer has to desilt up to his last nakka 
according to the warabandi schedule. These rules are easy to understand and acceptable to all 
the shareholders of the watercourse command areas. These rules are enforced since the start 
of the irrigation system and are developed by the farmers themselves since no rules to desilt 
the watercourse are provided by the Canal and Drainage Act 1873. 
Table 4.5: 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
Rules to allocate desilting work in six sample watercourses 
Basis for labour 
input 
Biradari and land 
holding size 
Land holding size 
Land holding size 
Not applicable 
Land holding 
size, duration of 
canal water turn 
Land holding 
size, 
Duration of canal 
water turn 
Work-share 
principle 
1 kanah '/square 
Xkanah '/square 
Equally (since two 
cultivators) 
Not applicable 
1 karam7'/hour of 
the canal water turn 
1 kanah' /hour of 
the canal water turn 
Mode of allocation 
of work 
According to 
warabandi schedule 
According to 
warabandi schedule 
Not applicable 
(only two farmers) 
Not applicable 
Right branch: 
according to 
warabandi schedule 
Left branch: Fixed 
According to 
warabandi schedule 
Are 
shareholders 
expected to 
work at same 
time 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Not applicable 
Right branch: 
yes 
Left branch: no 
Yes 
'A kanah is a stick used to measure distance or length. In this case kanah is used to measure the 
length. This is just a reference stick to equally distribute stretch of the watercourse to be cleaned so 
it could be of any size. 
2A karam is a local unit to roughly measure the distance. 1 karam is 5.5 feet (1.67 meters) 
Desilting is a laborious work. On average it takes a farmer 90 minutes to clean only 67 meters 
of a watercourse, although time may range from 30 minutes to as long as 6 hours23. 
The time to clean 67 meters depends on several factors. It takes a farmer more time to clean a section of the 
watercourse if there is high vegetation on the banks that has to be cleaned; a high sedimentation will also result 
in a longer time for cleaning; if banks of a watercourse need strengthening; it also depends on a fanner's health 
and therefore speed to clean a watercourse; if a farmer has to clean a long stretch of a watercourse, his speed will 
reduce with the increasing meters he has to clean. 
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Free rider control (sanctions) 
All the shareholders are expected to show up or send a replacement on the day of desilting. If 
a person does not come without a genuine reason, (marriage, death, or illness is considered 
genuine reasons) he is considered an absentee and thus should be punished. Different rules 
are followed to deal with the absentees in different watercourses. The stretch of the 
watercourse that is supposed to be cleaned by the absentee is left for him to do later on if the 
work division is fixed. In some cases it is left even if the division of work is not fixed. This 
absentee is then expected to clean this part of the watercourse before water starts flowing 
again in that portion, since it is more useful to desilt the whole watercourse at the same time 
than spread the desilting over time. However, if fellow shareholders know that the absentee 
cannot do the work later for a genuine reason, other farmers do his share of work as well. 
When an absentee has no genuine reason to be absent and does do the work later on, a 
labourer is hired or a fellow shareholder cleans his portion of the watercourse. The absentee 
has to pay the labourer's wage for one day that goes to the shareholder who did the work. 
In most of the selected watercourses no formal sanction is imposed on the absentees, even if 
announced. Nevertheless the fanners are rarely absent on the day desilting is organised. 
Different mechanisms to control 'free riding' are found in the selected watercourses. For not 
participating in the desilting activity a farmer can be fined, or in some cases other fellow 
farmers close the mogha during his warabandi turn. Yet another way to prevent lack of 
collective action for desilting is social pressure. Table 4.6 presents different measures adapted 
in the sample watercourse to ensure high participation of the farmers in desilting activities. 
The left branch of the watercourse FD 84-L however was observed to have difficulties in 
organising the activity collectively because of the high level of off-farm employment of most 
of the shareholders of the command area. This once created a problem in the desilting of the 
main watercourse since the main branch is cleaned by all the farmers together. When the 
farmers from the left branch did not show up on the planned day of desilting, farmers of the 
right branch also did not clean the main branch. Another time, the fine to be paid by any 
absentee was also announced in the Mosque with the announcement of date and time of the 
desilting activity. However the person responsible for this announcement said it was done 
more to control farmers who want to ride free, and will not be implemented. The result of this 
announcement was positive and almost all the shareholders appeared on the day the activity 
was to take place. In the right branch of the watercourse, MD 1-R, fellow shareholders block 
the mogha during the water turn of the farmer who does not participate in the desilting 
activity without any solid reason. This is also a good motivation for farmers to participate in 
the activity. 
It is not easy to enforce the rules regarding payment of money because of the kinship 
relations, lack of authority and in some cases the financial position of the shareholders. 
Sometimes farmers are not able to pay a fine in terms of money because of lack of cash. It is 
difficult to punish a person from the same caste as well since they have to socialise with that 
person, besides he could also be a relative. Because of the clear leadership in desilting 
activities in one of the six selected watercourses, MD 11-TC, the rule of paying fine in cash is 
enforced. However it is not clear that higher participation of farmers is due to the fine 
enforcement or because of social obligation: farmers participate in a collective activity out of 
a sense of collective responsibility or for fear of paying the fine in cash. Another reason for 
higher participation of the shareholders could be the higher water need of MD 11-TC and 
lower rate of off-farm employment. In this watercourse most of the farmers are cultivating 
their own lands and are mainly relying on agriculture for their livelihood. They also grow 
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high water demanding crops, like sugarcane and rice. Therefore, they may take more interest 
in the desilting activity to improve conveyance efficiency of their watercourse. 
Table 4.6: Sanctions to control free riding in the six selected watercourses and their 
branches 
Watercourse Branch Sanction 
MD1-R Main No1 
MD 1-R Right Close mogha 
MD 1-R Left No' 
MD11-TC Main Fine (labourer's wage) 
FD 38-L Main No 
FD 67-L Main Not applicable 
FD 84-L Main No' 
FD84-L Left No1 
FD84-L Right No1 
FD 96-R Main NoJ 
1
 Leave the portion belonging to absentee who cleans it later on. 
Sanctions in form of cash are not the only way to motivate people to take part in the desilting 
activity. Absentees also lose face if they are questioned in public by other shareholders for not 
being present on the day desilting took place. Sometimes the absentee is called in front of a 
group and asking him to explain why did he not show up. He is also warned not to be absent 
next time. In this way they lose face if they do not have a genuine reason for not being 
present. Moreover other shareholders can go to the house of the absentee and complain that 
he did not show up. This is called 'gilla shikwa' and is embarrassing for a person. This fear 
for embarrassment is considered a motivation to participate in the collective action. 
4.5.2 Canal Water Acquisition 
Canal water acquisition is very often an illicit activity and no one in a watercourse command 
area is formally responsible to undertake that activity. If a farmer feels that the water supply is 
not enough for crop growth, he discusses it with other fellow farmers who are often the ones 
who arrange it with the ID. They discuss the course of action and then discuss the issue in the 
Panchayat with all the shareholders who have to pool money for the activity. If everyone 
agrees then a small group of farmers negotiates with the ID and when an agreement is 
reached, the money is collected and additional water is arranged - most often by enlarging the 
mogha dimensions. Thus for this activity though no formal platform is present to organise the 
activity, still farmers organised it in a systematic way. Some farmers are considered to be 
more effective in negotiation with the ID, hence they take the lead in performing the activity. 
A Panchayat is held a number of times before the action is taken. A message is sent around to 
each shareholder about the time, date and place of the meeting. In some of the watercourses, a 
meeting is always held at one particular place, but in other watercourses it varies. However it 
never takes place at the dera of a lower caste farmer, or a ladles farmer24. For instance, in FD 
67-L a Panchayat always takes place in the dera of farmer OID 41, who is the biggest land 
owner in the watercourse, and is considered a very helpful person by fellow shareholders. In 
Usually lower caste farmers are also ladles farmers, who acquire agricultural land by renting it in or by 
sharecropping it with a landowner. 
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the rest of the selected watercourses FD 11-TC25, FD 96-R26 and FD 84-L27 meetings take 
place in different deras. In FD 67-L a big landowner always communicates the date and the 
time for the meeting to fellow shareholders. Where meetings do not take place at one fixed 
place the initiative taker discusses the issue with a few respectable persons in the watercourse 
and then send the message around for a meeting. Farmers who are informed and expected to 
join the meetings are mainly water users who have water rights - landowners and lessees. 
Sharecroppers on a tenancy contract are usually not expected to pay for this kind of 
acquisition activity since it has a more permanent impact. However, in some cases, for 
instance in FD 67-L, sharecroppers are also expected to share the cost to get the mogha 
enlarged. Among all the sample watercourses, this watercourse has highest amount of land 
under sharecropping. The amount to be paid for the mogha enlargement to the ID staff (as 
bribe) is fixed between the farmers and the ID staff. This kind of intervention usually last for 
about a year - and tenancy contracts are also for one year28 - because most of the time the 
mogha is downsized again during the annual canal closure. Thus they are also invited to 
attend these meetings. Sometimes, this intervention could last for many years in which case 
often farmers have to pay for additional money to the ID officials29. Nevertheless the event of 
a fine from the ID for tampering with the mogha is dealt with, in all the watercourses, in the 
same manner and all the shareholders including tenants and sharecroppers have to pay the 
fine. 
Table 4.7 notes the farmers considered as leaders of organising canal water acquisition or 
representing farmers' interests to the ID staff. Farmers in the watercourses along the 
Mahmood distributary usually do not take collective action for water acquisition. However in 
kharif 1997 MD 1-R farmers undertook a successful collective action in negotiating or 
organising increased mogha dimensions (for details see Box 4.1). The fact that there are only 
two cultivators in the watercourse FD 38-L also does not give much room for undertaking 
collective action to acquire canal irrigation water; they rather acquire additional water 
individually by illegal siphoning from the distributaries. In the remaining three watercourses 
landowners mainly organise the activity. Landowners in watercourses FD 67-L and FD 84-L, 
who lead in arranging additional canal water, have their land at the tail of the watercourse, 
and thus are affected most from low water supply. However, in the watercourse FD 96-R 
farmers from the head and the middle of the watercourse are more active in this collective 
action because they are considered leaders of the watercourse for organising collective action 
for all water management activities. 
25
 Three places are often used for these meetings, dera of the Numberdar of the village, CID 48, dera of another 
senior farmer CID 14 and the Mosque of the village. 
26
 Main places for meetings are deras of farmers CID 6, CID 8 and CID 18 
27
 Meetings could be held at any place, however the dera of an ex patwari OID 49 is more common place for 
Panchayats 
28
 However, in FD 67-L the sharecropping contracts continue beyond one year. 
29
 Although, it did not happen in the FD 96-R until the end of the research. During the annual canal closure of 
1997-98, when new Sub-Engineer was transferred to the Fordwah distributary, he prepared a check statement 
and on the basis of last check statements he wanted to remodel the outlets which deviated form their design 
dimensions. The Sub-Engineer also marked the outlet of FD 96-R (sample watercourse of the current study) for 
downsizing. According to farmers, the Sub-Engineer sent them a message through one of his baildars to pay 
money to him if they did not want their mogha to be downsized. Farmers agreed to pay the money, hence the 
mark was removed. When the Sub-Engineer was asked about the reason of this change, he said he marked that 
mogha by mistake. Farmers and Sub-Engineers disagreed on the amount to be paid, however before any decision 
could have been taken the Sub-Engineer was transferred again to another area. The mogha remained unchanged. 
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Table 4.7: Farmers active in organising collective action to acquire additional 
surface water 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 38-L 
FD 67-L 
FD 84- L Main 
FD 96-R 
OID/CID 
OID 50, CID 49 
OID35,CID 1 
OID 46, CID 48 
OID 14, CID 14 
NA 
OID 41 
OID 43 
OID 49 
OID 14, CID 8 
OID 10, CID 6 
Tenure Status 
OC 
OC/L 
OC 
OC/L 
NA 
Owner 
Owner 
Owner 
OC 
OC/L/T 
Location of farm 
Head 
Head/Tail 
Head/Tail 
NA 
Tail 
Tail 
Tail (right branch) 
Head 
Head/ Middle 
During the study period farmers from two of the selected watercourses, FD 67-L and FD 84-L 
discussed the possibility of enlarging their moghas. In the watercourse FD 67-L a few farmers 
realising the problem of water scarcity went to the watercourse leader farmer OID 41 to 
discuss the matter. They together discussed the situation and came up with the solution to get 
the mogha size enlarged through ID. A Panchayat was held to discuss the issue. Since all the 
shareholders would get benefit and thus had to pay money, everyone had to agree to take the 
action. All the farmers agreed about the problem and the way to solve the problem. However 
the timing of the action could not be decided. Moreover some of the farmers thought that the 
money they had to pay to get additional water was too much. Thus no proper action was taken 
before the end of the research. 
Farmers of another watercourse FD 84-L also discussed to get their mogha enlarged but did 
not agree on the amount of money paid by each farmer therefore nothing happened by the end 
of the research period. 
4.6 IMPROTANT COLLECTIVELY PERFORMED WATER MANAGEMENT 
ACTIVITIES 
All the activities that farmers undertake are significant for farmers in term of hassle to 
organise them and the profit gained as a result of performing the activity. Farmers from all the 
watercourses were asked to list the collectively performed water management activities and 
prioritise them through group meetings in every watercourse. The most important activity 
identified by the farmer was watercourse desilting and then arranging more water at the 
mogha. It is amazing that the farmers of all the watercourses consider the desilting of the 
watercourse important since it is very laborious (see Table 4.8). Lining of the watercourse is 
also prioritised as an important activity since it considerably reduces the conveyance losses 
and the frequency to clean the watercourse - watercourse lining is considered equally 
important as desilting. Installation of pakka nakkas is also considered very important since it 
makes it easier to open and close nakkas and usually results in less leakage or seepage losses 
than katcha nakkas. Drainage was not mentioned as a water management activity in any of 
the watercourses, the reason being that it is more considered an individual activity rather than 
a collective action. 
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Acquisition of canal water is considered as the second most important water management 
activity. This includes higher and reliable discharge. However, farmers are aware that 
acquiring additional canal water supply that is usually through remodelling of the mogha is 
illicit. 
Increasing watercourse command area was mentioned as an activity that needs a collective 
decision if not action by farmers of the watercourse command area of FD 67-L. Although a 
majority of the shareholders of the command area were against the undertaking of this 
activity. 
Table 4.8: Importance of water management activities, 
watercourses, as mentioned by the farmers 
in the six sample 
Water management activity 
Watercourse Desilting 
Acquisition of surface water 
Lining of the watercourse and installation 
of pakka nakka 
Increase in additional Culturable Command 
area 
Repair the breach in the distributary 
Other collective activities (construction of 
roads, marriage etc) 
Watercourse 
MD 
1-R 
1 
2 
1 
MD 
11-TC 
1 
2 
1 
FD 
38-L 
1 
2 
1 
FD 
67-L 
1 
2 
1 
FD 
84-L 
1 
2 
1 
FD 
96-R 
1 
2 
1 
X 
X 
X X X 
1: most important activity 
2: second most important activity 
X: mentioned in the meeting and considered equally important as 1. 
In MD 11-TC land is sometimes flooded with water when there is a breach in the 
neighbouring Azim distributary. One of the banks of the distributary is not strong enough and 
needs strengthening once in a while to bear the pressure of water if the canal carries full 
supply. Farmers from Mahmood distributary including MD 11-TC take collective action to 
strengthen the bank of the distributary by putting more soil on the affected bank. Whenever 
Azim distributary receives full supply it breaches. However according to farmers "it breaches 
whenever it receives water and remains dry for rest of the time". When there is a danger of a 
breach in the distributary villagers patrol along its bank. In case of a breach they also have to 
repair the bank either all by themselves or with the help of the ID. 
Other activities like construction of roads in the village or within the watercourse command 
area were also mentioned as important collective work. Although not an action or activity 
needed regulated actions. This activity was mentioned in three selected watercourses. In each 
watercourse farmers had to collect money to rent tractors or to buy some equipment and 
labour is provided by the farmers/villagers. In fact farmers from FD 84-L got a prize as a 
'model village' after they constructed a sewerage system within the village30. Farmers also 
mentioned some social gatherings like marriage ceremonies and deaths as social events where 
farmers get together and take collective action. 
Farmers from two watercourses, FD 84-L and MD 11-TC.Farmers of the watercourse FD 84-L are living in 
two separate villages. 
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4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Collective action for water management was studied in six watercourses selected along two 
tail distributaries of the Fordwah Branch Canal. The main water management activities 
identified that are performed collectively in almost every watercourse are watercourse 
maintenance and canal water acquisition. These activities are repeated whenever they need to 
be performed. Desilting activity is performed more often in an unlined watercourse as 
compared to a lined watercourse. An unlined watercourse is desilted at least three times a 
year, as in the watercourse MD 11-TC and watercourse FD 84-L, and sometimes up to 7 
times in one year, as in FD 38-L. Watercourse lining is also considered an important water 
management activity by the farmers in almost every watercourse. Given a choice, all farmers 
prefer to have fully lined watercourse v/ith pakka nakkas. But since it is an expensive solution 
sometimes farmers get only part of the head reach lined, like in the case of MD 1-R and MD 
11-TC. Farmers of the watercourses FD 84-L and FD 96-R also discussed the issue of 
watercourse lining, but it did not materialise by the end of the research period. Inclusion of 
more command area in the watercourse was the most recent water management activity that 
was being discussed in watercourse FD 67-L. 
Canal water acquisition at the watercourse level is the other important activity farmers 
mentioned. It is done either by getting higher discharge in the distributary - so all in the 
distributary benefit - or by increasing discharge in the watercourse - by mogha tampering or 
mogha enlargement through remodelling. All of these actions are illicit and result in lower 
availability of water for other farmers. Higher discharge in one distributary means lower 
discharge in the other since the existing water supply within the system is redistributed. 
Enlargement of one mogha will result in the inequity within the distributary as this particular 
mogha will draw more than its designed share. 
Generally it is easier to organise collective action in the watercourses along Mahmood 
distributary than along Fordwah distributary. That relatively higher number of owners are 
cultivating their land along the Mahmood distributary as compared to the watercourses along 
the Fordwah distributary may be the reason for successful collective action. The number of 
shareholders is very high in these watercourses however. Another reason could be that all the 
shareholders live in one locality making it communicate easier for farmers. These farmers 
also cultivate high water demanding crops; therefore better water management is needed to 
match supply with the demand. 
Collective action for watercourse maintenance is organised smoothly in almost all the 
branches of the selected watercourses except in the left branch of FD 84-L where farmers do 
not undertake collective action easily because of their other off-farm activities. However, 
farmers of FD 84-L clean their watercourse at the specified frequency, but there have been 
difficulties in co-ordinating wok in the left branch. 
Acquisition of additional water is organised very well in the watercourses along the 
Mahmood distributary and two of the selected watercourses, FD 67-L and FD 96-R, along the 
Fordwah distributary. These two watercourses have relatively fewer shareholders than the 
watercourse FD 84-L therefore it is easier to get consensus on any action and to act 
accordingly. Furthermore most of the farmers of these two watercourses are living in their 
respective watercourse command area. Farmers of FD 84-L are living in two different 
villages, that also makes it more difficult to communicate. However the majority of the 
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shareholders live in one village with a very good history of co-operation. Though farmers of 
FD 84-L do agree on the need to undertake collective action they do not operationalise it. 
In their efforts to acquire additional canal water, farmers interact with the Irrigation 
Department staff very regularly. These Agency-farmer interactions are sometimes 
confrontational, however as shown here they work in farmers' favour in the form of increased 
canal water delivery to their watercourse. Thus, the encounters of farmers and ID staff in their 
daily activities to manage water at different levels of the irrigation system influence the water 
supply of the watercourses. 
A Panchayat, a word frequently used by farmers for their meeting, is still the main platform 
to discuss water related (and other) issues and take decisions in all the sample watercourses. 
However, most of the forms of organisation found in the sample watercourses were based on 
hydraulic units, although actions by deras was sometimes a sub-organisational level, and not 
on the village level. In four out of six of these watercourses farmers were living in their deras 
within the watercourse command area. In the two watercourses (FD 84-L and FD 11-TC) 
where farmers were living in villages, others forms of organisation - such as village level 
Panchayat - which were different than the watercourse level organisations also existed. Even 
in these two villages the Panchayat, held to discuss watercourse related issues, is attended by 
the shareholders of the watercourse command area and the Numberdar31. 
Table 4.9 presents the factors, as listed in the section 2.4, which can influence collective 
action and their presence or absence in the selected watercourses. The need for water and 
mutual benefit seems to be the major deciding factor for organising collective action in 
almost all selected watercourses. 
From the table there are no universal factors that promote or limit collective action. However, 
some observations can be made on social factors that seem to facilitate or ease execution of 
collective action for water management in the selected watercourses: 
• Percentage of actual cultivators involved in off-farm employment: If a high percentage 
cultivators are involved in off-farm employment they have less time for organising and 
taking part in water management activities. Besides intensive agriculture is not a priority 
for them. 
• Clear leadership: Presence of one or two leaders in the watercourse helps in organising 
collective action. Though the decision is taken collectively, a leader who is well 
respected by other shareholders can organise the activity in a better way. 
The factors that seem to inhibit collective action are: 
• Relatively equal distribution of power: It is easier to organise collective action when 
people listen to each other. In one of the watercourse with less collective action, FD 84-
L, a farmer said, 'nowadays no one listens to any one especially younger generation. No 
one accepts authority from others; everyone wants to be elder of the village. We lack 
unity therefore we can not organise collective action anymore' 
• Zid: Because of lack of interest by some shareholders others also do not undertake the 
activity and everyone suffers. 
31
 Who may or may not cultivate land in that watercourse command area 
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In some sample watercourses work division for the execution of some water management 
tasks, like watercourses desilting, is based on the biradari. However, the biradari does not 
seem to play a decisive role in most of the water management activities. For organising the 
water acquisition activities, what is more important is the involvement of landowners and 
lessees (because they get temporary rights of the land they rent). 
Table 4.9: Presence or absence of factors effecting collective action in the selected 
watercourses 
Factors effecting collective action 
Number of cultivators 
Number of pure tenants' 
% cultivators with land holding 
size between 2.5 to 10 ha. 
% cultivators with land holding 
size less than 2.5 ha. 
% cultivators with land holding 
size greater than 10 ha. 
% cultivators involved in off farm 
employment 
Panchayat takes the decision about 
collective action 
Farm location of influential 
farmer(s) 
Clear Leadership 
Relatively equal distribution of 
power 
Shareholders of single biradari 
Social gain or loss 
Zid 
Enforcement of sanctions 
Effective conflict resolution 
History of co-operation 
Crops- Higher crop water 
requirement 
1
 pure tenants are the tenants (lessees 
watercourse command area 
Watercourse 
MD1-R 
71 
7 
13 
84 
3 
1 
Yes 
Head 
Tail 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
MD11-TC 
74 
18 
27 
72 
1 
9 
Yes 
Head 
Tail 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
FD 67-L 
57 
25 
42 
51 
7 
14 
Yes 
Tail 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
FD 84-L 
48 
24 
35 
65 
0 
46 
Yes 
Tail 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
FD 96-R 
29 
12 
25 
75 
1 
41 
Yes 
Head 
Middle 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
or sharecroppers) who do not own 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No. 
any land in the 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
To conclude, Uphoff 's (1990) theory about the scope of collective action in relation to water 
scarcity situations, and Wade (1977, 1988 and 1990) argument of emergence of collective 
action as a result of water scarcity holds true in the selected watercourses32. Farmers from the 
selected Mahmood watercourses took collective action for canal water acquisition when their 
canal water supply was reduced. Similarly they desilted their watercourse more often at the 
peak crop water requirement. Whereas, farmers from two of the sample watercourses along 
the Fordwah distributary took no collective action to acquire additional canal water even after 
However, Wade's hypothesis about water scarcity in canal system that reliability decreases and farmers 
hoarding behaviour increases with the distance of farmers' location from the source, is very simplistic. It is not 
fully true for the study cite. At the higher level, both the distributaries offtake at the same point from the Branch 
Canal, but water supply to the Mahmood distributary is much better than the water supply of the Fordwah 
distributary. Similarly, along the Fordwah distributary the remodelled moghas were found all along the 
distributary and not only in the tail reach of the distributary. 
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discussing it. The perceived need of their crops was still better met, in kharif\997, than the 
perceived irrigation requirement of Mahmood watercourses33. However farmers from FD 96-
R did take collective action for desilting the watercourse, which they thought will improve 
water delivery to the tail end farmers. This also proves the argument of De Klein and Wahaj 
(1998) that farmers take collective action when they need irrigation water and benefit 
mutually. However, there are some other factors, like off-farm employment transaction costs 
to organise collective action or lack of mutual benefit that sometimes inhibit collective action, 
as in watercourse FD 84-L. Nevertheless farmers discussed it. In this case - change of mogha 
location - the benefit of collective action are perceived less than the efforts to organise the 
action by some farmers. This proves Ostrom's (1993) point that collective action happens if 
the benefits outweigh the efforts involved in organising it. 
33In kharif FD 84-L and FD 96-R have better RWS as compared to the other sample- watercourses of the 
Fordwah distributary and one sample watercourse of the Mahmood distributary. This is mainly because their 
crop water requirement is also less. Only MD 1-R had RWS higher than these two watercourses. 
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INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES TO INCREASE CONTROL OVER 
IRRIGATION WATER AT THE FARM-GATE 
Lack of accountability of the Irrigation Department to the farmers and the fact that the canal 
water delivered to the farmers at the farm-gate is highly variable and inadequate, coerces 
farmers to adapt certain strategies to get additional canal irrigation water, or to dispose of 
excess water. Generally farmers are not concerned about the causes of this fluctuating water 
deliveries that could be technical and may be related to the geographical location of their 
irrigated agricultural land. Hence the farm-gate is the focus of this chapter. This chapter first 
looks at the individual action and then actions with a wider benefit. It describes the range of 
activities undertaken and estimates the benefits from them, showing resourcefulness and 
financial sense of actions chosen. 
5.1 INDIVIDUAL ACTION AND WATER CONTROL 
Water control could be defined differently at different levels of the irrigation system. At the 
more individual level of decision making and managing water, that is farm level, water 
control refers to the flexibility to use water in the right quantity and at the right time, i.e. 
when required by the crops. It is also needed to perform other on-farm water management 
activities, for example fertiliser application. Therefore for farmers, water control is the 
capacity to adapt irrigation supply to their production requirements (Freeman and 
Lowdermilk, 1991). Hence in supply driven large irrigation systems, water control at the farm 
level refers to two sets of activities, those performed to acquire additional water for irrigation 
and those to use available irrigation water more efficiently. Together they both result in better 
room to manoeuvre and flexibility in the use of irrigation water for farmers at individual 
level. 
The following factors are found to explain individual actions for better water control. 
• Results bring individual benefit, without significant benefit for the whole group of 
farmers, 
• Lack of collective action (even if needed but not initiated) would lead to individual 
struggle to acquire better control over irrigation water, 
• More tenants in a watercourse command area would result in more individual actions for 
water management, 
• Farmers with either very small or very large operational land holdings will prefer to 
make individual arrangements, 
• Involvement of many farmers in off farm employment would result in more individual 
actions, and 
• No clear leadership would result in more individual action. 
The first two points listed above are mainly the reasons why farmers take individual actions 
and the rest are the characteristics of the watercourses having possibilities of more individual 
actions. Most of the factors that are assumed to explain individual action for water 
management are the result of the lack of collective action. On the one hand these individual 
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actions depend on the need to acquire better individual control over irrigation water. On the 
other hand, it would depend on opportunities to attain better individual control over irrigation 
water. 
In case of a highly fluctuating water supply, a majority of the farmers would borrow part of or 
full water turn from another farmer and would also give this water turn back. Strosser (1997) 
found that the water turn duration (based on the land holding size) does not affect canal water 
transactions that are more dependent on the physical characteristics of the farm. The main 
determinant is canal water supply at the head of the watercourses and eventually at the farm-
gate. Similarly almost every farmer would like to and will try his best to have access to 
groundwater though it depends highly on the capital investment and some other physical 
conditions. Meinzen-Dick (1996) reports that tubewell owners with big landholding size are 
less involved in selling of groundwater since they need to use it on their own land. On the 
contrary Strosser (1997) found that the main sellers of groundwater are large commercial 
farmers. 
Big landowners tend to show their physical power, and are likely to intervene with the system 
physically at the distributary level and watercourse level, for example, blocking the whole 
distributary and siphon off water from the distributary. Nevertheless being a big landowner is 
relative in terms of owning land within a watercourse command area. Operational 
landholding size increased through tenancy contracts would also influence water acquisition 
through illicit practices of physical intervention. Tenants who could get larger land holding 
size to cultivate in a watercourse command area are likely to be involved in practices like 
siphoning of the water from the distributary. Cultivators who are getting less time per unit of 
land than their right are also likely to indulge in water acquisition by intervening with the 
system at lower level (for example at watercourse level). Farmers with landholding sizes in 
the middle range would try to influence water allocation and hence would be involved in 
institutional interventions. These activities are mostly illicit. 
Since only individual actions are studied here, social relations and kinship would not matter 
in most of the activities. But when considering water transactions (canal water as well as 
groundwater) as individual activity the social relations would come in as they influence the 
dealings of the farmers in terms of access to additional irrigation water as canal and 
groundwater transactions (see Malik and Strosser, 1994, Meinzen-Dick, 1996; Strosser, 
1997). 
In this study the activities undertaken to fulfil perceived individual needs in terms of 
irrigation water are: 
• Canal water and groundwater management strategies that include conjunctive water use, 
and water exchanges. 
• Institutional modifications related to water allocation strategies. 
• Physical interventions related to: (i) cleaning of farm channels, (ii) refusal to accept 
surplus water, and (iii) siphoning of canal water 
• crop choice 
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5.2 CONJUNCTIVE USE OF CANAL AND GROUNDWATER 
With the increased cropping intensities, canal water deliveries are not enough to fulfil 
irrigation water needs, therefore groundwater has to be exploited to fill the gap between canal 
water deliveries and irrigation water needs. In past the Government of Pakistan encouraged 
installation of tubewells in this area - there was even a subsidy on installing tubewells. 
However, at present the procedure to get that subsidy is so long and difficult that farmers are 
not interested in acquiring this subsidy anymore, moreover some of the farmers are not even 
aware that such a subsidy exists. 
If the canal water supply to the area is high, usually the tubewell density is low. When 
farmers own land in adjacent watercourses they do not have to install separate tubewells in 
these watercourses. They can install one tubewell and use it's water to irrigate lands in both 
the tertiary units provided that the water could be conveyed to the other watercourse 
command area. Tubewell density, number of tubewells and the number of landowners for the 
selected watercourses are presented in table 5.1. Tubewell density per owner and per 
cultivator is calculated in two ways: (i) using the number of tubewells within the watercourse 
command area, and (ii) the total number of tubewells (in and out command), owned by the 
farmers of selected watercourses. 
Table 5.1: 
Watercourse 
MD-1R 
MD-11TC 
FD-38 L 
FD-67 L 
FD-84 L 
FD-96 R 
Tubewell density according 
watercourses 
Number of 
Land owners -
Cultivators 
77 -71 
78-74 
0 3 - 2 
44 -57 
86-48 
4 8 - 2 9 
Number of 
Tubewells' 
10+2 
5+1 
2 
17+2 
24+7 
10+6 
to area and number of owners in six selected 
TW density 
cultivator 
TWsin 
command area 
0.1-0.1 
0.1-0.1 
0.7-1.0 
0.4-0.3 
0.3-0.5 
0.2-0.3 
per owner -
Including TWs 
out of 
command area 
0.2-0.2 
0.1-0.1 
0.7-1.0 
0.4-0.3 
0.4-0.6 
0.3-0.4 
TW density per 
lOOha. (only 
TWsin 
command area) 
7.1 
3.0 
4.7 
10.9 
22.5 
14.5 
' Number of tubewells is the actual number of tubewells present in the watercourse command area 
+ number of tubewells owned by the farmers of sample watercourses in other watercourses. The 
water pumped from these out of command tubewells is also used in the selected watercourses. 
Since canal water supply to the watercourses along Mahmood distributary is very good 
tubewell density is low. Similarly, because the watercourse FD 84-L has poor canal water 
supply and a large number of landowners, tubewell density (number of tubewells per 100 ha) 
in this watercourse is also highest. Each individual landowner wants to be flexible in 
irrigating his crops, thus likes to install his own tubewell. TW density in the Fordwah 
watercourses is higher than the Mahmood watercourses except FD 38-L. FD 38-L has only 
three landowners and two cultivators1. Such a high intensity of tubewell indicates a high 
pumpage of groundwater and unreliability of canal water. Overall 83 % of total water users in 
1
 Two of the landowners belong to one family; they are father and son. Their land is cultivated is rented in by 
only one farmer. 
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the watercourses studied were using groundwater in addition to the canal water. Because of 
comparatively better canal water supply, a lower percentage of farmers (70 %) along 
Mahmood distributary are using groundwater as compared to 96 % of the farmers along 
Fordwah distributary. Farmers not using groundwater were mostly small farmers with land 
holdings of less than 4 acres (1.76 ha). These farmers mostly grow one crop per season: 
fodder, wheat, cotton, and sugarcane are the main crops they cultivate. Groundwater use was 
observed more in kharif 1997 than in rabi 197-98 because of disturbed canal water supply2. 
In kharif1997 groundwater provided 47 % of the total irrigation water available for irrigation 
at the farm-gate. Whereas in rabi 1997-98 groundwater supplied 22 % of water for irrigation 
at the farm-gate. 
Farmers prefer to irrigate crops with canal water, firstly because it is of better quality as 
compared to groundwater, and secondly because pumped water is far more expensive than the 
canal deliveries. Nevertheless, when they decide to use groundwater they prefer to blend it 
with canal water mainly because of the small stream size of the pumped water and to reduce 
the negative effects of marginal quality groundwater. However, a farmer can use groundwater 
out of his warabandi turn as well if the tubewell is within his farm since he only uses farm 
channels for the conveyance of groundwater. In case he needs to use (a portion) of the main 
watercourse to transport the pumped groundwater, he cannot use it as long as there is canal 
water flowing in the watercourse . 
Some farmers also give alternate irrigations with canal and pumped groundwater to reduce 
the impact of marginal quality groundwater on land and crops4 (Kuper, 1997). Farmers have 
their own indicators to judge the quality of tubewell water. Hoeberichts (1996) researched the 
indicators used by the farmers to evaluate groundwater quality. The tubewell water is of bad 
quality if: i) it tastes salty; ii) if one feels satiated just after drinking this water; iii) if it foams 
easily while washing clothes; iv) if after infiltration, there is sign of salinity on the soil 
surface; and v) if irrigation with the tubewell water causes the soil to harden. The quality of 
the tubewell water in the selected watercourses along the Mahmood distributary is good, 
farmers also acknowledge it. In the selected watercourses along the Fordwah distributary the 
groundwater quality is not as good as in Mahmood and varies a lot even within a watercourse 
command area. Almost all the tubewell owners were consulted about the quality of tubewell 
water. Ten tubewells, from the watercourses FD 67-L, FD 84-L and FD 96-R, were selected 
for the chemical analysis of their water. Two factors influenced this selection, firstly the 
intensive pumpage from those tubewells, and secondly that their owners complained about 
the quality of the water. The analysis showed that water from 5 out of 10 tubewells was found 
unfit for irrigation5. While it is very rare that other farmers buy water from these tubewells 
2
 One of the link canals, which bring water for Fordwah Irrigation system, was damaged in kharif 1997. See 
chapter 3 for details. 
3
 During kharif 1997, groundwater was intensively used by the farmers of FD 67-L because of unusual high 
canal water scarcity. Farmers were also using the main watercourse for tubewell water conveyance. Once, 
during this period of water scarcity, a very thin layer of the canal water started flowing in the watercourse, which 
upset these farmers. As the canal water was not enough to fulfil irrigation water need and they could also not use 
groundwater since they could no longer use main watercourse to transport the pumped water form the source to 
the point it was needed for irrigation. 
4
 Hussain et al. (1990) found that alternate irrigation with canal and groundwater is more effective in keeping the 
ECe and SAR levels of the soil as compared to mixing of canal and tubewell water (in Kuper 1997). 
5
 Water samples from tubewells considered to have bad water were tested by Soil Fertility Punjab, Bahawalpur 
office. The criteria used to estimate the quality is the one used by WAPDA that could be found in WAPDA 
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the owners are still using this water since it still gives more flexibility in terms of timing of 
irrigation. 
The presence of tubewells also influences the choice of crops for the farmers in a water scarce 
system. Farmers with access to groundwater could grow more water sensitive crops since they 
are more flexible in terms of amount and timing of the irrigation water as compared to the 
farmers having no access to groundwater. Moreover, farmers having more than one piece of 
land in one watercourse would prefer to cultivate a water sensitive crop in the parcel that is 
closer to the outlet and/or the tubewell. For example in the watercourse MD 1-R one farmer 
has a land at the tail of the watercourse and has also rented in some land at the head, he 
cultivates rice at the head and sugarcane at the tail of the watercourse, which is very logical. 
He is the last and the first in warabandi cycle: he thus has a longer water turn, as he also gets 
all the remaining water when the watercourse is drained. This gives him much flexibility in 
using his water turn. Farmers also prioritise crops to irrigate with only canal water. For 
example, farmers growing rice, like in the MD 1-R and MD 11-TC prefer to irrigate rice with 
canal water, sugarcane is at second priority. Farmers mainly growing sugarcane and cotton, as 
in MD 11-TC, prefer to irrigate rice with canal water. Cotton could be irrigated with the 
groundwater, as it requires less irrigation depth in one irrigation event. 
Tubewell ownership gives better control and more flexibility to use irrigation water for better 
crop yield, and hence increases the productivity of irrigation water. Freeman et al. (1978) 
found that the productivity of irrigation water was higher for tubewell owners as compared to 
the purchasers of groundwater and non-users of groundwater, since they have the highest 
degree of control over irrigation water6. In the research area most of the farmers who are 
purchasing pumped groundwater in kharif1997 have landholding sizes between 5 acres (2.02 
ha.) and 12.5 acres (5.06 ha.), whereas in rabi 1997-98 majority of farmers who are buying 
tubewell water have landholding size of less than 5 acres (2.02 ha). Large farmers, with 
landholding size bigger than 12.5 acres (5.06 ha) are least interested in buying tubewell water, 
also because they own their own tubewells. The net value of production7 of selected farmers, 
both tubewell owners and farmers who rely on purchased groundwater, is calculated for 
kharif 1997. Information from 35 farmers (14 tubewell owners and 21 purchasers of tubewell 
water) of all the selected watercourses was collected about their total expenditure (except 
abiana) and income from the produce during the whole season. These 35 farmers were 
randomly selected from all the watercourses for collecting information regarding the input 
use. The income9 from the produce of these farmers was calculated using the yield data and 
the actual prices for the crops marketed by these farmers. As expected, the average net value 
of production of the tubewell owners is significantly higher than the average net value of 
publication of 1975: Appraisal of Initial Chemical Quality of Groundwater in Kot Adu Unit of SCARP III, 1972-
74. SCARP Monitoring Organisation (SMO) Publication Number 78. 
6
 In Freeman's (1978) study crop yields of wheat and cotton were respectively 1.3 and 1.8 times higher for farms 
with tubewells as compared to the farms with no tubewells. These results were based on the data from 40 
watercourses in Pakistan. 
7
 Net value of production is the gross value of production - input. Input here does not include abaina because of 
several practical reasons: 1) information about abiana (water rent) paid was not available, as farmers were not 
willing to give that information. 2) Very often farmers manage to pay much less abiana than they should pay by 
bribing patwari who assess the abiana 
8
 Tubewell owners here refer to the farmers who have direct access to the tubewell water. It may include the 
owner of the tubewell himself or his sharecropper tenant who can operate the tubewell whenever he needs to 
irrigate his crops. 
9
 This does not include the earnings of tubewell owners by selling water from their tubewells. 
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production of the purchasers of pumped groundwater. On average tubewell owners earned 
about 13000 Rs (325 US$) more than the farmers who were purchasing groundwater since the 
owners are much more flexible in pumping the water whereas purchasers depend on the 
willingness of the tubewell owners to sell water. 
To compare canal water and conjunctive water, 8 farmers were taken from 3 watercourses-
MD 1-R, MD 11-TC and FD 67-L. Farmers with similar cropping patterns in the two water 
use patterns were selected. Table 5.2 presents information about the farmers studied for this 
comparison of conjunctive water use. Most of the farmers who rely only on canal water for 
irrigation belong to the Mahmood Distributary as it used to get very good canal water supply 
before kharif 1997. Hence it was only possible to select farmers from only one Fordwah 
watercourse. 
rable 5.2 
Tubewell 
owner 
Non user 
of 
pumped 
water 
Selected tubewell owners 
status, cropping pattern 
Farmer 
MD 
1-R 09 
MD 
11-TC17 
FD 
67-L 03 
FD 
67-L 08 
MD 
1-R 40 
MD 
11-TC02 
MD 
11-TC66 
MD 
67-L 28 
and non-users of groundwater, their tenancy 
and yields in kharif1997 and rabi 1997-98 
Tenancy Cropped area Cropped area 
Status1 kharif \997 rabi 1997-98 
hectares hectares 
OC 
OC 
OC 
T 
OC 
OC 
OC 
T 
2.83 
2.78 
2.88 
2.71 
0.81 
1.01 
2.18 
0.81 
3.23 
2.78 
3.03 
3.26 
0.81 
1.21 
1.52 
0.81 
Crops cultivated 
kharif19972 
(yield in tons/ha) 
Rice (4.6) 
Sugarcane (47) 
Fodder 
Cotton (2.07) 
Sugarcane (48) 
Fodder 
Cotton (1.53) 
Rice (2. 59) 
Fodder 
Cotton (1.19) 
Vegetable 
Fodder 
Rice (2.46) 
Fodder 
Sugarcane(26)4 
Fodder 
Sugarcane (23) 
Fodder 
Cotton 
(destroyed) 
Crops cultivated 
rabi 1997-983 
(yield in tons/ha) 
Wheat (2.0) 
Sugarcane 
Fodder 
Wheat (3.53) 
Sugarcane 
Fodder 
Wheat (2.29) 
Fodder 
Wheat (2.2) 
Vegetable 
Fodder 
Wheat (2.95) 
Wheat (1.48) 
Sugarcane 
Fodder 
Wheat (2.2) 
Sugarcane 
Wheat (2.07) 
1
 OC is owner cultivator and T is sharecropper 
2
 Figures in the brackets are yield in tons per hectare. For some crops and farmers this information 
was not available. 
3The yield of sugarcane is unknown as it is a ratooned crop and was not harvested by the end of this 
research. 
4Sugarcane grown in 20 % of his area was of very poor quality and therefore used as fodder. 
Figure 5.1 presents the irrigation water requirement, calculated with the help of FAO software 
CROPWAT 4 for Windows, and mm of water (canal and groundwater) available to the 
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farmers at the farm-gate10 of tubewell owners and tubewell non-users. Therefore it was 
decided to choose farmers with different cropping patterns. 
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Figure 5.1: Irrigation water requirement and conjunctive water use by selected 
farmers in kharif1997 and rabi 1997-98 
There are two very striking things: one is that the irrigation water requirement of the farmers 
of one watercourse with two patterns of water use does not differ much specifically in rabi 
1997-98; secondly non-users of tubewell water in Mahmood managed to get the same or 
greater canal water supply than the tubewell users in kharif 1997. With relatively higher 
availability of canal water they managed to prevent significant yield reduction. These are the 
farmers who are also more involved in the exchange of canal water turns. Another strategy 
they adapted was to concentrate on part of the crop that is growing better and use the rest as 
fodder, as was done by the farmer CID 11-TC 02 in case of sugarcane. He cultivated 
sugarcane on 0.5 hectares, when the crop cultivated in 0.1 hectare was almost damaged; he 
decided to use it as fodder for his cattle and irrigate the rest of the crop with the available 
canal water. Only one farmer, i.e. FD 67-L 28, has very little canal water supply. He grew 
cotton but when it was ruined through disrupted water deliveries, he gave away his water turn 
to other farmers in the watercourse command area. The tubewell owners could easily meet the 
gap between demand and supply and therefore benefited in terms of better yield". The 
sugarcane yield of tubewell owners is about 94 % higher than the sugarcane yield of non-
users of groundwater. The difference in the rice yield of the tubewell owners is not as big as 
for sugarcane. The difference is about 46 percent. However, only one non-user of tubewell 
'"Amount of water available at the farm-gate was calculated in the spreadsheet by volume balance method. 
Application efficiency is not considered in these calculations. 
1
' It seems that the tubewell owners are over-irrigating their crops, which is not true. Part of this water is needed 
for application and distribution losses. In these calculations application efficiency is not deducted from the water 
available at the farm-gate. Therefore, actual water available for the crops is less than what is presented in the 
graph. 
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water for the analysis is growing rice. In kharif 1997, tubewell owners have more diversified 
cropping patterns as compared to the non-users of tubewell water, as they count on additional 
irrigation water at the time they plan which crops to grow. It seems that cotton is not widely 
grown by the farmers who do not use tubewell water - only 18 % of non-users of groundwater 
cultivated cotton. In the rabi 1997-98 cropping pattern, yield of the main crop(s), and the gap 
between water demand and supply is more or less consistent for all the farmers. In fact almost 
all the farmers are able to provide irrigation water to match evaporatranspiration demand of 
the crops cultivated. Although the use of pumped water was much less in rabi 1997-98, all 
tubewells owners did use groundwater for irrigation: they use it mainly during the canal 
closure. 
5.3 WATER TRANSACTIONS 
Water trading was studied separately for canal water and groundwater, as the trade of 
irrigation water from these two different sources is dealt with separately by the farmers. Canal 
water is mostly exchanged and not sold or bought. However, groundwater, since it is more 
expensive than the canal water, is formally sold or bought. Social relations matter in both 
canal and groundwater transactions, although actual exchanges are also limited by physical 
constraints. For example, groundwater cannot be transported upstream from a tubewell. 
5.3.1 Canal Water 
According to the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 (Nasir, 1993) water trading, that is defined as 
any kind of exchange of water turns or selling and buying of water turns, is forbidden, since 
the water turn is allocated to the land and not to the farmers. However, exchange of water turn 
is very commonly practised to cope with the uncertainty of canal water supply. A canal water 
turn is not sold unless it is really difficult to make use of it. Farmers who have more than one 
water turn in one watercourse command also swap turns for one parcel of land with the water 
turn for another parcel of land to consolidate time. 
Two kinds of arrangements exist for canal water transactions: one is a more ad hoc 
arrangement and the other is more planned. In an ad hoc arrangement, if a farmer realises 
during or before his warabandi turn that he is not able to irrigate the desired number of 
bunded units which need irrigation, he borrows all or part of the water turn from another 
farmer. This borrowed water is given back in terms of time used and not in terms of quantity, 
nevertheless it is made sure that the difference in quantity is not very big12. More permanent 
arrangements are planned at the start of a crop season. Farmers having very small water turns 
(very often less than half hour), which is not enough to irrigate one bunded unit during one 
warabandi turn, give their water turn to another relatively bigger farmer for two to three 
weeks. They would then get a longer turn every third or fourth week depending on the deal. 
This deal is mostly made among the neighbouring farmers (Strosser 1997 found the same). 
Though this arrangement is considered beneficial for both the farmers, the quantity of water 
could not be compensated, so it is possible that the smaller farmer misses his longer water 
turn because of no supply and vice versa. That may be one of the reasons that this 
arrangement is not found in the watercourses studied, nevertheless 12 % of cultivators had a 
water turn of less than a half-hour. Most of these farmers are owner-cultivators having 
12
 Farmers though they do not measure quantity, do have their own criteria to judge the quantity of water, for 
example if the watercourse is flowing at full capacity or is half full (Hoeberichts, 1996). 
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agricultural land of 1.0 acre or less, and exchange water turns very often with the 
neighbouring farmers who in many cases are relatives13. Such a small agricultural land 
holding and hence short water turn has implications on the cropping pattern as well, farmers 
can only grow one or at maximum two crops since the produce would not be significant if 
they cultivate more crops under small area. 
Swapping of canal water turns was practised more in kharif 1997 in the watercourses along 
the Mahmood distributary whereas along the Fordwah distributary it was done more regularly 
in the rabi 1997-98. The reason is that kharif '1997 was a water scarce season for the farmers 
in the privileged Mahmood distributary that also has lower tubewell density per hectare. 
Therefore these farmers had to exchange canal water turns more often than usual. Whereas 
farmers of the Fordwah distributary have tubewells that could be used whenever additional 
water is needed. The high intensity of water exchanges in rabi is possible as when a farmer 
does not need water it could be used by another shareholder in the watercourse command 
area. The longer water turns are more often borrowed at the start of the season, when water is 
needed for pre-irrigation. A farmer can borrow a water turn from more than one farmer, and 
thus can have more than 4 hours of irrigation time in one warabandi turn. Since the water 
demand is low at the start of the season, also because of the different sowing dates of the 
same crops, farmers can give away full water turns. 
Most often farmers exchange canal water turns for between 30 and 60 minutes. On average 28 
% of time farmers borrowed water for 30 minutes or less during the year 1997-98, it occurs 
more often in the watercourses along the Mahmood distributary (33 % of time) as compared 
to the watercourses along the Fordwah distributary (22 % of time). Sometimes one farmer 
borrows a canal water turn from more than one farmer to be able to give pre-irrigation or 
irrigate a large area. These exchanges happen almost all year round, but it is easier to borrow 
longer canal water turns when not every farmer in the watercourse needs to irrigate. 
Warabandi in this case becomes flexible. Sometimes, the discharge at the mogha is so low 
that it does not reach the point where a farmer has his land, in which case another farmer 
upstream can use this water without returning this water turn. 
Another kind of arrangement is the rotation among a group of farmers sharing one official 
nakka in the warabandi. Usually, each square in a watercourse command area has one official 
nakka: farmers having land in the square share this nakka. Officially, only one farmer within a 
square gives time to the watercourse to fill and only one farmer gets all the water from 
drainage. To distribute the filling and draining time equitably among all the farmers from one 
square, they rotate their warabandi turns. Each week, a different farmer irrigates first, hence 
each week a different farmer has the drawback of the advance phase, by filling the 
watercourse, and benefits from the drainage phase. These changes are made at the start of the 
season, and remain while a farmer does not object. 
In some cases farmers even sell their full warabandi turn for the whole season. Two brothers 
in the watercourse FD 96-R, who also own land in another adjacent watercourse, sharecrop14 
13
 Note that they exchange canal water turn on ad hoc basis, rather than more permanent or structural basis, 
because they are more aware of the quantity of canal water they will receive in this case. 
14
 In fact they cultivated this land only in the first season studied that is rabi 1996-97, for the remaining two 
seasons they left this part of land as fallow. In Rabi 1996-97 they cultivated wheat, and the yield per acre from 
their field was 1.7 tons per hectare, that is 69 % of the average yield per acre in this watercourse for this season. 
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with the same tenant on the basis of 50-50. They sold out their irrigation water turn(s) of this 
watercourse for the full season(s) because of the following reasons: 
• The elevation of their fields located at the tail of the watercourse command area is very 
high and the slope of the watercourse in the tail reach is very little. Therefore it is very 
difficult to irrigate these fields; 
• These farmers buy sewer water for irrigation from the local council of the town and use 
it for irrigation - this arrangement is cheaper than the levelling of fields; 
• They own a tubewell (out of command) that could be operated to pump groundwater 
whenever needed; 
• These fanners also have side businesses hence have less time to take care of agriculture, 
therefore have a lack of interest in levelling the fields. 
At the tail of watercourse FD 84-L four cultivators have sold out their irrigation turn mostly 
to other relatives in the command area because they rarely get water. The reason for this 
unavailability of canal water is the lack of maintenance of the main watercourse and low 
discharge at the mogha. Furthermore these farmers also have off-farm employment hence do 
not have enough time to mobilise resources and maintain the watercourse. They have direct 
access to groundwater and mainly cultivate fodder and cotton. In this case the benefit of 
collective action is not substantial according to the farmers hence individual action is taken. 
One of the cultivators is using canal water from another outlet. 
5.3.2 Groundwater 
In Pakistan groundwater is an open access resource, anyone can exploit it by drilling a 
tubewell in his/her land. Tubewell water supply gives better control over security of irrigation 
water supply in terms of quantity and timing, however not all the farmers have enough capital 
to install private tubewells. Another alternative to get access to groundwater at times it is 
needed is to purchase it from the tubewell owners. In the study area water users started to 
trade groundwater during the eighties. In this study about 39 % of groundwater users in the 
selected watercourses have direct access15 to the groundwater (58 % in Fordwah and 19 % in 
Mahmood distributaries). However 61 % are purchasing pumped water (42 % in Fordwah and 
81 % in Mahmood). Sometimes, the tubewell owners also have to buy pumped groundwater 
if i) the tubewell is temporarily out of order; or ii) irrigation water requirement is so high that 
it can not be fulfilled by operating only his own tubewell; or iii) the quality of his tubewell 
water is hazardous for crops and soil. 
Access to groundwater for non-tubewell owners primarily depends on the need of the owner 
to use it. A tubewell owner will be willing to sell water if he himself does not need water 
from his tubewell. Three kinds of arrangement for groundwater trading are found in the study 
area depending on many factors. The first is to pay money to buy water, which is mostly by 
flat rate per hour to the tubewell owner. The amount to be paid depends on several factors 
that will be discussed later. A second way is to bring ones' own fuel and use the tubewell: this 
arrangement is based on social relations of the involved farmers. A third way is to use ones' 
own tractor to pump the water. One can argue that the second and third kind of trading is not 
trading since there is no money involved and the owner of the tubewell does not get any 
material thing in return. However, the buyer has to invest money in buying diesel. Also the 
This includes tubewell owners, lessees who have rented in land with an installed tubewell, or tenants who 
could operate an installed tubewell anytime and then share the cost with the owners. 
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owner of the tubewell does get some respect if he allows others to take some material benefits 
from his tubewell. The reason for listing the last two kinds of arrangements is to show all the 
possibilities of access to groundwater for non-tubewell owners. Meinzen-Dick (1996) carried 
out a study on water markets in Pakistan and also found a share of crop as a mode of payment 
for groundwater purchase, though this was only found in North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP) and not in Punjab. 
In the first kind of arrangement, the price of pumped water16 varies and is dependent on the 
discharge, type of tubewell, quality of groundwater, price of the diesel used etc. The price of 
pumped groundwater sold in the selected watercourses ranged from 30 Rs (US $ 0.75) per 
hour to 120 Rs. (US $ 3) per hour. The discharges of the tubewells used for water trading 
were in the range of 7 1/s to 50 1/s. The second and third kinds of arrangements are mainly 
dependent on the social relations of the farmers involved. These arrangements usually exist 
among brothers and other relatives. If the relations are good and the owner is not using the 
tubewell then the fanner in need can pump water. 
To summarise there is no strict procedures for buying or selling of groundwater. Many 
physical and social factors influence farmers' preferences for selling or buying from a 
particular tubewell. A buyer would prefer to purchase: 
• Groundwater from a tubewell that is close to the land to be irrigated to avoid 
conveyance losses, 
• Good quality groundwater. There is always a trade off between the quality and the price 
though. Sometimes farmers decide to use cheap water of marginal quality to save some 
money, and 
• Groundwater from the seller with whom he has good relations. In case of a dispute, a 
seller may turn down the request of buyer. 
5.4 INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTIONS: WATER ALLOCATION STRATEGIES 
Warabandi is the only written proof of the canal water right in a warabandi system since 
water is allocated to land and not to the farmers in form of time per acre. This method of 
time-sharing was adopted to make water allocation equitable, and the procedure to distribute 
water transparent. Sometimes farmers try to get some individual benefits out of this 
transparent system of water allocation. 
Figure 5.2 a presents the percentage difference of the water allocated to the individual 
landowners with the official water allocation in minutes per acre according to the official or 
pakka warabandi1''. Though water allocation to the individual landowners in the selected 
watercourses is reasonably equitable, and generally water users do not complain about the 
warabandi, there are still some institutional interventions that are interesting to study. Water 
allocation for about 85 % of the landowners is within 10 % of the official water allocation in 
minutes per acre. Most of the landowners are receiving slightly higher number of minutes per 
16
 Tahir (1997) found that in Chishtian sub-division the main factors that influence price of groundwater are the 
type of tubewell, quality of tubewell water and tubewell density within a watercourse. Cropping patterns, as a 
major demand factor, also influence price of groundwater. 
17
 These farmers may not be the actual cultivators of the land, some of them may not even be alive anymore. 
Since they are official owners of the land, they have official right to use this canal water. 
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acre than the allocation (Appendix VII presents the way water is allocated by a patwari). 
While, the reasons for some of these discrepancies in water allocation are not really known 
they are well accepted by other farmers in a watercourse command area18. In most of the 
cases when a farmer's allocation is greater than the official allocation in minutes per acre, it is 
because a patwari gave away left over minutes to these farmers. 
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Figure 5.2a: Variation in official time allocation to individual landowners in six 
selected watercourses. Variation is presented as the percentage difference 
of individual official allocation (minutes per hour) with the average 
official allocation (in minutes per hour) of the respective watercourse 
The agreed upon warabandi, which is the real water distribution schedule used by the farmers 
also shows more or less same pattern. Figure 5.2 b presents the variation in the percentage 
difference of the canal water turn time (in minutes per acre) allocated for cultivators with the 
official allocation (in minutes per acre). The time allocated for cultivators is within 10 % 
range of officially allocated time in minutes per acre1 . More extreme deviations - that is 
higher than 10 % of the officially allocated time for an acre - in the official warabandi have 
disappeared in the agreed upon warabandi, largely because the extra time that was allocated 
to one land owner is distributed among more farmers either through tenancy or inheritance. 
Large variations in the water allocation of agreed upon warabandi are due to the trade of the 
canal water turn and use of water allocated for the Government property. While former has 
already been discussed in the section 5.3, the latter will be discussed later in this section. 
18
 The patwaris who made these warabandh are no longer in the area therefor it was difficult to really find out 
the reason of these few discrepancies. Even farmers can not explain it. 
19
 These small deviations within 10 % are even minimised because most of the farmers are practising rotation 
within the square (see section 5.3.1 for rotation). 
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Figure 5.2b: Variation in time allocation to individual cultivators in the six selected 
watercourses. Variation is presented as the percentage difference of 
individual allocation (minutes per hour) with the average official 
allocation (in minutes per hour) of the respective watercourse 
The main water allocation strategies found in the study area are: (i) combining different 
irrigation water turns, and (ii) use of canal water allocated for orchards and Government 
property for irrigating crops. 
5.4.1 Combining Different Irrigation Water Turns 
A farmer can have more than one irrigation water turn in one watercourse, depending on the 
location of the parcel(s) of land he cultivates. He can use this water turn to irrigate any of the 
parcels and any crop. However if a farmer wants to swap one water turn with the other he has 
to take care of the schedule of the rest of the warabandi. Officially he is supposed to give 
water to the farmer having the next water turn in the schedule at a fixed nakka. In practice if 
he wants to disturb the warabandi schedule he has to communicate with other farmers, and 
try to change the order of turns in a way that he could use this water on the parcel of land for 
which this water turn is not granted. Sometimes, farmers try to get a combined official water 
turn for parcels of land that are close but not adjacent. In some cases it is even difficult to get 
what a farmer perceives his legitimate official right. He has to make physical financial efforts 
in order to get his right. Box 5.1 explains the effort of individual farmers to get a combined 
water turn and to safeguard water rights in terms of time allocation. However, in both cases 
the intermediary that was used was money. These kinds of efforts are mainly made by Owner 
Cultivators since they are the legal right holders of canal water. Besides Tenants or Lessees 
do not have to deal with the official water allocation, and discuss these things with the 
landowner when they finalise the tenancy contract. 
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Box 5.1: Individual efforts to make localised minor changes in official warabandi 
Trying to get a combined water turn for different parcels of land 
In the watercourse MD 1-R, warabandi was changed on 13-05-97. CID 09 and CED 10 both 
belong to one biradari and are relatives and both had more than one water turn (CID 09 had two 
water turns and CID 10 had three water turns) in the watercourse command area. They wanted to 
combine two water turns into one in order to be able to have more control over this water and use 
this water more efficiently. Therefore they requested the patwari, who is responsible for the 
warabandi, and the SDO to make adjustments in the pakka warabandi several times but nothing 
happened. Recently they again asked the patwari who suggested that if these farmers paid 
something in cash then the changes could be made. However officially patwari is not supposed to 
get any money from farmers to make any change in warabandi at farmers' request. Changes were 
incorporated after the payments were made. Now CID 9 has one water turn instead of two and 
CID 10 has 2 water turns instead of one, which is more practical in terms of management and 
efficient use of water. 
Trying to get perceived right of water turn time 
CID 58 in the watercourse MD 1-R owns two parcels of land and therefore has two water turns. 
The time allocated to him for both the water turns is less than the official allocation of 29 minutes 
per acre (29 minutes per acre). He was getting 28 minutes per acre for one parcel and 24.8 minutes 
per acre for the other parcel of land (Appendix VII explains how the patwari allocates water). 
Therefore in total he was losing 5.20 minutes. He started making efforts to get his right but it was 
difficult in the beginning. Then he tried to use money as intermediary and it worked. He had to 
pay Rs 1500 (approximately US $ 33) to get his 5 minutes back. It was also not easy for the 
patwari to do it since he had to extract these five minutes from water turn of others farmers as 
every minute in the week is allocated. Now CID 58 is getting 28 minutes per acre on one parcel of 
land and 30 minutes per acre on the other parcel of land, which on average is 29 minutes per acre. 
Some farmers (including CID 49, 57 and 27) have objected to this change since their water turn 
time is reduced. However, no one took any action to stop this change perhaps because they knew 
that they were wrong, they had taken this water illicitly. Besides they have to pay some money 
again to the Patwari to get this water back. 
5.4.2 Use of Canal water Allocated for Orchards for Irrigating Crops 
Some farmers also use canal water allocated for orchards2 for irrigating crops. If a farmer 
plants orchards he gets a double water allocation for that plot. However, they first have to 
plant the trees and get it inspected by the Irrigation Department officials in order to get water 
allocated for the orchards. In many cases the orchards disappear after few years but the water 
allocated remains and hence some farmers get extra water for their crops. When the trees are 
still small farmers grow other crops, like wheat and fodder, in the fields. 
Moreover, sometimes farmers use part of the irrigated land for non-agricultural purposes - for 
instance for the construction of a (farm) house - but the water allocation for this part of land 
remains and is used for another piece(s) of agricultural land. However in some cases, like in 
the watercourse FD 96-R, other farmers complain about this situation to the Irrigation 
Department. As a result this water is subtracted from the water turn of the owner and 
20
 Recently in 1999, the Government of Punjab has announced that no further special allocation will be made for 
orchards because of the water scarcity and illegal use of canal water. The question now is whether they take back 
already allocated extra time for Orchards? 
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distributed among all the shareholders of the command area. This actions is seen more in the 
watercourses along the Fordwah distributary since farmers along the Mahmood distributary 
already get enough water hence they do not need to put efforts into such activities. 
Three farmers - CID 18 and CID 19 in the watercourse FD 96-R, and CID 26 in the 
watercourse FD 67-L - have allocations for Orchards as though they are cultivating crops in 
those fields. They are all owner cultivators and only one has direct access to groundwater. 
The other two buy groundwater if needed - which is not very often because of the longer 
canal water turn with the 'Orchard allocation'. Had these water users not had this extra time 
allocation they would have had to buy groundwater every time they needed this water. A 
rough estimate tells us that farmer CID 26 would have spent RS 4000 (US$ 87) and farmers 
CID 18 and 19 would have spent RS 3000 (US$ 75) each time in order to get the same 
volume of groundwater. Whereas now each one of them has to give approximately RS 330 
(approximately US$ 8) per year as "abiana" (water fee) for orchards. Farmer CID 26 mainly 
cultivates sugarcane, wheat and cotton; farmer CID 19 cultivates cotton, wheat and fodder but 
farmer CID 18 cultivates only fodder. The reason for this is that CID 18 and 19, who are 
brothers, both have dairy farms and therefore they cultivate fodder, which could also be sold 
in the nearby market if in surplus. 
5.4.3 Allocation for the Government Property 
Sometimes a pakka warabandi schedule also includes time allocation for a Government 
property, e.g. a school, a forest, a guesthouse etc within a watercourse command area. 
However in reality these Government properties hardly get any canal water as it is used by 
farmer(s) within a watercourse command area. In most cases users of these water turns have 
to pay something in kind or cash for this additional water to the person responsible to take 
care of this Government property. 
In two of the selected watercourses, FD 67-L and FD 84-L, 60 minutes and 69 minutes 
respectively are allocated for a forest and a school. A Lessee, CID 392', is using the canal 
water allocated for forest in FD 67-L and owner cum cultivator CID 30, is using water 
allocated for forest in the watercourse FD 84-L during the study period. In the case of FD 84-
L the farmer gives fodder in return to the irrigation staff responsible for this water whereas in 
case of FD 67-L the farmer gives cash. Both the water users have direct access to 
groundwater (one through ownership and the other through the tubewell owned by the 
landowner) and are full time cultivators, growing sugarcane, wheat and cotton. 
5.5 PHYSICAL INTERVENTION: ACQUIRING MORE AND REFUSING 
SURPLUS CANAL IRRIGATION WATER 
Farmers intervene physically with the system in both situations when they need more water 
for irrigation, and also when canal water supply is present but not needed for irrigation. The 
former is mostly done during the period of peak crop water requirement, and the latter during 
the rainy season or at the end of the crop season. 
21
 He stopped giving us data at the beginning of kharif season because of some problems with another project of 
IWMI in the area. We tried our best to convince him but did not succeed. However, he remained nice and 
hospitable with us throughout the research period but refused to give data to us since we were representing 
IWMI. 
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5.5.1 Water Acquisition 
Individual farmers who do not want to spend their resources in relatively long-term solutions 
for water scarcity - such as mogha enlargement or tubewell installation - sometimes decide to 
physically intervene with the system. The preferred point of intervention varies depending on 
location of the mogha or more precisely farm location along the distributary. 
Water acquisition at the distributary level 
Farmers who have power and access to resources to acquire additional canal water intervene 
at the distributary level. Some efforts are easier to make if a farmer is living along a smaller 
distributary or at least close to the head of the distributary. For example it would be difficult 
for farmers living at the tail of a long distributary to go to the head of the distributary to 
arrange additional water. Whereas a farmer living at the tail of a smaller distributary could 
walk up to the Gauge Reader (Irrigation Department staff member responsible for the 
operation of the gates of the distributary) and request to increase the discharge in the 
distributary. 
Water users along the Fordwah distributary mostly acquire water at the watercourse level 
while in Mahmood distributary individual efforts to acquire additional water are more geared 
towards the distributary. Such an individual action would benefit all since this water would be 
distributed to all the ungated outlets. Still it takes much less effort compared to siphoning. 
The Gauge Reader has also rented in some agricultural land in one of the head watercourses 
of the distributary hence a social pressure is there on him to grant the request from the fellow 
farmers. The Gauge Reader is considered as a friend by the farmers and is not paid in cash for 
the services he provides to the farmers in terms of additional water. According to farmers they 
give him fodder as a token of friendship that he could use for his cattle. This way of 
appreciation is not seen as a bribe. In return he usually keeps the gate of the Mahmood 
distributary fully open. Supply patterns in the past show that the flow is more stable for the 
Mahmood distributary compared with two other two tail distributaries (Habib and Kuper, 
1998). 
Blocking the whole distributary is another way of getting additional water for irrigation in 
Punjab's feudal system. Big landowners block the whole distributary and take as much water 
as they want for their crops. After these big landowners are satisfied only then small farmers 
downstream could get irrigation water. On one the hand the big landowners do this to get 
additional water for irrigation. On the other hand it is the matter of their honour or "izzat", 
though this izzat they gain is out of fear and is what Merrey (1979) calls false izzat. A farmer 
may also do it to prove that he is not weak, or out of stubbornness. Sometimes the same 
farmer who is indulged in this act of water stealing by blocking the whole distributary could 
have a completely different image in another distributary command area. Box 5.2 gives an 
example of such a person. 
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Box 5.2: Blocking the distributary for honour 
Farmer X is a landowner in one of the watercourse along Mahmood distributary and has also 
leased in land in the watercourse MD 11 TR that is adjacent to the command area of watercourse 
MD 11 TC. He visits the watercourse MD 11 TC very often since he is a relative of the 
Numberdar (person responsible for collecting abiana) of the village and is considered a very 
helpful and kind person by the farmers of MD 11-TC and MD 11-TR. He gives loans to the 
farmers in need of money and helps them in negotiating for more water with the Irrigation 
Department staff since he is an influential person. When asked what he gets out of it, he said that 
he gets respect and trust of the farmers in this watercourse. If he needs help in terms of labour he 
could easily get it; farmers in this watercourse command area help him with labour in case his 
servants are not available. This interdependency is not seen by the other fanners like this, they 
however feel obliged by the fact that they get help from Mr. X when they need it most, therefore 
they should help him when he needs them. 
However the same farmer X now and then blocks the whole distributary to fulfil the perceived 
irrigation water requirement of his crop. The justification he gives of this act is that along the 
bigger distributary where he owns land he has to show his strength to fellow big landowners 
along the distributary. Therefore he uses force to take what he considers his share of water. 
According to him if he does not do it there he loses his pride and other big landowners will 
consider him a weak person and he would most probably be deprived of his share of canal water. 
Water acquisition at the watercourse level 
Unpredictable supplies of canal irrigation water make farmers take some actions to ensure 
that they are able to irrigate the bunded units needing irrigation in one irrigation turn. Use of 
tubewell water and/or exchange of canal water turns are two options to ensure crop water 
requirements. However some farmers opt to take temporary control over irrigation 
infrastructure and decide to intervene physically with the system. 
Siphoning 
Farmers having their water turn in the night can take advantage of the dark and dare to steal 
the water by putting a pipe in the distributary, hence increasing the total amount of water in 
the watercourse. The diameter of the pipe depends on the farmers' choice and could be 
influenced by various factors. If a farmer needs more water he will use a bigger diameter. The 
ease with which a pipe could be installed, and removed depends on the available labour for 
that particular water turn, and also influences choice of pipe diameter. Pipes with diameters of 
4 inches (about 10 cm) and 6 inches (about 15 cm) are more commonly used. According to 
the Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 the punishment for water theft is a fine of up to Rs. 200 
and imprisonment for up to three years. The Irrigation Department can fine the farmer and 
report the matter to the police, and the Police can arrest the farmer who stole the canal water. 
Very often a farmer manages to escape punishment by paying some money to the police or 
with the help of some influential person, even if the Irrigation Department files a case at the 
police station. These cases are hardly registered at the police station22. Moreover, the fine that 
a farmer has to pay in case he is charged of water theft is much less than the profit he would 
22
 During kharif 1998, 4000 water theft cases were reported in the whole Punjab, 1400 cases were registered 
while only 150 arrests were made (DAWN-the international edition, 4 June 1999). 
117 
FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGA TION PERFORMANCE BELOW THE MOGHA 
likely gain by this extra irrigation water23. According to some of the staff of Irrigation 
Department since police hardly takes any action against the farmers stealing water, they have 
also lost interest to report incidents and do not bother about water theft anymore (personal 
communication with the Sub-Engineer Irrigation Department, 1998). 
In the study area the watercourses that have more collective action and better water supply 
conditions have less water theft through siphoning. However, logically it seems reasonable 
that a higher number of cultivators and small operational land holding size in a watercourse 
command area would be more likely promote localised individual actions for water 
acquisition that mainly includes siphoning. A small operational land holding size means a 
small water allocation in terms of minutes per acre, which sometimes is not enough even to 
irrigate one bunded unit. Also a short duration of water turn could stimulate the theft of water 
from the distributary since farmers would like to irrigate one full plot during a water turn. 
However, this supposition seems untrue for the study area, since siphoning was only found in 
two out of six selected watercourses. One of these two watercourses, FD 38-L, has only two 
cultivators, with big land holding sizes and long water turns. Whereas the other watercourse, 
FD 84-L, has many farmers, with small land holding size but reasonably long water turns and 
comparatively poor water supply. Perhaps, a long water turn is needed to install an illegal 
pipe in the distributary. 
The overall increase in irrigation water attained from different sources plays a vital role in the 
crop production strategies and water management practices at the farm level. For instance if a 
farmer has an opportunity to get good quality water from a cheap source even if it is illegal to 
do it, he would use it in preference to water that is expensive but legally allowed. The longer 
breaks in the canal water supply also lead to illicit water acquisition practices by the farmers. 
Table 5.3 gives an overview of the canal water supply and different water management 
actions at farm level undertaken by individual farmers in one of the watercourses FD 38-L, 
along the Fordwah distributary. Research could not define the amount of water acquired 
through siphoning from the distributary24. The supplementary water helped them to achieve a 
sugarcane (the main cash crop in the watercourse command area) yield 36 % above average 
(39 % for farmer 1 and 34 % for farmer 2). This water siphoned from the right of other 
watercourses downstream disturbs the water distribution of the distributary and deprived 
other farmers of their rights. Long breaks in the water supply during the kharif1997 created a 
kind of mistrust and farmers started to get involved with illicit practices to fulfil the loss of 
water in earlier weeks25. Later in the season whenever they received an irrigation turn they 
continued to acquire additional water in the same manner and hardly operated their tubewells, 
perhaps because there is almost no check on these kind of practices from the Irrigation 
Department or any other law enforcement agency. Because there were only 2 shareholders in 
23
 Recently in 1999, the Government of Punjab has increased this punishment which now is a fine up to Rs 5000 
and imprisonment up to three years, or both. It would be interesting to see if the Government is able to enforce 
these punishments in the political system of Punjab. 
24
 Permission to measure the discharge through siphoning was not granted by the farmers, although they were 
open about being involved in this activity. The frequency of occurrence of siphoning was recorded during the 
study period. In some cases the diameter of the pipe used to take water from the distributary is known but other 
information is also needed in order to be able to estimate the amount of water acquired through siphoning. 
25
 In the first monitoring season rabi 1996-97 siphoning was not reported during the monitoring of water 
distribution. One of the involved farmers in this watercourse is an owner-cultivator and the other is a lessee. The 
lessee was changed after rabi 1996-97 (in April 1997), the former lessee said that he did not steal water. 
However it could not be verified as the reason he did not siphon might also be low crop water requirement in 
rabi. 
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the watercourse practices have no effect on any other farmer within a watercourse command 
area hence local farmers were bothered to take any action against the thieves. 
Table 5.3: Water management actions of individual 
FD 38-L over time 
farmers from the watercourse 
Kharif 1997 
Rabi1997-98 
April 1997 
May 1997 
June 1997 
July 1997 
August 1997 
September 1997 
October 1997 
November 1997 
December 1997 
January 1998 
February 1998 
March 1998 
April 1998 
Wkl 
Wk2 
Wk3 
Wk4 
Wk5 
Wk6 
Wk7 
Wk8 
Wk9 
WklO 
Wkl l 
Wkl2 
Wkl 3 
Wkl4 
Wkl5 
Wkl6 
Wkl7 
Wkl8 
Wkl9 
Wk20 
Wk21 
Wk22 
Wk23 
Wk24 
Wk25 
Wk26 
Wkl 
Wk2 
Wk3 
Wk4 
Wk5 
Wk6 
Wk7 
Wk8 
Wk9 
WklO 
Wkl l 
Wkl2 
Wkl3 
Wkl4 
Wkl5 
Wkl6 
Wkl7 
Wkl8 
Wkl9 
Wk20 
Wk21 
Wk22 
Wk23 
Wk24 
Wk25 
Wk26 
MM OF CANAL WATER 
Fanner 1 
5.4 
0.0 
0.0 
7.0 
0.0 
14.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
24.2 
0.0 
0.0 
25.6 
27.0 
23.7 
22.7 
26.0 
7.7 
15.2 
26.1 
22.4 
21.3 
0.0 
0.0 
20.2 
22.3 
24.7 
23.0 
23.9 
14.4 
15.7 
14.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
17.6 
29.9 
0.0 
16.2 
15.5 
21.0 
28.3 
28.7 
25.2 
0.0 
Farmer 2 
5.4 
0.0 
0.0 
7.0 
0.0 
14.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
24.2 
0.0 
0.0 
25.6 
27.0 
23.7 
22.7 
26.0 
7.7 
15.2 
26.1 
22.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
29.6 
22.6 
25.9 
23.9 
1.9 
20.5 
6.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
15.6 
18.4 
27.2 
12.5 
22.9 
22.8 
21.7 
25.4 
32.6 
32.6 
0.0 
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FARMERS 
Farmer 1 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
SIPHONING 
TUBEWELL 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
OUTLET CLOSED 
OUTLET CLOSED 
Farmer 2 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
SIPHONING 
TUBEWELL 
TUBEWELL 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
SIPHONING 
OUTLET CLOSED 
OUTLET CLOSED 
OUTLET CLOSED 
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Siphoning was mostly done in kharif season, which was also irregular in terms of canal water 
supply because of the damaged link canals. Siphoning is usually done in response to the 
uneven and inadequate canal water supply. There are no clear pattern why farmers are 
undertaking siphoning since: 
• The number of farmers involved in this activity is limited, only 8 % of the total 
population in the selected watercourses, 
• There is no exception to the tenancy status since Owner Cultivator, Lessee and Share-
cropper all are involved, and 
• Tubewell ownership also does not seem to have any influence since 75 % of the farmers 
involved are tubewell owners. 
In addition to siphoning, some farmers try to increase the working head by putting some grass 
or bush downstream side of the mogha to get higher discharge into the watercourse when 
water in the distributary is less than the normal. Though this activity is not very common it 
happened a few times during the study period specially during the month of July 1997 when 
the irrigation requirement for rice is very high in watercourse MD 1-R, along Mahmood 
distributary. A farmer usually takes this action during his water turn - however he does not 
always take out the bushes afterwards. Usually every farmer goes to the head of the 
watercourse just before the start of his water turn to check the water level in the distributary 
or otherwise ask about it from the farmer irrigating his field before him. In both the cases he 
would know if someone has tried to increase the working head and if the water level in the 
distributary increases he would remove the bushes. It may be possible that not all the farmers 
have intentions of intervening with the system like this but they take advantage of the prior 
action of a fellow farmer. Unfortunately the researcher does not have information about who 
was involved in this activity since almost everyone benefits from it and farmers were not 
always willing to tell about these things, though it was observed and noted every time it 
happened. 
Using multiple water sources 
Figure 5.3 shows irrigation water requirements and irrigation water used from different 
sources by MD 11-TC CID 14: a buyer of canal water. The ratio of his water use is 68 % 
supplied (including his borrowed and given water), 11 % bought26 (canal water) and 21 % 
groundwater. The over-irrigation shown in October is in fact the pre-irrigation for wheat. 
Sometimes when farmers acquire additional canal water that is much cheaper as compared to 
pumped water, they also over irrigate their crops. It also happens that when farmers do not get 
water during one water turn they try to compensate later by irrigating for longer than is 
required. Beside some water is required for application and distribution losses. That is also 
the case with this farmer, as application efficiency is not considered in the estimation of water 
available for irrigation at the farm-gate. Farmer CID 14 managed to reduce the gap between 
demand and supply, by buying canal water turns from other farmers and operating his 
tubewell. However, the total amount of irrigation water needed during the whole year is much 
higher than the amount used (1372 mm required and 934 mm used). Operating a tubewell 
more often could have filled this gap between the canal water supply and demand. However, 
CID 14 bought canal water turn of a farmer, CID 74) who had land at the tail of the watercourse. Some fields 
of CID 74 are elevated because of which he could not irrigate. He also did not want to invest in land levelling, 
therefore he sold out his water turn. Another farmer sold out his nikal time (time to drain water from a 
watercourse after it is blocked form upstream) of one hour to CID 14 because of the same reason. 
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perhaps operating tubewell for cotton may not have been recovered from cotton yield. He 
used pumped water from his tubewell to irrigate crops grown on his land which was in 
another adjacent watercourse. By doing so he managed to prevent any crop failure in kharif 
1997, and gave priority to irrigate rice and then sugarcane. Hence, the yield27 of his rice crop 
is 2.73 tons/ha that is nearly the same as the average yield in the watercourse command area, 
which is 2.72 tons/ha. Sugarcane and cotton yields are 18.5 tons/ha and 0.217 ton/ha. These 
are much less than the watercourse average yield of both the crops, which are 34 tons/ha and 
0.94 tons/ha for sugarcane and cotton. 
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Figure 5.3: Irrigation water requirement and use of irrigation water obtained from 
different sources by farmer CID 14 of the watercourse MD 11-TC. He 
cultivates 8.96 hectares of land out of which he owns 1.92 hectares, rents 
in 5.97 hectares and sharecrops 1.06 hectares. He also owns a tubewell. 1: 
problems in canal water supply because of damaged link canal. 2: 
distributary closed because of rotation. 3: mogha adjusted and discharge 
of the distributary reduced. 4: canal water drained in budh because of 
early harvesting of cotton, crop water requirement is still calculated by 
the CROPWAT. 5: Annual canal closure 
The financial rewards of water acquisition 
The previous paragraphs in this section have outlined farmers' individual efforts to acquire 
additional water for irrigation. Although with available data it is not possible to show actual 
financial rewards of individual action for water acquisition, an effort is made here to get an 
idea of the magnitude of benefit in terms of money. An estimate has been made to find out 
how much money a farmer would have had to pay if he used the same amount of 
groundwater. Table 5.4 gives an overview of the individual actions related to water 
acquisition and gain and loss as an outcome of their activities. For siphoning and installation 
data were not available to estimate the actual cost spent and benefit achieved for one year. 
27
 This yield is of the crop from the command area of the sample watercourse. 
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The special allocation for orchards, and use of canal water allocated for Government property, 
is the cheapest source of supplementary canal water for irrigation, Although this is only 
possible in command areas where there are allocations for Government property. The 
orchards could create some disagreement between the shareholders since this water could be 
distributed equally within the watercourse command area. The next cheapest option is 
exchange and trade of canal water- although it also depends on some agrarian factors and 
physical conditions of the fields of seller. 
Table 5.4: Rewards of farmers' individual actions to acquire additional irrigation 
water (April 1997-April 1998) 
Actions taken 
to acquire 
additional 
water 
Canal water 
buying 
Special 
Allocation for 
Orchards 
Allocation of 
Government 
property 
Siphoning3 
Groundwater 
purchase 
Perceived right 
of water6 
Capital cost 
(Tubewell 
Installation) 
Farmer 
(OLHS)' in 
hectare) 
MD11-TC 
14 
(8.96) 
FD 
96-L 19 
(1.06) 
FD 
84-L 30 
(1.74) 
Amount of 
water gained 
in one year 
(m3) 
5748 
3248 
2838 
10004 
Time required to 
operate 
Tubewells for 
equivalent water 
(hrs) 
60 
57 
RS/$ spent 
on this 
activity 
Loss 
1000/25 
230/62 
In kind 
(fodder) 
18000/4507 
Equivalent 
RS/USS for 
acquiring 
groundwater 
4000/100 
3400/85 
2000/50 
813/205 
Difference 
RS/USS 
Gain 
3000/75 
3170/79 
1
 Operational Land Holding Size 
2
 This is the abiana (water rent that he had to pay for) 
3
 Estimation of water obtained through siphoning was impossible since fanners did not allow to 
measure that water 
4
 It is not the volume of water gained by a person but to make calculations practical and comparison 
easier 1000 m3 is taken as reference 
5
 Average price of 1000 m3 of groundwater purchased. Average for Mahmood and Fordwah 
watercourses is Rs723/US$18 and Rs872/US$22 respectively 
6
 Estimation of total volume of water gained by getting additional 5 minutes was not possible because 
of fluctuating canal water delivery and inconsistent length of water turns 
7
 This is the total cost of tubewell installation for year 1996-97. 
Groundwater acquisition, though the most common source of additional water for irrigation is 
the most expensive individual activity The main reason for its popularity is far better water 
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control in terms of timing and quantity in comparison with the canal water since its 
availability is purely supply oriented. Moreover, it is more easily accessible to more farmers 
as compared to the water attained through institutional or physical intervention that is very 
often illicit and hence could create some problems. 
5.5.2 Refusal to Surplus Canal Water 
Closing of the mogha is illegal and may cause a breach in the distributary. However, in the 
absence of drainage infrastructure sometimes farmers have to close their mogha to make sure 
that undesirable irrigation water does not destroy their crops. This happens mostly during the 
monsoon rains or during the harvesting periods when farmers do not irrigate their crops. 
Farmers at the extreme tail of the distributary cannot close the mogha since water cannot flow 
further downstream. These farmers are left with three choices: (i) irrigate their crops that 
would cause over irrigation and may damage the crops, (ii) dump all the water in a water-
logged area fields (if there is one), and (iii) complain to the concerned Irrigation Department 
staff and request for either reducing the inflow or shutting down the distributary. Option (iii) 
is not practical for tail farmers of longer distributaries, since the time lag between the shutting 
down of the distributary and its of effect at the tail28 is too long29. When farmers would need 
water again it will take a long time to reach the tail. Besides, during this time lag (when 
distributary is opened again and the water reaches the tail) some farmers would miss their 
water turn and will again have to wait for seven days for their turn to irrigate. Option (ii) is 
also not practical for the distributaries without a water-logged area within or adjacent to the 
tail watercourses. This only leaves with the option (i) for those farmers having no water-
logged area for water disposal. Farmers choose an option that is appropriate to their situation. 
The tail of the Fordwah distributary was dry for more than half of the time during the study 
period30. Recently in Fordwah distributary one farmer in the tail reach of the distributary has 
tried to store unwanted water in a small reservoir and used it with the groundwater later 
though it was done in a small watercourse with only one land owner. It is difficult to say that 
if this would work in the watercourses with more shareholders since later the distribution of 
this water may cause conflicts among the shareholders. 
Farmers from the tail of smaller distributaries have the great advantage of smaller time lag 
and quick access (in terms of shorter distance) to the Gauge Reader or higher level Irrigation 
Department officials. Whenever it rains any farmer can go to the Gauge Reader and requests 
him to close the distributary, it is also easier for the Gauge Reader to divert the relatively less 
discharge of the smaller distributary to the bigger distributary. In Mahmood distributary it is 
easier to do so since the Gauge Reader is considered as the farmer and a friend rather than a 
representative of Irrigation Department. The Gauge Reader himself also feels closer to the 
fanners since he almost lives among them and knows their problems and worries. 
28
 In some of the distributaries the time lag is as long as three days 
29
 Distributaries at the tail end of the system cannot be just closed like this as they can cause a breach in the main 
canal hence the Irrigation Department staff of the Sub-Division has to communicate with the staff upstream and 
request them to release less water. Officially Irrigation staff are supposed to prevent any breach in the main or 
branch canal even if it is at the cost of breach in the distributary(ies) since it is more difficult to repair the main 
branch as compared to the distributaries. Besides a breach in the main or branch canal would cause more damage 
than a breach in a distributary. 
30
 In fact tail of Fordwah was dry for about 70 % of the time in first two seasons of the study period, rabi 1996-
97 and kharif\997. This situation considerably improved in the last season when the tail was dry for only 30 % 
of the time. Hence the overall dry days were 55 % of the time during the whole study period. 
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Sometimes farmers also drain all this water in a water-logged area or field31, which enhances 
an existing water-logged situation. Farmers in one of the selected watercourse MD 11 TC 
have access to a water-logged area that is the old river bed locally called "budh" of river 
Sutlej. Hence if a farmer decides not to irrigate his field and he knows that other farmer(s) 
may need to irrigate he just leaves the water to flow in the watercourse that leads to budh. 
Figure 5.4 shows different options used by farmers in the selected watercourses along 
Mahmood distributary to deal with surplus canal irrigation water during the study period and 
the rainfall32. Most of the actions taken to manage surplus water were in November, 
December March and April either after the rain or sowing and harvesting of wheat. Note that 
because of different sowing dates of wheat, the sowing and harvesting periods of wheat could 
be 30 to 45 days apart. Also, not all the farmers keep the outlet closed or drain the water in 
budh. However, even if only a few farmers within the watercourse command area refused to 
accept unwanted canal water supply, it is shown in the graph. Sometimes, at the time of 
sowing or harvesting of a crop it also happens that farmers do not need their full irrigation 
turn. They use the water that is needed and then close the mogha or drain the rest of the water 
in budh. The next farmer in the warabandi may open the mogha if he needs to irrigate his 
fields. It happened only once for a few days that farmers requested the Gauge Reader to shut 
down the distributary. It happened after a very heavy rain shower of more than 50 mm. 
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Figure 5.4: Actions taken by the farmers along the Mahmood watercourses to deal 
with surplus canal water supply. The outlet was closed for only MD 1-R 
and water was drained into Budh for only MD 11-TC 
31
 In one of the watercourse along 6-R distributary of Eastern Sadiqia canal irrigation system farmers use this 
option and dump all the surplus water in the water-logged field (de Klein and Wahaj 1998). 
32
 Most of the time when a mogha is closed or water is drained in the budh, it is for more than a day and 
happened when most fanners do not need to irrigate their crops. Nevertheless sometimes only one farmer does 
not need water therefore he closes the mogha but the next one opens it again. The graph includes the records of 
every time a farmer closed a mogha or drained water in the budh. 
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5.6 CROPPING PATTERN 
The availability of total irrigation water and its control by an individual farmer influences the 
cropping pattern of his farm in terms of which crops to grow. If a farmer is confident of good 
canal water delivery in terms of quantity and timing he will cultivate more water sensitive 
crop(s). Access to groundwater also influences the choice of crops. In the sample 
watercourses almost all the farmers have access to groundwater therefore it is not the major 
deciding factor of different crop choices of farmers but still tubewell owners have more 
flexibility and control over the groundwater. Therefore they have more options of which 
crop(s) to grow. 
The choice of crops also depends upon other factors like risk, capital investment, and 
availability of labour, storage facilities, transportation facilities, access to markets, and above 
all family need. Some crops like sugarcane need more inputs (including water) as compared 
to fodder, wheat or cotton but have less risk of failure from pest attack. Sugarcane is difficult 
to store, and its price goes down with delay but if harvested and sold at the right time it gives 
a good profit. In the study area, some farmers sell their standing crops of sugarcane to the 
sugar mills, and then it is the responsibility of the sugar mill to get the crop harvested. This 
saves a fanner the hassle of finding a good buyer for the crop and also to transport the harvest 
to the sugar mill. Others harvest the crop first and then transport it to sugar mill to sell. MD 
1-R, MD 11-TC and FD 38-L have a high percentage of sugarcane since they are very close to 
the sugarcane mill. Cotton on the other hand does not need a lot of water, and cannot be 
grown in places with a high groundwater table. It is profitable but prone to pest attack and 
risk of crop failure is much higher as compared to sugarcane. In the selected watercourses the 
percentage of the difference between maximum and minimum yields is bigger for cotton than 
for sugarcane. Cotton can also be stored and sold later in the year whereas sugarcane loses its 
sugar content if stored for longer periods. 
Wheat is grown basically for home consumption, does not need much water and can be 
stored. That is the reason for its higher cropping intensity in rabi as compared to kharif: 
fallow land is much less in rabi than in kharif. Rice simply needs lots of water, therefore is 
grown only in the watercourses with high canal water availability (like MD 1-R). Fodder 
grown in the study area has a higher water requirement than wheat, but can do well even with 
limited water supply33. Farmers also irrigate fodder (berseem, millet, and maize) in case of 
surplus canal water supply, as up to a certain level of over-irrigation, fodder is not damaged. 
It has more than one cutting and has to be transported fresh to the market. The watercourse 
FD 96-R has the highest percentage of fodder since it is quite close to the market, besides 
there are dairy farms very close by this watercourse that give a good incentive to farmers to 
grow fodder. Vegetables are labour intensive, can not be stored for long and are highly 
profitable. Vegetables are not among the first three main crops in any watercourse, however 
they contribute significantly to high gross value of production of the watercourse FD 96-R in 
rabi 1997-98. 
When a farmer has more than one plot along the watercourse he prefers to cultivate more 
water demanding crop(s) in the plot closer to the head of the watercourse. Sometimes a 
farmer gives part of his farm on lease if it is difficult to irrigate that plot, due to a bad slope of 
the watercourse or another physical reason. Similarly, priority crops are cultivated on good 
Berseem is the main forage crop cultivated in the area. Other main fodder crops are millet and maize. 
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quality soil. Other crops, like oil seeds, are cultivated in the saline/sodic soils (Kuper, 1997). 
Farmers prefer to grow sugarcane in a better quality soil as compared to cotton. Cotton is 
more salt resistant than sugarcane (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979). Very often farmer(s) tend 
to cultivate fodder towards the tail of the watercourse. In the watercourse MD 11 -TC, a 
farmer, CID 14, cultivates 21.6 acres (8.8 hectares) of land, of which he owns 4.75 acres 
(1.92 hectares). All the land he cultivates is spread over the whole command area of the 
watercourse from head to tail (see figure 5.5) therefore he has many water turns. The map 
reveals that he cultivates rice at the tail of the command area and other crops in the rest of the 
land he cultivates, which does not seem logical of first since the water availability is lowest in 
the tail section. Nevertheless he bought water turns from the other two cultivators who follow 
him in the warabandi schedule, and therefore he could easily use all the water for rice. By 
doing so he on the one hand has acquired more water and on the other hand increased his 
control over that water and ultimately increased the water productivity. 
Legends 
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Figure 5.5: Cropping pattern of the farmer CID 14 in the watercourse MD 11-TC 
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5.7 MAINTENANCE OF FARMER'S CHANNELS 
The maintenance of the main watercourse has been discussed in Section 3.1 The criteria of 
maintenance of farmers' channels is the same except the fact that the farm channels are to be 
taken care of by the individual farmers. These channels are not permanent: a farmer can make 
a new channel whenever he thinks it is needed - although it is not very often that a farmer 
makes a new channel. A farmer constructs a new channel when a) he changes the layout of 
his farm completely; b) the rodent holes are irreparable; c) the slope of the channel and the 
banks have deteriorated and need complete overhauling. It is easier to take a decision about 
the maintenance of these channels as compared to the main or branch watercourse, since the 
matter does not have to be discussed with other shareholders. 
The frequency of desilting of farmers channels is much more than the frequency of desilting 
of the main or branch watercourses, since individual channels are much smaller and have 
much less slope as compared to the main or branch watercourse therefore more silt is 
deposited and obstructs the flow. Besides these channels are used for much less time than the 
main or branch watercourse. Farmers also clean these channels or part of the channel as 
routine activity. For instance, if a farmer during his water turn sees an obstruction in the water 
flow, he removes the obstruction right away without even realising that he is cleaning the 
channel. The frequency of channels desilting increases if farmers have to use only 
groundwater34 since groundwater is much more expensive and the discharge is also lower as 
compared to the canal water. It was not possible to measure conveyance losses in the farmers' 
channels since the length of the channels is not enough for an inflow outflow test. According 
to a rough estimate 25 % of total water losses occur in farmers' channels (Barral, 1994). 
Sometimes a farmer individually maintains part of the main watercourse that runs through his 
farm and for this he does not has to inform anyone or discuss it with anyone. Usually a farmer 
intervenes with the main watercourse when the leakage from that part of the watercourse is 
significant especially during the period of peak water requirement. A farmer reconstructs the 
part of the main unlined (katcha) watercourse35 when water is not flowing in that part of the 
watercourse to ensure smooth and safe conveyance of canal water. This clearly shows the way 
an individual farmer actualises his actions for his own benefit which also benefit the other 
farmers as well. Box 5.3 shows the entrepreurship of an individual fanner in a sample 
watercourse: his knowledge about the system, and actualisation of his actions to manage his 
farm and crops individually. 
4
 During canal closure or when canal water is not available for more than two weeks only groundwater is used 
for irrigation. 
35
 A farmer cannot intervene in this way with the pakka (lined) watercourse. 
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Box 5.3: Entrepreneurship of an individual farmer 
Farmer OID 49 is an ex patwari of the Irrigation Department (ID), who served ID for 32 years 
between 1948 to 1980. He is considered an influential person in the village and in the watercourse, 
he is a member of Panchayat and some other village level social work organisations. Within the 
watercourse command area he is responsible for organising watercourse desilting, and 
representing farmers interests to the ID. He together with another farmer also resolves any conflict 
related to watercourse maintenance. 
ODD 49 is a farmer as well and owns 7 acres (2.83 ha) of land at the tail of the right branch of the 
sample watercourse FD 84-L. He sharecrops this land with a tenant CID 26, who is sharecropping 
land with some other farmers in the same watercourse, on the basis of 50 % share in input and 
produce. He realises that this system was designed for much less cropping intensity than the 
existing cropping intensity of the system. It is because of the increased cropping intensity and 
unpredictable and inadequate canal water supply that he, in 1986, installed a tubewell. Pumped 
tubewell water could also be sold if not needed to irrigate his fields. 
He, unlike many landowners who when sharecropping their land leave most of the task for their 
tenants to perform, is involved in day to day management of his land and crops. He is usually 
present in the fields, when his tubewell has to be operated and during his warabandi turn, however 
it is his tenant who practically irrigates the crops. But he is often involved in decision making 
regarding the water distribution like borrowing or lending a part or full water turn. He also makes 
sure that the farm and field channels are cleaned especially when pumped water alone has to be 
used for the irrigation, since it is more expensive to pump groundwater than the abiana of the 
canal water. According to him, the frequency of farm channel cleaning increases from once in 
three weeks to almost once in a week if a channel is used to convey only pumped tubewell water. 
According to ODD 49 they have a saying that 'it is better to clean your own watercourse than to 
borrow an irrigation water turn.'' 
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Individual actions taken to acquire better water control were studied in six selected 
watercourses with varying water delivery situations at the head of the watercourse. In the 
study area farmers take many actions to manage irrigation water, however most widely and 
intensively practised individual water management activities are conjunctive water use and 
exchange of canal water turns. Table 5.5 gives an overview of all the events took place during 
the study period and the percentage of cultivators involved in these events. Most of the 
fanners are undertaking almost similar kind of actions to manage their water effectively, for 
instance exchanging canal water turns, desilting of farm channels and conjunctive use of 
irrigation water. These are the actions which do not require much capital investment, and 
most of them are necessary. Farmers cannot afford to miss these actions. While combining of 
different water turns is one way to increase water control, it only happened in one of the 
selected watercourses. It does not mean that farmers in other watercourses do not have more 
than one water turn, it is just that the hassle involved in this action is so high that farmers 
prefer to have separate water turns. Moreover, very often these different water turns belong to 
different owners, hence it is not possible for the tenant (both sharecropper and lessee) to have 
it merged and get a single water turn. 
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Most of the canal water acquisition activities are also undertaken by a limited number of 
farmers since they depend on the opportunity - for example in the case of use of water 
allocated for the Government property - and on willingness of other farmers to let it happen -
for example canal water trade and getting special allocations. 
Groundwater use is the main source of additional irrigation water. Though farmers would still 
like to attain additional canal water, that is always dependent on the Irrigation Department 
services that are not considered satisfactory by farmers. For example even after buying a canal 
irrigation turn the farmer CID 14 had to operate his tubewell in order to match his irrigation 
water requirement. 
Tubewell installation, though the most expensive activity to undertake, provides more room 
for manoeuvre to farmers and also some income by selling its water to other farmers. It has 
also been shown that the net crop income of purchasers of groundwater is less as compared to 
tubewell owners. However, while every farmer would prefer to install an independent 
tubewell most of the farmers still opt to buy pumped water instead because if the capital 
investment required by installing a tubewell. 
Mostly owner-cultivators or lessees are involved in the activities related to the canal water 
acquisition since they are the ones who have a right to water - owner by inheritance and lessee 
by renting in land. Tenants are only involved when they hold more than one tenancy status 
within a watercourse command area, for instance they also own land. Canal water was bought 
by the cultivators having more than 20 acres (8 ha.) of land regardless of their tenancy status, 
though none of the cultivators involved was only a tenant. It also depends on the willingness 
of other farmers to sell all or part of the water turn. Farmers only sell canal water when it is 
almost impossible for them to use it. The assumption made at the start of the chapter that 
cultivators with landholding size in the middle range would be mostly indulging in 
institutional interventions holds true for the study, since most farmers involved have between 
2.25 and 5 acres. 
The hypothesis regarding the involvement of big landowners in physical interventions with 
the system is true at the distributary level. At the watercourse level, cultivators that were 
found to be active in physical intervention included people of different tenancy status. Big 
landowners, lessees and small landowners were all found to be acquiring canal irrigation 
water through siphoning from the distributary. All the farmers who were siphoning had long 
water turns (greater than an hour) at night. The risk involved of being caught and fined may 
discourage cultivators to undertake this activity. Moreover it also requires a higher labour 
input. 
Usually it is assumed that water distribution in large-scale irrigation systems is effective 
through collective action and that most individual actions for water management are a result 
of lack of collective action. However there are still some individual actions that would be 
undertaken by farmers regardless of existence of collective action within the watercourse 
command area. In chapter 3 we have seen that the watercourse FD 84-L has problems in 
organising collective action. Table 5.5 shows the number of individual activities to acquire 
supplementary water for irrigation is also highest in the watercourse FD 84-L (5 activities). 
However, the difference is not much compared to the other watercourses. Therefore it could 
not be said that individual actions to acquire more water are undertaken only because of lack 
of collective action. 
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Table 5.5: 
Better Water 
Control 
Water 
acquisition 
Usability/ 
Effective use 
of water 
Percentage of farmers undertaking 
control in six selected watercourses 
Actions 
Canal water 
buying 
Groundwater 
trade 
Getting special 
allocations of 
canal water 
Use of water 
allocated for 
Government 
properties 
Getting right of 
water back 
Siphoning from 
distributary 
Tubewell 
installation 
Exchange of canal 
water turns 
Conjunctive water 
use 
Combining 
different water 
turns 
Desilting of 
farmers' channels 
Rejection to (or 
disposal of) 
excess water 
individual actions for increased water 
% farmers undertaking these activities in the studied Watercourses 
MD 1-R 
42 
1 
18' 
76 
69 
2 
100 
100 
MD11-TC 
3 
58 
11' 
50 
70 
100 
100 
FD 38-L 
50 
100 
100 
0 
100 
100 
100 
FD 67-L 
52 
2 
2 
33 
56 
98 
100 
FD 84-L 
4 
77 
2 
8 
56' 
70 
98 
100 
FD 96-R 
7 
58 
2 
52' 
72 
88 
100 
' Tubewells were also installed during the study period 
The most important factor influencing the number of different kind of individual actions for 
water management is the canal water supply at the head of the watercourse. Figure 5.6 shows 
the number of individual activities and delivery performance ratio in the selected 
watercourses. The number of total individual activities for water acquisition increases with 
the decrease in the DPR. This relationship between the DPR and the number of individual 
activities undertaken within a watercourse is stronger (R2 of 0.7) if only Fordwah 
watercourses are considered, which is logical since overall water supply to Mahmood 
distributary is much better than the supply to Fordwah distributary. 
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Figure 5.6: Relationship between the Delivery Performance Ratio and number of 
water acquisition activities performed individually in the selected 
watercourses 
This relationship was also tested for other watercourse factors including: numbers of tenants, 
average operational land holding size, number of owners, number of actual cultivators and 
number of farmers with off-farm employment. When all the watercourses were considered the 
relationship was best for off-farm employment (R2 = 0.81) followed by the number of tenants 
(R2 = 0.58). Which means, that if a large number of farmers within a watercourse command 
area have off-farm employment, farmers will take up more, and diverse ways of individually 
acquiring additional water for irrigation, because collective action is difficult and they need to 
organise their on-farm and off-farm chores as suits them. These different types of action may 
and may not be legal. No relation was found for other watercourse factors. However, when 
these factors were tested for Fordwah watercourses only the results were very good. The 
correlation between the number of owners and number of different types of individual water 
acquisition activities is strongest with R2 of 0.99. The number of farmers having off-farm 
employment is also strongly related to the number of individual actions for acquiring 
irrigation water with R2 = 0.90 
To conclude, in a highly unreliable and fluctuating canal water delivery, water acquisition is 
the most important individually undertaken activity. The Delivery Performance Ratio or 
discharge at the head of the mogha, and off-farm employment are the most important factors 
influencing diversity of individual strategies to acquire more irrigation water. Farmers take a 
range of effective and financially astute actions for water management to get water supply 
that meets crop needs. 
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IMPROVE WATER DELIVERY 
The previous chapters have described the actions of farmers and their organisation. They have 
also shown the financial incentives and rewards to farmers taking part in these activities. This 
chapter demonstrates the outcomes of these activities in terms of water availability at the 
farm-gate and their effects on key crops. The activities selected for analysis are the ones that 
(a) have been shown to be most important in case collective action; (b) in case of the 
individual actions, the activities practised by the majority of the farmers are considered for 
analysis. These activities are: 
• Desilting of watercourse 
• Water acquisition 
• Conjunctive water use 
• Exchange of canal water turn 
• Refusal to accept surplus water 
6.1 DESILTING OF WATERCOURSE 
Farmers desilt the watercourse for smooth flow of water that results in an increased amount of 
water in one warabandi turn. Increased velocity will increase a discharge during the same 
time period in a section thus increasing the total amount of water available at a certain point 
particularly at the tail of the watercourse. Consequently time to irrigate a unit land decreases 
and more area can be irrigated in same period of time with the same discharge. In some cases 
the time to irrigate a unit land, at the tail of a watercourse, becomes half after the desilting of 
the watercourse. The difference in the availability of water between head and tail end sections 
of the watercourses is on average about 34 % (see section 4.3 for details). Desilting reduces 
this gap and thus improves equity of water distribution within a watercourse command area. 
The research found that farmers, in general, desilt a watercourse four to five times in one year 
at the time of perceived higher water demand. The first desilting of the year usually takes 
place either at the end of the canal closure period or right after the canal closure1. Second and 
third desiltings are usually done before the sowing and during the growth period of the crops 
like rice and cotton between May and August . A watercourse is desilted for the fourth time 
before the sowing of wheat. This activity is also undertaken when the flow condition of the 
mogha changes from free flow to submerged flow because of the backwater effect caused by 
the sedimentation in the upper reach of the watercourse3. In the following paragraphs an 
Canals are closed for one month in a year to carry out routine maintenance. The canal closure period is 
different for different canals between November and February. This is done at the time of lowest water demand. 
For the study area canals are closed for four to six weeks in January and February. 
" Like in MD 1-R and MD 11-TC the second desilting of the year was done in May just before rice planting and 
cotton sowing and the third in June when irrigation water requirement is at its peak. In the watercourse FD 84-L 
it was done in July and August whereas in FD 96-R these were organized in May and August. 
3
 As in case of FD 38-L, but in this case the whole watercourse is not always cleaned. Only the first few hundred 
meters effecting the flow condition of the mogha are cleaned. 
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effort is made to demonstrate the impact of the desilting activity by establishing the water 
losses before and after the desilting has taken place. 
The water loss rate - that is the amount of water lost over a certain length of watercourse (for 
example 1/s/1000m) - changes with the discharge, it increases with the higher discharge. For 
this analysis two different loss rates - before and after desilting - were developed. To give an 
example, figure 6.1 presents loss rate at different discharges at the mogha for the watercourse 
FD 96-R, with and without desilting. Note that up to a certain length of the watercourse the 
loss rate does not differ much even if the watercourse is desilted. The water loss rate 
equations with and without desilting for the sample watercourses were developed based on 
the conveyance loses tests conducted before and after the desilting activities undertaken by 
the farmers4. Watercourse FD 67-L was not considered in the analysis as it was only desilted 
once and not enough data was available to develop a water loss rate after desilting. FD 84-L 
also presented a challenge. Here, as the loss rate was developed after the desilting it was 
mainly done for the farmers along the right branch of the watercourse where the desilting is 
done frequently and collectively. Along the left branch farmers desilt the watercourse but not 
collectively. Hence the effect of desilting is not the same in the two branches. Since not 
enough data was available to develop a loss rate after desilting for the left branch, the same 
loss rate was used for the farmers along both the branches. 
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Figure 6.1: Loss rate with and without desilting of the watercourse FD 96-R 
The discharge and thus the volume at the nakka along the watercourses was estimated using 
these loss rates for two scenarios, 1) when desilting was done and 2) if desilting would not 
have been done. A three weeks period before and after desilting was considered to minimise 
the effect of fluctuating canal water supply. The volumes of these three weeks were averaged 
to obtain one value for before and one for after desilting event. The percentage difference 
between these two conditions is presented in figure 6.2 a and b. This difference in percentage 
4
 To develop loss rates, several conveyance loss tests before and after the desilting were conducted in each 
sample watercourse. 
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of volume available increases with the power function as the distance from the mogha 
increases, in all the selected watercourses. However the pattern is the same - the impact of 
desilting is higher in the watercourses along the Fordwah Distributary as compared to the 
watercourses along the Mahmood Distributary. As expected the effect of the desilting activity 
is more visible at the tail of a watercourse where the difference in the amount of water 
available with and without desilting is highest. However, the difference in the amount of 
water available before and after desilting in the first half of all the watercourses (about 1000 
meters) is less than 5 %. The farmers in the first half of the watercourse still take part in the 
activity because of a) social obligation; b) their work load is much less than the work load of 
the farmers from the second half as they only have to help in cleaning the watercourse up to 
their own nakka; and c) they may also have a parcel of land at the tail of the section and so 
they are also interested in cleaning the first half. Since FD 84-L has longer breaks between the 
two desiltings - four desiltings during the study period as compared to six desiltings in FD 
96-R (see table 4.1) - the difference between the head and the tail end farmers is bigger in this 
watercourse. In the watercourses along Mahmood distributary, the situation is more or less 
similar in both the watercourses - water saving is approximately same for same length of 
watercourse. 
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 
distance from mogha (meters) 
• MD 11 -TC MD 1 -R Power (MD 11 -TC) - - • Power (MD 1 -R) 
Figure 6.2a Percent difference in the water availability along the Mahmood 
distributary sample watercourses with and without desilting. These 
watercourses are lined up to about 400 meters from the mogha 
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Figure 6.2b Percent difference in the water availability along the Fordwah 
distributary sample watercourses with and without desilting 
In the sample watercourses the highest increase in volume of canal water available at the 
farm-gate, as a result of desilting is about 17 % at the tail of the watercourse FD 84-L (right 
branch) and the lowest is 0 % at the head of the watercourse MD 11-TC. This increased 
availability of canal water in FD 84-L accrues to the farmer who is responsible of desilting of 
the watercourse. Also in the watercourse MD 11-TC, the farmer responsible for the desilting 
is among those who benefit most from the desilting of the watercourse. Which explains the 
reasons of active involvement of these farmers in organising the activity. At the end of the 
season, desilting may not result in an increase of significant volume of water but it saves 
water from losses when it is needed most, and therefore is an important activity to be 
undertaken. The average amount of water saved in four sample watercourses is only 5.1 % 
but the fact is that it does make a significant difference in the tail section of the watercourse 
and encourages tail end farmers to organise and undertake this activity. Conveyance losses 
decrease significantly after the desilting, and results in the higher discharge at the field inlet at 
a given point of time, which consequently improves the application efficiency at the field 
level. The application efficiency of a basin5 increases with the increasing field inlet flow 
(Walker, 1989). Kalwij (1997a) has also found the same results during her study on the field 
irrigation performance in the Chishtian subdivision (the same area where this research was 
also conducted). Moreover, if farmers do not desilt the watercourse at all then the water 
available without desilting will be much lower and it could also be possible that the 
watercourse loses its capacity to carry water. 
In some cases farmers at the tail section of the watercourse stop using the canal water and sell 
out their canal water turn because they think that the time and labour investment in the 
desilting is more than the benefit they gain out of this activity. They do it because (a) the 
elevation of their fields is higher that makes irrigation difficult (b) because of sedimentation 
problems they hardly receive any water. In these situations they decide to either install a 
s
 Basin irrigation is commonly practiced in the study area. 
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tubewell or make some other arrangements, like getting canal water if possible from another 
adjacent watercourse. However they officially remain the shareholders in the watercourse. 
Examples of such cases were found in the sample watercourses. In FD 84-L tail of the left 
branch two farmers have stopped using the water from this watercourse. Instead they are 
buying a water turn from the adjacent watercourse. They could also buy tubewell water from 
that watercourse. In the watercourse FD 96-R the slope is very low, the two farmers who have 
their land along this portion of the watercourse have access to tubewell water, and are also 
buying sewerage water for irrigation. Therefore they have decided to sell out their water turn. 
Similarly one farmer at the tail of the watercourse FD 11-TC can not irrigate his land because 
of the high elevation of his field. He has also sold out his water turn for that particular parcel 
of land to another farmer upstream and is using tubewell water. In the watercourses where tail 
end farmers cannot rely on water from other adjacent watercourse desilting becomes 
inevitable in order to be able to use canal water. Therefore, the farmers consider it an 
important activity, however it is also very labour intensive to desilt the watercourse. Given 
the choice farmers would opt for a lined watercourse. 
6.2 WATER ACQUISITION 
The canal water delivery to the farms is much lower than the demand of the existing cropping 
pattern at the farm level. To reduce this gap between the demand and supply farmers try and 
acquire additional water either by individually exploiting the groundwater resources or by 
collectively arranging additional canal water. The acquisition of additional canal water is 
relatively cheaper than pumping groundwater but since it benefits all the farmers within a 
watercourse command area it requires collective efforts. A collective decision has to be taken 
whether the activity should be undertaken or not and a course of action has to be formulated. 
Because all the farmers have to pay for the intervention it is important that all the farmers 
give their consent even if they do not take part in the actual activity. Section 4.1 discussed the 
efforts made by farmers to acquire more canal water through collective action. The most 
common way of acquiring water at the watercourse is to get the mogha enlarged. This 
benefits all the farmers within a watercourse command area. 
The difference in the water available at the nakka (farm-gate) before and after the mogha 
enlargement is calculated using the actual duration of the water turn of farmers along the 
watercourse, and the two discharges (i.e., the actual discharge and the discharge that would 
have been delivered in case of no intervention). The discharge at a nakka is calculated by 
subtracting the conveyance losses for that length of the watercourse from the discharge (with 
and without intervention) at the mogha. The conveyance loss rate was developed earlier based 
on several conveyance loss tests in the field. The discharge was converted into volume by 
multiplying it with the time used for the irrigation. This volume was then added for the whole 
year for every farmer in the watercourse command area and the percentage difference 
between the two quantities of water was calculated. 
Figure 6.3 shows the impact of mogha enlargement on the percentage difference in water 
availability to the farmers along the watercourse FD 96-R, in the year, mid-April 1997 to 
mid-April 1998. As a result of increase in mogha dimensions, the average increase of the 
discharge at the mogha of the watercourse FD 96-R was about 20 % for the year 1997-98. 
One would expect that this increase of discharge is the same for the whole watercourse and 
the expected performance would look like the straight dotted line in the figure 6.3. However, 
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in reality the situation is different. The difference in the percentage of water available for 
irrigation at the nakka decreases linearly as the distance of the nakka increases from the 
mogha, as conveyance loss is a function of discharge at the mogha and distance from the 
mogha (AH et al, 1978). 
The farmers at the tail of the watercourse are mainly the small farmers with less than 5 acres 
of land and are mainly growing fodder. Whereas, the farmers with higher water delivery near 
the head of the watercourse have more diverse cropping patterns. They are cultivating cotton, 
vegetables, fodder and also sugar cane and some oil seed crops. The average increase in the 
amount of water delivered to all the farmers along the watercourse is 13.8 % with highest 20 
% increase at the head of the watercourse and lowest 6.3 % increase at the tail of the 
watercourse. The farmers CID 6 and CID 8, who took the initiative in getting the mogha 
remodelled are among the farmers who benefited most from this intervention. Water delivery 
to their farms was increased by about 18 % and 20% respectively. About 85 % of farmers get 
more than 10 % increase in the canal water supply at the farm-gate. This overall increase of 
water delivery to the watercourse has helped in improving the adequacy of water at the farm 
level. The Relative Water Supply would have been 19 % less in the year 1997-98 had this 
mogha not been increased, of which 24 % increase was in kharif 19976 and about 11 % in 
rabi 1997-98. Unfortunately information about the cropping pattern and yield before the 
remodelling of the mogha is not available for comparison. The tail-enders who managed to 
receive 6% higher water supply might have missed some of their water turns in case of no 
enlargement of mogha. 
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Figure 6.3. Percentage difference in the amount of water with and without mogha 
enlargement along the watercourse FD 96-R 
This increase would have been more if the canal water supply was not disturbed because of the damaged weir 
upstream of the Fordwah canal. 
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6.3 CONJUNCTIVE WATER USE 
Conjunctive water use is the main water acquisition strategy of individual farmers in the study 
area. Out of total irrigation water used, 34 percent in kharif 1997 and 13 percent in rabi 1997-
98 came from groundwater. Groundwater is pumped more in kharif than in rabi because of 
the higher water demand. In Rabi tubewell water is used mostly during the canal closure, in 
the watercourses along the Mahmood distributary. In the rest of the season groundwater 
pumpage is very limited. However, in the Fordwah distributary farmers do take access to 
tubewell water into account at the start of the season when they plan which crops to grow. 
Therefore a higher tubewell use is observed in both the seasons. 
Farmers try to use water efficiently from all the sources - canal, ground, and rainfall. 
Although they can not control rainfall, in case of heavy rain they will stop irrigating from 
canal water. Not all the water that infiltrates the soil is lost, as it can be re-used by pumping. 
However, it becomes more expensive to use as compared to the canal water. One way to see 
the impact of farmers' conjunctive water management practices is to look at the depleted 
fraction. The depleted fraction of water is that part which is not available for further use 
(Molden, 1997) . Water depleted at the farm level is calculated by deducting all the losses 
from the gross inflow at the mogha, plus the groundwater pumped. In this study Gross Inflow, 
Depleted Water and Depleted Fraction of the Gross Inflow is calculated in the following way: 
Gross Inflow = Discharge at the mogha + total rainfall in the watercourse command 
Depleted Water = (Discharge at the mogha - conveyance losses9) + effective rainfall10 + 
pumped water1' 
Depleted Fraction of Gross Inflow = Depleted Water 
Gross Inflow 
Figure 6.4 presents the ratio between the water depleted for irrigation and gross inflow for all 
the selected watercourses. That this ratio is higher than 1 indicates that removal of 
groundwater is higher than the addition to the groundwater storage. In the selected 
watercourses the depleted fraction is higher than 1, in kharif 1997 and for full year, for the 
watercourses FD 67-L and FD 84-L. These two watercourses had the worst canal water 
supply situation during the kharif 1997 season (see figure 3.4 for DPR that is a canal water 
supply indicator). The watercourse MD 11-TC has the lowest depleted fraction of the gross 
inflow because of less groundwater pumpage and drainage of surplus canal water supply. This 
7
 Molden (1997) provided a conceptual framework for water accounting. In which he defined water depletion as 
use or removal of water from a water basin such that renders it unavailable for further use. There are four 
processes through which water can be depleted: (i) evaporation: water is evaporated form the surface or 
transpired by plants; (ii) flows to sinks from where it can not be reused; (iii) it is polluted to an extent that it is 
unfit for certain uses; and (iv) it is incorporated into a product like incorporation of irrigation water into plant 
tissues. 
This water is not further available for any other use. Part of this water may recharge the groundwater reservoirs 
through infiltration from the fields, however this has not been included in the analysis at the farm level. In fact in 
Molden's water accounting diagram (Molden 1997; p:5) removal from and addition to the storage is shown to be 
taken place before the water is available for depletion 
9
 In case of the watercourse MD 11-TC, water that was drained in the budh (water logged area) has also been 
subtracted. 
10
 Effective rainfall was obtained by the software Cropwat 4. 
" In the original Molden's formula to calculate depleted fraction change in groundwater storage was estimated 
based on groundwater level instead of groundwater pumpage. In this study groundwater use is used since 
groundwater level data was not available for one full year. 
139 
FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGA TION PERFORMANCE BELOW THE MOGHA 
factor of farmers' refusal to surplus canal water supply does not influence the depleted 
fraction, in other watercourses as the mogha is closed hence it is not included in the gross 
inflow. The canal water that was illicitly siphoned from the distributary by the farmers of the 
watercourse FD 38-L is also not included here, as the actual amount of that water siphoned 
could not be estimated. In general, farmers from selected Fordwah watercourses are making 
better use of their gross inflow as compared to the farmers from the, better supplied, selected 
watercourses of the Mahmood distributary. However, even after getting the mogha enlarged, 
farmers of the watercourse FD 96-R are using about 90 % of their gross inflow. Firstly 
because they are pumping significant amounts of groundwater and secondly by keeping the 
conveyance losses low by frequently desilting of the watercourse. This depleted fraction also 
suggests that the groundwater level is significantly rising for the watercourses along the 
Mahmood distributary and falling for the watercourses along the Fordwah distributary . 
kharif 1997 Brabi 1997-98 Dyear 
Figure 6.4: Depleted fraction of gross inflow in the six selected watercourses 
The depleted fraction does demonstrate the impact of conjunctive water use in terms of water 
availability at the farm level and also in terms of groundwater levels. It also includes the 
effect of other activities, like desilting and drainage. Therefore, to study the influence of 
conjunctive water management of canal and groundwater one has to study the share of both 
sources of waters in achieving irrigation water supply. The shares of canal and groundwater in 
fulfilling irrigation water need at the farm level are calculated for kharif '1997 and rabi 1998. 
225 farmers from all the selected watercourses are considered for this analysis. Relative 
Irrigation Supply, that's is the ratio of irrigation water supply to irrigation water demand 
(Perry, 1996), is calculated for both the sources of water The rainfall is deducted from the 
crop water requirement to obtain irrigation water requirement13. 
12
 This statement is based mainly on the basis of farmers' interviews. However, to prove this point a long- term 
data of groundwater table depth is required, which was not available to the researcher. 
13
 Effective rainfall and crop water requirement for individual crops are estimated with the help of CROPWAT 4 
program. Later Relative Irrigation supply at the farm level is calculated in the spreadsheet. 
140 
OUTCOMES OF ACTIONS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT TO IMPROVE WATER DELIVERY 
Figure 6.5 (a, b, and c) presents contribution of canal water and groundwater in the Relative 
Irrigation Supply (RIS) at farm level in kharif 1997. The share of canal and groundwater in 
the RIS is plotted against the total Relative Irrigation Supply of each farm. For instance if the 
irrigation water requirement (IWR) of a farm is 360 mm and the water used from canal and 
tubewell is 347 and 114 mm respectively. The RIS of such a farm will be 1.28, and the 
contribution of the canal and groundwater will be 0.96 (347mm /360 mm) and 0.32 (114 mm/ 
360 mm). The sum of these RIS of canal and groundwater (0.96 + 0.32) is equal to the total 
RIS (1.28). One would expect that farmers would try to achieve RIS of 1.0 (or 1.25 in this 
case as field efficiencies are not included). The canal water is more or less a given range 
depending on water available in the distributary and conditions in the watercourse. Whereas 
tubewell operation is flexible therefore the expected outcome of the conjunctive water 
management would be decreasing canal water and increasing groundwater share as the RIS 
increases at farm level. In reality up to a certain extent, the contribution of water from both 
the sources is increasing with the increasing Relative Irrigation Supply because of differential 
reliability of water and crop choices. However for kharif 1997, in Fordwah all high RIS 
depend on high groundwater contribution whereas in Mahmood it is the other way around. 
The situation in rabi 1997-98 for all farmers in the selected watercourses and in kharif1997 
for farmers in the selected watercourses, along Mahmood distributary is more or less same. 
Canal water makes a major contribution in RIS. Farmers with extra canal water allocations 
(like Orchards allocation or allocation for Government property) were able to achieve better 
RWS (higher than 0.6) with only canal water supply, they used groundwater mainly in June 
1997 when canal water was disrupted because of damage link canal. 
» CW • GW Linear (GW) — Linear (CW) 
Figure 6.5a: Contribution of canal water and groundwater in Relative Irrigation 
Supply at farm level in kharif 1997, farmers along the Fordwah 
distributary 
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Figure 6.5b: Contribution of canal water and groundwater in Relative Irrigation 
Supply at farm level in kharif 1997, farmers along the Mahmood 
distributary 
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Figure 6.5c: Contribution of canal water and groundwater in Relative Irrigation 
Supply at farm level in rabi 1997-98, all the farmers 
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The farmers along the Mahmood distributary with RIS greater than 1.25 are mostly growing 
rice that is grown under continuous submersion - for which an RIS of more than 1.25 is 
required for the better growth of the crop. Along the Fordwah distributaries most of the 
farmers who seem to over-irrigate and have RIS greater than 1.25 are tubewell owners who 
grow mainly cotton and fodder. During kharif\991 when canal water supply was scarce these 
farmers used tubewell water for irrigation. Most of the groundwater was used in the months 
of June and July 1997 in Fordwah watercourses - 40 % of the total groundwater use in kharif 
1997- and in June 1997 in Mahmood watercourses - 75 % of total groundwater use in kharif 
1997. But when canal water supply was normalised they started receiving water that was not 
needed for irrigation anymore. In the absence of proper drains they dumped this water over 
the fodder that is a crop more tolerant of water-logging. Therefore at the end of the season it 
seems as if they are over-irrigating their crops. 
The farmers growing 50 % or more cotton or wheat or sugarcane or rice are the main users of 
groundwater. Farmers use groundwater for vegetables as well but the main crops in the study 
area for which groundwater is used are cotton and wheat. The contribution of groundwater in 
RIS is usually least for farmers have fodder over 50 % or more cropped area and highest for 
farmers growing wheat or cotton on 50 % or more cropped area. Therefore the main crops, 
wheat and cotton, of the area are further evaluated. 
6.3.1 Cotton 
Cotton, one of the main crops in the study area, is quite sensitive to water stress and requires 
frequent irrigation during the whole growing period. Adequate water supply is required for all 
the growth stages except early in the growing period. It needs adequate water prior to and 
during the bud formation, continued water supply during flower opening and yield formation 
A little water stress at the start is good for root and crop development (Doorenbos and 
Kassam, 1979). Farmers in the study area do keep track of the growth stages and try to 
provide adequate water at the time of flowering to prevent yield reduction. They give 5 to 7 
irrigations to the cotton, between 5 and 6 to Desi cotton and between 6 and 7 to American 
cotton (Agricultural extension data 2000). Desi cotton and American cotton are the local 
names of the varieties mainly grown in the area. Cotton is a salinity tolerant crop, its yield 
starts reducing if salinity exceeds 7.7 mmhos/cm (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979)14. 
A large percentage of farmers (85 %) in the selected watercourses practice conjunctive water 
use for cotton cultivation. In fact all the farmers in the selected watercourses along the 
Fordwah distributaries and the watercourse MD 1-R along the Mahmood distributary relied 
on tubewell water in addition to the canal water. In the watercourse MD 11-TC, the majority 
of farmers (63%) irrigated cotton with only canal water. One does not expect such a high 
intensity of conjunctive water management in the watercourses along the Mahmood 
distributary, as it is a privileged distributary in terms of canal water delivery. This relatively 
high use of pumped water is due to the water scarcity induced by a damaged structure 
upstream. Although the overall groundwater use along the Mahmood distributary still remains 
lower than the Fordwah distributary, Mahmood fanners give priority to their rice and sugar 
cane crops. They tend to irrigate these crops with the canal water first and irrigate cotton with 
the tubewell water. Because the depth of water applied to rice and cotton during one irrigation 
event is higher as compared to the water depth applied to cotton in one irrigation event. 
14
 Soil from different fields of the watercourses FD 67-L, FD 84-L and FD 96-R was laboratory tested. ECe 
value of all the fields was found less than 1.5 mmhos/cm 
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Table 6.1 presents the percentage of farmers using only canal water and farmers using both 
canal and tubewell water, the average depth applied by these farmers, average relative water 
supply and average yield per unit area. Farmers practising conjunctive water are applying 
higher depth of water to the cotton; managing to achieve higher Relative Water Supply (close 
to 1) and therefore getting higher yield. Since they are usually more flexible in applying 
irrigation, they managed to irrigate the crop in time and that improves RWS and also the 
yield. Whereas the cotton yield of the farmers using only canal water for irrigation have 
suffered. 
Table 6.1: Water depth applied to cotton, in khari/1991, and it's yield for farmers 
using canal water (CW) and practising conjunctive (Conj.) water use in 
the study area 
All farmers 
MD 
FD 
MD1-R1 
MD 11-TC 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
% farme 
CW 
15 
63 
63 
0 
0 
0 
rs using 
Conj. 
Water 
85 
37 
100 
37 
100 
100 
100 
Avera] 
appliec 
CW 
265 
265 
265 
0 
0 
0 
>e depth 
1 (mm) 
Conj. water 
492 
310 
514 
310 
537 
460 
605 
Average R\ 
CW 
0.90 
0.90 
0.90 
vs 
Conj. water 
1.04 
0.97 
1.05 
0.97 
1.25 
0.94 
0.92 
Average Yield 
(tons/ha) 
CW Conj. water 
0.77 
0.77 
0.77 
0.95 
0.83 
0.96 
0.83 
1.11 
0.88 
0.86 
Because of insufficient data available, this watercourse was not used in the analysis. Cotton was only 3 % of 
the total cultivated area in the watercourse. 
6.3.2 Wheat 
Wheat is the other main crop of the study area. The crop stages that are more sensitive to the 
irrigation and have a maximum effect on yield reduction are establishment or early vegetative 
growth and flowering stage. Irrigation or rainfall at the early stage is required for a good yield 
of wheat (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979). Realising this fact, farmers in the study area try to 
provide the first irrigation to the wheat after 3 to 4 weeks of sowing. They also try to take care 
that sufficient water is supplied at the flowering stage. Total irrigation turns provided to 
wheat in the study area are between 5 to 6 (Kalwij, 1997b; Agricultural extension data 2000). 
However, data form this study suggests that farmers irrigate wheat from 4 to 6 times with 
average of 5 irrigations. Wheat is moderately tolerant to soil salinity however the ECe levels 
should not exceed 4 mmhos/cm in the upper soil layer during germination (Doorenbos and 
Kassam, 1979)'5. That may be the reason for farmers to give a heavy pre-irrigation to wheat. 
Some of the farmers use the last irrigation they provide to cotton as a pre-irrigation for wheat. 
About 70 % of farmers in the selected watercourses are using both canal and groundwater for 
irrigating wheat. This high percentage is due to the 4 to 6 weeks canal closure in January/ 
February, that is the time when many farmers have to give the first irrigation to wheat. In the 
watercourses with better canal water supply the average yield of wheat is better for farmers 
who used only canal water as compared with farmers that practised conjunctive water use. 
However in the watercourses with comparatively less canal water supply the situation is 
reversed (see Table 6.2). Very often the farmers who are using only canal water apply the first 
irrigation before the canal closure. By applying sufficient irrigation at the early stages of the 
' See footnote 14. 
144 
OUTCOMES OF ACTIONS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT TO IMPROVE WATER DELIVERY 
crop and at the flowering stage they could still get better yield than the farmers practising 
conjunctive water use. Farmers usually mix tubewell water with the canal water for irrigation 
to increase the discharge and thus to decrease application losses. This mixing also reduces ill 
effects of the marginal quality groundwater. When groundwater alone is used for the first 
irrigation during the canal closure the soil is only moistened that may result in the yield 
reduction. 
The farmers who are only applying canal water can still get a better yield if they provide 
irrigation at the proper time even if they apply less total water than those than used by farmers 
practising conjunctive water. In fact when all the farmers are considered, there is hardly any 
difference in the wheat yield of the farmers practising conjunctive water use and farmers 
using only canal water for irrigation suggesting farmers apply canal water carefully. 
Surprisingly, for the watercourse FD 96-R the wheat yield of only canal water users is also 
higher. This may be explained by the fact that there are only 3 farmers who are not using 
groundwater for irrigation and all of these farmers got good yield by applying a good amount 
of water at the most crucial crop stages. Therefore, the average yield of these farmers became 
higher than the average yield of conjunctive water users in the area who are in majority. The 
canal water users sow the wheat such that they could apply water before the canal closure. 
The reason is that farmers from watercourses with a better canal water supply plan their crops 
based on only canal water supply and hence delay use of groundwater as much as possible. 
Besides there are comparatively fewer tubewells in the area in the watercourses with better 
canal water supply. The average depth of irrigation water applied by the farmers practising 
conjunctive water use is still higher than the average depth of water applied to wheat by 
farmers relying only on canal water. 
Table 6.2: Water depth applied to wheat, iu rabi 1997-98, and it's yield for farmers 
using canal water (CW) and farmers practising conjunctive water (Conj. 
Water) use in the study area 
All farmers 
MD 
FD 
MD1-R 
MD11-TC 
FD 67-L 
FD 84-L 
FD 96-R 
% farr 
CW 
27 
49 
8 
26 
63 
11 
3 
12 
tiers using 
Conj. Water 
73 
51 
92 
74 
37 
89 
97 
88 
Averag 
applied 
CW 
247 
252 
218 
153 
276 
209 
91 
300 
edepth 
(mm) 
Conj. water 
293 
291 
293 
262 
325 
324 
273 
276 
Average 
CW 
1.06 
1.58 
0.67 
1.10 
1.90 
0.72 
0.29 
0.76 
RWS 
Conj. Water 
1.62 
1.80 
0.83 
1.26 
1.94 
0.87 
0.77 
0.86 
Averag 
(tons/hi 
CW 
2.3 
2.4 
1.8 
2.7 
2.2 
1.3 
1.5 
3.0 
e Yield 
) 
Conj. water 
2.2 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3 
1.9 
2.0 
2.4 
2.5 
6.4 EXCHANGE OF CANAL WATER TURN 
Swapping and exchange of canal water turn is commonly practised in the study area even 
though farmers are not allowed to do so according to the Canal and Drainage Act 1873 
(Nasir, 1993). Farmers who have more than one water turn in the watercourse command 
exchange water turns for one parcel of land with the water turns for another parcel of land. 
Two kinds of arrangements exist for canal water turn exchange among different farmers. One 
is on an ad-hoc basis while the other one is planned. 
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In the planned arrangements, the decisions are made at the start of the cropping season. A 
farmer having very short water turns (very often less than half hour) that is not enough to 
irrigate one bunded unit during one water turn gives his water turn to another relatively bigger 
farmer for two to three weeks and gets a longer turn every third or fourth week depending on 
the deal. This deal is mostly made among neighbouring farmers. Though this arrangement is 
considered beneficial to both the farmers the quantity of water is not always compensated for. 
It is possible that the smaller farmer misses his longer water turn because of no supply and 
vice versa. That may be one of the reasons that this arrangement is not very common in the 
selected watercourses (12 % of cultivators have water turns less than half-hour). 
In the ad-hoc arrangement a decision to exchange a full or a part of the water turn is taken just 
before or during the water turn. If a farmer realises that he is not able to irrigate the desired 
number of bunded16 units, he borrows a part of or the full water turn from another farmer. 
This borrowed water is given back in terms of time used and not in terms of quantity. 
Nevertheless it is made sure that the difference in quantities is not very big17. Almost 100 % 
of the farmers are practising it in the study area. Canal water turns are more frequently 
exchanged, in the watercourses along the Fordwah distributary, than in the Mahmood 
distributary because of better water supply in to the Mahmood distributary. 
Like desilting, fluctuations in the canal water delivery make the effect of canal water 
exchange on the amount of water available at the farm level difficult to show. An effort is 
made here to present the difference in the mm of water if farmers do not take part in canal 
water turn exchanges. Figure 6.6 compares water availability at the farm-gate for all the 
farmers in the watercourse FD 84-L for kharif 1997. FD 84-L has the highest occurrence of 
exchange of full or part water turns in one year. Some of the farmers would have had higher 
water availability per irrigation if they had not exchanged their water turns. However, this 
water might not have come at the right time. Farmers do try to give the same quantity of water 
back, although they can not measure it precisely. Therefore at the end of the season, the 
amount of water given away by a farmer may be more than the amount of water borrowed. 
The farmers who have significantly higher or lower canal water supply through canal water 
exchanges are marked with their farmers identities (CIDs) in the figure. Farmer CH> 4 is 
cultivating his own land and also sharecropping land with another owner in the area of whom 
farmer CID 49 is a brother. In kharif 1997, CID 49 only cultivated fodder, and gave away 
many of his water turns without taking it back from the tenant of his brother who was 
cultivating a cotton crop that needs more water18. Farmers CID 19, 20 and 22 are relatives, 
CID 20 and 22 are brothers and CID 19 is their nephew. Farmer CID 20 and 21 borrowed 
many water turns from their nephew without returning them. Farmer CID 20 cultivated cotton 
and did not use groundwater at all whereas farmer CID 21 cultivated fodder and sugarcane 
and he also used groundwater. Their nephew cultivated cotton, fodder and vegetables, and has 
direct access to tubewell water. Farmers CID 11 and CID 53 gave away more water than they 
received through canal water turn exchanges. They only cultivated fodder, and both used 
groundwater for irrigation. CID 11 has direct access to tubewell water. The rest of the 
differences are mainly because of the fluctuation in the canal water supply. 
16
 One bunded unit is usually equal to 0.25 acres. 
17
 Farmers though do not measure quantity, they have their own criteria to judge the quantity of water, for 
example if the watercourse is flowing at full capacity or is half full (Hoeberichts, 1996). 
18
 However, they both purchased tubewell water. CID 4 used much higher amount of groundwater as compared 
to the farmer CID 49. 
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Figure 6.6 Depth of water available for irrigation at the nakka (farm-gate) in kharif 
1997 with actual practices and in case farmers had not exchanged any 
canal water turn in the watercourse FD 84 -L 
6.5 REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SURPLUS WATER 
Canal water supply changes over time and so does crop and irrigation water requirement. 
There are times when supply is higher than the demand. None of the six selected watercourses 
have possibilities to drain the surplus water except MD 11 -TC, where the watercourse itself 
leads to a water-logged area that is the old riverbed of the Sutlej River. Farmers in the five 
watercourses close the outlet to deal with the unwanted canal water supply while the farmers 
of the watercourse MD 11-TC let the water flow to the Budh if they don't need to irrigate 
their crops. Since MD 11-TC is at the extreme tail of the distributary, farmers along this 
watercourse cannot close the mogha, which may cause a breach in the distributary and 
damage a larger area. The frequency of refusing the surplus water is higher in the 
watercourses along the Mahmood distributary as compared to the selected watercourses along 
the Fordwah distributary. The moghas of the selected watercourses along the Fordwah 
distributary were closed only in rabi, and then well for less than 15 days. FD 38-L and FD 84-
L were closed for 12 days; FD 96-R for 14 days; and FD 67-L was closed only for one day. 
The mogha of MD 1-R was closed for 21 days in kharif 1997 and for 103 days in the rabi 
1997-98. It mainly happened in October 1997 after the heavy rains. Canal water was drained 
to the Budh for 3 days in kharif 1997 and 58 days in rabi 1997-98 by the farmers of the 
watercourse MD 11-TC. Note that the number of days the outlet was closed or water was 
drained to the budh does not mean that this water was refused by all the farmers or was not 
used for all the 24 hours. It means that the canal water was refused for at least part of the day. 
Canal water was surplus for most of the farmers in the months of October, November 1997 
and April 1997 and 1998 at the end of the seasons. 
Relative water supply (RWS) is one way of showing the impact of the farmers' water 
management activity of refusing surplus water. As the RWS of the watercourse exceeds a 
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certain limit the farmers start closing the outlet or start draining the water in the budh in their 
warabandi turn. Figure 6.7 presents weekly RWS of the watercourse MD 11-TC during 1997-
98 and the weeks when water was refused by the farmers by draining it to the budh. The 
supply in the RWS is calculated by using all the water entering the watercourse minus 
conveyance losses plus the effective rainfall and groundwater. The water drained to the budh 
is not deducted from the supply and therefore is included in the RWS. Crop water 
requirements and effective rainfall is estimated with the help of CROPWAT 4 software. A 
RWS of 1.5 appears as a threshold value for farmers to drain water19. Almost all the farmers 
did not use canal water during the two weeks of October, two weeks in November and two 
weeks in December. These are the weeks with the highest RWS. The amount of total water 
drained to the budh was 10 % of the total canal inflow in kharif, 30 % of the total canal 
inflow in rabi and 20 % of the total canal inflow in the whole year. This canal surplus water 
could have been supplied to another distributary however it became available at the time 
when most of the farmers do not need water, therefore it was of little use to divert it to the 
other distributary. 
Figure 6.7: Relative Water Supply and farmers reaction to the surplus canal water 
supply in the watercourse MD 11-TC 
6.6 INDIVIDUAL GAINS: COMPOUNDING THE EFFECT OF ACTIONS FOR 
WATER MANAGEMENT 
The previous sections in this chapter have shown the impact of different water management 
activities on the water availability at the farm level in general. They have also demonstrated 
that the impacts of these water management activities are not the same for all the farmers 
within a watercourse command area. Some farmers benefited more than others. It is 
interesting to see the difference in availability of canal water, in terms of water depth, to all 
19
 However, in some other watercourses RWS of about 2 is also observed. This is mainly because i) farmers have 
no other option but to spread as surplus water ii) farmers want to flush their soils for leaching. 
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the farmers within a watercourse command area and to study how well are these farmers 
managing the gap between demand and supply. To do so, this study first looks at the variation 
in the total canal water depth available to the fanners at the farm-gate over two seasons 
(kharif 1997 and rabi 1997-98) in all the selected watercourses. According to the design and 
the recommended operational rules of the irrigation system, the depth of canal water should 
be the same for all the farmers, especially farmers from one watercourse. However in reality it 
is not so because of different physical, institutional and agrarian conditions. The physical 
condition of the system has been changed over time because of lack of maintenance. The 
main system is not always operated according to the rules. Besides the location of the farm 
also influences the amount of water available at the farm-gate for irrigation. This canal water 
availability is also influenced by the farmers' actions resulting from changing agrarian 
conditions of their farms. Farmers with high water demanding crops tend to borrow water 
turns for longer time as compared to farmers who are cultivating low water demanding crops. 
Trade (selling and buying) of canal water will also be reflected in the variation of depth 
across the watercourse. Figure 6.8 presents the coefficient of variation of the depth of canal 
water (in mm) among the farms within all the selected watercourses. This variation in depth 
not only reflects the fluctuations in the canal delivery to the watercourse but also the impact 
of all the water management activities undertaken above the farm level. The impact of 
conveyance losses, canal water turn exchanges, and farming strategies (mainly crops grown, 
which influences the demand for irrigation water) is compounded in this variation in the 
water depth available to the farmers for irrigation. 
The variation in the depth of canal water for farms in the selected Mahmood watercourses 
was higher in rabi 1997-98 than in kharif 1998. In the selected Fordwah watercourses, along 
the Fordwah farm level canal water depth also varies more in rabi 1997-98 than in kharif 
1997. Nevertheless this seasonal difference is higher in the Mahmood watercourses than in 
Fordwah watercourses. The reason was higher canal water requirements, because of which a 
stricter warabandi schedule was followed and desilting was more frequent, to give lower 
conveyance losses. Most of the farmers in watercourses MD 1-R and MD 11-TC are growing 
high water demanding crops, rice and sugarcane, therefore in kharif 1997 when canal water 
was extremely scarce farmers tended to stick to their warabandi schedule °. Whereas in rabi 
1997-98 during the time of harvesting of one crop and sowing of another crop warabandi 
became more flexible: farmers who needed water could use the warabandi turns of farmers 
who did not need water in those weeks. Because of high irrigation water demand farmers of 
the Mahmood watercourses desilted their watercourses more often in kharif than in rabi21. 
The coefficient of variation of the canal water depth in the watercourse FD 38-L is zero, 
which is unusual and surprising. This may be the result of several factors: i) Since this 
watercourse has only two cultivators, their water turn is unusually long, about 3.5 days (84 
hours) per farmer in a week. It is possible that the fluctuations in canal water delivery when 
averaged were equalled out for both the farmers, ii) The watercourse is quite short, that is 
1300 meters, and is desilted quite frequently therefore conveyance losses do not make much 
difference on the amount of volume available at the farm-gate of the two farmers. Besides, 
20
 However, in the Fordwah watercourses more canal water exchanges were observed in kharif as compared to 
rabi. The water given away is more or less compensated as it is received back another time. 
21Although, in the Fordwah watercourses the frequency of watercourse desilting is also higher in kharif than in 
rabi the range was relatively than the Mahmood watercourses. 
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both the farmers have the same nakka, one on the right side of the watercourse and the other 
on the left side of the watercourse. 
0.9
 n 
Figure 6.8: 
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Co-efficient of variation of the mm of canal water available to all farmers 
within a watercourse: analysis done for six selected watercourses along 
the Fordwah and the Mahmood distributaries 
The difference in the co-efficient of variation of two seasons in the rest of the three 
watercourses is mainly because of the difference in the cropping pattern of the farmers. 
Although most of the farmers in kharif are cultivating cotton there are still a considerable 
number of fanners with fodder as their main kharif crop. Access to tubewell water is also one 
of the factors influencing this higher disparity in the available canal water depths. Access to 
extra allowances - like use of water turn allocated for Government property by some farmers-
make a difference in the variation in actual canal water depth available to the farmers within a 
watercourse command area. 
This difference in availability of canal water depth at the farm-gate is highly related to the 
cropping pattern and hence to the crop water requirement of the different farmers. Table 6.3 
presents the data on achievements for Relative Water Supply (RWS) by 225 farmers in the 
selected watercourses. The crop water requirements of the individual crops and effective 
rainfall were estimated with the help of the software CROP WAT 4.0 for Windows. The RWS 
was then calculated in the spreadsheet. Since this RWS is calculated at the farm level, 
application efficiency was not calculated, as it was difficult to estimate appropriate factors for 
such a diverse range of crops. However, allowing a general magnitude for application 
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efficiency RWS should be between 1.00 to 1.2522 if full crop water requirements are to be 
met. There is a large range in RWS23, from 0.25 to 2.0, that different farmers are achieving. 
Table 6.3: Farmers achieving different ranges »f the Relative Water 
six selected watercourses. MD is Mahmood and FD is 
Kharif1997 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Total 
Rabi 1997-98 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Total 
Year 1997-98 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Total 
RWS Range 
<0.25 
0.25 to 0.50 
0.50 to 0.75 
0.75 to 1.00 
1.00 to 1.25 
1.25 to 1.50 
1.50 to 1.75 
1.75 to 2.00 
<0.25 
0.25 to 0.50 
0.50 to 0.75 
0.75 to 1.00 
1.00 to 1.25 
1.25 to 1.50 
1.50 to 1.75 
1.75 to 2.00 
<0.25 
0.25 to 0.50 
0.50 to 0.75 
0.75 to 1.00 
1.00 to 1.25 
1.25 to 1.50 
1.50 to 1.75 
1.75 to 2.00 
Supply in the 
Fordwah 
Number of Framers 
MD 
1-R 
0 
2 
12 
15 
11 
3 
4 
7 
54 
0 
1 
10 
23 
13 
2 
1 
4 
54 
0 
3 
15 
15 
10 
7 
3 
1 
54 
MD 
11-TC 
2 
4 
28 
16 
8 
0 
1 
1 
60 
1 
6 
9 
22 
14 
2 
3 
3 
60 
1 
4 
23 
23 
6 
2 
1 
0 
601 
FD1 
38-L 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
FD 
67-L 
3 
3 
7 
9 
9 
5 
3 
2 
41 
0 
1 
4 
11 
16 
5 
2 
2 
41 
0 
1 
5 
16 
10 
7 
2 
0 
41 
FD 
84-L 
0 
1 
6 
16 
15 
3 
4 
2 
47 
0 
0 
3 
21 
15 
4 
2 
2 
47 
0 
0 
3 
17 
20 
6 
1 
0 
47 
FD 
96-R 
0 
2 
3 
3 
6 
3 
3 
1 
21 
0 
0 
2 
8 
6 
2 
2 
1 
21 
0 
0 
2 
7 
4 
5 
3 
0 
21 
MD 
2 
6 
40 
31 
19 
3 
5 
8 
114 
1 
7 
19 
45 
27 
4 
4 
7 
114 
1 
7 
38 
38 
16 
9 
4 
1 
114 
' Actual RWS of these farmers is higher than this because they acquired 
through siphoning which is not included in this analysis. 
FD 
3 
6 
17 
29 
30 
11 
10 
5 
111 
0 
1 
9 
40 
38 
12 
6 
5 
111 
0 
1 
10 
42 
34 
18 
6 
0 
111 
additi 
Total 
5 
12 
57 
60 
49 
14 
15 
13 
225 
1 
8 
28 
85 
65 
16 
10 
12 
225 
1 
8 
48 
80 
50 
27 
10 
1 
225 
anal car 
% Total 
2 
5 
25 
27 
22 
6 
7 
6 
100 
0.4 
4 
12 
38 
29 
7 
4.4 
5 
100 
0.4 
4 
21 
36 
22 
12 
4 
0.4 
100 
lal water 
In kharif 1997 there is no farmer in the watercourses FD 84-L and FD 96-R with RWS less 
than 0.5, these also the watercourses with least gap between the irrigation water demand and 
supply at the watercourse level (see Figure 3.7a). MD 11-TC that has highest gap between 
the irrigation water demand and supply in kharif 1997 has highest number of farmers in the 
range 3 (0.50 to 0.75). Although irrigation water supply in all the six selected watercourses in 
22
 Usually, the average application efficiency for surface irrigation system is taken as 75 %. But, it may very a lot 
between the different fields. 
23
 One factor that influenced this big range is the length of the sowing period of one crop. For every watercourse 
the crop water requirement for each individual crop and effective rainfall for each season is calculated with the 
help of CROPWAT 4 program. The crop water requirement was calculated using the most common sowing date 
in the watercourse. However still the sowing period of many crops is spread over about two months. 
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rabi 1997-98 exceeded irrigation water demand (see Figure 3.7b) the RWS of the farmers 
varies within the watercourses. There are still some farmers who could not achieve RWS 
higher than 0.5 especially in the Mahmood watercourses. Which could be explained with the 
fact that other farmers in the same watercourses are achieving RWS of 1.25 or higher. 
The percentage of farmers with RWS less than 0.50 and greater than 1.5 is quite low24. Low 
levels are also those partly abandoned their crops or have problems with the purchasing of 
tubewell water. This suggests that farmers are trying their best to achieve a reasonable water 
delivery. The highest percentage of farmers lie between the RWS range of 0.5 to 1.25: 
between 70 and 80 % of the farmers achieved RWS in this range. In kharif 1997 most of the 
farmers are concentrated in the ranges 3 and 4 (between 0.5 and 1.00). Most of the farmers in 
rabi 1997-98 are achieving RWS of ranges 4 and 5 (between 0.75 to 1.25). 
Farmers with one major crop - one crop grown over more than 50 % of the total cultivated 
farm area - except fodder are achieving RWS mainly in two of the ranges. Table 6.4 presents 
the information related to RWS achieved by farmers growing different crops. Farmers are 
divided in 6 categories for kharif and 5 for rabi according to their cropping pattern: farmers 
growing 50 % or more of one crop (cotton, rice, sugarcane, wheat, fodder, and others25) and 
farmers having mixed cropping pattern (three or more number of crops cultivated under equal 
amount of land). 
Table 6.4: Relative Water 
| RWS Range 
Kharif 1997 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
<0.25 
0.25 to 0.50 
0.50 to 0.75 
0.75 to 1.00 
1.00 to 1.25 
1.25 to 1.50 
1.50 to 1.75 
1.75 to 2.00 
Total 
Cotton 
2 
6 
11 
27 
27 
10 
4 
0 
87 
Supply of the farmers with different crop 
Sugarcane 
1 
4 
29 
15 
9 
2 
4 
0 
64 
Rice 
0 
0 
3 
7 
1 
0 
0 
9 
20 
Fodder 
2 
2 
7 
6 
5 
1 
5 
4 
32 
Mix 
0 
0 
7 
3 
6 
0 
2 
0 
18 
ping patt 
Others 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
4 
erns 
Total 
5 
12 
57 
60 
49 
14 
15 
13 
225 
Rabi 1997-98 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
RWS Range 
<0.25 
0.25 to 0.50 
0.50 to 0.75 
0.75 to 1.00 
1.00 to 1.25 
1.25 to 1.50 
1.50 to 1.75 
1.75 to 2.00 
Total 
Wheat 
0 
3 
16 
52 
41 
12 
6 
5 
135 
Sugarcane 
0 
0 
6 
24 
15 
1 
1 
2 
49 
Fodder 
1 
1 
0 
3 
5 
1 
3 
2 
16 
Mix 
0 
2 
6 
6 
2 
1 
0 
1 
18 
Others 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
2 
7 
Total 
1 
8 
28 
85 
65 
16 
10 
12 
225 
24
 The farmers with RWS less than 0.5 are either brothers who are commonly cultivating their land(s) - they also 
have combined water turns, which sometimes makes it difficult to analyze their water supply situation separately 
- or are the ones who after losing their crop(s) gave away their water turns to their brothers. If these farmers are 
considered as one farmer then the RWS they achieve may becomes more higher than 0.5. They also have another 
source of income, like working as laborers. 
25
 Others includes farmers growing 50 % or more vegetables , oilseed crops and melon. 
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Most of the farmers who are mainly cultivating rice lie in the ranges 4 and 8. Cotton and 
wheat growing farmers are in the ranges 4 and 5. Sugarcane growers could achieve RWS in 
the ranges and 4 in kharif 1997 and 4 and 5 in rabi 1997-98. Farmers who have a mixed 
cropping pattern - three or more number of crops cultivated under equal amount of land - are 
spread over several ranges. Fodder cultivators are also distributed over various ranges since in 
case of water scarcity others crops get priority for irrigation and in case of surplus water 
fodder is irrigated. Hence it is also found in extreme cases of water supply. The largest group 
(27 % of farmers in the kharif 1997 and 38 % in rabi 1997-98) was found in the range 
between 0.75 to 1.00. The farmers who have direct access to tubewell water26 were able to 
achieve RWS between 1.0 tol.25. 
The majority of the farmers are achieving the RWS in the range between 0.5 to 1.25. 
Therefore three farmers representing each range - 0.5 to 0.75, 0.75 to 1.00, and 1.00 to 1.25 
were randomly selected to study the gap between the demand and supply over one full year. 
These farmers also represent the cropping pattern of their respective groups. Their total water 
supply - including effective rainfall, canal water availability at the farm, and groundwater use 
at the farm level - and evaporative demand of the crops are plotted for one year {kharif 1997 
and rabi 1997-98). The weekly crop water requirement and the effective rainfall at selected 
farms were estimated with the help of CROP WAT 4 program for windows. 
Farmer MD 11-TC CID 53: RWS in the range of 0.50 to ft 75 
Farmer CID 53 is a lessee in the watercourse MD 11-TC. He has rented in about 7.5 acres 
(3.03 ha.) land from a landowner towards the tail of the watercourse. The land he cultivates is 
very close to the Azim distributary; therefore a high groundwater table is present. He has to 
rely on only canal water supply, as there is no tubewell installed on his land. Neither is there a 
tubewell installed in the neighbouring fields, therefore he has to purchase and transport 
pumped water from about 850 meters away. His main crop is sugarcane, which gives him a 
good profit and since he is close to a sugar mill, transporting the produce to the mill is also 
not difficult27. He also grows fodder and wheat: wheat mainly for domestic purposes and 
fodder for the cattle. Any surplus produce from wheat and fodder is sold. 
In kharif 1997, he cultivated sugarcane28 on 4 acres (1.6 ha.) and fodder on 2.4 acres (0.98 
ha.), and in rabi 1997-98 he had sugarcane ratoon and planted wheat and fodder on 0.94 (0.38 
ha.) and 2 (0.8 ha.) acres respectively. The rest of the land was left fallow in both the seasons. 
The water scarcity in kharif 1997 did not cause any change in the cropping pattern of this 
farmer, who probably knew that this water scarcity was temporary. Besides he had to take this 
risk, as cultivating cotton with a shallow groundwater table is more risky. Figure 6.9 gives an 
overview of his weekly crop water requirement and his efforts to meet this demand. The 
demand and supply curve shows a big gap that is also reflected in the harvest of major crop(s) 
sugarcane and wheat. The yield of sugarcane29 is 25 tons/ha, which is about 25 % less than 
the average yield of sugarcane in this watercourse. His wheat yield was 0.82 tons per ha that 
is about 59 % less than the average wheat yield in the watercourse command area. Although 
26
 Direct access means, either they own the tubewell or can operate tubewell of their landowner or a brother at 
any time they need to pump water for irrigation. 
27
 Because he has rented in land, he is flexible in the choice of crops and the area he wants to cultivate. 
28
 Sugarcane was planted in rabi 1996-97 
29
 This yield is only for the kharif 1997. 
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the canal water supply situation in kharif 1997 was the major cause of lower yield of 
sugarcane, his sugarcane and wheat yield were also poor in the previous rabi season3 . 
Canal water supply was more erratic than usual at the start and in the middle of the kharif 
1997 (especially between May and August). Because it rained in these months, the farmer 
only used groundwater for once31 (in the week of 25th June 1997) after about one month of 
irrigating from canal water. Another incidence that did fulfil the crop water requirement of his 
field was the breach of the Azim distributary in September; the amount of water that was used 
to match demand with supply is not reflected in this graph. Usually the farmers do not 
welcome this breach as it floods their fields, but it is possible that this year it did help a few 
farmers in matching demand with the supply. In rabi 1997-98 canal water is not available to 
the farmers in the month of January, in which most of the farmers use tubewell water for 
irrigation. This is also the time when many farmers have to give first irrigation to wheat, 
which is very important. Farmer CID 53 planted the wheat such that he gave first irrigation in 
the first week of December 1997. In rabi 1997-98 he used groundwater32 only once, right 
after the canal closure. With all his irrigation management practices he could achieve the 
RWS of 0.51 in kharif1997, and 0.61 in rabi 1997-98. 
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Figure 6.9: Meeting demand with the supply: weekly match between the supply and 
demand of the farmers CID 53 in the watercourse MD 11-TC 
Farmer FD 67-L CID 6: RWS between the range ofO. 75 to LOO 
Farmer CUD 6 of the watercourse FD 67-L is a tenant of two landowner brothers in the head 
and middle reaches of the watercourse. He sharecrops 14.5 acres (5.87 ha) from one brother 
and 9.75 acres (3.95 ha) from the other, so in total he cultivates 24.25 acres (9.82 ha). The 
owners have a tubewell, which could be operated whenever additional irrigation water is 
30
 In rabi 1996-97 the harvest of wheat and sugarcane were 1.2 and 26 tons/ha. 
31
 He bought 12 hours of tubewell water at the rate of 100 Rs (40 US$) per hour. 
32
 This time he did not pay in terms of money but he bought his own fuel to operate the tubewell. Water was 
pumped for 3.5 hours. 
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needed. He never purchases pumped water from other farmers33. Since he cultivates a 
reasonably big area he can grow a variety of crops34, although his main crops remain cotton 
and wheat. However due to insufficient water available for high water demanding crops, the 
area under sugarcane remains modest 
During 1997-98 he cultivated 2.93 acres (1.19 ha) of sugarcane during, which was grown in 
the fields around the tubewell. In kharif 1997 apart from sugarcane, he cultivated cotton on 
10.43 acres (4.23 ha), and fodder on 0.5 acres (0.20 ha.). In rabi 1997-98 wheat was planted 
in 13.8 acres (5.59 ha), mustard in 3.67 acres (1.49 ha), and fodder in 0.87 acres (0.35 ha). 
The area under sugarcane remained the same in rabi 1997-98 as the crop was ratooned. The 
land left fallow was much more in kharif 1997 as compared to rabi 1997-98 because of high 
evaporative demand35. Fodder is mainly grown for the cattle, and mustard for oil. Sugarcane 
is grown mainly to produce raw sugar (locally called gur) for domestic consumption, which 
could also be sold in case of surplus. A weekly demand and supply situation of the CID 6, for 
one full year (two crop seasons), is presented in figure 6.10. Even after increased cropping 
intensity in rabi 1997-98 the match between demand and supply is very good. 
There was hardly any canal water available at the start and in the middle of kharif 1997. 
However rain in those weeks helped farmers to cope with this water scarcity. Very often in 
rabi 1997-98 and sometimes in kharif1997, it looks like he is over-irrigating. However it is 
not always the case: some of this water that appears to be over-irrigation is needed for on-
farm distribution and application losses and other is needed for rouni (pre-irrigation). In the 
first week of kharif1997 rouni irrigation for cotton was practised together with the irrigation 
to sugarcane and fodder. In the next few weeks either the canal water flow was extremely low 
or there was no canal water supply. Unlike farmers of the Mahmood distributary he did pump 
groundwater for irrigating sugarcane and for rouni (pre-irrigation) as well36. In fact 
groundwater was frequently used for irrigation throughout the year, although the amount of 
water pumped in kharif 1997 was much higher than the amount of water pumped in rabi 
1997-98: the ratio was approximately 3:1. A gap of two weeks in operating the tubewell is 
observed when there was almost no canal water supply (in May and June) and it rained as 
well. Whenever canal water supply was there, groundwater was mixed with the canal water 
for irrigation. An over-irrigation in late October and (almost full) November 1997 is because 
of rouni irrigation for wheat and mustard37. During the canal closure (January 1998) the 
tubewell was again operated in two weeks to irrigate wheat, fodder and mustard. Irrigation to 
sugarcane is much less frequent in rabi than in kharif. With all his water control he achieved 
overall RWS of 0.92 with which he could get a good harvest of both cotton and wheat both. 
His cotton yield was 1.1 tons /ha and wheat yield was 2.0 tons/ha. - which were exactly the 
average yields of the crops in the watercourse for kharif 1997 and rabi 1997-98. 
33
 Only when the tubewell is out of order, he operates someone else's tubewell for which he does not pay in cash 
but uses his own fuel to pump the water. 
34
 However, because he is a sharecropper, he has to discuss the cropping pattern and the cropping intensities with 
the landowners. 
35
 It is also recommended that in case of limited irrigation water supply a higher total production of cotton can be 
achieved by spreading the irrigation over area and partially meeting crop water requirement, rather than by 
meeting full crop water requirement over a limited area (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979). 
36
 Because in this watercourse groundwater table depth is much lower than in the watercourses along the 
Mahmood distributary the chances of capillary rise are little. 
37
 Sugarcane and cotton, which was still standing in some fields, were also irrigated. 
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rabi 1997-98 
O Effective rainfall I mm canal • mm tubewell — CWR 
Figure 6.10: Weekly demand and supply situation of the CID 6 in the watercourse FD 
67-L for one full year (kharif 1991 and rabi 1997-98) 
Farmer FD 96-R CID 12: RWS between the range of1.0 to 1.25 
Fanner CID 12 cultivates about 6 acres (2.42 ha) of land in the middle reach of the 
watercourse FD 96-R. He owns 3.0 acres (1.25ha) out of the total land he cultivates, the rest 
of the land he has leased in from another farmer . He also has many brothers cultivating 
their own land in the same watercourse command area. Because of this year of canal water 
scarcity he and a brother installed a private tubewell. Earlier he used to buy pumped water 
from another fellow farmer, but he had to transport that water for 780 meters. Cotton and 
wheat are the main crops he cultivates. Fodder and vegetables are other crops that he grows. 
In kharif 1997 he planted cotton on 3.2 acres (1.29 ha), fodder on 0.4 acres (0.18 ha) and 
vegetables on 0.1 acres (0.015 ha.). In rabi 1997-98 wheat was planted in 4.1 acres (1.67ha), 
fodder in 1.6 acres (0.633 ha), and vegetables in 0.1 acres (0.051 ha). Fodder is needed for 
the cattle and vegetables are for domestic use, any surplus produce is sold in the market. 
Figure 6.11 shows the demand and supply curves of farmer CID 12 over a year. At times, this 
fanner seems to over-irrigate his crops39. First few irrigations at the start of kharif season are 
for pre-irrigation (that is called rouni in the local language). Then there were about one and a 
half months (from mid May to end of June 1997) with no canal water supply because of 
problems in the link canal. It is surprising to see no use of groundwater in those weeks, while 
one would expect a high groundwater pumpage in case of such a prolonged canal water 
scarcity. The reason for not extracting the groundwater in those weeks is the rainfall, though 
it did not completely fulfil crop water requirement. These were the days of initial stages of 
cotton that may also be one reason that farmers did not irrigate after it rained. Some water 
stress at the early stages of cotton is good for the root development (Doorenbos, and Kassam. 
1979). When canal water supply was resumed in July 1997, CID 12 blended tubewell water 
38
 This farmer owns 3.5 acres of the land, out of which he himself cultivates only 0.5 acres. He is a trader, 
therefore can not spare much time for agricultural activities. 
39
 Some of this water is required for distribution and application losses. 
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with canal water and irrigated all his crops. There was again a gap of two weeks in the canal 
water supply that was partly filled by the rain. After this time, there is almost no week 
without irrigation until 10th December 1997, when canal water supply again stopped. A 
visible over-irrigation in late October and November is mostly the rouni irrigations for wheat, 
rabi fodder and rabi vegetables40. There is also one-month canal closure in January 1998. The 
first irrigation to wheat was given before the canal closure. Over-irrigation is practised when 
crops were irrigated after a long break about three weeks in December 1997. CUD 12 achieved 
an annual RWS of about 1.14 and thus achieved good yield of major crops, cotton and wheat. 
His cotton yield was 1.15 tons/ha that is about 24 % higher than the average of the 
watercourse. His wheat yield, which was 2.5 tons/ha, was about the same (bit on a lower side) 
of the watercourse average (that was 2.6 tons/ha.) 
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Figure 6.11: Irrigation water demand and supply of the CID 12 of the watercourse FD 
96-R in kharif 1991 and rabi 1997-98 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The impacts of actions taken for water management have been analysed in terms of amount of 
water available to the farmers at their nakka (farm-gate), examining both individual and 
collective actions. These actions were conjunctive water use, exchange of canal water turn, 
refusal to surplus canal water supply, desilting of the watercourse and acquisition of 
additional canal water by enlarging the mogha. At the end of the chapter a combined effect of 
all the farmers' actions was demonstrated on the variation in depth of canal water available to 
the farmers at the farm-gate, and a demand-supply situation for selected farmers was 
presented to show the way farmers with different water depths practice irrigation. 
Half of the actions studied in this chapter are illicit. Exchange of canal water turn, closing the 
mogha to refuse to accept surplus canal water supply, and acquiring additional water for the 
In October, this over-irrigation is also due to rainfall 
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whole watercourse command area by enlarging the mogha are all illicit practices. While 
Conjunctive use of canal and groundwater, draining the water in the waterlogged area or budh 
and desilting a watercourse are legal. 
If a watercourse has a pakka warabandi farmers should not deviate from this fixed schedule 
of water distribution. However, in practice farmers are deviating from their fixed warabandi 
turns very often by exchanging full or part of their water turn. This flexibility in warabandi 
helps them improve timely availability of canal water required to irrigate desired number of 
bunded units in an irrigation water turn. The more flexible water distribution does not effect 
farmers of the other watercourse command area. 
The conjunctive water management of canal water and groundwater is another very common 
and important individual water management activity. It is more common in the watercourses 
along the Fordwah distributary than the sample watercourses along the Mahmood 
distributary. This practice of conjunctive water management helps farmers to deal with the 
variable and unpredictable canal water supply, and helps them avoid yield reduction from 
water stress especially for the crops like cotton. 
Farmers along each watercourse desilt their watercourses to increase the velocity of the water. 
This activity improves equity, by reducing the conveyance losses, in terms of water 
availability and time to irrigate a unit area. It has a limited effect on the total water 
availability at the end of the season though. 
In some watercourses farmers try and get additional canal water by getting their mogha 
enlarged. This activity, on one hand improves adequacy within a watercourse command area 
however it creates inequity among the watercourses as the water supply is only increased to 
few watercourses at the cost of others. 
During the season of excessive rain and at the end of a crop season, when water is not needed 
for irrigation, farmers do not accept canal water for irrigation. This happens more in the 
watercourses along the Mahmood distributary than the watercourses along the Fordwah 
distributary. In case of excessive canal water supply farmers close their moghas if there is no 
drainage infrastructure available, or drain the water in the budh or water logged area. Or 
otherwise irrigate crops that are not effected much by over irrigation. However, closing of the 
outlet is illegal, Irrigation Department seems to have developed a tolerance for this action. 
This action helps farmers to prevent crop failure due to over-irrigation and thus improves the 
productivity of the crop. 
A high variation in canal depth available to different farmers within a watercourse command 
area has shown that the impact of all the water management activities is different for different 
farmers. On one hand this depends on the crop water requirement and on the other hand on 
the water availability at the mogha and physical location of the farm along the watercourse. 
An in-depth study matching demand with the supply over time for the selected individual 
farmers revealed that almost all the farmers try to keep their soils wet, even if they cannot 
supply full water depths: they give frequent irrigation with small depths in case of low canal 
water supply. They irrigate very often if it does not rain. Farmers with a high groundwater 
table depth give less heavy rouni as compared with the farmers having land in the area with 
the low groundwater table depth. 
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To conclude, all these actions help farmers to improve the water control at the farm level and 
increase water availability at the farm-gate at a given point of time. The combined effects of 
these actions enable many farmers to irrigate with reasonable levels of water supply 
indicating how these actions do improve 'performance indicators'. Hence it is assumed that 
they also improve productivity. Some of the activities, like exchange of canal water turn and 
desilting, have a temporary timely influence and therefore their impact on the water 
availability is difficult to demonstrate. Whereas activities like conjunctive water management 
and acquisition of additional canal water have a more long-term impact. Management of 
excess water is the activity that is undertaken in response, so if there were no excess of canal 
water this activity would not be undertaken. Nevertheless, all the activities are equally 
important for the good water management. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study started with the aim to study the impact of farmers' actions for water management 
on local water delivery performance in a conjunctive water use environment. However 
already at the start of the study it was found that current performance studies and criteria 
are not able to show the realities of social relations shaping water availability. These 
performance studies and criteria are mainly concerned with monitoring and improvement of 
management of the main irrigation system, and cannot focus on the way farmers appropriate 
the irrigation water. Besides very often, these studies are not able to include conjunctive use 
of canal and groundwater in the framework of performance assessment of canal irrigation 
systems. By incorporating the way farmers intervene with the system and thus appropriate 
water delivery, performance studies could analyse a system and suggest recommendations 
based on realities to improve the functioning of the irrigation system. This study used a 
performance study as a base to demonstrate the outcome of the farmers' actions. It was not 
used as something static, but was considered dynamic that is changing every time farmers 
take action to influence water delivery (to a distributary, a watercourse and eventually to a 
farm). The following question was posed to gain more insights on how farmers cope with and 
amend the dysfunctional water supply system: 
How and why do farmers intervene in irrigation water supply, what conditions shape 
their actions and what is the impact of their action on water delivery in a large scale 
irrigation system of Punjab, Pakistan? 
This chapter is organised in four sections: The first section summarises and discusses the key 
findings of the study. In the second section theory and research methods are revisited, the 
third sections presents findings that have implications for the current debates on 
environmental deterioration in salinity, water-logging and overuse of groundwater, and 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PEVI) in Punjab, Pakistan. The fourth section briefly 
indicates some future research issues. The final conclusions restate the active concern of 
farmers in their water delivery. 
7.1 FARMERS ACTIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON WATER DELIVERY 
PERFORMANCE: KEY FINDINGS 
This study has shown that farmers are knowledgeable and capable actors who take many 
actions that improve their water supply and compensate for dysfunctional water 
delivery. They adapt different strategies to manage irrigation water. The foremost objective 
of a farmer is to attain as much water control as possible, which gives him better room to 
manoeuvre: he can plan cropping intensity and cropping pattern of his farm in a better way. 
The 'water control' framework was helpful to study farmers actions by looking at technical 
control (influencing physical processes or technology for example tampering with the 
mogha), organisational control (by interacting and negotiating with other farmers for 
management of irrigation water) or social or political control (by influencing the process of 
water distribution at the main and tertiary level sub-system)1. Farmers, in the sample 
watercourses, who manage to receive higher canal water supply, are growing rice and 
See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion. 
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sugarcane, crops that require higher amount of irrigation water. In addition they also grow 
cotton, fodder and vegetables. Whereas farmers from the watercourses with relatively less 
canal water supply are mainly growing cotton, and wheat with some fodder and vegetables. 
Farmers by undertaking all these water management activities try to match irrigation water 
demand with the supply. They are usually aware of the crop water requirement and stages of 
the crop that are more sensitive to water stress or water abundance. Table 7.1 summarises the 
impact of farmers' actions on water delivery and yield in the sample watercourses. The table 
shows that while farmers with better canal water supply (DPR >1) achieved better yields of 
high water demanding crops (sugarcane and rice). However, farmers from the less privileged 
watercourses still get equally good yields of less water demanding crops (wheat and cotton). 
They filled the gap between the demand and supply mainly by pumping groundwater. With 
conjunctive water use, the RIS in all watercourses was 0.7 or higher in kharif and rabi 
seasons. Compared to other watercourses a higher percentage of farmers of watercourse FD 
84-L (one with the low DPR) managed to achieve a RWS between 0.75 to 1.25 in kharif1997 
when canal water supply was disrupted because of a damaged link canal. Similarly in case of 
surplus water supply farmers are clearly aware of when to start getting rid of the excess 
water. Although farmers do not measure the water delivery, figure 6.7 showed the match 
between calculated RWS value and farmers' refusal, and farmers almost always drained off 
the water when RWS exceeded 1.5. Thus farmers are capable and knowledgeable actors who 
through their practices and interactions with the Irrigation Department staff, politicians and 
other farmers, shape and reshape their canal water delivery to their mogha and farm. 
To improve water delivery to a watercourse, and thus to farms, farmers intervene below and 
above the mogha. Figure 7.1 presents how farmers actually intervene with the system and at 
what level. Fanners evaluate the water delivery to their farm-gate and mogha over time. If 
this water is not enough to fulfil the perceived crop water requirement of their crops over 
time, or if this discharge is more than the perceived crop water requirement, action has to be 
taken. This could be either within the farm, within the watercourse or at the higher lever of 
the irrigation system. A farmer first figures out the problem and the cause of the problem 
within the watercourse. For example there could be several reasons for an increasing 
(perceived) gap between canal water supply and (perceived) demand of crops. An increased 
gap between demand and supply could be due to 1) the total water delivery to the mogha has 
been decreased; 2) the capacity of the watercourse to carry irrigation water has been reduced; 
3) someone upstream is stealing water. The first two causes are found more over time while 
the third cause is more a temporary one and can only happen during the irrigation water turn2. 
Depending on the cause of the increased gap between demand and supply or decreased water 
delivery at the farm-gate farmers choose the point of intervention. If canal water supply was 
disturbed because of less discharge at the mogha farmers' intervention would be focused on 
the mogha and the distributary. If the discharge at the mogha is more or less according to the 
farmers' expectations then something has to be done within the watercourse, for example 
watercourse desilting - or for a longer term solution watercourses has to be lined. It may also 
be possible that irrigation water demand of a farm has been increased and therefore the water 
delivery at the farm-gate is not enough to match this increased crop water requirement: then 
rubewell is installed, or tubewell water is purchased and changes in water turns are pursued. 
In case of surplus canal water supply farmers have to get rid of this water. For that they can 
either completely refuse to accept this water by closing the mogha, or by draining the surplus 
' Such water thefts were not found in the selected watercourses. 
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water3. If this situation prevails for somewhat longer time, they try to influence the operation 
of the main system by influencing the Gauge Reader to close the whole distributary. 
The negotiation processes, power relations, resource mobilisation, and the agrarian conditions 
of a farmer and a watercourse all influence the interventions that take place to improve water 
delivery to the watercourse and farm. For intervention within the watercourse, conflict 
resolution among the shareholders is also very important, although in the sample 
watercourses no serious conflict related to water distribution was noticed4. Farmers have to 
negotiate with other shareholders, fellow farmers, within the watercourse command area to 
organise collective for water management activities: for example watercourse desilting and 
lining of the watercourse. Any conflict among them can hinder achievements of a common 
goal of the whole group. They also have to negotiate with the Irrigation Department to get 
additional canal water supply for their mogha. Or for shutting down the gates of the 
distributary in case of surplus canal water supply. Resources in terms of money - to give as a 
bribe - or manpower - to desilt a watercourse or a distributary - are very important for 
execution of some activities. Power relations also play an important role in the undertaking of 
water management activities. Within the watercourse command area farmers who are more 
influential can get favours from the Irrigation Department without less influential farmers 
objecting to it. For, instance a farmer can get a higher allocation in his warabandi turn and 
other shareholders do not take any action against it, as shown in section 5.4. At the higher 
level, farmers try to influence the management of irrigation system through politicians. 
Another factor that influences the interventions is the agrarian condition. Large number of 
tenants make actions more difficult. A big landowner is most likely to be the influential 
farmer as well: one way to acquire influence is to obtain relatively higher landholding size. A 
farmer cultivating high water demanding crops may be more active in the interventions taken 
to administer water within a watercourse command area. Similarly farmers from a 
watercourse with high irrigation water requirements, as a whole, will be more willing to 
increase the discharge at the mogha by influencing the operation of the system, as was 
observed in the sample watercourses along the Mahmood distributary. All these actions, 
which are taken by farmers to manage irrigation water improve water delivery at the farm-
gate. 
3
 In case of absence of the drainage infrastructure water is drained and dumped in the water-logged areas or 
fields. 
4
 However, people had differences in opinion, which were sometimes shared openly. Some had objections and 
reservations on actions of farmers (for example in MD 1-R some farmers objected when CID 58 got his water 
right back (see Box 5.1) but no one took any action). 
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Collective action 
Individual action 
Influence gate operations 
Lobbying for higher discharge 
Desilting 
Remodelling of the mogha 
Blocking the distributary 
Siphoning 
Negotiation process 
Agrarian conditions 
Power relations 
Resource mobilisation 
(money and 
manpower) 
Collective action 
Discharge at the mogha 
Tampering with 
the mogha 
Close the mogha 
• & -
Negotiation process 
Agrarian conditions 
Conflict resolution 
Individual action 
^Collective action 
Desilting 
Discharge at the farm-gate 
(Performance) 
Getting higher 
water allocation 
Negotiation process 
Agrarian conditions 
Power relations 
Resource mobilisation 
(manpower) 
Conflict resolution 
Individual action 
Farmers' responses 
Exchange and selling/buying of canal water turns 
Tubewell installation 
Purchase of tubewell water 
Desilting of farm channels 
Crop choice 
Use water allocation for orchards to irrigate crops 
Use of water allocated for Government property 
Drain water to a water-logged are or irrigate 
A 
Individual action 
(in case of selling and buying of 
canal and tubewell water and 
exchange of canal water turns, tw 
persons are involved) 
Figure 7.1: Farmers' interventions at the different levels of the irrigation system 
Farmers not only take actions to improve water delivery, their actions are also sensible 
technically and economically and their actions have motives beyond just economic 
benefit. Chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated the financial rewards of farmers' actions. These 
chapters have shown the savings of farmers, in terms of money and water, as a result of 
taking certain choices of actions. Chapter 6 has shown the impact of these actions on the 
water availability at the farm-gate. These chapters have shown that these activities are 
An effort was also made to classify farmers on the basis of water management actions they undertake. Cluster 
analysis technique was used with the help of SPPS software. But no significant clusters were identified on the 
basis of farmer's actions for water management. However, in an analysis of water management activities and 
agrarian features some clusters emerged identified by landholding size and tenancy status of the farmers. It is 
not unreal to generalise that water management strategies followed by individual farmers in one watercourse do 
not differ much between them, some agrarian characteristics may bring differences. 
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undertaken to improve adequacy and reliability of the irrigation water supply in cost-effective 
ways, and increase flexibility in the use of irrigation water. 
To increase flexibility and ease in irrigating the desired number of bunded units in one 
warabandi turn, farmers exchange their canal water turn which, according to the Canal and 
Drainage Act 1873, is illegal. However, these small exchanges of irrigation turns help 
fanners to provide the perceived optimum irrigation depth to the crops and give them more 
room for manoeuvre. Sometimes these water exchanges result in loss of some water for some 
of the farmers - they give away more water than they receive even if the time of the turns 
exchanged remains the same. 
Farmers desilt their watercourses several times in a year to improve the conveyance 
efficiency of the channel. This activity is more effective if the entire watercourse is 
collectively cleaned at the same time. A watercourse may lose its capacity to carry water if 
this activity is not performed at all. Farmers in the study area, in general have no problems or 
very few problems in undertaking collective action for watercourse desilting. Which in a way 
increases the equity of water distribution within a watercourse command area; and improves 
the flexibility in terms of availability of higher amount of water at a given place and at a 
given point of time (See chapter 4 for details). 
Water for irrigation purposes is not needed during the monsoon rains and at the time of 
harvesting of crops. Farmers try to protect their crops, from over-irrigation and their land 
from flooding, by simply refusing to accept the surplus canal water. They close the mogha 
(which they are not legally allowed to do) or drain the water to the water-logged area in case 
they have an access to the drainage infrastructure. Closing of a mogha in the upper reaches of 
a distributary may create problems for fanners downstream. In the absence of drainage 
infrastructure farmers at the extreme tail6 of the distributary are left with the no choice but to 
spread the water, otherwise the distributary may suffer a breach if not closed. Some farmers 
inigate crops like fodder, that can resist over-inigation when they have no choice but to 
irrigate. 
Social dynamics also influence the happening of the water management activities and the 
way farms are managed by the farmers. Very often, farmers from one family (father and 
sons)7 jointly cultivate their farms even if the land has been distributed among the family 
members. Officially they do have a combined warabandi turn which in practice is 
(re)allocated to everyone. The canal water turn exchanges are very common among such 
farmers. They can also freely pump water from each other's tubewells. Chapter 6 (section 
6.4) has also shown how farmers from one family help each other at the time of water 
scarcity - they exchange their water turns among themselves without getting any 
6
 In case of the selected distributaries, farmers from the middle and tail reach of the Fordwah distributary do not 
often close their mogha. Fanners from the extreme tail are happy to receive at least some canal water, although 
not at the wrong time. Tail farmers from the Mahmood distributary drain this water in budh. However, some 
landless farmers use some area in budh for cultivation (mainly rice). These landless farmers complain about the 
damage to their crops by this drained water. 
7
 In some cases the father only provides guidance and sons cultivate. Therefore the decisions regarding the 
cropping pattern and other factors like installing a tubewell are taken in the consultation between father and 
sons. In other cases sons are independent as far as the decision making is concerned but still help each other 
whenever needed. 
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compensation for that - which shows that they, sometimes, take decisions in the interest of an 
extended family and not just for a nuclear family . 
Farmers, politicians and Irrigation Department staff, have various kinds of interdependencies. 
The influential farmers within a watercourse help the non-influential farmers by representing 
their view to the Government Departments, like the Irrigation Department, or by helping 
them at a time of domestic need9. In return non-influential farmers sometimes provide labour 
to the influential farmers and also do not object on some favours given to him by the 
Irrigation Department10. Farmers also try to lobby for additional canal water through their 
politicians, who in return get votes from these farmers. The Irrigation Department staff gets 
money from the fanners and provides them with the water, or by co-operating with the 
politicians they get transfers. These findings agree with Mollinga's (1998) model of water 
control. It is kind of a win-win situation for people involved in this circle. However 
somewhere in the system some fanners get deprived of their water right, and the main system 
objective of equitable water distribution disappears. 
The dilemma in performance assessment and improvement of Pakistan's Irrigation systems is 
that performance is looked at from the system's perspectives of equity, reliability and 
adequacy whereas adequacy was never an objective of the system". Moreover, different 
stakeholders have different standards of performance of the inigation system. For instance a 
farmer judges the performance of irrigation system by timely and sufficient water supply to 
his farm, whereas for the Irrigation Department a system is performing well if the tail of the 
system is getting water. However the performance parameters and indicators to evaluate and 
demonstrate farmers actions may be different than the performance parameters and indicators 
used by the managers of the main system. Farmers' actions do improve adequacy - through 
acquiring additional irrigation water - and usability - through exchanging canal water turn 
and desilting the watercourse - that are the two main concerns of farmers. However, farmers 
are also concerned about the reliability or what Gowing et al. (1996) call predictability12 of 
canal water delivery. Farmers in the sample watercourses are concerned about reliability 
however they did not take much action to try and change it during the study period13, perhaps 
because they knew that it will be difficult to influence this at the tail of the system. This 
might also be one reason why they put in so much effort to try and get some additional canal 
water supply wherever possible to improve adequacy and short-term predictability. It is easier 
8
 Terpstra (1998) rightly notes that sometimes even after the informal land division after inheritance, farmers 
from one family (brothers or nephews and uncles) still cultivate their lands more or less jointly. In fact they keep 
their water turn as combined and can install a tubewell jointly, which improves flexibility in the availability of 
irrigation water and eliminates the costly installation of a separate tubewell for each family member. 
9
 For example if some one from the house of non-influential farmer is ill and has to be taken to the hospital, an 
influential farmer with his car (and in some cases driver) can offer help by driving them to the hospital, etc. 
10
 For instance in one of the selected watercourse, one influential farmer owns an agency to sell fuel. He gives 
this fuel to the farmers on credit as well. He is also very active in organising water management activities. In 
return farmers do not object on the extra 15 minutes of nikal (time to drain the watercourse) time that he gets 
with his warabandi turn. 
" Moreover, the increasing role of private tubewells - in the large scale irrigation systems in Punjab, Pakistan -
in the irrigation water availability and thus cropping pattern has made performance evaluation of canal irrigation 
systems even more difficult (Murray-Rust and Snellen, 1993) 
12
 Gowing et al. (1996) suggest that farmers are mainly concerned about the predictability, convenience, and 
tractability. Predictability is referred to the knowledge of future water supplies and the degree of its certainty. 
Convenience is referred to the time of arrival of water at the farm-gate: for example day or night? a working day 
or a weekend?. Tractability is referred to the ease with which the water user can control the flow rate. 
13
 The reliability was very bad in kharif\997 because of damaged link canal but considerably improved in rabi 
1997-98. 
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for farmers of the Mahmood distributary to discuss this issue at the distributary level and 
approach Irrigation Department officials. But it takes a lot more efforts to organise farmers of 
the Fordwah distributary simply because of its magnitude - farmers prefer to take actions that 
require fewer hassles (Hoeberichts, 1996). Although some of the actions by farmers can be 
called reactive management, in general farmers do plan their irrigation management activities 
and they have learned through experience to manage their irrigation system. Their 
management can not be classified as 'contingent management' and is rather 
performance oriented. 
7.2 REVISITING THEORY AND RESEARCH METHODS 
In a multidisciplinary socio-technical study of irrigation system, one needs different concepts 
to study and understand the dynamics of the water management activities happening in the 
system. This study, however, focused more on the water delivery, looked at both physical 
quantification of water supply and processes involved in irrigation simultaneously - in short 
this study looked into the 'Water Delivery Environment' of the sample watercourses. All the 
concepts used in the study were useful to understand the 'Water Delivery Environments'. 
While, the concept of different kinds of water control helped to identify different actions 
undertaken by different farmers for water acquisition, - technical water control was 
especially helpful to study farmers' intervention with the infrastructure. A framework of 
infrastructure that encompassed canals as well as outlets and gates (of the distributaries) was 
important to study the locations and actions of farmers. It was not possible to compare 
intervention around different technologies since both the distributaries were designed for 
proportional distribution, and tampering and remodelling occurred with almost all the outlet 
types. ID staff themselves and under the influence of farmers try to 'actualise' the 
management but canal water is so scarce that it is difficult to fully 'actualise the management 
of the system. Individual strategies of farmers helped to illustrate the way they cope with the 
fluctuating canal water supply. 
The concept of human agency was found very helpful in studying the way people interact 
with each other and their motives behind these interactions. The monitoring of interactions 
between the actors in the ID and farmers, and among farmers themselves, helped gain insight 
into the way water control is negotiated and different water management activities are 
organised, who plays an active role in organising these activities and why. 
This study attempted to see how farmers try to change water supply in terms of equity, 
reliability, adequacy, and productivity. It was not easy to develop different indicators for 
these performance parameters at the watercourse and farm level. Two indicators, RWS and 
RIS, were found helpful for showing the impact of farmers' actions on performance. Some 
conventional indicators like DPR, CV of discharge and yield per unit of area also helped to 
understand the choice of action undertaken by farmers. The water delivery indicators gave 
insight in the level of dysfunctionality of the water supply, and yield per unit of area helped 
to study the impact of all farmers' actions together. Observations and unstructured interviews 
with the farmers were very helpful in understanding the way farmers manage irrigation water 
and the complexity of the situation. More insight was gained through process monitoring and 
observing water management activities - for example desilting and water distribution. Use 
was made of participatory tools during farmers' meetings and interviews that helped facilitate 
discussions between the farmers and the researchers. 
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Activities for water management 
An adapted version of Uphoff s typology of water management activities was used, which 
was found quite useful as a starting point. Later as the research progressed, different activities 
were identified to have great importance and were monitored in the field. The activities 
studied were water allocation, water distribution, watercourse maintenance, and drainage. 
While some actions are inevitable to take, others depend on the opportunities available to 
undertake them. For example, watercourse desilting is required to retain the capacity of the 
watercourse to carry water, however water acquisition by using canal water allocated for a 
Government's property depends upon the presence of such an allocation in a watercourse 
command area. Depending on the nature and need to undertake the activity, farmers choose 
the organisational level, that is collective or individual. 
There is no standard set of water management activities nor are they strictly planned in the 
study area. Farmers' actions are mostly subject to their need for water, however one can still 
see some of the water management activities that are inevitable to operate the system. The 
actions taken and the way and time these activities are organised and performed is difficult to 
predict in advance. But that does not mean that farmers do not plan these activities. In fact 
they plan their cropping season based on the knowledge that they can undertake these actions 
for water management or not. 
In the selected watercourses some water management activities do exist at both levels of the 
organisation. The water management activities and the level of organisation of these activities 
in the study area are summarised in Table 3.5, "Yes" shows that the activity happens at the 
level mentioned in first column. Not all the activities are organised at all levels in the selected 
watercourses, and the need to perform the activity is mainly shaped by the Water Delivery 
Environment of the watercourse command area or a particular farmer. For example 
watercourse maintenance is an activity performed at both the levels: individual and 
collective. All the farmers of the watercourse command area desilt the main watercourse 
together whenever needed. The branches of a watercourse are cleaned by the farmers using 
water from these branches; therefore same activity is collectively performed by a smaller 
group of people. They also clean farm channels that are used and cleaned only by individual 
farmers. They undertake desilting activity depending on which of the water channel needs 
desilting. Since official water allocation is done by the patwari in the case of pakka 
warabandi, re-allocation of water turns between tenants and landowners is an individual 
activity. 
Table 7.2: Water management activities and their organisational level in six selected 
watercourses 
Level of 
Organisation 
Individual 
Collective 
Water 
Acquisition 
Yes 
Yes 
Water 
(Re)Allocation 
Yes 
Water 
Distribution 
Yes 
Watercourse 
Maintenance 
Yes 
Yes 
Management of 
Excess water 
Yes 
The level of organisation of the activities highly depends on the prioritisation of the farmers 
to undertake this activity. 
Individual and Collective action 
Better control over irrigation water at the farm level could be achieved by undertaking 
individual or collective action. In large irrigation systems water is very often assumed to be 
managed collectively. However, since every farmer also has individual interests and priorities 
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that could be conflicting with other farmer's objectives, individual actions also take place. 
Individual actions of water management are very often researched in relation to the collective 
action. Researchers like Ostrom (1993) and Uphoff et al. (1990) have looked at the incentives 
for farmers to participate in collective action and difficulties of it. Others (like Mirza and 
Merrey, 1979) studied agrarian and social factors promoting collective action for water 
management. They also looked at the factors that inhibit collective action and generally lead 
to individual actions or no action at all. Merrey (1986a) found biradari as one of the major 
factors influencing effective organisation of farmers for watercourse maintenance. In one of 
the sample watercourses of this study watercourse desilting was organised according to 
biradari, but it did not play an important role in the performance of other water management 
activities. This study has shown that depending on the need and the resources available, some 
of the activities are performed by most farmers regardless of their economic status or 
influence, because they are needed to avoid any damage to crop(s). For instance every farmer 
would clean the farm channels whenever it is needed and every farmer has to get rid of the 
water excess during his water turn. Nevertheless the level of action highly depends on the 
activity to be undertaken, for instance (re)allocation of water to a tenant is more likely to be 
an individually undertaken activity whereas water acquisition could be done collectively as 
well as individually14. The assumption that watercourses are managed collectively because of 
the fact that farmers are grouped together is an over-simplification of the realities in which 
water management takes place in a watercourse command area. In fact different actors are 
involved in managing a watercourse (or a tertiary unit), and different management domains 
emerge through their interactions and negotiations (Manzungu, 1999). These domains are 
shaped by power relations and possibilities to intervene for water delivery (Van der Zaag, 
1992; Mollinga, 1998). Figure 7.2 presents an example of emergent domains of interaction in 
the study area. 
The main reason, found in this study to organise collective action for water management are 
the need to acquire canal water, and mutual benefit. Two main factors that were identified as 
enabling collective action for water management are clear leadership and greater involvement 
of farmers in agriculture. It was recognised that if farmers have off-farm employment they 
have less time to organise and to take part in the collective action. Thus, if collective action is 
not undertaken that does not mean there is no consensus on the need to undertake collective 
action, but the efforts involved in the collective actions are higher than the benefit gained by 
it. A higher number of shareholders in a watercourse command area seemed to have an 
influence on maintenance of the watercourse: the gap between the perceived and actual 
desilting activities per year was higher in the watercourses with higher number of 
shareholders. Location of the chak also influences the collective action for water 
management. If the chak is close to a city or a larger town, the dynamics of the city also 
influences the chak. Farmers have more awareness of job opportunities available outside 
farming if they live close to a city. The main factors found to restrict farmers for organising 
collective action is 'zid'15 and relatively equal distribution of power. The main water 
management activities for which collective action is taken are the desilting of the watercourse 
and water acquisition through physically intervening with the system. The former is a legal 
14
 However, more often the collective action leads to a more permanent solution. As in case of water acquisition, 
if a farmer steals water it is only for limited time - he has to take this action again to get the benefit, besides 
there is more risk involved in this action. Whereas if all the farmers in the watercourse command get their 
mogha enlarged through the Irrigation Department it is a more permanent solution, that at least lasts for one crop 
season and everybody benefits from this action. The benefit is not always in economic terms; it could also be in 
terms of social gains like "izzat" means pride (Merrey, 1986a) likewise the loss may also be seen as loss of face 
(De Klein and Wahaj, 1998). 
15
 Being stubborn. See chapter 3 for the details. 
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action whereas latter is illegal. Chapter 4 discussed the water management activities 
undertaken collectively. 
Most of the actions that are undertaken - individually or collectively - to acquire additional 
canal water supply are illicit. These include getting higher discharge through distributary gate 
operations, siphoning, remodelling of the mogha, exchange and selling/buying of canal water 
turn. The only legal way to acquire additional water is to install a tubewell, which requires a 
high capital investment. 
Generally different farmers are informally responsible for organising different water 
management activities. For instance one farmer is unofficially responsible for organising the 
watercourse maintenance, another farmer to organise more water at the mogha. However, 
sometimes this distinction is not very clear and one person may lead more than one activity or 
more than one person could be responsible for different parts of the activity. For instance a 
well-respected influential farmer is usually responsible for mobilising resources within a 
watercourse command area. These resources could be money or manpower1 , for any water 
management activity. A farmer, who is regarded as more knowledgeable and has more 
exposure to the 'outside world', is also considered suitable by fellow farmers to negotiate 
with the other group of farmers17 and with the Irrigation Department. A typical example of 
farmers responsible for water management activities is shown in figure 7.2. 
To conclude, farmers as individuals do their best under existing constraints to try and 
improve water control at the farm level. In doing so they use different organisational levels -
the individual level or the collective level - to perform water management activities. The 
choice of level to use depends on the need or urgency of undertaking the activity and the 
efforts involved in undertaking the activity. In other words it depends on the efficiency and 
efficacy of performing or undertaking the activity. For instance, watercourse maintenance is 
mainly done collectively since it is more efficient to do it that way: it is difficult to desilt the 
whole watercourse by an individual farmer. Similarly water acquisition through an enlarged 
mogha is done collectively since it is more efficient and effective way to acquire additional 
surface water as compared to individual efforts require to get additional water through 
siphoning. For undertaking these activities, farmers very often have informal rules that may 
and may not be followed by all in practice. Some farmers play more important and active 
role(s) to organise the collective action: usually these farmers are the ones who benefit most 
from the activity, either by attaining economic benefits or social gains. 
'Resource mobilisation in terms of money means collection of funds for any activity, for example watercourse 
lining and mogha enlargement, and in terms of manpower means gathering the farmers for a meeting or 
watercourse desilting. 
17
 For instance, in case of desilting of the Mahmood distributary, farmers from three tail watercourses have to 
negotiate about the time and task division. 
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WATERCOURSE 
Command Area 
Figure 7.2: Emergent domains of interaction for water management 
Selection of the distributaries and watercourses 
This research was undertaken in the two perennial distributaries - Mahmood distributary and 
Fordwah distributary - of the Fordwah canal irrigation system. These distributaries were 
selected despite big differences in size because of the difference in their water delivery, and 
their position at the end of the system. The smaller Mahmood distributary receives a 
relatively higher discharge in relation to its design discharge. The discharge of its tail 
watercourses is also higher than their respective design discharges. The tail of the bigger 
Fordwah distributary on the other hand is dry for the most of the time even when the design 
discharge is received at its head. The watercourses for detailed monitoring were selected on 
the basis of their canal water supply and tubewell density per 100 ha. in order to see how 
farmers, as a group or individually, from different water supply conditions react to water 
scarcity and water abundance. Four watercourses from Fordwah distributary and two from 
Mahmood distributary were selected. The framework was able to show up different patterns 
of overall water availability, and especially differences in canal water supply. One 
watercourse selected had only two people, but was retained - and showed up a very specific 
issue - how they were influential enough and linked together to siphon water on a large scale. 
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Siphoning was also possible because of their much longer irrigation turns (3.5 days each). 
Agrarian conditions were not an initial criteria for selection, however the watercourses 
selected did have differences in livelihoods, castes and land-tenure, which were also an 
influence on water management actions. 
7.3 POSSIBLE IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE WATER MANAGEMENT 
POLICIES 
Conjunctive water use 
Canal infrastructure and water supply limit the control of individual farmers over canal 
irrigation water that is vital in the crop production system. Farmers in the warabandi system 
are expected to adapt their crop calendar to their warabandi schedule: planned scarcity was 
foreseen to lead to the efficient use of surface water supply. However at the same time there 
is no legal provision for farmers to increase individual control over their surface water supply 
in this supply driven irrigation system. The only legal way is to install a tubewell that 
requires capital - which is not a practical solution for all the farmers because of relatively 
high capital investment. 
At farm level, groundwater provides a reliable access to irrigation water. In total irrigation 
water applied to crops, groundwater is almost equal to canal water supply in kharif, whereas 
in rabi, it contributes only 22%. The majority of the farmers (83%) are using groundwater for 
irrigation purposes, but it is generally considered a source of supplemental irrigation, mainly 
because it is of lower quality, and is expensive to use as compared to canal water. Farmers, 
therefore, take into account the canal water supplies as a base for their agricultural decision-
making, and consider the use of groundwater in peak periods of demand only, which is highly 
efficient. Groundwater use is very important in the study area. However, in this study actions 
in canal water were studied in more depth also because groundwater extraction was 
considered as a response to inadequate and unreliable canal water supply. 
Groundwater use makes a significant contribution in enhancing agricultural productivity at 
farm level. However, there is a productivity gap between farmers who purchase groundwater 
and those who own their own tubewells, as both the amount and the timing of irrigation is 
important for good crop production. A farmer with direct access to tubewell water is more 
flexible in irrigating his crops. They first use their tubewell water for irrigating their own 
fields, and sell water afterwards. Therefore, farmers with no direct access to tubewell water 
either delays irrigation until canal water comes again or have to wait until tubewell owners 
sell their tubewell water. Therefore, there is a need to identify factors that promote more 
equitable sharing of groundwater resources. 
This study has shown that canal water supply is highly variable and unpredictable therefore 
farmers have to rely on the extraction of groundwater. That sometimes causes over irrigation, 
however, this over-irrigation is because of two reasons, 1) farmers use groundwater while 
they are not receiving canal water and also irrigate when they get canal water, 2) they 
intentionally over-irrigate some areas to wash out salts from the root-zone. However, in the 
Fordwah distributary gross inflow (that is canal water supply + rainfall) is lower than the total 
water available for irrigation at the farm-gate: thus mining of groundwater at this rate may 
lead to serious future problems of groundwater depletion. Groundwater levels in the Fordwah 
distributary showed a considerable fall by the end of the kharif1997 (October) however they 
rose again in rabi 1997-98 because of less groundwater extraction and better canal water 
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supply in the rabi season18. In Mahmood distributary, on the other hand, the water table is 
rising because of much better canal water supply and less groundwater extraction. Farmers in 
the watercourse MD 1 -R already have problems in growing cotton because of shallow water 
table; rice is second major crop in Many besides sugar cane. If this situation prevails water-
logging may create problems in future. 
The patterns of conjunctive water use at the farm level suggest that in future groundwater will 
have to continue to provide significant amount of water for crop production. At times of 
scarcity farmers in Fordwah distributary continue to irrigate even with very bad quality 
groundwater that is considered to be unfit for irrigation (see section 5.2). Farmers do take 
some measures to control salinity build up, like applying heavy pre-irrigation with canal 
water and blending the canal water with tubewell water, but Kuper (1997) found that these 
measures have a smaller effect than a change in a significant quantity and quality of irrigation 
water. He suggests to re-allocate canal water for salinity and sodicity control: higher 
allocation of canal water to the areas effected by salinity will reduce the groundwater 
pumpage and salinity. However his modelling results showed that this re-allocation would 
result in significant decrease (about 40 %) in an area of considerable or high sodicity risk, it 
would also increase the area with low sodicity risk by 23 %, which may not be a desirable 
situation for many farmers. Besides the re-allocation may result in increased cropping 
intensity in the watercourses with high canal water allocation (Kijne, 1998). This study has 
also shown that farmers with better canal water supply grow high water demanding crops. 
Therefore, more actions are needed to ensure sustainable use of groundwater. This 
sustainability can be ensured by taking measures like a) improving reliability of canal water 
delivery, b) devising appropriate operational management strategies and technologies for 
groundwater extraction such as skimming wells (Asghar et al., 2001)19, and c) by 
incorporating the issue of groundwater extraction rights in the legislation of the PIDA acts as 
recommended by other researchers (Punjab Private Sector Groundwater Development Project 
Consultants, 2000: Technical Report No. 38, 42, and. 45). 
Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) 
The irrigation system in Pakistan is going through institutional changes. The World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank and the Government of Japan are assisting20 the Government of 
Pakistan to undertake these institutional reforms. Merrey (1997) identified two models of 
Irrigation Management Transfer: the Asian model and the World Bank model. The Asian 
model takes the grass root level as the starting point and is therefore more interested in the 
situation already existing. Whereas the World Bank model aims for rapid and intensive 
institutional reforms, but which still requires farmers' participation. Because of the high 
involvement of the World Bank in Pakistan's economy it is possible that part of the irrigation 
systems are turned over to the farmers organisation at higher speed than the Asian model 
proposes (De Klein and Wahaj, 1998) 
Whichever model is used in executing the proposed irrigation sector institutional reforms, 
farmers organisations in several distributaries2' and watercourses are being formed for pilot-
testing of the viability of these organisations and their capacity to operate and maintain the 
19 
Because of insufficient availability of data decline in groundwater level could not be studied for a year. 
A well which can extract relatively fresh groundwater from an aquifer underlain by saline groundwater for 
instance a multi-strainer shallow well, dugwell, compound well, etc. 
20
 In fact the World Bank threatened Pakistan to stop loans if they do not agree with the institutional reforms in 
irrigation sector proposed by the World Bank. 
21
 This pilot testing is underway in all the four provinces of the country. 
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secondary and tertiary levels of the irrigation systems (Starkloff and Zaman, 1999). However 
in reality farmers are already managing and maintaining the system at the tertiary level, 
specifically in day to day management, with little or no interference of the Irrigation 
Department. 
This research has shown that many informal initiatives are organised at the watercourse level 
and in some cases even at the sub-distributary level - like in the case of desilting of the 
Mahmood distributary. However, these organisations are not formal but have certain rules22, 
which are acknowledged and followed by the farmers. For example it has been demonstrated 
in chapter 4 that the watercourse desilting is organised in a very systematic way and farmers 
have developed their own rules to acquire additional canal water through remodelling of the 
mogha. Similarly although warabandi becomes flexible in practice, it remains the reference 
point for all the farmers when it comes to water allocation and rules for water distribution. 
This shows that farmers do have potential to manage their system as a group at watercourse 
level. However, at the same time farmers opt for pakka warabandi whenever they are unsure 
of their equitable arrangements of a katcha warabandi. Which implies that they need an 
unbiased outsider whom they can trust for the conflict resolution when it comes to their water 
rights. 
It has also been observed that as a group they feel accountable to their fellow farmers within 
a watercourse. For example, in the case of watercourse maintenance, a social pressure of loss 
of face in front of others has been seen as an incentive to join the collective efforts to clean 
23 
the watercourse . When it comes to the Farmers Organisations at the higher level in the 
system where people do not know each other that well, they may feel less obliged to take part 
in the group activities (De Klein and Wahaj, 1998). This study has also revealed that while 
farmers do not steal water from another shareholder of the same watercourse, they do steal 
water from the distributary through siphoning24. However farmers from three tail tertiary 
units of Mahmood distributary collectively desilt their distributary, other farmers from 
upstream tertiary unit have tried to prevent this desilting in June as the whole distributary has 
to be shut down for cleaning. Farmers from a distributary can pressurise the Gauge Reader to 
increase the discharge of their distributary without considering the fact that this increase in 
discharge in their distributary will result in decrease in the discharge of another distributary. 
That shows that these farmers feel less obliged and accountable to other farmers at the higher 
level of the system, who they do not know very well. This means that political power may 
still be able to ensure privilege in the new water management structure. However, the 
interaction between the Farmers Organisations and other farmers may improve the 
accountability between them. 
This research has also shown that farmers as individuals and as groups try and exploit all the 
water resources and manipulate every opportunity to acquire additional canal water. Starkloff 
and Zaman (1999) opine that most of the farmers' illegal actions to minimise relative water 
scarcity are individualised rather than collective in nature. However this research suggests 
that the most effective and commonly undertaken action to acquire additional canal water is 
the remodelling of the mogha, and is collectively performed. In all the selected watercourses 
it was at least discussed even if it was not materialised. It is not necessary to have formal 
organisations for a range of effective action to take place. Influential farmers can get higher 
22
 These rules are made by fanners themselves. 
See section 4.5.1 for details. 
24
 Though the percentage of farmers who are practising this is not very big, it depends on the opportunity a 
farmer gets to indulge in this practice: usually farmers who have their irrigation turn at night do it. 
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benefit as compared to the small and less influential farmers in a watercourse. There is a 
question whether people can come out of this circle of contested water control after the 
turnover of irrigation management from the agency to the farmers, who at present do not let 
go of any opportunity, legal or illegal, to try and get additional canal water supply. Will small 
farmers, who are dependent on influential and big farmers so much so that they do not even 
object to the existing inequities, be able to object to the inequities in the water distribution 
and get their fair share? And will they get fair representation in Farmers Organisations (FOs)? 
Starkloff and Zaman (1999) found that the small farmers, with landholding size 10 acres 
(4.04 ha.) or less are under-represented in the pilot FOs25. They recommend a higher 
participation of small farmers in FOs - something that does not seem an easy task 
considering the political nature of the irrigation management in Pakistan. More recently, in 
2001, a meeting to review the pilot testing of the Farmers' Organisations was held in which 
participants, who included those involved in organising the farmers, reviewed the future of 
National Drainage Programme26 (NDP) and the strategies. Two of the major concerns of the 
participants of the meetings were misuse of power by influential and sustainability of 
Farmers' Organisations (NDP, 2001). The following concerns are stated in the minutes of the 
meeting: 
• The inherent danger in a rapid transition are the misuse of these forums by vested 
interests to the detriment of the small farmers and a breakdown of the operational and 
regulatory controls especially in a water shortage scenario as experienced on 4-R Hakra 
distributary where 50 % outlets were found tampered with by FO Members 
• Three FOs registered in Bahawalnagar Canal Circle were brought up under 
FESS27 with the social mobilisation in about 5 years through very costly input by 
IIMI/OFWM, Even these FOs are not yet sustainable. 
With these concerns on board and considering the political nature of the irrigation 
management and water control PIM has a tough task ahead. Care has to be taken to involve 
non-influential farmers in the process and to safeguard interests of these small farmers. 
7.4 ISSUES FOR STUDY IN FUTURE 
This research can be used as the benchmark to compare farmers' actions for water 
management before and after the irrigation management reforms are implemented. It is also 
interesting to go back to the study area after a few years and see what is happening after part 
of the system is handed to the Farmers Organisations. For that an intensive data collection 
program is not needed, a fair amount of information can be gathered by observations and 
talking to the farmers. More recently Gowing et al. (1996) have presented a research method 
with farmers to rate their satisfaction with water supply that does not depend on extensive 
discharge measurements. This approach uses fuzzy set theory to quantify farmers linguistic 
expressions use to rate the water supply that they call 'utility of supply'. However, while this 
method has been tested usefully at different places - including large-scale canal irrigation 
schemes in Sudan (Gezira scheme) and two schemes in Egypt), it is not recommended for a 
comparative assessment of water supply. This method of assessing water supply utility could 
still give an insight into how water users rate their water delivery and whether or not they are 
25
 Farmer' Organisation will eventually take over the responsibility of a) maintenance of the distributary b) 
equitable water distribution within a distributary, and c) collection of abiana from the farmers. 
26
 NDP is the long term programme through which funding is channelled in the irrigation and drainage sector in 
Pakistan. 
27
 FESS is Fordwah Eastern Sadiqia System 
176 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
satisfied with the level of irrigation delivery service. In the new set-up of Participatory 
Irrigation Management in Pakistan - that is considered to be more service oriented - this 
method could be useful for improving or 'actualising' water distribution. However, more 
research is required to find out if this method is applicable in the 'Water Delivery 
Environment' of Pakistan28 - the large-scale irrigation systems with conjunctive water use, 
very diverse farm level cropping patterns and diverse socio-economic conditions. The 
schemes in Sudan and Egypt where this method was tested mainly had more or less fixed 
cropping patterns with almost no groundwater extraction. 
This research was done in two perennial distributaries. It would be interesting to study the 
difference in the water management activities undertaken by the farmers from the non-
perennial distributary that receives water only for one season. 
Another interesting (desk) study would be to compare indicators calculated by Remote 
Sensing with the primary field data analysis making use of studies like this study. The current 
study considered to compare the two methods for watercourse level - especially for the yield 
- but it was not possible since watercourse level remote sensing data was not available to the 
researcher. 
Many questions about the water use by farmers and their yields arose during this study. Some 
initial efforts are made here to initiate the discussion for further research. However more 
systematic studies of fanner water use practices, on when and how much water they use -
such as that by groundwater - are recommended to give more insight into social and technical 
reasons for patterns of water use at the field level. The discussion on two issues - how do 
farmers' water use patterns influence the yield of major crops?, and how do farmers' irrigation 
frequencies match the scientific irrigation scheduling for major crops? - is initiated with a 
brief analysis in the following paragraphs. 
Water use and productivity 
Farmers with different agrarian conditions and water availability use water differently. While, 
it was not possible to show different water use pattern for major crops in the area an attempt 
was made to get an overview of water depth applied and yield of the two major crops: cotton 
and wheat. Farmers from only three Fordwah watercourses (FD 67-L, FD 84-L, and FD 96-
R) were considered in the analysis. The information on fertiliser/pesticide use was inadequate 
to include in analysis. More studies could be done on yield response curves achieved by 
farmers with different production conditions and water supply. 
Cotton 
Fig 7.3 presents the irrigation water depth applied to cotton and crop yield corresponding to 
each depth. Depth of water applied is averaged for every 50 mm and so is yield for 
corresponding depths. The depths of water applied and their corresponding yields range from 
247 mm to 942 mm and 0.13 to 1.34 tons/ha, respectively. The highest cotton yield (1.34 
tons/ha) was achieved when the depth of water available at farm-gate was 786 mm - RWS 
approximately equal to 1. The crop water requirement of cotton in the area is 790 mm for 
1997. 
28
 The results obtained by such research methods could also be compared with other studies - such as this study 
- which are based on intensive field data collection at farm and watercourse level. 
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Fordwah distributary 
Wheat 
Fig. 7.4 shows depths of irrigation water applied to wheat and crop yield corresponding to 
each depth. Irrigation water depths applied are averaged for each 50 mm and so is yield for 
corresponding depths. Variations in depths of water applied and in yields are high, and range 
from 91 to 867 mm and from 1.5 to 2.6 tons/ha, respectively. The highest yield (2.6 tons/ha) 
was achieved when the water depth was 419 mm - RWS = 0.93. The crop water requirement 
of wheat in the area is 450 mm for 1997-98. This yield response curve shows that farmers are 
achieving about 58 % of the highest yield (2.6 tons/ha.) even with a very modest water 
supply, which is about 22 % of the water depth (i.e. 419 mm) with highest yield. This shows 
the need for more in-depth study of the farmers differential water supply to different crops 
during one water turn. 
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Comparing irrigation frequencies of farmers with the irrigation scheduling 
The yields of different farmers vary in the study area, depending on the irrigation and other 
production choices made by the fanners. It would be interesting to make further studies of the 
frequency and the depth of water applied by farmers with those recommended by computer 
software. Table 7.3 compares the depth of water applied by a farmer FD 84-L CID 12 to 
cotton crop and the depth for same irrigations suggested by computer software CROPWAT 4 
for Windows. CID 84-L 12 is an owner cum cultivator who has direct access to tubewell 
water. He mainly cultivates cotton and wheat. In kharif 1997 cotton was 70 % of his 
cultivated area. With medium textured soil and actual irrigation interval followed by the 
farmer, irrigation depths suggested by CROPWAT 4 for Windows are higher than the actual 
applied depths, except for first irrigation. In calculating actual depth applied a general value 
of 75 % field application efficiency was considered which might bring in some errors, as 
application efficiency could be much higher in a water-scarce environment. The CROPWAT 
suggests that this farmer will have about 26 % of yield reduction. The actual cotton yield of 
this farmer was 0.6 tons/ha., which was 25 % less than the average yield of cotton in this 
watercourse, and about 60% less than the average yield in Punjab for that season. Whether 
farmers are practising deficit irrigation, or there remains a question on computer software for 
assessing irrigation water requirements, is a research issue for the future. 
179 
FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGATION PERFORMANCE BELOW THE MOGHA 
Table 7.3: Comparing depth of water applied to cotton by a farmer with the depth 
proposed by computer software CROPWAT 4 for Windows 
Irrigation 
Pre-irrigation (Rouni) 
Sowing 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Total 
Irrigation Water Requirement 
Irrigation 
interval (days) 
30 
25 
20 
20 
25 
25 
Depth suggested by 
CROPWAT (mm) 
150* 
30 
59 
79 
84 
61 
34 
497 
497 
Actual depth 
applied (mm) 
120 
79 
48 
63 
42 
52 
32 
436 
Deficit 
(mm) 
30 
-49 
11 
16 
42 
9 
2 
61 
* Soil assumed to be at field capacity 
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This empirical study was conducted to gain more insight in the roles already played by 
farmers in shaping the water availability at the tertiary outlet and farm-gate in an agency 
managed supply-based irrigation system with a dysfunctional water supply that is going to 
experience some drastic institutional changes in the near future. Presently, farmers are not 
suppose to have any role in the management of main irrigation system. However this study 
has demonstrated that direct or indirect roles of farmers in water distribution are extensive -
through their interventions at different levels. Already, farmers as individuals and as groups 
are trying their best to achieve as much water control as possible and it seems they will 
continue to do it. Participatory irrigation management or not, with or without new Farmers 
Organisations, farmers will continue to try and acquire control over irrigation water, since for 
them control over irrigation water is like control over their own lives - as water is life. 
180 
APPENDICES 
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APPENDIX II: UPHOFF'S CUBIC MATRIX OF IRRIGATION TASKS 
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Source: Uphoff 1986 
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APPENDIX III: TRAJECTORY METHOD OF DISCHARGE MEASUREMENTS 
The discharge of a horizontal pipe could be estimated with the trajectory method that consists 
of measuring horizontal (X) and vertical (Y) co-ordinates of a point (see figure III-I) in the jet 
issuing from the end of a pipe (Stock, 1995, in USBR Water Management Manual, 1997). 
Figure III-I: 
Source: 
Co-ordinate method tubewell discharge measurement. 
USBR Water Management Manual, 1997. 
The equation for discharge from a fully filled pipe is as follows: 
Q = CAX4gl2Y 
Where 
Q = Discharge ft3/sec 
C = Co-efficient 
A = Area of the pipe in ft2 
X = X-co-ordinate in ft 
Y = Y co-ordinate in ft 
g = Acceleration due to gravity in ft/sec2 
The value of C commonly used in calculations is 1 (Michael, 1978). The flow from partially 
filled pipes is estimated by multiplying the flow obtained from the equation mentioned above 
by the percentage area of the pipe that is filled at the end of the pipe. 
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APPENDIX IV: TENANCY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE SELECTED 
WATERCOURSE 
(Slightly adapted from Terpstra 1998) 
Three kinds of tenancy agreement are legal. One is sharecropping, where the tenant and the 
landowner have a 50 percent share in production. The second is leasing. In this case the 
cultivator pays a fixed price for a certain time for use of the land. The third one is 
shareholding. Here, a permanent labourer provides manual labour for l/5th or 1/10th of the 
yield. This person does normally not invest in land or crops. 
However, one person can be involved in more than one tenancy agreement with one or more 
farmers. For example, people who cultivate their own land (owner-cum-cultivators) might 
lease and/or sharecrop in more land. Landowners might rent or sharecrop part of their land 
out, while cultivating the other part themselves. Even landowners might rent out their own 
land and sharecrop or rent in another piece of land in the next watercourse. The following 
combinations are found in the study area (OC = owner-cum-cultivator, OL = leasing out land; 
OT = sharecropping out land; L = leasing in land; T = sharecropping in land): 
OC 
OC/OL/L/T 
OL/OT 
T/L 
OC/L 
OC/OT 
OL/OT/T 
OC/L/T 
OC/T 
OL/T 
OC/OL 
OL 
OT 
OC/OL/OT 
OL/L 
L 
OC/OL/L 
OL/L/T 
T 
Note that these combinations are the sum of contracts an individual farmer has in different 
watercourses. For example, a farmer who is landowner in more than one watercourse might 
lease land out in one watercourse, cultivate his land in another watercourse, and lease in extra 
land in the same watercourse (OC/OL/L). 
In short six categories can summarise all the above-mentioned combinations: 
I Owner-cum-cultivators; An owner who cultivates his own land 
II Owner-cum-tenants (owner-cum-cultivators who are also sharecropping or renting 
land in); 
HI Owner-cum-cultivators who sharecrop or rent part of their land out; 
IV Landowners who sharecrop or rent out all their land (landlords); 
V Landless cultivators who sharecrop or rent land in; 
VI Mixed strategy. 
In category I we find landowners who do not rent or sharecrop land in or out. They are 
dependent on their own fields and are not involved in tenancy contracts. Farmers in category 
II are owner-cultivators who seek extra land to cultivate; either by renting land, 
sharecropping land, or both (OC/L, OC/L/T, and OC/T). In category III the farmers are the 
owner-cultivators who have more land than they can or want to cultivate, and sharecrop or 
rent part of their land out, while they keep on cultivating themselves (OC/OL, OC/OL/OT, 
OC/OT). Category IV consists of landowners who do not cultivate themselves anymore. Not 
everyone in this category is an absentee landlord. Some have found a (good) job outside 
agriculture, and simply do not have the time for cultivation anymore. Some just sit at home 
while receiving the rent. These landowners are not involved in agricultural activities anymore 
(OL, OT and OL/OT). Category V is a group of landless farmers. They are involved in 
agriculture because of tenancy relationships with one or more landowners. Category VI is a 
somewhat vague category of people who both rent land in and out, or sharecrop land in and 
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out, or have their own land that they rent out, and sharecrop another piece. The ratio behind 
these strategies differs per individual. 
Different terms and conditions for sharecropping and leasing contracts are now reviewed. 
SHARECROPPING 
Sharecropping for 50 percent of the yield is the most common, even dominant, practice in 
sharecropping. Only some cultivators sharecrop for 25 percent, or even for l/6th or l/8th of 
the harvest. Sharecropping for 50 percent is an arrangement in which the cultivator provides 
labour, pays 50 percent of the inputs, and has a 50 percent share in the yield. Cultivators, who 
sharecrop for 25 percent provide labour, pay 25 percent of the inputs and get a quarter of the 
yield. Sharecroppers for l/8th, however, provide labour, get l/8th of the yield, but do not pay 
for inputs. In sharecropping the whole household is involved in providing labour. The 
contract is made with a household or family rather than with one person. 
The sharecropping contract 
Generally, sharecropping contracts are verbal commitments between a landowner and a 
cultivator. The parties do not always discuss a specific time period of duration of the 
sharecropping contract. The norm is that it is for at least one year (one kharif and one rab'x 
season). When relations between the landowner and the tenant are good, the contract is likely 
to be prolonged. Some tenants work on the same fields for more than 20 years. Both parties 
can end the contract at the end of the Rabi season, when the wheat is harvested. It is an 
unwritten rule to end the contracts in this period, both for sharecropping and renting. This 
unwritten rule is hardly violated, except when serious conflicts between the parties arise. The 
party who wants to end it should inform the other party in time, to give him the chance to 
look for a new tenant or a new piece of land. 
The terms and conditions of sharecropping contracts are more or less fixed. Normally, the 
costs of inputs, like fertiliser and pesticides are shared on a 50-50 basis. When the tenant 
purchases inputs, he ought to get 50 percent back from the landowner, and when the 
landowner purchases inputs he has the right to ask 50 percent back from the tenant. The costs 
are balanced at the end of the season either in cash or in an equivalent part of the harvest. 
The expenditures on seeds are 100 percent paid by the tenant. Often an exception is made for 
expensive seeds, like sugarcane, fodder and potato. Then the costs are shared on a 50-50 
basis. If tubewell water is purchased the costs are shared. When the landowner has his own 
tube well, the tenant can use this water if he arranges the fuel to run the tube well. Mostly the 
tenant has to pay the fuel; sometimes he gets 50 percent of these costs back. The costs for 
hired labour are 100 percent for the tenant, as he is responsible for all the labour on the fields. 
Instead of hiring labour, many tenants prefer to exchange labour with neighbours and friends, 
or make use of family labour. Sometimes, sharecroppers are (agricultural) wage labourers 
themselves to earn more money. In the study area only in one instance the tenant paid only 50 
percent of the costs for hired labour'. Tenants also pay 50 percent of abiana (water tax). 
When cultivators break the mogha, the Patwari (with permission of SDO) imposes a penalty 
upon the landowners. Tenants have to pay 50 percent of the fine back to the landowner. It is 
felt that the tenant directly benefits from the extra water. In case officials from Irrigation 
Department are bribed for increasing the size of the mogha, tenants do not have to pay a 
In the study area only in one instance the tenant paid only 50 percent of the costs for hired labour. He said that 
the reason for this is that he works very hard, and the landowner earns about Rs 8.000 to 10.000 per acre, which 
is much more compared with the tenant he had before. 
185 
FARMERS A CTIONS AND IMPRO VEMENTS IN IRRIGA TION PERFORMANCE BELO W THE MOGHA 
share2. People see this as a more permanent arrangement for improving water availability, 
although it happens that farmers have to bribe every year for changing the size of the mogha. 
Normally, the landowner pays big expenditures, like lining the watercourse, maintenance of 
the watercourse, and installation of a tube well. The tenant provides labour in these activities. 
The tenant bears responsibility for paying the more common or general management 
activities, like for the costs for hiring equipment for levelling the fields, ploughing, 
harvesting, transport of manure and loading of sugarcane and wheat. 
In a sharecropping contract for 25 percent, the landowner arranges all the inputs, because the 
tenant can mostly not afford them. The tenant does all the manual work, like weeding, 
irrigation and harvesting. 
In a few instances, landowners give their land on sharecropping for l/8th of the share. In this 
contract the tenant has no expenditures on inputs whatsoever, but is supposed to do all the 
work. In this way a landowner can get a permanent labourer for the whole season, who helps 
him with manual labour. Often the tenant does not have permission to work with machinery, 
like ploughing with the tractor, which is done by the landowners' family. 
Task-division and decision-making 
Sharecropper families are the actual contemporary cultivators. They bear responsibility for all 
cultivation activities that involve manual labour, like ploughing, irrigation and daily 
maintenance of the fields, maintenance and desilting of the watercourses, application of 
fertiliser spray, making boundaries on the fields, harvesting etc. The tenants make decisions 
on daily management activities. For non-daily management activities, like levelling the fields, 
applying fertiliser or spray, growing a certain crop, or purchasing water for irrigation, they 
often need permission from the landowner. Applying fertiliser and spray is sometimes done 
under supervision of the landowner. 
Generally, decisions are made through mutual discussion, especially important decisions like 
which crops to grow, although the landowner has veto-right. Room for decision-making by 
the tenants differs in the following situations: 
Landowner does not take part in decision-making and actual cultivation; just takes part of the 
yield (e.g. absentee landowner and some big landowners); 
Landowner advises, but leaves actual decision-making for tenants; 
Landowner (or family) tells the tenant what to do and make all the decision himself. He 
sometimes criticises tenant's work that a tenant perceived as 'teasing'. 
The degree, to which a landowner leaves room for the tenant to cultivate in his own way, 
depends on three factors. These are the attitude of the landowner, the socio-economic 
position of the landowner and the tenant, and whether the landowner is absentee or not. 
Attitude 
A few landowners are not much interested in agriculture, and just want their share of the 
yield. They leave decisions to the cultivator, who is more interested in agriculture and more 
experienced. To avoid conflicts some landowners allow their tenants to cultivate in the way 
they like. Both the owner and the tenant benefit if the crop grows well on that piece of land. 
2
 In this case tenants are not even involved in the discussion and negotiation process unless he is also a 
landowner in the watercourse command area. However, in one of the watercourse FD 67-L tenants are usually 
involved in this process of acquiring additional canal water. 
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If the tenant grows a crop that does not give much yield, he knows for the next year that the 
crop is not suitable for that piece of land, and will listen to the landowner. Most landowners 
keep an eye on the tenants' work in order to maintain control over the crop, soil, and water. 
Socio-economic position 
A tenant may have a higher socio-economic status than the landowner. In this case it is very 
likely that the tenant is the principal manager of the land. A nice example is a landowner on 6 
killa who sharecrops the land from a widow without sons. This person expressed his 
preference for a 'weak' owner, because in this situation he makes the decisions on which 
crops to grow. The advantage for this woman to give the land in sharecropping is that she 
gets half of the yield at the end of the season. 
Landowners mostly like tenants who are poorer than them, because they are perceived to 
work harder and better to get a (fair) share. They should be able to bear the expenditures of 
sharecropping though. In this way the landowner also has a certain authority over the tenant, 
which would be hard to exercise if the tenant is richer. At the same time tenants do not prefer 
very rich or big landowners, as the landowner might ask them to do extra work like in the 
traditional landlord - kammi relationship. This decreases their honour and the time they can 
spend on cultivation. Moreover, if the landowner has more or less the same social-economic 
status, the tenants feel free to go to him frequently and discuss management activities or ask 
permission for certain activities. Sharecroppers often prefer smaller landowners because they 
cannot bear the expenses of cultivation on large fields. 
Absentee landowners 
A tenant has much more decision-making authority, when the landowner is absentee; that is 
when he lives in a far away village or town, or even abroad (Saudi Arabia). When the 
landowner is living nearby, he can often meet the tenant, like once in 2 or 3 days and 
sometimes every day. Hence can interfere more in day to day decision making process, for 
example when to apply fertiliser, whether to purchase tube well water or not, etc. An absentee 
landowner might visit the fields now and then, or check the condition of the fields every year. 
Still, the tenants have much more responsibility for maintenance and management of the 
fields and the watercourses. 
Landowners, who give the land on sharecropping for less than 50 percent share, consider the 
tenant to be a permanent labourer to be paid in part of the yield, instead of in money. The 
landowner is the sole decision maker and bears costs of all the inputs. Labourer does all the 
physical work including physically irrigation of the fields, fertiliser application etc. However 
all the work related to machinery, for example ploughing, is done by the landowner. 
RENTING 
Renting land means that the renter is not only the contemporary cultivator; he is also the 
contemporary owner. The real landowner will still be the legal landowner, but after paying 
the rent the renter has full decision-making power over the land for the duration of the 
contract. 
Factors that increase the rent of a piece of land are: 
Good condition of the soil: fertile land; 
Availability of tube well water; 
Fields close to the main watercourse branch; 
Less amount of land available for renting in the area; 
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Inflation. 
Factors that devalue a piece of land are: 
Sandy soil; 
Bad condition of the soil in general; 
Problems of water logging; 
Problems of salinity; 
Fields far away from the main water channel. 
The renting contract 
When the contract is discussed between the future renter and the landowner, the rent and the 
duration of the contract is one of the most important points for discussion. In this area a 
landowner can ask Rs 5000 (US$ 125) for one acre of fertile land on which a tube well is 
available. On sandy lands where no tube well is available the rent rate is around Rs 2000 
(US$ 50). Fields of bad quality, but with access to tube well water are leased out for about Rs 
3500 (US$ 88) per acre, and the same counts for fields of good quality, but without tube well. 
The rent rate for a piece of land also depends on the bargaining power of the landlord and the 
tenant, e.g. a landowner who urgently needs money reduces the rent to find a tenant quickly. 
Most contracts are for one or two years. There are a few exceptions: when a landowner is in 
urgent need of money, he might gives the land on rent for 3 or 4 years, since the money for 
the whole period is paid in advance. Among family members the duration of the contract is 
sometimes more than average. After one or two years, the contract can be extended if both 
parties agree. Some renters take care of one field for the last 5 to 8 years, but this is 
exceptional. 
Usually the maximum time for a renting contract is five years. The reason behind this is not 
only that landowners want to increase the rent as often as possible. There are examples of 
renters who have tried to occupy land that they rent by transferring it to their name. So people 
are afraid that after five years the renter might not want to leave the land anymore3. 
Normally, the rent should be fully paid in advance, although there are exceptions. Sometimes 
the renter and the landowner agree that the rent will be paid after the kharif cash crop (cotton 
or sugarcane). In that way the renter gets the chance to earn the rent from his cultivation 
practices, so that he does not have to invest a lot of money in advance. 
The rent is fixed until the end of the contract; after the contract the rent may increase or 
decrease. The landowner increases the rent before the next contract when the yield is good, 
there is more canal water or a tube well has been installed. Farmers say that landowners like 
short-term contracts of one or two years, so that they can increase the rent. When the yield is 
disappointing the lessee may ask the landowner to decrease the rate. Renters often like 
longer-term contracts than their landowners for the same reason. If they know the land is 
theirs for more than one year, they have more security, and feel more responsible for the land. 
After one or two years lessees also know which crops are suitable for that soil, and they get 
higher yields. 
In the study area an exception is a person who first sharecropped land for many years and than rented the same 
land for 8 years more. He says that the landowner knows that he would not try to occupy the land, and this thrust 
is why the contract is prolonged every year. 
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Task-division and decision-making 
Once the rent is paid all the costs and benefits are for the renter. The owner has no concern 
with the land anymore. An owner cannot prevent excessive use of chemical fertiliser or (bad 
quality) tube well water, as he cannot interfere with the renter's cultivation practices. There 
are a few things that the landowner remains responsible for. These are: 
Matters related with the government like changing the size of the mogha, taxes and paying 
the fine for breaking the mogha. Often the renter has to pay these costs back to the 
landowner, as he is the one who benefits from the land; 
Planning the making of new watercourses; 
Paying for big long-term investments, like installation of a tube well (that will be the property 
of the landowner), or lining the watercourse; 
Trees on the land and on the boundaries remain the property of the landowner. Tenants 
cannot cut them (even a branch from it) without his permission; 
Making decisions about matters related with neighbouring land, like straightening a 
watercourse on the boundary of two fields. 
So the landowner still has some tasks and decision-making power in a renting contract. The 
owner plans the big, long-term investments. If the owner wants the lessee to participate in 
activities like levelling the land, dig a new watercourse or help installing a tube well, he has 
to ask these things at the time contract is agreed upon. A lessee is interested in these things if 
he takes the land for 4 to 5 years. If he leases the land in for only one year, there is less 
advantage for him to participate in these activities. 
Usually the lessee also has right to use water turn allocated to the piece of land he rents in. He 
can sell the water turn if he wants, or give it to another cultivator whenever he does not want 
to use his water turn. He also does not have to share the cost of lining of the watercourse but 
he has to bear the cost of maintaining the watercourse and levelling the land. However, there 
are some exceptions, in some cases a lessee needs permission of landowner for giving or 
selling the warabandi turn to someone else, and the landowner participates in costs for 
maintenance of the watercourse and levelling land. 
The responsibilities of a lessee are: 
Full responsibilities for daily maintenance of the land and the watercourses in the fields; 
Decisions about non-daily management activities, like which crops to grow, whether to 
cultivate with oxen or tractor, how much fertiliser he applies, whether he applies chemical 
fertiliser or manure, how often he sprays, etc. Whether he leaves the land fallow or not, that is 
of no concern for the owner; 
Bears all the costs of all inputs, and the whole yield is for him; 
He pays 100 percent of abiana, bribes and penalties imposed by the Irrigation Department for 
breaking the mogha. A penalty is on the name of the official landowner, but the lessee pays 
for it, because he is the one who benefits from the additional water during the warabandi 
turns. 
Normally, if the landowner has a tube well on the land, the renter does not have to pay for its 
use; he just arranges the machinery and the fuel to run it. 
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APPENDIX V: MAIN TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ID STAFF 
Main Tasks and Responsibilities of the Irrigation Department Staff as considered by the staff 
themselves are listed here. These responsibilities can also be found in the Revenue Manual. 
Patwari 
1. Making warabandi: Making and remaking of warabandi of a chak if requested by the 
farmers. 
2. Gardawari: Visit villages every 15 days or one month to record cropping pattern for 
abiana calculations. 
3. Reporting water theft: Check the area on which stolen irrigation water has been used and 
report the incidence to his officers. 
Sub-Engineer 
1. Surveying: Surveying of the distributary channel once every three years. 
2. Maintenance of the distributary: Strengthening of the bank of the distributary channel 
after every five years. 
3. Water distribution: Equitable water distribution within the distributary. Check dimensions 
of the outlets - B, Y and H - of the outlets every month. 
4. Water theft: Deal with water theft and tampering with the mogha. 
5. Checking of watercourse condition: If farmers do not maintain their watercourse, and 
waste canal irrigation water report to XEN and SDO who are supposed to take action 
against farmers - collect fine and get the watercourse maintained. 
Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) 
1. Water Distribution: Equitable water distribution of available water within the sub-
division. 
2. Maintenance: Strengthening of banks of the distributary channels after every five years. 
3. Other tasks - like communicate with the other SDOs upstream and downstream about the 
Executive Engineer4 
1. Water Distribution: Equitable water distribution within the division 
2. Revenue assessment 
3. New supply to barren lands on request by farmers 
4. Other management work - for example estimate of demand for the whole sub-division, 
and make estimate for maintenance of channels etc. 
5. If farmers complain that the discharge to their outlets is less than the design discharge 
then ID measures the discharge. 
4
 Apart form these tasks XEN of the study area also felt that he has to work for Member of Provincial who 
influence water distribution. The ID staff gets transferred or suspended if they do not follow the instructions of 
MPA. 
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APPENDIX VI: OUTLETS TYPES IN THE SELECTED WATERCOURSES 
The standard design and functioning of the three different types of outlets of the selected 
watercourses are described in this section after Mahbub and Gulhati (1951). 
Adjustable Proportional Module or Adjustable Orifice Semi-Module 
The Adjustable Proportional Module (APM) is a long throated flume with a roof block at the 
upstream end of a parallel throat (see Figure I). The roof block is adjustable and is attached 
with the flume through a couple of bolts. To prevent it from tampering, the bolts are secured 
by a masonry key. 
Figure VI-I: Sketch of Adjustable Proportional Module (APM) 
As is clear from its name, it is a modular structure: modularity is ensured by the introduction 
of standing wave, and so long as the wave is steady and remains clear of the exit of the 
orifice, the discharge coefficient does not alter. The roof block is such that "the jet is made to 
fill the exit of the orifice and jet contraction is suppressed. Also by extending the parallel 
throat to a distance G below the exit, curvature of the jet is avoided thereby ensuring a 
uniform velocity—distribution over the section of the jet". Thus the discharge is dependent 
on VHS. The discharge formulae is as follows: 
q = 13B,YJHi 
where: 
q 
B, 
Y 
Hs 
Discharge (ft /s) 
Width of the opening (ft) 
Elevation of the roof block above the crest of an outlet (ft) 
Height between the upstream water level and the suffit of the roof block (ft) 
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In the case where water does not touch the roof block the outlet behaves like weir and hence a 
weir formula should be used to calculate the discharge. 
In the beginning the APM outlets were designed for proportional water distribution. But with 
the time it was found that this type of outlet created a problem of siltation in the distributary 
therefore the crest of the outlets were lowered (from 6/10 to 8/10) which solved the problem 
of silt but made it more rigid. It was not proportional anymore. This new modified form of an 
APM outlet was called the Adjustable Orifice Semi-Module (AOSM) (Mahbub and Gulhati, 
1951). Later as experience was gained and some experiments were carried out, some more 
changes were made in the design of AOSM. For example the length of the gullet was 2 feet 
for all the cases. The sidewalls below the gullet were given a fixed radius of 25 feet, the 
curves starting tangentially from the throat. Instead of roof block having a horizontal base, a 
lemniscate curve with a tilt of 1 in 7.5 is provided (see figure II).These changes helped 
improved the proportionality of the outlet. 
Gulhati after some experiments found out that the discharge formulae for AOSM remains the 
same as for APM. 
i:-> ; " . f 
Figure VI-II: Sketch of Adjustable Orifice Semi-Module (AOSM) 
The outlet is difficult to tamper with, however it could not be fully ruled out. The roof block 
could be raised bodily and then re-fixed, although it is easier to detect the tampering. A 
wooden block inserted at the downstream side of the roof block could increase the discharge 
since it forms an airtight roof in continuation of the roof block. The discharge is increased 
due to imperfect aeration of the jet. 
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Open Flume 
The Open Flume (OF) Outlet is like a weir and is mostly found in the tail clusters5 as in the 
case with the watercourse MD 11860 TC. Figure III presents the sketch of Crump's open 
flume outlet that is generally in use in Punjab, Pakistan. The advantage of this type of outlet 
is that it can draw water even with the minimum small head. However, in most of the cases 
the outlet is either deep & narrow, which can easily be blocked or wide and shallow that 
makes it hyper-proportional. Due to this reason this outlet is often installed at the tail. 
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Figure VI-III: Sketch of Open Flume (OF) 
The discharge formula for the open flume outlet is: 
Where, 
q 
K 
B, 
G 
q = KB,G3 
Discharge (ft /s) 
Coefficient of discharge 
Bed width of the outlet (ft) 
Depth of water over the crest of outlet (ft) 
5
 The group or cluster of outlets at the tail of the distributary or any irrigation channel. 
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The Open Flume outlet is not easily adjustable: if adjustments have to be made the structure 
has to be either partially or fully constructed. It is proportional if installed at 0.9 of the depth 
of the depth of the distributary. Silt drawing capacity is highest if installed at the bed level: 
the higher the crest of the outlet compared with the bed level of the distributary, the less is the 
silt drawing capacity of the outlet (OF). 
Open Flume with Roof Block 
The Open Flume with Roof Block (OFRB) was originally the Open flume outlet: the roof 
block was added to open flume outlets to prevent excessive discharge to these outlets in the 
case of the water level increases in the parent channel6. The OFRB (see figure IV) works as 
Open Flume if the water level in the distributary is lower than the roof block and works as 
orifice if the water level touches the roof block . 
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Figure VI-IV: Sketch of Open Flume With roof Block (OFRB) 
Source: Visser (1996) 
The discharge formulas for OFRB, when it behaves as an orifice is: 
q = CBYyJl^H 
where: 
q 
C 
B 
Y 
g 
H 
Discharge (ft /s) 
Discharge coefficient 
Bed width (ft) 
Elevation of the roof block above the crest of an outlet (ft) 
Gravitational constant (ft/s2) 
Water level above the suffit of the roof block (ft) 
The OFRB behaves as an open flume when water is not touching the roof block. The roof 
block is sharp-edged, therefore a further increase in the water level results in slower increase 
in the discharge as compared to the OF. However, farmers can increase the discharge by 
placing a slanting brick or bundle of grass in the aperture of the flume. This converts the 
effluent into a jet from an orifice with a slanting roof provided that the jet flows free of the 
roof block. 
6
 In case of Fordwah distributary the placing of roof block resulted in the non-proportionality of the channel 
(Hart, 1996). 
7
 Most of the time these kind of outlets behave like orifices in case of Fordwah distributary (Hart 1996). 
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APPENDIX VII: WARABANDI AS MADE BY A PATWARI 
If a farmer wants to convert a katcha warabandi to pakka warabandi, he is required to submit 
an application to the Divisional Canal Officer. This application then goes through several 
officers to fulfil official requirements and investigations. The Canal Patwari finally prepares 
the hand-sketch of the outlet command area according to the details given in the Part 
Watercourse Plan (sanctioned chak plan) (Bandaragoda and Rehman, 1995). The Patwari 
prepares the warabandi, which goes to the Sub-Divisional Officer through other Irrigation 
department Officers. The Patwari then arranges a meeting of the Sub-Divisional Canal 
Officer, who functions as a Canal Magistrate, and the farmers. The Sub-Divisional officer 
announces the proposed warabandi in an open court. If any farmer has an objection that is 
discussed in the open canal court. The Sub-Divisional Officer announces judgement and 
sanctions the warabandi. A copy of the new warabandi is also handed over to the Numberdar 
(or Lambardar). The way a Patwari prepares a warabandi schedule is explained in the 
following paragraph. 
Making of the Warabandi 
The first step in preparing the warabandi is to estimate the number of minutes per acre. To 
calculate number of minutes per acre a Patwai first calculates the total minutes availavble for 
irrigation in 7 days by estimating the time needed for filling (bharai) and draining (nikal) of 
portions of the watercourse. The bharai is subtracted from the total time to compensate for 
the time needed to fill that part of the watercourse leading to the farm. Similarly a farm may 
continue to receive water from a filled watercourse even if water is diverted to another farm 
from upstream. In this case, total nikal time is added to the minutes available for irrigation in 
one week. Usually Patwaris use 5 minutes8 per 67 meters9 of the watercourse for both nikal 
and bharai. The average water allocation time per acre is then calculated based on Culturable 
Command Area (CCA) with the following formulae: 
Average allocation time (TA) = 10080 -total bharai + total nikal 
CCA (acres) 
Based on this average allocation individual irrigation water turn is calculated with the 
following formulae: 
Water turn = (Average allocation time * Area) + bharai time - nikal time 
Where area is in acres and time in minutes. 
For example, consider a watercourse with: 
CCA = 300 acres 
Total bharai time = 123 minutes 
Total nikal time = 66 minutes 
And a farmer with: 
Total culturable area = 10 acres 
Bharai time = 15 minutes 
Nikal time = 5 minutes 
In some cases this time could also be 3 minutes. 
1
 This is one side of an acre (220 feet). 
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Then, 
The average allocation time in the watercourse will be 
TA = 10080-123 + 66 = 33.41 minutes/ acre = 33 min/acre 
300 
and the allocation for the farmer will be: 
Water turn of the farmer = (33 * 10) + 15 - 5 = 340 minutes (5 hours and 40 minutes) 
Same formulae is used to calculate water turns of all the farmers in a watercourse. After 
allocating water a 7 day schedule is prepared with the specific days and time for all the 
farmers in a watercourse command area. 
Patwari's influence 
Although this procedure of making warabandi is theoretically quite transparent, a patwari 
can still influence it. For example in case of average allocation comes up to be in fraction like 
in this case the Patwari round it off to the next nearest digit, like in this case it was rounded 
off to 33 from 33.41. At the end all this fractions would add up and some minutes will remain 
extra. Patwai can allocate these minutes to the farmers he likes. According to a Patwari 
interviewed during the field work of the current study Patwaris give these minutes to the 
farmers who help them in conducting surveys for preparing outlet command area or who 
offers money. 
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FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGATION PERFORMANCE 
BELOW THE MOGHA 
How farmers manage water scarcity and abundance in a large scale irrigation system in 
South-Eastern Punjab, Pakistan 
The irrigation systems of Punjab, Pakistan are not functioning effectively in relation to design 
criteria or farmers' needs. This under-performance is attributed to among others, scarcity of 
irrigation water, changes in cropping intensity and mis-allocation of available resources. 
Farmers at the receiving end play an important role in shaping the performance of the 
irrigation system. A farmer continuously monitors and evaluates water delivery to his farm 
based on which he takes individual or collective action to improve water delivery and 
intervene with the system. To develop appropriate recommendations for reforming system 
operations, more knowledge is required about irrigation conditions at the watercourse level 
and the actions that farmers take to improve water availability at their farm head, in order to 
understand and evaluate the results of this human action on the performance of the Irrigation 
system. The present study was conducted to study the impact of farmers' water management 
actions in a conjunctive water use environment of Fordwah Irrigation System. The central 
research question of the study is: 
How and why do farmers intervene in irrigation water supply, what conditions shape 
their actions and what is the impact of their action on water delivery in a large scale 
irrigation system of Punjab, Pakistan? 
In the past most performance assessment frameworks were developed to study performance 
of the main and secondary level irrigation system. However, as rightly noted by Perry (1995), 
the performance evaluation of an irrigation system at primary and secondary sub-system 
levels, in isolation from the performance evaluation of an irrigation system at watercourse 
and farm level, would not provide full understanding of the system. Since the focus of this 
study is the farmers' actions and their influence on water delivery, a multi-disciplinary socio-
technical approach is needed that keeps technology-in-use as a central point while studying 
relations around it. 
A comparative study method was used to analyse farmers' actions for water management. 
The research was undertaken in the Fordwah Irrigation System, which serves a command 
area of 232,000 hectares. Six watercourses along the two distributaries (at the tail of the 
system) were selected based on their canal water supply and tubewell density per 100 
hectares. Fieldwork was conducted between November 1996 to April 1998. This covered 
three crop seasons, two winter seasons and one summer season: rabi 1996-97, kharif 1997 
and rabi 1997-98. A wide range of quantitative and qualitative data was collected in the 
field. A measurement and regular monitoring plan was followed to collect data on water 
flows, crop production and climate. To collect data on water management practices and social 
relations un-structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted, and observation of 
water management practices were made. However, use was also made of some participatory 
tools during farmers' meetings to discuss water management. 
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The book is organised in eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the central theme of the book 
and the area of the study. After a literature review the research framework for this study is 
presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes the 'Water Delivery Environment' of the studied 
watercourses. In Chapter 4 and 5 farmers' actions for water management are described and 
the financial rewards of these actions are estimated. Chapter 6 presents the impact of farmers' 
actions in terms of improved water delivery to their farms. The study is summarised and 
concluded in chapter 7. 
In Chapter 2, after reviewing the strengths and the weaknesses of the existing models to study 
irrigation system management and its performance, a framework to study inter-relatedness of 
issues at tertiary level is formulated. This research framework studies the outcomes of 
interaction between technology, people and water based on the socio-technical approach. The 
actions of people, collective and individual are studied to understand the transformations they 
achieve in water supply by changing the irrigation technology. 
Chapter 3 describes the 'Water Delivery Environment' - that is the context of people, 
technology and water supply in which farmers take actions for water management - of the 
study area. The settlement pattern, social relations and other agrarian conditions suggest that 
the research site is transforming through population growth, and urban employment. Off-farm 
activities and markets shape production and market choices as well as water supply. However 
despite these changes some social institutions like Panchayat abide. The analysis of canal 
water delivery situation of the two distributaries shows the level of dysfunctionality of the 
system. One distributary is water-short whereas, other is privileged with actual water supply 
more than double its design discharge. The water delivery to the watercourses also shows 
inadequacy and unreliability of canal water supply especially in kharif season. The actual 
dimensions of the tertiary outlet show that farmers (as a group) try to increase water delivery 
to their watercourse through outlet remodelling, that influences the water distribution within a 
distributary. One of the reasons for inadequacy is also the high actual cropping intensity that 
is far exceeding the cropping intensity for which the system was designed. To compensate for 
insufficient and variable canal water supply farmers are extracting groundwater. Through a 
range of actions farmers manage to transform a dysfunctional canal irrigation system to 
achieve reasonable yields of their major crops. 
The collective efforts of farmers to improve canal water delivery to their watercourse are 
discussed in Chapter 4. Two activities, canal water acquisition and watercourse desilting are 
identified to be the most important collectively performed activities to manage irrigation 
water, the former to improve the adequacy of water supply to a watercourse and the latter to 
improve the water flow in a watercourse. Additional canal water is acquired either through 
getting higher discharge in the distributary - a strategy adopted by the farmers of the 
distributary with high canal water supply - or through remodelling of the tertiary outlet - a 
strategy that is usually adopted by the farmers of the relatively water scarce distributary. A 
watercourse is desilted several times during a year, however the frequency varies in different 
watercourse command areas. 
This chapter also describes the institutionalisation of these activities. The rules in practice, 
and roles and responsibilities of the farmers in organising these activities are explained. 
Generally different farmers are informally responsible for organising different water 
management activities. Although, sometimes this distinction is not very clear and one person 
may lead more than one activity or more than one person could be responsible for different 
parts of the activity. At the end of the chapter factors influencing the collective action are 
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identified. The need for canal water is considered to be the deciding factor for farmers to 
undertake collective action and mutual benefit, provided that no conflict occurs within the 
group. Two factors, relatively equal distribution of power among the farmers of a 
watercourse and zid (being stubborn) were identified as having negative influence on 
collective action in the watercourses studied. 
Chapter 5 discusses the strategies of individual fanners to increase water control at the farm 
level. It is argued that main concern of farmers is to meet evaporative demand of their crops, 
hence water delivery to their farm is very important for them. They are not really concerned 
about the technical causes of fluctuating water supply. To get a higher quantity of irrigation 
water and to manage available water efficiently at individual level, they try to take actions 
that require less resource mobilisation and less efforts in terms of organisation. Sometimes 
individual actions also benefit more than one farmer. 
Farmers take several actions to manage irrigation water. Some actions are undertaken to 
acquire additional water for irrigation and others to reduce hassle or increase the usability of 
irrigation water. Actions taken to acquire irrigation water include groundwater pumpage, use 
of canal water turns allocated for Government property and stealing water from the 
distributary. Trade of canal water turn (also illegal) is another strategy to acquire additional 
canal water at the individual level. Actions that seem to improve usability are exchange of 
canal waters, desilting of farm channels and disposal of excess water. 
The most widely practised individual actions found in the study area are conjunctive use of 
canal water and groundwater and canal water exchanges. Groundwater is the main source of 
additional irrigation water. About 83 % of the farmers in the study area are using 
groundwater for irrigation, in which 40 % have direct access to the tubewell water whereas 
the rest 60 % purchase pumped ground water from the tubewell owners. The demand-supply 
curve for different farmers who are using only canal water for irrigation and farmers 
practising conjunctive water use of canal and groundwater is presented to show the gap 
between the supply and demand of these farmers. The gap between the demand and supply 
for farmers using only canal water for irrigation was much higher than for the farmers 
practising conjunctive water use. This was also reflected in the difference in their yields 
especially of sugarcane and rice: respective yields of sugarcane and rice of the farmers using 
both canal water and groundwater for irrigation are about 96 % and 46 % higher. Although 
not officially allowed, farmers frequently exchange full or a part of their canal water turns, 
which helps them to irrigate the desired number of bunded units in one irrigation turn. The 
financial rewards of these activities are estimated to show the incentives for fanners to 
undertake these actions. This data shows the sound assessment and planning of farmers in 
choosing actions to improve water supply. 
Usually it is assumed that water distribution in large-scale irrigation systems is effective 
through collective action and that most individual actions for water management are a result 
of lack of collective action. However this chapter shows that there are still several individual 
actions that would be undertaken by farmers regardless of existence of collective action 
within the watercourse command area. 
The outcomes of the most widely undertaken collective and individual actions for water 
management to improve water delivery are presented in Chapter 6. Farmers' responses to 
water scarcity and water abundance are quantified. Two indicators, Relative Water Supply 
and Relative Irrigation Supply are used to demonstrate the impact of farmers' actions on 
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water availability. It shows how farmers from different Water Delivery Environments are 
matching water demand with supply. Variation in water depth at the farm level suggests that 
the impact of water management activities is not same for all the farmers within a 
watercourse command area. The demand and supply situation over time of some selected 
farmers is presented and the actions they undertake are explained to present the management 
of individual farmers to meet evaporative demand of their crops. It is concluded that the 
combined effects of the actions for water management enable many farmers to irrigate with 
reasonable levels of water supply and hence improve 'performance indicators'. 
Chapter 7 presents summary and conclusion of the study. It presents the key findings of the 
study. The usefulness and limitations of the approaches and some study tools are also 
discussed. All the different concepts used in this study were found helpful to study different 
elements of the 'Water Delivery Environment'. 
It is recognised that there is neither a standard set of water management activities nor they 
strictly planned, in the study area. Farmers' actions are mostly subject to their need for 
meeting water supply with the demand, however one can still see some of the water 
management activities that are inevitable to operate the system. The actions taken and the 
way and time these activities are organised and performed is difficult to predict in advance. 
Collective action is undertaken more at the watercourse or higher level in the irrigation 
system, whereas individual actions are mainly undertaken at the farm level. 
Farmers are not passive recipients of water delivery to their farms: they respond to the water 
availability at the farm-gate. However, their response depends on the severity of the 
problem(s), which is related to water scarcity or water excess and the political and financial 
risks they are ready to take in selecting specific actions. The level of organisation of the 
activities highly depends on the prioritisation of the farmers to undertake this activity. A 
farmer is more likely to undertake individual actions in the case that he is the only one to 
benefit from it, or if collective action requires more efforts than the benefit gained from the 
action. Whereas, collective action would happen if individuals expect benefits that outweigh 
the efforts involved in organising the collective action (Ostrom 1993). Moreover, more often 
the collective action leads to a more permanent and sustainable solution. 
The four main findings of the study are: 1) that farmers are knowledgeable and capable actors 
who take actions that improve water supply and compensate for dysfunctional delivery; 2) 
Farmers actions are not only technically and economically sound but also have motives other 
than just economic benefit; 3) Farmers' management can not be classified as 'contingent 
management' and is rather performance-oriented; and 4) Current performance indicators, 
which are not able to show realities of social relations shaping water availability, could be 
improved by including criteria to assess performance of irrigation system from the 
perspectives of different actors. By incorporating the way farmers intervene with the system 
and thus appropriate the water delivery, such new performance studies could portray local 
water dynamics of a system and support recommendations based on reality to improve the 
functioning of the irrigation system. 
The study contributes to the debate on Participatory Irrigation Management and overuse of 
groundwater in Pakistan. The patterns of conjunctive water use at the farm level suggest that 
the in future groundwater will have to continue to provide significant amount of water for 
crop production. It was suggested to take some measures for the sustainable use of 
groundwater. These measures include improving reliability of canal water, devising 
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appropriate technologies - such as skimming wells - for relatively fresh groundwater 
extraction (Asghar et al., 2001), and incorporating issues of groundwater extraction rights in 
the PIDA legislation (Punjab Private Sector Groundwater Development Project Consultants, 
2000: Technical Report No. 38, 42, and. 45). 
The findings of this study and others suggest that political power may still be able to ensure 
privilege in the new water management structure. Concerns are raised regarding the 
involvement of non-influential farmers in the Farmers' Organisation and safeguarding the 
interests of small farmers. 
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Dutch Summary 
BOEREN ACTIES EN VERBETERINGEN IN HET FUNCTIONEREN VAN 
IRRIGATIESYSTEMEN IN HET TERTIAIRE VAK 
Hoe boeren waterschaarste en -overschot managen in een grootschalig irrigatiesysteem 
in het Zuidoosten van de Punjab, Pakistan 
De irrigatiesystemen in de Punjab, Pakistan, functioneren niet effectief gemeten naar de 
ontwerpcriteria, noch in vergelijking met de behoeften van de boeren. Dit slecht functioneren 
wordt toegeschreven aan onder meer: de schaarste aan irrigatiewater, veranderingen in de 
gewasintensiteit en de slechte verdeling van het aanwezige water. De boeren spelen een 
belangrijke rol in het uiteindelijke functioneren van het irrigatiesysteem. Een boer controleert 
en evalueert continu de toevoer van water naar zijn velden. Op basis van deze evaluatie zal 
hij individueel, of samen met andere boeren, actie ondernemen om de toevoer van water te 
verbeteren. Om te komen tot aanbevelingen voor het verbeteren van het gebruik van de 
irrigatiesystemen is het nodig meer te weten over het werkelijke functioneren van het 
irrigatiesysteem in het tertiaire vak en de acties die de boeren ondernemen om de 
watertoevoer naar hun land te verbeteren. Deze kennis kan gebruikt worden om de effecten 
van de acties van de boeren op het functioneren van het irrigatiesysteem te evalueren. In het 
gepresenteerde onderzoek zijn de gevolgen van de boerenacties op het gecombineerde 
gebruik van kanaal- en grondwater onderzocht in het Fordwah irrigatiesysteem. De 
hoofdonderzoeksvraag luidt: 
Hoe en waarom intervenieren boeren in de waterdistributie, welke condities beinvloeden 
hun acties en wat is het effect van de acties op de waterdistributie in een grootschalig 
irrigatiesysteem in de Punjab in Pakistan? 
Eerdere studies naar het functioneren van grootschalige irrigatiesystemen concentreerden 
zich voornamelijk op het hoofdsysteem van primaire and secondaire kanalen. Echter, zoals 
terecht opgemerkt door Perry (1995), een goed begrip van het functioneren van een 
irrigatiesysteem ontstaat alleen dan wanneer men de analyse van het hoofdsysteem alsmede 
het secondaire, tertiaire en veld niveau met elkaar combineert. Om een onderzoek te doen 
naar de acties van boeren en de invloed daarvan op de waterdistributie is een sociaal-
technische aanpak vereist die het gebruik van technologie en de relaties daaromheen 
analyseert. 
Een vergelijkende studie werd uitgevoerd om de boerenacties te analyseren met betrekking 
tot het waterbeheer. Het onderzoek vond plaats in het Fordwah Irrigation System, met een te 
irrigeren areaal van 232.000 hectare. Zes tertiaire kanalen (watercourses) langs twee 
secondaire kanalen (distributaries) in de tail-end van het systeem werden geselecteerd op 
basis van de kanaalwatertoevoer en dichtheid van grondwaterpompen (tubewells). Van 
november 1996 tot april 1998 werd veldwerk uitgevoerd tijdens drie irrigatieseizoenen: rabi 
(winterseizoen) 1996-97, kharif (zomerseizoen) 1997 en rabi 1997-98. Verschillende 
kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve gegevens werden verzameld in het veld. Data werd verzameld 
over de waterdistributie, gewasproductie en klimaatkarakteristieken in een meet- en 
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observatieprogramma. Niet gestructureerde en semi-gestructureerde interviews werden 
gehouden, naast veldobservaties, om data te verzamelen over de waterbeheerspraktijken. 
Tevens werden er participatieve methoden gebruikt tijdens boerenbijeenkomsten om het 
waterbeheer met de watergebruikers te bespreken. 
Dit boek heeft acht hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert het centrale thema van het boek 
en het studiegebied. Na de presentatie van het literatuuronderzoek wordt het onderzoekskader 
voor dit onderzoek toegelicht in hoofdstuk 2. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de context van het 
waterbeheer in de bestudeerde secondaire kanalen. In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 worden de acties van 
de boeren ten aanzien van het waterbeheer beschreven en wordt een inschatting gemaakt van 
de financiele opbrengst van deze acties. Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert de gevolgen van de boeren 
acties op de watertoevoer naar hun velden. Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een samenvatting van de studie 
en de conclusies. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt, na een beschouwing van de sterke en zwakke punten van bestaande 
modellen om waterbeheer te bestuderen, een kader ontwikkeld om de complexe interrelaties 
tussen technische en sociale factoren binnen het tertiaire vak te onderzoeken. Dit raamwerk 
beschouwt de uitkomsten van de interacties tussen technologie, mensen en water, en is 
gebaseerd op de 'sociaal-technische benadering' ('socio-technical approach'). De activiteiten 
van mensen, zowel collectief als individueel, worden bestudeerd om de transformaties in 
watertoevoer, die zij bereiken door veranderingen in de irrigatietechnologie, te begrijpen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft de 'De context van het waterbeheer'. Dat is de configuratie van 
mensen, technologie en watertoevoer waarbinnen boeren acties ondernemen. De 
bevolkingsspreiding, sociale relaties, en andere voor de landbouw belangrijke 
omstandigheden suggereren dat het onderzoeksgebied transformeert door bevolkingsgroei en 
migratie naar de steden. Activiteiten buiten de landbouw en markten bei'nvloeden de 
productie en marktgerichtheid als mede de watertoevoer. Ondanks deze veranderingen 
blijven bepaalde sociale instituties zoals de 'Panchayaf (soort dorpsbestuur) bestaan. De 
analyse van de kanaalwaterdistributie in de twee secondaire kanalen laat zien hoe slecht de 
systemen functioneren. Een van de secondaire kanalen heeft een water tekort, terwijl in het 
andere kanaal meer dan twee maal zo veel water stroomt als het ontwerpdebiet. De 
waterdistributie in de secondaire kanalen is inadequaat en onbetrouwbaar, vooral in het kharif 
(zomer) seizoen. De afmetingen van de inlaten, die de tertiaire kanalen voeden vanuit het 
secondaire kanaal, laten zien dat (groepen) boeren proberen de toevoer naar hun tertiaire 
kanaal te vergroten door de inlaten aan te passen. Dit bei'nvloedt de totale waterdistributie in 
een secondair kanaal. Een van de redenen voor de inadequate toelevering is de hoge 
gewasintensiteit, die de oorspronkelijk bedoelde intensiteit ver overstijgt. Boeren gebruiken 
grondwater om het tekort aan kanaalwater te compenseren. Dankzij een scala van activiteiten 
lukt het de boeren een redelijke oogst te verkrijgen van de belangrijkste gewassen, ondanks 
het slecht functionerende irrigatie systeem. 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft de collectieve acties van de boeren om tot een betere 
kanaalwatertoevoer te komen. Het verkrijgen van meer kanaalwater en het schoonmaken van 
het kanaal, bleken de meest gebruikte activiteiten. Additioneel kanaalwater wordt verkregen 
door meer water te bemachtigen in het secondaire kanaal - een strategic gebruikt door de 
boeren in het secondaire kanaal met veel water - of door de inlaat naar het tertiaire kanaal te 
vergroten. Deze laatste strategic wordt gebruikelijk toegepast door de boeren met tertiaire 
kanalen langs het waterschaarse kanaal. De tertiaire kanalen worden verschillende keren per 
jaar schoongemaakt. De precieze frequentie verschilt per kanaal. 
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Dit hoofdstuk beschrijft ook de institutionalisering van deze activiteiten. Hierbij wordt 
ingegaan op de regels, de taken en de verantwoordelijkheden van de boeren in de organisatie 
van de activiteiten. Normaal gesproken zijn verschillende boeren informed verantwoordelijk 
voor het organiseren van verschillende waterbeheer activiteiten. Echter, de verdeling van de 
taken is niet altijd duidelijk. Soms heeft een persoon meerdere taken en soms zijn meerdere 
personen verantwoordelijk voor verschillende delen van een activiteit. Aan het einde van het 
hoofdstuk worden de factoren die collectieve acties bei'nvloeden gei'dentificeerd. Het blijkt 
dat de behoefte aan kanaalwater de doorslag gevende factor is om te komen tot collectieve 
actie met wederzijds voordeel, met als voorwaarde dat er geen conflicten ontstaan binnen de 
groep boeren. Twee belangrijke factoren die collectieve actie bemoeilijken waren: relatief 
gelijke verdeling van macht binnen de groep boeren, en zid (koppigheid). 
Hoofdstuk 5 bediscussieert de strategieen van individuele boeren om meer controle te krijgen 
over de toevoer van water naar hun veld. Belangrijkste doel van de boeren is om aan de 
watergewasbehoefte te voldoen. De boeren zijn niet echt gei'nteresseerd in de technische 
redenen van de fluctuaties in de watertoevoer. De boeren proberen acties te ondernemen die 
minder kosten en organisatie vereisen om een hogere water gift te verkrijgen en het 
aangeleverde water efficienter te gebruiken. In bepaalde gevallen bevoordeelt een individuele 
actie meer dan een boer. 
Boeren ondernemen verschillende acties ten aanzien van waterbeheer. Sommige acties 
worden ondernomen om meer water te verkrijgen, om het geleverde water beter te gebruiken, 
en andere om 'geregel' te verminderen. Acties om meer water te bemachtigen zijn: het 
gebruik van grondwater, het gebruik van kanaal water dat bestemd is voor 
overheidseigendommen (scholen, bossen), en het stelen van water uit het secondaire kanaal. 
Het verhandelen van een irrigatiebeurt (ook illegaal) is een andere strategic om additioneel 
water te verkrijgen op veldniveau. Acties ter verhoging van de bruikbaarheid van het 
geleverde water zijn: ruilen van irrigatiebeurten, schoonmaken van kanalen en het 
verwijderen van overtollig water. 
De meest gebruikte individuele acties van boeren zijn het gezamenlijk gebruik van grond- en 
kanaalwater en het ruilen van irrigatiebeurten. Grondwater is de belangrijkste additionele 
waterbron. Ongeveer 83 procent van de boeren in het studiegebied gebruiken grondwater 
voor irrigatie, van wie 40 procent directe toegang heeft tot een pomp (tubewell) en de overige 
60 procent het grondwater koopt van de pomp eigenaren. Het verschil voor de 
watervoorziening van de gewassen tussen de boeren die alleen kanaalwater gebruiken en 
degene die zowel kanaal- als grondwater gebruiken wordt gepresenteerd. Het tekort aan water 
voor de gewassen was veel groter voor de boeren die alleen kanaalwater gebruiken. Dit 
kwam ook tot uiting in de gewasopbrengsten, speciaal voor suikerriet en rijst. Boeren die 
zowel grond- als kanaalwater gebruiken hadden hogere opbrengsten voor deze gewassen: 
respectievelijk 96 en 46 procent. Het ruilen van de gehele of een deel van een irrigatiebeurt 
gebeurt vaak, alhoewel dit officieel niet is toegestaan. Dit helpt hen de irrigatiebeurten beter 
te benutten. De financiele voordelen van deze activiteiten worden geanalyseerd in dit 
hoofdstuk, om de beweegredenen van de boeren beter te begrijpen. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat 
de boeren wel overwogen beslissingen nemen ten aanzien van de keuze van te ondernemen 
activiteiten ter verbetering van de watertoevoer. 
De gebruikelijke aanname is dat grootschalige irrigatiesystemen efficient kunnen zijn 
vanwege collectieve actie, en dat individuele actie ten aanzien van waterbeheer alleen 
voortkomt uit een gebrek aan collectieve actie. Dit hoofdstuk, echter, laat zien dat er goede 
215 
FARMERS ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN IRRIGA TION PERFORMANCE BELOW THE MOGHA 
redenen zijn voor boeren om individuele acties te ondernemen, terwijl er ook collectieve 
acties worden ondernomen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert de gevolgen van de meest voorkomende collectieve en individuele 
acties in het waterbeheer. Een kwantitatieve analyse wordt gemaakt van de readies van 
boeren op water schaarste en water overschotten. Er worden twee indicatoren gebruikt om de 
effecten van de boeren acties te meten op de waterbeschikbaarheid: Relatieve Water Toevoer 
(Relative Water Supply) en Relatieve Irrigatie Gift (Relative Irrigation Supply). Dit laat zien 
hoe boeren in verschillende omstandigheden vraag en aanbod van water op elkaar 
afstemmen. De verschillen in watergiften voor verschillende boeren in het gebied van een 
tertiair kanaal tonen aan dat de effecten van het waterbeheer verschillen per boer. De 
waterbehoeften en irrigatiegiften van enkele geselecteerde velden worden gepresenteerd, met 
daarbij een uitleg van de acties van de desbetreffende boeren. Hieruit wordt geconcludeerd 
dat het gecombineerde effect van de activiteiten is dat veel boeren redelijk kunnen voldoen 
aan de waterbehoeften van de gewassen, en daarmee de indicatoren van het functioneren van 
het systeem verbeteren. 
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een samenvatting en de conclusies van het onderzoek. Het presenteert de 
belangrijkste bevindingen, de bruikbaarheid en beperkingen van de gebruikte benaderingen, 
en bediscussieert het gebruik van enkele onderzoeksmethoden. Alle gebruikte concepten 
bleken nuttig in het bestuderen van de verschillende elementen van de 'water distributie 
context'. 
Het wordt onderkend dat er in het studiegebied geen standaard waterbeheer activiteiten zijn, 
noch een strikte planning. Sommige activiteiten, zoals het schoonmaken van het kanaal zijn 
alleen gedeeltelijk afhankelijk van de watertoevoer, andere activiteiten vinden alleen dan 
plaats wanneer de watertoevoer dat vereist. Het type en de timing van de acties die worden 
ondernomen kan niet worden voorspeld. Collectieve actie wordt meer ondernomen op het 
niveau van tertiaire kanaal, of hoger in het irrigatiesysteem, terwijl individuele acties vooral 
worden ondernomen op het veldniveau. 
Boeren zijn geen passieve ontvangers van het water op het veldniveau: zij reageren op de 
watertoevoer naar hun veld. Echter, hun respons hangt af van de ernst van de problemen, zij 
het water schaarste of overschot, en tevens de politieke en financiele risico's die zij bereid 
zijn te nemen. De graad van organisatie van de activiteiten hangt samen met de prioriteit die 
de actie heeft voor de boeren. Een boer is meer geneigd een individuele actie te ondernemen 
als het profijt alleen hem toekomt, of in het geval de collectie actie meer moeite zou kosten 
dan het voordeel dat het oplevert. Collectieve actie vindt plaats als individuen meer baat dan 
kosten verwachten van het organiseren van collectieve actie (Ostrom 1993). Bovendien leidt 
collectieve actie vaak tot een meer permanente verbetering van de watervoorziening. 
De vier belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek zijn: 1) dat boeren kundige en bekwame 
actoren zijn die acties ondernemen om de watervoorziening te verbeteren en zo de slechte 
watertoevoer compenseren; 2) de acties van boeren zijn technisch en financieel goed 
onderbouwd, maar worden ook door niet economisch factoren bei'nvloed; 3) Het waterbeheer 
van de boeren kan niet worden aangemerkt als 'ad hoc' beheer en is uitkomstgericht; en 4) 
De nu gebruikelijke indicatoren die gebruikt worden om de irrigatie waterdistributie te 
evalueren kunnen niet de sociale relaties laten zien die de waterdistributie vorm geven. Dit 
zou verbeterd kunnen worden door de indicatoren aan te passen aan de perspectieven van de 
verschillende actoren. Door de interventies van de boeren, en daarmee de toe-eigening door 
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de boeren van de waterdistributie, mee te nemen in de evaluatie van het functioneren van het 
irrigatiesysteem, kan de lokale dynamiek gei'ncorporeerd worden in de evaluatie. Op die 
manier kunnen aanbevelingen geformuleerd worden, gebaseerd op de werkelijke situatie, die 
het functioneren van het systeem kunnen verbeteren. 
De studie levert een bijdrage aan het debat over het Participatieve Waterbeheer van 
Irrigatiesystemen en de uitputting van de grondwatervoorraden in Pakistan. Het patroon van 
gecombineerd watergebruik van kanaal- en grondwater suggereert dat grondwater in de 
toekomst een significant deel van de waterbehoefte van de gewassen zal dekken. Enkele 
suggesties worden gedaan voor maatregelen voor duurzaam grondwaterbeheer. Enkele van 
deze maatregelen zijn: het verbeteren van de betrouwbaarheid van de kanaalwater leveringen, 
het gebruik van geschikte technologie - zoals de 'skimming wells' - voor extractie van relatief 
vers grondwater (Asghar et al. 2001), en het incorporeren van rechten ten aanzien van 
grondwatergebruik in de PIDA wetgeving (Punjab Private Sector Groundwater Development 
Project Consultants, 2000: Technical Report No. 38, 42, and. 45). 
De bevindingen van deze studie suggereren dat politieke macht ook in de nieuwe 
waterbeheerstructuur privileges kan bieden. Bezorgdheid wordt geuit omtrent de lage 
participatie van de kleine boeren in de watergebruikers-organisatie. Zij kunnen op die manier 
niet hun belangen veilig stellen. 
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